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ABSTRACT 
This  research  presents  new  documents,  which  have  not  been  discussed,  studied  or 
mentioned  in  any  previous  study  of  the  dispute  between  Iran  and  the  UAE  on  the 
sovereignty  over  the  islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb.  The 
dispute  began  when  Iranian  troops  occupied  the  two  islands  of  Tunb  Greater  and 
Lesser  Tunb  on  30  November  1971  by  the  use  of  armed  force,  after  a  battle  with 
police  personnel  who  had  designated  by  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  on  the 
island  of  Greater  Tunb.  At  the  same  time,  Iranian  troops  occupied  the  southern  part 
of  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  in  a  peaceful  fashion,  according  to  the  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  which  was  signed  by  the  government  of  Sharjah,  the  owner  of 
sovereignty  rights  over  the  island. 
The  occupation  was  carried  out  one  day  before  the  retreat  of  the  British  forces 
from  the  Gulf,  and  at  the  end  of  the  treaty  of  protection  signed  by  the  rulers  of  the 
Trucial  States  (today  known  as  the  [JAE)  in  1892.  It  also  coincides  with  the  date  of 
the  declaration  of  the  foundation  of  the  UAE  on  2  December  1971  which  was  agreed 
between  the  rulers  of  the  seven  emirates  of  Abu  Dhabi,  Dubai,  Sharjah,  Ras  al- 
Khaimah,  Ajman,  Unim  al-Qaiwain,  Fu  lairah. 
Iran  built  its  claims  on  three  arguments.  Firstly,  that  it  had  evidence  to  prove  its 
sovereignty  over  the  islands.  Secondly,  that  British  maps  included  the  three  islands 
tinder  Iranian  sovereignty.  And  thirdly,  that  they  were  strategically  important  tor 
Iran. 
Given  to  the  Iranian  arguments  which  had  led  to  the  armed  occupation  of'  the 
islands,  we  lormed  a  lew  questions.  What  was  the  strength  ofthc  Iranian  arguments 
t'or  their  acquiring  the  three  islands'?  To  what  extent  do  courts  and  arbitration  accept 
maps  as  evidence  for  territorial  sovereignty?  What  are  the  legal  modes  on  which  Iran Abstracl 
built  its  acquisition  of'  the  islands?  Does  the  use  of  force  by  Iran  grant  sovereignty 
over  the  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb?  Who  has  an  historical  right  to  the  three 
islands'?  And  can  Iran  win  sovereignty  over  the  two  islands  of  Greater  Tunb  and 
Lesser  Tunb  according  to  the  doctrine  of  historical  consolidation  of  title,  from  its 
occupation  of  the  islands  on  November  1971  until  the  present'?  Which  party  had  the 
greater  exercise  of  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands? 
To  answer  these  questions,  I  have  arranged  the  thesis  into  ten  chapters  and 
appendices.  Chapter  one  is  an  introduction  to  the  research  stating  its  significance,  its 
aims,  methods  of  research  and  the  problems  faced  the  researcher  in  collecting  Z' 
information  and  structuring  the  thesis.  Chapter  two  sheds  light  on  the  historic  stages 
of  the  emergence  of  the  territory  of  the  UAE,  especially  on  the  territories  controlled 
by  the  Qawasim,  the  rulers  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah,  because  of  their 
relations  with  the  islands.  The  legal  status  of  these  two  Emirates  is  also  discussed 
before  the  foundation  of  the  unified  state,  according  to  their  signature  of  treaties 
with  the  British  government,  the  last  of  which  was  in  1892. 
Chapter  three  defines  the  three  islands  geographically.  It  also  reviews  the 
historic  background  of  the  dispute.  Chapter  four  discusses  the  modes  of  acquiring  a 
territory  according  to  international  law  and  the  legal  arguments  on  which  Iran  had 
built  her  armed  occupation  of  the  islands.  The  sarne  discussion  is  made  on  the  legal 
arguments  on  which  the  UAE  built  its  claim  for  sovereignty  over  the  islands. 
Chapter  five  analyses  the  legal  arguments  on  which  Iran  built  its  clairn  and  the  legal 
validity  of  these  arguments.  Chapter  six  is  a  study  of  the  maps  and  their  legal  worth, 
to  assess  the  legal  worth  of  the  Iranian  argunicrit  concerning  the  recognition  bly  the 
vi 
British  inap  of  1886  ofIranian  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands. Abstract 
Chapter  seven  considers  the  critical  date  on  which  the  dispute  between  Iran  and 
UAE  over  the  three  islands  was  crystallized.  Chapter  eight  reviews  the  fornis  of  the  Zn 
practice  of  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  of  sovereignty  over  the 
three  islands,  and  the  recognition  of  [ran  and  other  countries  that  the  three  islands 
were  under  UAE  sovereignty.  Chapter  nine  discusses  peaceful  means  for  settling 
disputes  and  the  possibilities  of  settling  the  dispute  of  Iran  and  UAE  over  the  three 
islands  peacefully.  The  final  chapter  is  the  general  conclusion  and  results  which 
Jý 
were  reached  by  the  research. viii 
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CHAPTER  ONE 
Introduction 
The  dispute  over  the  sovereignty  of  a  territory  is  one  of  the  causes  for  disturbance  in 
friendly  relations  between  states  in  international  life.  If  such  a  dispute  were  not  to  be 
settled  by  peaceful  means  this  could  lead  to  a  military  confrontation  between  the 
disputing  parties.  The  present  reality  is  that  there  are  many  disputes  between  states 
over  territories  which  are  not  solved  nor  have  they  been  referred  to  an  international 
court,  because  the  disputing  parties  refuse  to  solve  them  by  peaceful  means.  Since 
the  question  of  sovereignty  over  territories  is  related  to  the  dignity  of  states,  a  state 
may  fear  to  lose  the  disputed  territory  if  the  case  were  to  be  referred  to  the  court. 
While  a  state  is  able  to  hold  on  to  the  territory,  it  remains  the  more  powerful  party. 
It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  most  regional  disputes  between  states  are  over 
the  sovereignty  of  islands  or  rocks.  '  One  such  dispute  is  that  over  the  sovereignty  of 
the  islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  in  the  Arabian/Persian 
Gulf,  2 
between  Iran  and  the  (JAE. 
On  30  November,  1971,  two  days  before  the  proclamation  of  ',  'ie  United  Arab 
Emirates  as  a  new  State,  consisting  of  the  Emirates  of  Abu  Dhabi,  Dubai,  Sharjah, 
Ras  al-Khaimah,  Fujairah,  j\jman  and  Umin  at-Qawain,  Iranian  troops  occupied  the 
three  islands  of'Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  1,  csser'Funb. 
The  northern  part  ot'AhU  Musa  island  was  occupied  on  29  November  1971  by 
Iran  Linder  an  agreement  (Mernorandurn  of'  Understanding)  reached  by  the 
government  of  Iran  and  the  ruler  of  Shar 
. 
jah,  who  had  held  sovereignty  over  the 
'-  See  Appendix  B,  Map  1,  P.  295. 
2  There  is  a  dispute  between  Iran  and  the  Arabian  states  regarding  the  nanic  of'  the  Gulf.  for  more 
detai  Is  reter  to  S.  11.  A  min,  It  act-naitonal  awl  Legal  Problems  qf1lic  Gzlý/,  '  (1981),  11.3  LA  I  so,  M.  R. 
M-Fil,  al-Ahmih  ul-lsowtýjih  LI-Khalccj  al-4rahi  (Strategic  Importance  of  the  Arabian  Gull), 
(1988),  P.  45.  Also,  K.  Qalaclii,  al-Khalccj  al-.  4rabi  (Arabian  Cull),  (1992),  P.  7. ChaDler  I 
island.  The  other  two  islands  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  were  occupied  by  the 
use  of  force  after  an  attempt  at  negotiating  their  peaceful  transfer  from  the  ruler  of 
Ras  al-Khaimah,  under  whose  jurisdiction  they  fell,  had  failed. 
Arguments  used  by  Iran  were  : 
that  the  islands  had  been  owned  by  Iran  before  they  were  occupied  by  Britain 
150  years  earlier,  "on  the  assumption  that  they  were  essential  to  combat  piracy"  in 
the  Gulf-,  that  Britain  had  "in  pursuit  of  its  imperial  interests"  considered  the  islands 
as  belonging  to  the  Arab  Shaikhs  of  the  Trucial  States  and  had  transferred  them  to 
the  de  facto  administration  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  when  Iran  was 
"politically  weak";  and  that  the  islands  had  been  shown  in  Iranian  colours  on  a  map 
which  had  been  issued  by  the  British  Intelligence  Section  of  the  Ministry  of  Defence 
in  1886,  a  copy  of  which  had  been  presented  to  the  Shah  of  Iran  in  1888.3 
I.  I.  Aim  of  the  study 
The  aim  of  this  research  is  to  study  the  sovereignty  dispute  between  Iran  and  the 
United  Arab  Emirates  over  the  three  islands  as  a  case,  especially  from  the 
perspective  of  International  Law.  The  main  stress  will  be  an  attempt  to  answer  the 
following  questions: 
What  is  the  strength  of  Iran's  arguments  for  its  acquiring  the  three  islands?  To 
what  extent  do  courts  and  arbitration  accept  maps  as  evidence  for  territorial 
sovereignty?  What  are  the  legal  modes  on  which  Iran  built  its  acquisition  of  the 
islands?  Does  the  use  of  force  by  Iran  grant  her  sovereignty  over  the  islands  of' 
Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb'?  Who  has  an  historical  right  to  the  three  islands'?  Can  Iran 
win  sovereignty  over  the  two  islands  of  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  according  to 
2 
See  Chapter  5,  P.  123. ChaDler  I 
the  doctrine  of  historical  consolidation  of  title,  from  its  occupation  of  the  islands  on 
November  1971  until  the  present'?  Which  party  had  the  greater  exercise  of 
sovereignty  over  the  three  islands? 
1.2.  Significance  of  the  study 
The  significance  of  the  present  study  is  mainly  in  presenting  new  documents  which 
prove  the  practice  and  possession  of  the  UAE's  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands 
Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb.  These  documents  have  not  been 
discussed  or  referred  to  in  previous  studies  and  articles  on  the  dispute  over  the 
islands.  Such  a  situation  motivated  me  to  present  a  new  documentation  of  the  acts  of 
sovereignty  practised  by  the  UAE,  and  also  to  present  new  information  to 
researchers  interested  in  this  dispute.  This  is  the  first  academic  study  towards 
fulfillment  of  an  academic  degree  in  the  UK  to  discuss  the  dispute  of  sovereignty 
over  the  three  islands  between  the  UAE  and  Iran,  from  a  legal  point  of  view. 
1.3.  Previous  studies 
As  mentioned,  there  has  been  no  legal  academic  study  of  the  dispute  from  the  UAE 
point  of  view  in  the  UK,  whereas  outside  the  British  Isles  the  question  has  been 
studied.  Defending  the  Iranian  point  of  view,  Professor  G.  Mirfendereski,  completed 
his  Ph.  D.  on  "The  Tunb  islands  controversy"  in  1985,  at  the  Fletcher  School  of  Law 
and  Diplomacy,  Tufts  University  in  the  United  States  of  America. 
Other  than  this,  the  dispute  has  been  studied  from  a  human  behavioural  point  of 
view  in  a  Master's  Degree  on  "The  Merits  of'  Iran's  Claim  to  the  Islands  of'  Abu 
Musa  and  Tunbs"  by  M.  Al-Mahmoud  in  19833,  at  the  School  ofliuman  BehavIOUr, 
United  States  International  University,  and  by  S.  D.  G.  Alexander,  who  completed  his 
Master  of  Arts  in  International  Affairs  on  "Factors  in  The  Settlement  of  The  Dispute ri 
over  Abu  Musa  and  The  Tombs"  in  1979,  at  the  Faculty  of  the  School  of 
International  Service  of  the  American  University. 
Furthermore,  in  1992  Mr.  A.  Abdul  received  a  Master's  degree  in  Arabic  at  the 
Faculty  of  Legal,  Economic  and  Social  Sciences  at  the  University  of  Mohamed  V  in 
Morocco;  in  his  paper  he  discussed  the  dispute  from  the  UAE  point  of  view.  His 
study  which  concentrated  on  "The  Three  Arab  Islands  in  the  Gulf:  Extent  of  the 
Validity  of  Regional  Changes  Resulting  from  the  Use  of  Force",  was  later  published 
in  a  book  with  the  same  title.  Also  Mr.  Abdullah  Mohamed  Said  AI-Suwaidi,  in 
1984  made  a  brief  study  of  the  dispute  from  a  political  point  of  view  in  his  studies 
for  a  B.  Sc.  in  political  sciences  at  the  Faculty  of  Administrative  and  Political 
Sciences,  the  University  of  the  UAE. 
1.4.  Study  methods 
Since  the  study  concerns  a  dispute  between  two  states,  especial  care  had  to  be  taken 
in  searching  for  information  which  would  present  the  point  of'  view  of'  each 
disputing  party,  and  evidence  of  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands  for  both  parties. 
Thus,  I  had  to  collect  information  from  both  Iran  and  the  UAE,  as  well  as  in  the  UK 
where  there  are  many  documents  relating  to  the  region  ofthe  Gulf  and  the  dispute 
over  the  three  islands,  especially  from  its  entry  to  the  region  until  its  exit  in  1971. 
1.4.1.  In  the  UA  E 
I  began  by  reading  Arabic  books  and  articles  to  know  the  background  ofthe  conflict 
over  the  three  islands  between  Iran  and  the  UAE  Irom  all  aspects,  geographic, 
historic,  political  and  legal.  I  kvas  a  regular  visitor  ot'the  library  of-  the  University  of' 
the  UAE,  public  librarles  in  Sliar  jah,  Ras  al-Khan-nah  and  Abu  Dhabi  as  well  as  the 
4 
Archive  of  the  . 41-Khalee  in  Shar  .  ah.  j  newspaper  iI 5 
These  readings  motivated  me  to  meet  some  ofthose  who  wrote  books  or  articles 
on  the  conflict  over  the  three  islands,  such  as  Dr.  AI-Rokcn,  Mr.  Al-Tadmori  and 
Mr.  Abdoul.  My  airn  was  to  diSCUSS  with  them  and  to  understand  their  points  of' 
view,  the  conclusion  they  reached  and  the  points  which  they  did  not  research  in 
depth  and  thus  which  are  in  need  of  a  detailed  study  e.  g.  the  exercise  of  sovereignty 
by  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  three  islands. 
After  understanding  the  background  of  the  dispute,  I  started  searching  in  the 
most  important  point,  on  which  the  research  is  based,  namely  the  acts  of  sovereignty 
practiced  by  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  three  islands. 
I  visited  governmental  departments  in  both  of  the  emirates  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  which  offered  services  to  the  islands,  such  as  health,  electricity  and  water 
power,  education,  and  police.  I  interviewed  the  employees  and  heads  of  these 
departments  to  know  from  them  the  kinds  of  services  that  were  offered  in  the  islands 
and  the  documents  which  provide  evidence  of  this. 
In  order  to  understand  the  extent  ofacceptance  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  islands  for  these  services,  I  interviewed  some  of  them,  such  as  Mr.  Mohamed 
Bu-Ghanim,  the  representative  of  the  ruler  of  ShaKjah  in  the  island  of  Abu  Musa,  and 
Mr.  Mohamed  Said  AI-Suwaidi,  the  civil  servant  responsible  for  the  electricity 
station  in  the  island  of'Abu  Musa.  I  also  interviewed  Mr.  Mohamed  Ali  Abu  Al- 
Qasm  and  his  son  Abdul  Rahman  from  among  the  inhabitants  of'  the  island  of 
Greater  Tunb.  These  interviews  permitted  me  to  see  the  loyalty  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  islands  to  the  two  governments  and  then-  cooperation  with  them  to  develop  the 
islands.  I  acquired  during  these  Interviews  some  documents  which  prove  the  loyalty 
of-  the  inhabitants,  such  as  passports  issued  to  sorne  islanders  by  the  governments  of' 
Shar 
- 
jah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah,  beforc  the  Iranian  occupation  ofthe  three  islands. Chypler  I 
From  all  the  above,  I  formed  a  clear  understanding  of  the  Arab  point  of  view  on 
the  matter,  particularly  the  view-point  of  the  government  ofthe  UAE  concerning  its 
right  of'sovereignty  over  the  three  islands. 
1.4.2.  In  Iran 
The  second  step  was  to  learn  the  Iranian  point  of  view  concerning  the  case,  since  it 
is  the  other  party  involved.  I  travelled  to  Tehran  and  arranged  for  a  meeting  with  Mr. 
Abbas  Malki,  the  Under  Secretary  for  Education  and  Political  Research  at  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  However,  his  engagements  did  not  permit  the  planned 
meeting,  and  I  was  referred  to  Mr.  Abbas  Haghighat,  the  head  of  department  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  Research  in  the  Institute  for  Political  and  International  Studies  to  the 
Iranian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  I  discussed  the  subject  both  with  him  and  with 
members  of  his  department.  The  Iranian  point  of  view  was  made  clear  to  me.  I  was 
given  some  Persian  literature  on  the  subject  and  also  the  names  of  Iranians  who  had 
written  on  the  matter  in  English  SLIch  as  Dr.  Mojtahed-Zadeh,  who  lives  in  the  UK, 
and  Professor  Mirfendereski,  who  lives  in  the  USA. 
1.4.3.  In  the  United  Kingdom 
After  searching  in  the  two  disputing  countries  and  understanding  their  points  of 
view,  it  was  necessary  to  search  in  the  UK  since  it  was  the  last  western  presence  in 
the  Gulf  region.  The  UK  possesses  a  wealth  of  documents  on  the  history  of  the 
region,  especially  on  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands,  because  It  Used  to  act  on 
behalf  of  the  emirates  in  matters  of  loreign  affairs  before  their  independence  in 
1971. 
I  stared  my  search  in  the  British  Library,  particularly  in  its  Maps  Library  to 
study  the  map  of  1886  which  colours  the  three  islands  the  same  as  the  framan 
border,  on  which  Iran  builds  her  claim  of  sovereignty  over  islands.  I  also  studied Chapter  1 
other  British  maps  of  the  Gulf  region  which  were  drawn  before  and  after  the  1886 
map,  to  know  whether  British  maps  before  and  after  1886  represented  the  three 
islands  in  the  same  colour  as  Iran  or  not. 
I  also  examined  the  Oriental  and  India  Office  Collections,  because  of  the 
documents  concerning  the  Shaikhs  of  the  Trucial  States  and  their  correspondence 
with  the  British  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf.  This  was  to  examine  the  letters 
exchanged  between  the  Qawasim  of  the  two  shores  of  the  Gulf,  either  between  them 
or  between  them  and  the  British  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf.  They  prove  the 
recognition  of  the  Qawasim  of  Lingah  on  the  Iranian  shore  of  the  ownership  of  the 
three  islands  by  the  Qawasim  of  the  Omani  shore. 
Another  source  of  documents  was  the  Public  Records  Archives;  this  contains 
correspondence  between  the  British  government  represented  in  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  and  the  British  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf  and  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Tehran.  This  research  was  undertaken  to  know  the  viewpoint  of  the 
British  government  on  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands  through  their  diplomatic 
correspondence  from  their  entry  to  the  Gulf  region  until  they  left  it. 
The  sovereignty  dispute  over  the  three  islands  is  also  related  to  the  right  of  both 
parties  to  search  for  oil  in  the  islands  and  their  territorial  waters.  It  was,  thereflore, 
essential  to  study  the  correspondence  of'  the  British  Petroleum  Company  in  the 
company  archives  which  are  now  housed  in  the  University  of'  Warwick.  The  B11 
Archive  is  an  important  since  it  was  this  company  which  searched  lor  oil  in  the  Gull' 
region,  especially  in  Iran  and  the  UAF.  The  airn  was  to  find  out  whether  one  ofthe 
disputing  parties  had  granted  the  company  the  right  to  search  for  oil  in  the  islands 
and  their  territorial  waters. 8 
In  addition,  I  read  and  met  with  the  authors  of  articles  in  British  journals  on  the 
subject  of  the  three  islands'  dispute.  These  included  Dr.  Richard  Schofield,  research 
consultant  in  the  School  of  Oriental  and  African  Studies,  University  of  London,  who 
has  written  an  article  on  the  dispute  over  the  Gulf  islands  and  edited  the  Public 
Record  documents  which  relate  to  the  islands  and  maritime  boundaries  of  the  Gulf 
in  18  volumes  covering  the  period  from  1798  to  1960. 
After  researching  and  reading  I  built  a  personal  understanding  of  the  points  of 
view  of  the  British  government  and  British  writers  on  the  dispute  over  the  three 
islands  between  Iran  and  the  UAE. 
1.5.  Research  problems 
In  collecting  information,  obstacles  face  the  researcher  who  studies  a  dispute 
concerning  sovereignty  over  a  territory.  The  first  problem  I  was  faced  with  was  the 
understandable  secrecy  surrounding  information  and  documents.  This  problem  was 
evident  during  iny  visits  to  the  civil  servants  responsible  for  the  dispute  in  the  two 
disputing  states,  Iran  and  the  UAE,  because  of  the  sensitivity  of  the  case.  Also 
neither  wished  to  bring  to  my  attention  any  piece  of  information  or  any  document 
which  could  harm  their  interests  in  the  future  solution  of  the  dispute. 
The  major  problem,  however,  was  the  ret'usal  of'  Professor  Mirfendereski  to 
allow  me  to  read  his  research  on  the  dispute,  for  which  he  had  received  a  Ph.  D.  in 
1985  frorn  the  USA.  This  was  despite  continual  efforts  on  my  behall'  by  the 
University  Library  and  my  supervisor  Dr.  Scobbie.  This  is  not  to  mention  my  own 
telephone  calls  to  Prolessor  Mirtendereski  and  all  my  efforts  to  persuade  hirn  to 
allow  me  to  read  his  research,  lie  being  the  only  person  to  have  diSCUssed  the  dispute 
legally  from  an  Iranian  point  of  view.  I  le  was  adamant  on  the  sub  ject,  despite  the 
length  of  time  since  the  completion  of'  his  degree.  Professor  Mirfcndereski  justificd 9 
his  insistence  on  not  making  his  research  available  by  saying  that  some  Iranian  ZD 
authors  who  wrote  on  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands  have  studied  his  research 
and  copied  large  parts  of  it,  claiming  that  it  was  their  own  research  with  no  mention 
of  his  original  research. 
1.6.  Structure  of  th  e  thesis 
The  study  of  the  sovereignty  dispute  over  the  three  islands  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb 
and  Lesser  Tunb  is  arranged  in  ten  chapters  and  appendices  as  shown  in  the 
following  figure  : 
The  Sovereignty  Dispute  Over  the  Gulf  Islands 
Abu  Musa,  Greatcr'Funb  and  Lesser  Tunb 
Chapter  1 
Introduction 
Chapter  2 
Flinergence  ofthe  LJAE 
Chapter  3 
Definition  ofthe  DiSPLItC  over  the  three 
Islands 
Chapter  4  Chapter  5 
-1  he  AcqUiSiti0II  of  Sovereignty  over  Analysis  of  the  Iranian  Claim  of' 
e  three  islands  in  International  Law  Sovereignty  over  the  three  Islands 
Chapter  10 
Concluding  Observations 
Chapter  6 
ýaps  as  Evidence  ot"Ferrilorial 
()Velel  tI  VA  Sovereigilt)  in  International  Law 
C,  hapter  8 
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the  three  Islands 
Chapter  7 
The  Selection  ofthe  Critical  Date 
ot'a  I  )ispute 
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Possible  Memis  oftlic  I  JAF,  to  Achicvc 
Pacillic  Sculemcm  oftlic  Disputc 
As  shown  in  the  figure,  the  present  introduction  is  contained  in  the  first  chapter. 
The  emergence  of  the  UAF  state  is  described  in  chapter  two;  the  historic  stages  ol 
the  territory  of'  the  UAF  Lintil  the  foundation  of  the  state  are  reviewed  especially Chawer  I 
those  territories  controlled  by  the  tribe  of  Qawasim,  the  rulers  of  the  two  Emirates  oF 
Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khairriah,  because  of*  the  ties  between  thern  and  the  three  islands 
under  discussion.  In  the  sarne  chapter  I  concentrate  on  the  treaties  signed  between 
the  British  government  and  the  rulers  of  the  two  Emirates,  especially  the  treaty  of' 
1892,  so  as  to  highlight  the  rights  given  to  Britain  according  to  the  treaty.  I  also 
highlight  the  legal  status  of  these  Emirates  according  to  the  treaties  with  the  British 
government  before  the  foundation  of  the  UAE  government. 
Chapter  three  is  assigned  to  the  study  of  the  geography  of  the  three  islands,  and 
the  historic  background  of  the  dispute,  in  order  to  look  at  the  historic  rights  of  each 
disputing  party  over  the  three  islands. 
In  chapter  four  I  explain  the  means  of  acquiring  a  territory  according  to 
international  law,  in  order  to  clarify  the  legal  argument  whereby  the  Iranian 
government  took  its  decision  to  acquire  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands  by  the  use 
of  force.  This  also  aims  to  explain  the  legal  argument  whereby  the  [JAE  builds  its 
claim  of  sovereignty  over  the  islands. 
In  chapter  five,  I  analyse  the  Iranian  arguments  and  their  legal  validity  to  acquire 
sovereignty  over  the  territory.  Chapter  six  is  assigned  to  the  study  of  maps  and  their 
legal  power  to  prove  sovereignty  over  a  territory,  and  the  application  of  the  concept 
on  the  Iranian  claim  that  the  British  map  of  1886  recognises  the  Iranian  sovereignty 
over  the  three  islands. 
In  chapter  seven  I  discuss  how  to  select  the  critical  date  of'  a  dispute.  Theri  I 
define  the  critical  date  when  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands  between  Iran  and  the 
10 
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Chapter  eight  is  assigned  to  the  discussion  of  different  forms  of  exercising 
sovereignty  by  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  three 
islands.  I  also  review  the  recognition  ofthis  sovereignty  by  Iran  and  other  countries. 
In  chapter  nine  I  look  at  the  different  attempts  on  the  part  of  the  UAE  to  settle 
the  dispute  by  peaceful  means.  I  also  present  my  opinion  on  how  the  dispute  may  be 
resolved  between  Iran  and  the  UAE  over  the  three  islands. 
In  the  last  chapter  I  conclude  with  the  findings  of  the  dift'crent  parts  of  the 
research.  I  then  add  suggestions  for  the  government  of  the  UAE. 12 
CHAPTER  TWO 
Emerqence  of  the  UAE 
2.1.  Introduction 
With  the  advent  of  Islarn  in  the  Gulf  region  in  the  seventh  century,  both  the  Arabian 
tribes  and  Persian  regions  (what  is  known  today  as  Iran)'  were  united  under  the 
Islamic  state.  With  the  passage  of  time  and  the  decline  of  the  Islamic  state,  the  Gulf 
region  reverted  back  to  disunity.  Persia  was  separated  from  the  Islamic  state,  and  the 
tribes  of  Arabia  became  disunited.  Each  tribe  controlled  and  practiced  sovereignty 
over  a  particular  territory.  Disunity  led  to  conflicts  aiming  to  expand  territories, 
either  between  the  Arabian  tribes  or  between  the  tribes  and  Iran  over  the  Gulf 
region. 
With  the  European  presence  in  the  Gulf  region  conflicts  occurred  between  the 
European  states  and  the  Arabian  tribes  who  were  living  alongside  the  Gulf  at  that 
time,  to  protect  their  territories  from  foreign  intrusion.  Because  of  their  military 
superiority,  the  European  states  managed  to  occupy  some  of  the  Arabian  tribes' 
territories,  and  to  subdue  thern.  Some  tribes  thus  lost  their  sovereignty  over  parts  of 
their  territories. 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  shed  light  on  the  historical  stages  of  the  territory  of 
the  emirates,  and  its  legal  status  bef'ore  the  emergence  of  the  modern  state  of  the 
UAE.  Emphasis  will  be  placed  on  the  Qawasim  and  their  role  in  the  region,  and  the 
region  which  was  Linder  their  sovereignty  from  their  appearance  until  then, 
unification  with  the  rest  of'  the  emirates  in  1971,  because  the  three  islands  Abu 
1-  11-an  was  known  before  March  1935  as  Persia,  when  the  Iranian  government,  for  the  sake  of 
consistency,  requested  all  foreign  countries  to  use  the  official  name  of  Iran.  The  correct  desionation 
has  gained  general  usape.  See  D.  N.  Wilber,  Ir(in  Past  und  Present,  (  1948),  P.  v. C 
Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  are  connected  to  this  tribe.  There  will  also  be 
discussion  of  the  treaties  signed  between  the  British  government  and  Qawasim,  the 
rulers  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah,  and  especially  the  treaty  of  1892,  to  discover 
whether  these  treaties  gave  the  British  government  the  right  to  dispose  of  the 
territories  of  the  two  emirates,  either  by  sale,  gift  or  border  definition. 
In  this  chapter,  the  region  of  the  UAE  will  be  defined  geographically,  and  the 
history  of  the  emergence  of  the  region  of  emirates  high-lighted.  Finally,  the  legal 
status  of  the  territory  of  the  UAE  before  independence  will  be  clarified. 
2.2.  Geographical  description  of  the  "E 
The  UAE  was  established  as  a  state  only  in  1971;  before  this,  the  area  was  known  as 
the  Emirates  of  the  Trucial  States  or  Trucial  Oman.  2  The  UAE  is  at  the  south  east 
end  of  the  Arabian  Peninsula  and  is  an  independent  sovereign  Arab  state.  It  is  made 
up  of  the  union  of  seven  Emirates:  Abu  Dhabi,  Dubai,  Shaqah,  Ajman,  Umm  al- 
Qaiwain,  Fujairah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah.  It  is  bordered  by  Qatar  and  the 
Arabian/Persian  Gulf  in  the  North  and  North-West,  Saudi  Arabia  in  the  West  and 
South,  and  Oman  and  the  Gulf  of  Oman  in  the  East  and  North-East.  3  Its  total  area  is 
83,600  square  kilometres,  which  includes  over  a  hundred  offshore  islands.  4 
2.3.  The  history  of  the  emergence  of  the  "E's  territory 
At  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century,  European  countries  began  to  realize  the 
importance  of  the  Gulf,  which  is  situated  between  Europe  and  India,  and  Eluropeans 
started  to  send  their  fleets  to  this  region.  Thus,  local  inhabitants  of'  the  region 
13 
2-  After  1820,  Britain  Used  the  name  Trucial  States  instead  of  the  Omani  Coast  Emirates. 
See  Appendix  B,  Map  2,11.296, 
Central  Statistical  Department,  Ministry  of  Plannim.,  of  the  UAF,  (  1993). became  involved  in  conflicts  with  imperialist  countries.  From  time  to  time,  this  led 
to  changes  in  boundaries  and  territories  in  the  region. 
2.3.1.  Portuguese  occupation  of  the  Gu4f  region 
Portugal  set  her  sights  on  the  Gulf  area  immediately  after  Vasco  da  Gama 
5  discovered  the  sea  route  to  India  in  1498 
. 
In  1507,  the  Portuguese  fleet  arrived  in 
the  Gulf  and  began  its  domination  over  the  Gulf  region,  its  motivation  being  to 
monopolize  trade  between  India  and  Europe. 
Affonso  de  Albuquerque,  the  Portuguese  military  leader,  saw  the  Strait  of 
Hormuz  as  one  of  the  key  strategic  positions  whose  possession  would  secure  control 
of  the  vast  Indian  Ocean-East  Indies  region.  His  seizure  of  the  island  of  Hormuz, 
which  was  inhabited  by  Arabs,  was  the  key  to  a  century  of  Portuguese  control  of  the 
Gul  f.  6 
In  1515  the  Portuguese  occupied  the  majority  of  the  Gulf  coastal  cities, 
including  Ras  al-Khaimah,  as  well  as  the  coastal  cities  of  the  Gulf  of  Oman  such  as 
Musqat  and  Khor  Fakkan  port  which  was  an  enclave  of  the  emirate  of  Sharjah.  7 
The  Portuguese  occupation  of  the  Gulf  lasted  for  more  than  a  century  and  was 
characterized  by  excessive  brutality  and  by  destruction  of  cities.  The  inhabitants  of 
the  Gulf  suffered  severe  persecution  at  the  hands  of  the  Portuguese  who  established 
themselves  as  the  masters  of  the  main  ports  on  both  sides  of  the  Gulf.  The 
Portuguese  did  their  utmost  to  prevent  any  other  vessel  from  undertaking 
D.  Hawley,  The  Trucial  Staics,  (1970),  P.  68-9. 
1,,.  11  eard-Bey,  From  TruciulStatcs  to  United  A  rub  Emirates,  (1982),  P.  271. 
M.  C.  Peck,  The  United  Arab  Emirates,  (1986),  13.27.  Also,  Hawley,  op.  cit.,  P.  72. C 
commercial  activity.  Their  vessels  alone  dominated  the  Gulf  waters  and  they 
organized  its  trade  by  means  of  licenses  issued  by  them.  8 
The  Portuguese  took  control  of  the  Gulf  without  any  opposition  or  contest 
throughout  that  period,  despite  attempts  made  by  the  tribes  of  the  Gulf  of  Oman  to 
liberate  the  Gulf  coast  from  their  occupation.  Such  attempts,  to  drive  the  invaders 
out  of  the  Gulf,  ended  iri  failure  due  to  the  tribes'  disunity,  internal  conflicts,  and 
lack  of  leadership.  9 
At  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  the  fortunes  of  the  Portuguese  in  the  Gulf 
had  changed  as  a  result  of  the  arrival  of  other  European  vessels  which  had  came  to 
share  dominance  over  the  region.  The  Dutch  appeared  on  the  eastern  waters  of  the 
Gulf  while  the  British  were  moving  in  the  same  direction.  These  two  imperialist 
powers  were,  however,  more  aware  of  the  commercial  interests  than  the  Portuguese. 
They  were  able  to  occupy  an  eminent  position  and  to  bring  about  a  better  acceptance 
by  the  Asian  countries.  The  British,  for  instance,  were  able  to  establish  a  strong 
relationship  with  Iran  which,  in  effect,  led  to  the  gradual  weakening  of  the 
Portuguese  dominance  of  the  Gulf.  Portugal  lost  its  position  in  the  Gulf  after  its 
naval  fleet  was  defeated  by  the  British  at  Jask  in  1615.1() 
2.3.2.  Iran's  occupation  qf'part  of  Ras  al-Khaimah 
In  1587,  Shah  Abbas  acceded  to  the  throne  of  Iran.  Ifis  reign  coincided  with  the 
deterioration  and  waning  ofthe  PortUgLiese  power  in  the  east.  I  le  benefited  From  this 
'-  S.  M.  Al-Abid,  al-Srua  al-Omam  al-Priqli  w-Thrir  al-Srq 
' 
1;  -iqi  Kh1al  al-Saba  Ashr 
(The  Ornani-l"ortuguese  conflict,  and  the  Liberation  of  the  East  of  Africa  during  the 
Seventeenth  Century),  The  Relatimiship  betweeii  the  Arabia"  Gu4faiid  Eastcrti  Aftica,  (1987), 
P.  126. 
9-  Ibid.  Also,  V.  11.  Rajb,  Al-Khaleej  AI-Arahi:  iv-al-Sraa  al-Dw1i  ul-Muasr  (Arabian  Gulf  and 
Contemporary  International  Conflict),  (1989),  P.  14. 
10 
-  See  Hawley,  op.  cit.,  P.  73-4.  Also  see  S.  F.  Al-l-liti,  AI-Khaleej  Al-Arabi.  -  Orasah  li  a1-,  4i:  hrq1ih  al- 
Siasih  (The  Arabian  Gulf:  A  Study  of  Political  geography),  (1978),  1132. 
15 ChaDler  2 
situation  by  extending  his  authority  and  dominance  over  sonic  of  the  Portuguese 
Gulf  colonies.  Abbas  headed  for  the  Gulf  at  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century 
and  was  able  to  take  control  of  Bahrain  in  1602.11  In  1618,  his  conflict  with  the 
Ottoman  Empire  was  over;  hence  lie  was  able  to  head  south  and  gain  the  support  of 
the  Arabs  living  in  the  Lar  region.  The  British,  for  their  part,  started  to  strengthen 
their  commercial  relations  with  Iran  where  the  Shah  realized  that  they  were  better 
commercial  partners  than  the  Portuguese.  He  granted  them  commercial  franchises 
and  later  extended  that  grant  in  order  to  gain  British  support  against  the  Portuguese. 
Among  the  privileges  he  conferred  upon  them  was  allowing  them  to  establish  a  base 
at  Jask  on  the  Gulf  of  Oman,  to  save  them  the  journey  through  the  Strait  of  Hormuz 
where  the  Portuguese  could  attack  them  from  their  strong  fortresses  on  the  island  of 
Hormuz.  12 
Despite  all  these  measures,  the  Portuguese  were  determined  from  the  very 
beginning  to  sever  the  British  commercial  sea  lines  with  Iran.  Thus  they  intercepted 
the  first  British  naval  convey  which  came  from  Surat  in  India  on  its  way  to  the  Gulf. 
This  led  to  an  armed  encounter  near  Jask  in  1615  and  the  British  naval  force  was 
victorious.  These  events  turned  the  British  into  natural  allies  of  the  Shah  in  his 
struggle  against  the  Portuguese.  13 
A  naval  war  continued  ferociously  between  the  Portuguese  on  one  side  and  the 
British  and  the  Iranians  on  the  other,  and  the  coast  ot'Iran  was  sub  jected  to  a  number 
ofattacks.  However,  the  fall  of  the  island  of  I  lormuz  represented  a  111tal  blow  to  the 
Portuguese  prestige  in  the  Gulf'.  This  matter  increased  the  Iranians'  power  and,  in 
1619,  they  were  able  to  reach  the  other  side  ofthe  GLIII'and  occupy  that  part  of  Ras 
-  Hawley,  op.  cit.,  P.  74. 
12 
-  J. Marlowe,  The  Pet-sian  Guq'in  the  'I'viviaieth  Century,  (1962),  P.  6. 
'3 
-  Ibid. Chanter  2 
al-Khaimali  known  as  JUlfar.  There  they  established  a  fortress  and  thus  vied  with  the 
Portuguese  for  the  control  of  that  Emirate.  14 
The  Shah  exploited  the  fall  of  Hormuz  and  built  opposite  to  it  a  new  port,  on  the 
site  of  the  village  known  as  Gombrun.  He  named  it  'Bandar  Abbas'  and  opened  it 
for  European  commerce.  15 
However,  despite  the  weakness  of  the  Portuguese  at  that  period  due  to  their  loss 
of  some  of  the  regions  they  used  to  occupy,  the  Iranians  were  still  unable  to  liberate 
all  the  regions  on  the  Iranian  coast  and  the  Gulf  islands  from  the  grip  of  the 
Portuguese.  16 
2.3.3.  Ya'ruba  regain  the  occupied  territories 
The  Portuguese  continued  to  consolidate  their  domination  of  the  Gulf  region  on  the 
western  side,  particularly  the  coastal  regions  starting  from  Musqat  and  up  to  Ras  al- 
Khaimah.  This  increased  the  suffering  of  the  inhabitants  from  the  brutal  treatment  of 
the  Portuguese  rule  along  the  coast.  The  situation  spurred  the  Arab  tribes  to  begin 
contacting  one  another,  forget  their  differences,  and  concentrate  on  the  cornmori 
problem  they  all  suffered  from,  namely  the  Portuguese  colonial  power. 
At  the  end  of  1624,  the  majority  of  the  tribes  of  Oman  and  the  coast  of  Oman  - 
currently  known  as  the  United  Arab  Ernirates-elected  Nasir  bin  Murshid  Al-Ya'rubi 
as  a  leader  and  Imam  of  all  these  tribes  in  order  to  confront  the  Portuguese  and  put 
an  end  to  their  brutal  rule.  Within  a  short  period  of  time,  the  Imam  was  able  to  take 
control  of  a  large  section  of  Onian,  particularly  the  central  regions  such  as  'Abri  and 
"' 
-  AI-Hiti,  op.  cit.,  P.  32-3) 
15  Marlowe,  op.  cit.,  P.  7. 
16  A.  M.  Raslid,  al-Irfiltli(Il  ý11-Siasjh  w-al-l(lisadh  alli,  4qdt  hiii  hnarulSahl  Omaii  w-Britunia  1806- 
1971  (Political  and  Economic  Treaties  between  the  Emirates  of  Oman  and  Britain  1806-1971) 
(  1989),  P.  19. 18 
Nazawi,  as  well  as  the  Zahira  region  which  lies  between  the  al-Siar  region  and  al- 
Batina  coast.  17 
Following  these  victories,  the  Ya'rLiba  then  moved  on  to  liberate  the  two  cites  of 
Musqat  and  Matrah  on  the  coast  of  Oman  from  the  Portuguese.  Fierce  battles  raged 
between  them  and  many  were  killed  from  each  side.  However,  all  of  this  did  not  lead 
to  the  liberation  of  Musqat  and  a  peace  treaty  was  signed  between  the  two  parties. 
The  most  significant  provisions  of  the  treaty  stipulated  that  the  Portuguese 
should  hand  over  to  the  Arabs  all  the  territories  and  buildings  that  belonged  to  them 
in  the  Sahar  region  near  Musclat,  and  that  they  should  treat  the  Arabs  in  Musclat  and 
Matrah  better.  18 
Among  the  results  of  this  peace  treaty  were  the  weakening  of  the  Portuguese  in 
the  region,  and  the  increase  in  the  Ya'ruba  strength  which  encouraged  the  latter  to 
liberate  the  remaining  Arab  cities  in  the  Gulf.  Their  next  destination  was  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  which  had  two  fortresses.  The  Portuguese  were  in  control  of  one  of  these; 
in  addition,  they  had  two  vessels  in  the  Ras  al-Khaimah  port.  The  Iranians  controlled 
the  other  fortress. 
The  Ya'ruba  then  moved  on  to  attack  the  fortress  controlled  by  the  Iranians; 
here  a  dreadful  battle  took  place.  During  it,  the  Portuguese  supplied  the  Iranians  with 
weapons  and  ammunition  to  def'eat  the  Ya'ruba-,  this  they  were  unable  to  do.  The 
constant  determination  of  the  Ya'ruba  to  liberate  the  region  led  to  the  defieat  ofthe 
Iranians  and  their  withdrawal  From  Ras  al-Khaimah.  Meanwhile,  the  Portuguese 
were  confined  to  the  other  fortress  with  no  authority  over  the  city.  Thus  the 
17 
_  B.  J.  Slot,  Arab  al-Khaleej  1602-1784  (The  Arabs  of  the  Gulf  1602-1784),  Translation  to  Arabic 
by  A.  Kuri,  (1993),  P.  146. 
I's 
-  Raslid,  op.  cit.,  P.  20. 19 
Portuguese  were  also  confined  to  Musqat  and,  after  a  while,  were  lorced  to  leave 
that  region  as  well.  19 
The  Ya'ruba,  during  117  years'  rule,  were  able  to  dominate  the  Gulf  region  up 
until  1741.  During  that  period  they  maintained  a  strong  naval  fleet  able  to  drive  out 
the  Portuguese  from  the  ports  they  used  to  occupy  on  the  Gulf,  and  from  the  Gulf  of 
Oman,  as  well  as  the  Indian  coasts  and  Africa's  eastern  coast.  The  Ya'ruba  were  also 
able  to  gain  strong  footholds  in  Bahrain,  the  Zafar  region,  the  island  of  Hormuz, 
Qeslim  and  Bandar  Abbas.  20  Slot,  quoting  from  archives  of  the  Dutch  East  India 
Company,  stated  that  the  Iranians  had  totally  disappeared  from  the  Gulf  and  the 
supremacy  of  the  leaders  of  the  Arab  tribes  covered  the  whole  region  including  the 
Iranian  coast  of  the  Gul  f.  21 
2.3.4.  Qawasim  inherit  Ya'ruba  dominance  in  the  Guýf  region 
After  the  Ya'ruba  took  control  of  the  Gulf  region  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the  Arab 
tribes  lived  in  peace  and  started  to  migrate  from  inland  to  the  coast  of  the  Arabian 
Peninsula.  They  gradually  resumed  navigation,  commerce  and  fishing  for  pearls  in 
the  waters  of  the  Gulf.  At  that  time,  the  Arab  tribes  moved  from  Najd  and  settled  in 
Bahrain  and  Kuwait.  The  Sabah  family  settled  in  Kuwait  while  the  Khalifa  family 
and  the  Jalahima  settled  in  al-Zabara  and  Bahrain.  hi  Oman,  following  the  weakness 
and  disintegration  of  the  Ya'ruba  state,  the  Bu  Sa'id  family  ruled  Musclat  in  174  1.22 
At  the  same  time,  two  new  political  powers  which  were  independent  of  the  Omani 
19 
-  Ibid.  P.  2  1.  Also  Al-Abid,  op.  cit.,  11.127. 
20 
_  M.  M.  AbdUllah,  Imarat  al-sahl  w-al-Dw/h  al-Sawdih  al-Awlh  1793-1818  (The  Emirates  of  the 
Trucial  States,  Oman  and  the  First  Saudi  State  1793-1818),  (1978),  11.63.  Also  Marlowe,  op.  cit., 
P.  9. 
21 
_ 
Slot,  Op.  Cit.,  P.  324. 
22 
_  See  Ralb,  op.  cit.,  P.  16.  Also  see  J.  Z.  Qasein,  AI-Khalecj  AI-Arahi.  Drusah  L-Tarik  al-linarl  al- 
Arbaih,  fi  Asr  al-Twsa  ul-Orwbi  al-Awl  1507-1840  (The  Arab  Gulf:  A  Study  of  the  Aral)  Emirates 
in  the  age  of  the  First  European  Expansion  1507-1840),  (1985),  P.  14-5. state  appeared  on  the  coast  of  Oman  (the  area  known  at  present  as  the  United  Arab 
Emirates).  The  first  political  power  was  a  naval  force  that  consisted  ofan  alliance  of 
tribes  under  the  leadership  of  Shaikh  Rahmah  bin  Matar  Al-QasImI,  23  who  was 
24 
recognized  by  Nadir  Shah  as  the  hereditary  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  in  1740 
. 
The 
dominion  of  this  power  extended  from  Musandam  promontory  on  the  Strait  of 
Hormuz  to  the  north  to  Sharjah  on  the  south.  The  second  power  was  a  land  force  that 
consisted  of  the  Bani  Yas  tribe  25  and  their  allies  from  other  tribes,  under  the 
leadership  of  Al  Nahyan  who  lived  in  Zafra  and  Abu  Dhabi  city.  Their  influence 
extended  along  the  Gulf  coast  from  Dubai  to  Qatar.  26 
The  Iranians,  after  they  took  control  of  Lingah  27  and  Qeshm  island  and  drove 
the  Qawasim  out  of  these  places  in  1737,  started  to  strengthen  their  naval  fleet  and 
make  preparations  to  recapture  the  occupied  regions.  However,  their  strength  at  the 
time  fell  short  of  achieving  that  objective.  Following  the  death  of  Nadir  Shah  in 
1747,  the  Iranians  disputed  among  themselves  and  this  led  to  the  weakness  of  their 
authority  over  the  Gulf  coast  and  the  regions  they  occupied. 
In  1750,  the  Qawasirn  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Gull'  a  second  time  to  the 
Iranian  coast,  to  help  the  Iranian  ruler  of  the  port  of  Bandar  Abbas  and  IJorrnoz 
island,  who  was  in  conflict  with  the  Shah  of  Iran.  They  managed  to  recapture  Llngah 
2' 
-  The  Qawasim  are  not  a  tribe  but  a  ruling  clan.  By  the  early  nineteenth  century  Qawasini  rule  was 
consolidated  along  the  Gulf  coast  north  and  east  of  Dubai  and  into  the  Musandam  peninsula.  In  192  1, 
the  Qawasim  divided  their  territory  into  two  emirates,  and  becarne  the  ruling  families  of  both  the 
emirate  of  Sharjah  and  the  emirate  of  Ras  al-Khairnah.  For  more  details  on  Qawasirn,  see  Peck,  op. 
cit.,  P.  28.  Also  see  Heard-Bey,  op.  cit.,  11.82.  Also  see  Abdullah,  op.  cit.,  P.  89. 
24 
- 
slot 
,  op.  cit.,  P.  322. 
25 
-  Bani  Yas  is  a  tribe  in  the  western  part  of  the  Trucial  States.  They  were  many  tribes  which  had 
been  welded  together  by  a  common  history  of  several  centuries  into  a  tightly  knit  federation  by  the 
middle  of  the  seventeenth  century.  Now  Bani  Yas  is  the  most  numerous  tribal  grouping  in  the  arca  of 
the  UAE,  AI-Nahyan  is  the  ruling  family  of  Abu  Dhabi,  the  capital  city  of  the  LJAF,  and  Al-Maktouni 
the  ruling  family  of  Dubai.  For  more  details  on  Bani  Yas,  see  I  leard-Bey,  op.  cit.,  11.27.  Also  see 
Peck,  op.  cit.,  P.  332.  Also  see  Abdullah,  op.  cit.,  P.  98. 
26 
-  Abdullah,  op.  cit.,  P.  90. 
27 
-  Lin-ah  was  a  famous  town  and  port  on  the  Iranian  coast  in  the  ciOliteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries. 21 
and  other  locations  on  the  Iranian  shore.  The  Qawasim  continued  to  control  Lingah 
until  1767,  when  the  Iranians  under  the  leadership  of  Karim  Khan  succeeded  in 
recapturing  it.  However,  in  1780,  the  Qawasn-n  managed  to  regain  control  of  Lingah 
28 
after  the  death  of  Karim  Khan  in  1779 
. 
Within  ten  years,  the  Qawasirn  were  able 
to  take  control  of  the  majority  of  the  important  regions  in  the  Gulf,  such  as  Lingoah, 
Z:  ) 
Qeshm  island,  Leift  and  Shanas  on  the  Gulf  of  Oman.  A  group  of  them  remained  to 
rule  Lingah  and  run  the  affairs  of  the  other  regions,  as  well  as  the  islands  adjacent  to 
the  Iranian  coast. 
29 
The  Qawasim  continued  to  rule  the  Lingah  region  and  the  regions  surrounding  it 
up  until  1887,  when  the  Iranians  drove  out  the  last  Qasimi  ruler  and  took  control  of 
Sirri  island.  However,  the  Qawasims'  rule  over  the  Iranian  coast  was  only 
interrupted  for  a  short  period  when  Karim  Khan  took  control  of  Lingah  between 
1767  and  1780.  As  Niebuhr  mentions,  the  control  of  Qawasim,  the  expansion  of 
their  influence  and  sovereignty  over  the  Gulf  region,  and  their  naval  power  in  1765 
were  such  that: 
This  petty  sovereignty  extends  from  Cape  Mussendom  along  the 
Persian  Gulph.  The  Persians  call  it  the  country  of  Dsjulfar  (Julfar), 
another  Cape  near  Mussendom.  The  Europeans  also  have  thus 
learned  to  call  these  people  the  Arabs  of  Dsjulfar.  The  other  Arabs 
call  it  Seer,  from  the  town  of  the  same  name,  which  has  a  good 
harbour,  and  is  the  seat  of  the  Schiech.  Ile  formerly  possessed,  and 
indeed  still  retains,  the  isle  of  Scharedsje  (Shaijah),  with  some 
considerable  places  upon  the  opposite  side  of'  the  Gulph,  among 
which  are  Kunk  and  Lundsýjc  (Lingah). 
This  country  not  ]ong,  since  acknowledged  the  sovereign  authority  ZD 
of'  the  Imam;  but  it  has  withdrawn  itself'  From  this  conditloii  of' 
dependence;  and  the  Schlech  often  goes  to  war  with  his  old  masters. 
Yet  he  is  not  strong  enough  to  defend  Ininselfwithout  assistance;  and 
therefore  takes  care  to  live  in  a  good  understanding  with  the  other 
independent  Schiechs,  especially  with  the  Schiech  of  Ds.  jau,  whose 
dominions  lie  westward  from  Orrian. 
29 
_  J.  G.,  Lorimer,  Gazelleer  (?  f  ihe  Persian  Guýf,  '  Oman  aml  CeWralArabia,  Vol.  1,  Pail  2,11  istorical, 
(1915),  P.  2063-4. 
29 
-  Ibid.  VoLl,  Part  1,  P.  632. Chawer  2 
The  Prince  of  Seer  makes  some  figure  among  the  maritime 
powers  in  these  parts.  His  navy  is  one  of  the  most  considerable  in  the 
Persian  Gulph.  His  subjects  are  much  employed  in  navigation,  and 
carry  on  a  pretty  extensive  trade.  30 
2.3.5.  British  control  of  the  Gu4f  region 
At  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  British  started  to  make  regular 
journeys  to  some  of  the  Gulf  regions  after  the  establishment  of  the  British  East  India 
Company.  They  were  greatly  welcomed  at  that  time  by  the  Shah  of  Iran  due  to  the 
tension  between  the  Iranians  and  the  Portuguese  as  a  result  of  the  Portuguese  policy 
of  trade  monopoly  in  the  Gulf.  As  a  result  of  the  English  support  of  the  Iranians  in 
their  war  against  the  Portuguese  in  1615,  the  Shah  granted  them  the  right  to  establish 
branches  for  their  company  in  the  Iranian  cities.  The  British  Company  then 
established  a  centre  on  the  Gulf  and  trade  centres  in  Bandar  Abbas,  Asfahan,  Shiraz 
and  Basra.  On  12  April  1763,  the  Shah  of  Iran  also  agreed  to  a  British  diplomatic 
representation  in  Bushire.  31 
During  that  period,  there  were  two  other  European  powers  competing  with  the 
British  for  control  over  the  Gulf  region.  These  two  powers  were  Holland  and  France. 
The  Dutch  were  based  at  Bandar  Abbas  which  they  made  their  trade  centre.  They 
were  competing  with  the  British  in  trade  by  putting  pressure  on  the  Shah  to  exempt 
them  from  taxes.  32  This  conduct  inflicted  great  damage  on  British  trade  in  the  Gulf' 
which  was  only  saved  by  a  war  between  the  British  and  the  Dutch  in  1653-1664.  As 
a  result  of  this  war,  armed  conflict  moved  to  the  Gulf  region.  Both  the  British  and 
the  Dutch  tried  to  seek  the  support  ofthc  remaining  Portuguese  forces  in  the  Gulf  to 
enter  the  war  on  their  side.  The  Portuguese,  however,  reiected  that  dcrnand  and  zn  'I 
M.  Niebulit-,  Travels  Through  Arabia,  Vol.  11,11.123-4. 
31 
_  Hawley,  op.  cit.,  P.  78. 
32 
_  MA.  M-Fil,  al-Ahmih  al-lslralýjih  Ll-Khaleej  ul-Arabi  (Strategic  Importance  for  the  Arabian 
Gulf),  (1988),  P.  75 7 
remained  neutral.  Fierce  clashes  took  place  between  the  British  and  the  Dutch;  and 
some  of  the  British  vessels  were  sunk.  The  superiority  of  the  Dutch  was  evident  and 
they  were  able  to  impose  their  authority  over  the  region  and  take  trade  under  their 
control.  33  At  that  time  a  third  rival  force,  namely  the  French  East  India  Company, 
appeared.  Following  the  arrival  of  the  French  in  the  Gulf  region,  the  Dutch  resorted 
to  cooperation  with  the  British  in  order  to  drive  out  this  unexpected  rival.  The 
French  presence,  however,  did  not  last  long.  They  withdrew  from  the  region  as  a 
result  of  events  in  Europe  and  their  defeat  in  war  by  the  British.  Their  withdrawal 
took  place  at  about  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century.  34 
The  Dutch  made  a  big  mistake  in  cooperating  with  the  British,  for  their  strength 
began  to  gradually  wane  and  their  influence  in  the  region  to  decrease  after  they 
failed  to  persuade  the  Shah  to  stop  dealing  with  the  British  in  1688.  This  led  to  their 
gradual  withdrawal  from  the  region.  They  withdrew  from  Bahrain  in  17531  and  from 
Bandar  Abbas  in  1759,  leaving  the  British  free  to  control  the  Gulf  region.  3ý 
The  expansion  and  progress  of  Britain's  trade  and  the  increase  of  its  military 
influence  gave  the  Gulf  region  greater  significance  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  Z:, 
century.  From  that  time,  Britain  began  to  change  its  attitude  towards  the  region.  It 
shifted  frorn  the  logic  of  negotiation  and  diplomacy  to  the  language  ofvIolence  and 
political  and  military  pressure,  so  as  to  guard  the  region  against  the  influence  of  any 
other  state  that  tried  to  compete  with  it  for  control.  Thus  Britain  was  left  alone  to 
control  the  Gulf  region.  36 
See  Peck,  op.  cit.,  11.28.  Also  see  Marlowe,  op.  cit.,  P.  7-8. 
See  Flawley,  op.  cit.,  P.  77. 
5-  Ibid.,  11ý76. 
ý,  6 
_  M.  Y.  Olwan,  United  Arab  Emirates,  FPI  L,  Vol.  12,  (1990),  P.  382. 
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2.3.5.1.  Treaty  of  1806 
This  intervention  and  control  of  the  Gulf  region  by  the  British  was  treated  as 
unacceptable  by  the  QaNvasim  tribe  which  had  a  large  naval  force  in  the  region.  They 
felt  that  the  British  had  endangered  their  naval  force  by  intervening  in  their  sphere  of 
influence.  This led  to  the  Qawasim's  resistance  and  interception  of  British  vessels.  37 
Their  conduct,  therefore,  represented  a  source  of  danger  to  the  British  who  decided 
an  end  should  be  put  to  the  Qawasim.  They  alleged  that  the  activity  of  the  Qawasim 
in  the  Gulf  was  naval  piracy  which  should  be  stopped.  What  further  increased  the 
British  fear  was  that,  after  the  assassination  in  1804  of  the  of  Sultan  bin  Ahmed,  the 
ruler  of  Musqat,  the  Qawasim  had  taken  control  of  Bandar  Abbas  on  the  Iranian 
coast  which  used  to  be  under  the  control  of  the  ruler  of  Musqat.  By  so  doing,  they 
were  able  to  control  both  sides  of  the  Gulf  entrance.  The  British  East  India  Company 
considered  this  inove  as  a  threat  to  British  navigation  in  the  region,  therefore,  the 
British  government  in  India  decided  to  attack  the  Qawasim  in  Bandar  Abbas  and 
drive  them  out. 
38 
In  June  1805  the  British  government  sent  a  military  expedition  to  Bandar  Abbas 
and  besieged  it.  After  a  fight  that  lasted  one  day  the  Qawasim  surrendered.  When  the 
news  reached  the  Qawasim  on  the  coast  of  Oman,  they  dispatched  30  vessels  in  an 
attempt  to  lift  the  siege  on  Bandar  Abbas  and  drive  out  the  British.  They  failed  to 
achieve  their  objective,  due  to  the  strong  British  fleet  present  in  the  area.  This  led  to 
the  conclusion  ol'a  peace  treaty  on  6  February  1806 
. 
39  The  most  important  articles 
were: 
Article  I.  There  shall  be  peace  between  the  lionOUrable  Fast  India 
Company  and  Sultan  bin  SWýgUr,  Joasnice,  and  the  whole  of'  his 
24 
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dependants  and  subjects  on  the  shores  of  Arabia  and  Persia,  and  they 
shall  respect  the  flag  and  property  of  the  Honourable  East  India 
Company,  and  their  subjects  wherever  and  in  whatever  it  may  be,  and 
the  same  the  Honourable  East  India  Company  towards  the  Joasmee. 
Article  4.  Should  any  British  vessel  touch  on  the  coasts  of  the 
Joasinee  I'Or  wood  or  water,  or  be  forced  on  shore  by  stress  of 
weather,  or  any  other  cause,  the  Joasmee  shall  assist  and  protect  the 
said  vessel  and  property,  and  permit  it  to  be  disposed  of  or  carried 
away,  as  their  owners  shall  see  fit,  without  claim  or  demand. 
Article  6.  When  the  above  is  confirmed  and  ratified  by  both 
parties  the  Joasmee  shall  frequent  the  English  ports  from  Surat  to 
40  Bengal  as  before 
. 
The  treaty  did  not  last  more  than  two  years,  the  Qawasim  and  the  British  clashing 
again  in  1808.  The  reason  for  this  was  the  British  allegation  that  the  Qawasim  had 
attacked  a  number  of  vessels  in  the  Gulf  and  detained  some  of  them.  41 
2.3.5.2.  The  Preliminary  Treaty  and  the  General  Treaty  of  1820 
The  increase  of  the  Qawasim's  naval  force  obstructed  the  British  from  extending 
their  authority  over  the  Gulf  Every  now  and  then,  the  period  between  1808  and 
1819  witnessed  fierce  clashes  between  the  warships  of  both  sides.  The  area  of 
conflict  extended  from  the  west  coast  of  India  to  the  Gulf.  For  this  reason,  the 
British  government  in  India  was  more  than  ever  determined  to  put  an  end  to  the 
Qawasim's  opposition  and  take  all  measures  in  order  to  destroy  their  forces.  It  sent 
an  army  expedition  in  1819  from  Bombay  towards  Ras  al-Khaimah,  the  stronghold 
of  the  Qawasim,  so  as  to  destroy  their  forces  in  the  region.  42  The  British  vessels 
arrived  at  Ras  al-Khaimah  port  in  December  1819  and  launched  their  heavy  artillery 
fire  on  the  city.  The  Qawasirn's  artillery  returned  tire.  However,  in  the  end,  the 
British  torces  proved  superior  and  occupied  the  city  where  the  leader  of'  the 
Qawaslm,  Shaikh  Hassan  bin  Rahmah,  surrendered  to  thern.  Following  this,  the 
40 
-  CTS,  Vol.  58,1804-1806,  P.  387- 
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Thesis,  University  of  Salford,  (  1989),  P.  1  14-6. 
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British  forces  began  to  take  the  remaining  regions  of  the  Trucial  States  under  their 
control  set  fire  to  the  vessels  of  the  Qawasim,  and  destroyed  their  fortresses.  43 
The  rulers  of  the  Trucial  States  were  forced  to  sign  two  peace  treaties  in  1820. 
The  first  treaty,  the  Preliminary  Treaty,  stipulated  that  all  the  fortresses,  vessels  and 
artillery  pieces  in  the  Trucial  States  (which  signed  the  treaty)  should  be  handed  over 
to  the  British  forces,  and  that  Ras  al-Khaimah  should  remain  under  the  control  of  the 
British  government.  44  The  second  treaty,  the  General  Treaty,  stipulated  that  the 
British  vessels  were  entitled  to  inspect  in  the  waters  of  the  Gulf  the  vessels  that 
belonged  to  the  rulers  of  the  Trucial  States  who  should  accept  this  and  hand  over  the 
vessels'  manifestoes  to  the  British.  The  vessels  belonging  to  the  Trucial  States  rulers 
were  also  entitled  to  enter  the  ports  of  Britain  and  its  allies,  and  they  had  the  right  to 
undertake  business  there.  If  they  came  under  attack,  then  the  British  government 
would  deal  with  the  matter  in  earnest.  45 
It  is  clear  that  these  two  treaties  stripped  the  Qawasim  of  their  vessels,  artillery 
and  fortresses.  They  also  prevented  them  from  building  vessels  or  establishing 
fortresses.  This  led  to  the  extinction  of  the  Qawasim's  naval  force,  which  made  them 
incapable  of  det'ending  their  islands  and  regions  on  the  Iranian  coast,  such  as  Lingah, 
against  any  aggression.  In  return,  Britain  agreed  to  defend  only  the  Qawasim's 
vessels  and  not  their  territory.  For  example,  Article  10  ofthe  General  Treaty  in  1820 
provides:  "The  vessels  of  the  friendly  Arabs,  bearing  their  flag  above  described, 
shall  enter  into  all  the  British  ports  and  into  the  ports  of  the  allies  of  the  British  so 
Ibid.  11.147-52.  Also  see  I  lawley,  op.  cit.,  11.112-3. 
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far  as  they  shall  be  able  to  effect  it;  and  they  shall  buy  and  sell  therein,  and  if  any 
shall  attack  them  the  British  Government  shall  take  notice  ofit". 
46 
2.3.5.3.  Exclusive  Agreement  of  1892 
At  the  beginning  of  1887,  the  Iranian  government  looked  towards  the  Gulf  and  tried 
to  establish  a  foothold  in  the  region,  and  extend  its  authority  over  it.  The  first  thing  it 
did  was  to  attack  the  port  of  Lingah  on  the  coast,  arrest  its  Qasirm  ruler  and  put  the 
city  under  its  control.  Following  this,  the  Iranian  government  took  control  of  Sirri 
island.  47 
This  achievement  gave  the  Iranians  the  incentive  to  move  forward  in  order  to 
place  the  Gulf  region  under  their  control  and  extend  their  influence,  as  they  realized 
that  no  one  had  opposed  them  after  they  took  control  of  Lingah.  They  sent  a 
delegation  to  the  rulers  of  the  Trucial  States  in  an  attempt  to  persuade  them  to  sign  a 
friendship  agreement  with  Iran.  This  agreement  would  guarantee  their  protection  and 
keep  the  British  influence  away  from  the  region.  Among  the  most  important  points 
they  discussed  was  the  establishment  of  an  Iranian  diplomatic  representation  af  , ter 
the  pattern  of  the  British  diplornatic  representation.  48 
Despite  the  failure  of  the  Iranian  government  to  Persuade  the  rulers  of  the 
TrLICial  States  to  conclude  a  protection  agreement,  the  British  government  was  far 
from  pleased  by  the  Iranian  conduct.  It  felt  that  Iran  was  intervening  in  its  affairs  in 
the  region.  In  addition,  there  were  other  states  which  had  ambitions  to  dominate  the 
rcglon,  mainly  the  Germans,  the  French  and  the  Russians.  The  British  government 
was  therefore  left  with  no  other  option  but  to  sign  individual  treaties  with  the 
Shaikhs  of  the  Trucial  States  so  as  to  establish  a  stronger  foothold  in  the  region  and 
16 
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guarantee  that  the  rulers  ofthe  Trucial  States  would  not  cooperate  with  any  foreign 
government  or  agency  except  with  its  approval.  To  that  end,  the  rulers  of  the  Trucial 
States  signed  an  agreement  in  1892  in  which  they  committed  themselves: 
Ist.  -  That  I  will  on  no  account  enter  into  any  agreement  or 
correspondence  with  any  Power  other  than  the  British  Government. 
2nd.  -  That  without  the  assent  of  the  British  Government,  I  will  not 
consent  to  the  residence  within  my  territory  of  the  agent  of  any  other 
Government. 
3rd.  -  That  I  will  on  no  account  cede,  sell,  mortgage  or  otherwise  give 
for  occupation  any  part  of  my  territory,  save  to  the  British 
Government.  49 
By  means  of  this  treaty,  the  Trucial  States  were  put  under  the  protection  of  Great 
Britain,  and  the  British  government  ran  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  Emirates  which 
signed  the  treaty.  On  the  other  hand,  these  treaties  did  not  give  the  British 
government  a  free  hand  in  dealing  with  the  territories  of  the  Emirates  either  through 
sale,  gift  or  border  delimitation. 
This  situation  continued  in  the  Emirates  region  without  any  change  up  until 
Britain  left  the  Gulf  region  in  1971.  The  Emirates  which  signed  the  treaty,  in 
December  1971,  declared  a  union  arriong  themselves  and  established  the  current 
United  Arab  Emirates.  This  event  was  preceded  by  Iran's  occupation  of  the  three 
islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb.  Thus  the  United  Arab 
Emirates  lost  control  over  part  of  its  territory. 
2.4.  Legal  status  of  the  [JAE  territory  before  independence 
It  is  an  established  historic  fact  that  before  the  Portuguese  arrival  in  the  Gulf,  the 
Arab  tribes,  who  had  their  own  political  organization,  ruled  both  sides  ofthe  Gull' 
coast.  50  1  lowever,  the  Portuguese  colonial  power  did  not  deal  with  these  tribes  as  a 
49 
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political  entity,  rather  it  occupied  the  Gulfregion  by  the  use  of  force  and  treated  it  as 
terra  willius.  51  Unlike  the  Portuguese,  the  British  government  for  its  part  dealt 
differently  with  the  Gulf  regioii  despite  its  attempt  to  put  both  sides  of  the  Gulf 
under  its  control  and  subjugate  the  tribes  who  were  dominating  the  region.  Such  aii 
objective  could  never  have  been  achieved  without  the  conclusion  of  peace  treaties 
between  the  British  government  and  the  rulers  of  these  tribes. 
Despite  the  fact  that  these  treaties  did  not  define  the  legal  status  of  the  Trucial 
States,  even  though  they  were  considered  the  legal  basis  for  regulating  the  relations 
between  the  two  parties,  the  British  government  nonetheless,  in  its  official 
statements  used  to  describe  the  Trucial  States  as  an  independent  state  under  the 
British  Protectorate  or  an  independent  state  which  had  a  special  treaty  with  the 
British  government.  In  addition,  the  British  government  considered  the  Trucial 
States  a  protectorate  and  not  one  of  its  colonies.  It  kept  the  Trucial  States  outside  the 
Colonial  Office  and  it  assigned  the  running  of  its  affairs  to  the  Foreign  Office  rather 
than  the  Colonial  Off]ce.  52 
This  description  by  the  British  government  led  to  questions  about  the  delicate 
legal  status  governing  the  relations  between  the  two  parties.  One  opinion  ruled  that 
these  treaties  were  void  because,  at  the  time  they  were  concluded,  the  Trucial  States 
were  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  even  if  only  in  theory.  The  rulers  ofthe  F,  inirates 
who  signed  these  treaties  were  not  legally  competent  to  sign  them.  On  this  basis,  tile 
treaties  were  not  considered  as  being  international  and,  therefore,  no  legal 
commitments  could  result  from  thenC  3-  Fhis  made  the  Emirates  more  like  a  colonial 
protectorate,  despite  the  British  government's  official  treatment  of  them  as  an 
51  See  I  I.  M.  A  I-Baharna,  TheArablan  GuUSiate,  s,  (1975),  11.72. 
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independent  state  under  its  protection.  54  The  supporters  of  this  opinion  further  stated 
that  the  treaties  were  not  concluded  between  equal  political  powers,  rather  were  they 
concluded  between  a  powerful  state  and  a  helpless  or  weaker  one.  Britain  was  in  a 
position  to  dictate  to  the  other  party  whatever  it  wanted.  This  is  particularly  true 
when  we  take  into  acCOUnt  that  the  treaties  of  1806,1820,1892  and  others,  were 
prepared  by  the  British  Political  Resident  in  the  Gul  f.  55 
Al-Baharna  holds  the  opinion  that  it  is  possible  to  recognize  the  treaties 
concluded  between  Britain  and  the  Emirates  as  a  criterion  for  defining  their  legal 
status.  According  to  him,  Britain  used  to  distinguish  between  the  Emirates,  which 
were  called  protectorates,  and  its  other  protectorates.  The  essential  difference  was 
that  Britain  recognized  in  advance  the  sovereignty  of  the  Emirates'  rulers  over  their 
regions  which  remained  independent  of  the  British  Crown.  They  were  also  granted 
semi-autonomy  in  the  running  of  their  internal  affairs.  The  law  which  was  set  Out  In 
the  treaties  did  not  give  a  clear-cut  distinction  between  the  existence  and  non- 
existence  of  sovereignty,  or  between  the  concession  and  suspension  of  sovereignty 
in  the  regions  under  the  British  protection.  By  its  very  nature,  this  law  gave  the 
Emirates  a  special  status  which  can  be  described  neither  as  non-independence  nor 
non-protection,  but  a  combination  of  the  two.  56 
What  further  increased  the  ambiguity  surrounding  the  F,  mirates'  legal  status  was 
that  they  did  not  come  under  the  British  protection  in  the  last  century  as  a  result  ol'a 
I-orinal  document  stating  that  result,  as  was  the  case  in  the  former  French 
54 
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Al-Bali,  arna,  op.  cit.,  P.  79-80. protectorates  in  North  Africa  and  the  case  of  Zanzibar  and  Egypt  which  came  under 
the  British  protection  in  1890  and  1914  respectively.  Thus  it  was  considered  there 
was  no  provision  in  the  Emirates'  treaties  with  Britain  which  clearly  stated  that  the 
Emirates  were  put  under  the  protection  system.  57  The  protection  system  they  were 
under  had  developed  as  a  result  of  Britain's  continuous  running  of  their  foreign 
affairs.  Hence,  as  far  as  their  international  relations  were  concerned,  Britain  took  the 
responsibility  on  their  behalf.  This  situation  continued  up  until  Britain  declared  its 
departure  from  the  Gulf  region  and  terminated  its  peace  treaties  with  the  Emirates  in 
1971,  and  concluded  a  treaty  of  friendship  with  them.  58 
2.5.  Conclusion 
It  can  be  said  that  the  regions  controlled  by  the  Trucial  States  which  signed  the  peace  t:  l 
treaties  with  Britain  (currently  known  as  the  United  Arab  Emirates)  used  to  be 
politically  independent  and  sovereign  according  to  the  international  norms 
prevailing  at  the  time,  before  the  arrival  of  the  Portuguese  in  the  Gulf.  However,  as  a 
result  of  the  Portuguese  occupation  of  the  region  and  their  aggression  against  tile 
coast  tribes,  these  tribes  lost  control  over  a  large  section  of  their  regions  on  both 
sides  of  the  Gulf  for  some  time,  until  they  regained  control  once  more.  With  the 
British  infiltration  into  the  Gulf,  and  as  a  result  ofthe  treaties  they  concluded  with 
the  rulers  of  the  Emirates,  the  political  independence  and  sovereignty  of  the 
Emirates  were  affected  to  a  large  extent.  Therefore  because  of  this  protection  and  the 
prevention  of  the  Emirates'  tribes,  who  had  signed  the  treaties,  from  entering  into 
wars  or  running  their  own  foreign  affairs,  they  lost  part  of  their  region  such  as 
57 
-  ]bid.  11.82-3. 
5'-  See  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  United  Arab  Emirates  in  UNTS, 
Vol.  834,11.273. Lingah,  Sirri  island  as  well  as  the  three  islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and 
Lesser  Tunb. 
The  subject  of  my  discussion  in  this  research  is  the  three  islands  Abu  Musa, 
Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb.  I  will  shed  light  in  the  next  chapter  on  the  current 
dispute  between  Iran  and  the  [JAE  over  these  islands. 33 
CHAPTER  THREE 
Definition  of  the  Dispute  over  the  Three  Islands 
I.  Introduction 
The  airn  of  this  chapter  is  to  define  the  conflict  between  Iran  and  the  UAE  over  the 
three  islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  TUnb  and  Lesser  Tunbl  in  the  Arab  ian/Pers  ian 
Gulf.  The  chapter  will  be  divided  into  two  main  sections.  Firstly,  the  geography  and 
population  of  the  three  islands  will  be  described.  The  second  part  of  this  chapter 
concentrates  on  the  historical  background  of  the  three  islands  to  clarify  the  history  of 
sovereignty  over  the  islands  in  order  to  determine  the  historic  rights  of  the  two 
parties. 
3.2.  Geographical  description  of  the  three  islands 
The  three  islands  are  strategically  situated  at  the  entrance  of  the  Arabian/Persian 
Gulf,  opposite  the  Strait  of  Hormuz,  which  joins  the  Gulf  with  the  Gulf  of  Oman  and 
the  Arabian  Sea.  2  Hormuz  is  also  one  of  the  most  vital  channels  of  trade  in  the 
world  because  about  two-thirds  of  seaborne  trade  in  crude  oil  passes  through  it.  The 
world's  largest  tankers  use  the  Strait  and  a  total  of  about  80  ships  per  day  make  the 
transit.  3 
3.2.1.  Abu  Musa  island 
Abu  Musa  lies  in  a  strategic  position  at  a  distance  of  88  nautical  miles  south-west  of' 
the  Strait  of  Hormuz,  at  a  distance  of  38  nautical  miles  south-east  of'  the  Lingah 
Z:, 
shore  in  Iran,  and  34  nautical  miles  north-west  of  the  Sharjah  shore  in  the  UAF1.  The 
I-  The  Tunb  islands  are  respectively  known  to  the  Arabs  as  Tunb  td-Kubtu  and  Tunh  ul-Sughrci,  and 
to  the  Iranians  as  Tunb-e  Bozorg  and  Tunb-e  Kuchek. 
2 
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shortest  distance  between  the  UAE  and  the  island  is  32  nautical  miles  at  Umm  al- 
Qaiwain  coast. 
4 
This  island  is  larger  than  the  two  Tunbs.  It  is  about  four  square  miles  in  size  5 
and  is  almost  rectangular  in  shape.  The  island  is  relatively  low  land  consisting  of 
sandy  plains,  with  dry  grass  which  is  grazed  by  domestic  animals  and  wild  gazelles. 
The  surface  of  the  island  is  uneven,  with  hills,  the  highest  peak  of  which  is  'known 
as  mount  Halwa'  6,  and  is  about  360  feet  high.  Abu  Musa  has  a  number  of 
plantations  of  date  palms.  It  relies  on  water  from  a  number  of  wells. 
There  is  no  clear  recent  census  for  the  population  of  the  island  Abu  Musa 
though  it  is  thought  to  have  about  800  inhabitants 
.7 
These  are  the  Sudan  tribe'  from 
Khan,  a  village  in  Sharjah.  9  Most  work  in  fishing,  grazing  cattle  or agriculture.  The 
island  is  rich  with  red  iron  oxide.  There  is  a  school  and  a  mosque,  and  electrical 
generators  and  water  desalination  stations  have  been  erected  by  the  government  of 
Sharjah.  There  is  also  a  police  station  and  a  small  medical  clinic  belonging  to 
Sharjah.  Any  complicated  medical  cases  are  refered  to  Sharjah  for  treatment.  10 
4_  Tactical  Pilotage  Chart,  TPC  H-7D  Iran,  Oman,  United  Arab  Emirates,  Scale  1:  5000.000, 
Produced  under  the  direction  of  the  Director  of  Military  Survey,  the  Ministry  offlefence,  UK(1986). 
5_  DubailShatjah  Border  case,  ILR,  Vol.  91,  (1993),  P.  668. 
(I 
-  The  mount  known  to  the  Arabs  asJubal  al-Kalwa. 
7_  See  Ndivi  Juzur  al-Khaleqj  al-Arabi.  -  Asbab  al-Nzain  wa  Mtatlbal  al-l-IL  (Symposium  of  the 
Arabian  Gulf:  reasons  for  the  connict-requirements  for  the  solution),  (1994),  P.  71.  Also  see 
Dubai/Sharjah  border  case,  ILR,  Vol.  91,  (1993),  P.  668.  This  population  figure  is  much  smaller  than 
the  original  number  of  inhabitants  in  the  island  before  1971.  Due  to  Iranian  harassment,  a  lar-e 
number  ofthe  island's  inhabitants  have  left  for  Sharjah.  AI-Wasat  (Magazine),  20-26  September 
1993,  P.  15. 
'-  This  tribe  has  no  connection  with  the  country  of'  the  same  narne.  Members  of'  the  tribe  live  in 
Sharjah,  Abu  Dhabi,  Dubai  and  AI'man. 
9-  Qdiea  al-1hii1al  al-Irani  Li-JuZzir  Tunb  al-Kuhra,  Timb  ul-Sughra,  Abit  Musa  al-Tabuitih  Li- 
Daw/a/  al-linaral  al-Arabiah  al-Afulahidah  (The  case  of  Iranian  occupation  of  the  islands  of  the 
Greater  Tunb,  The  Lesser  Tunh  and  Abu  Musa  which  belong  to  the  UAE),  a  paper  submitted  to 
the  Conference  of  the  Peace  Islands,  Ras  al-Khairnah,  30  Novernber-I  December  (1994),  11.5.  Also, 
J.  G.  Lorimer,  Gazetteer  oj'lhc  Persian  Guý(  Oman  and  Central  Arabia,  Vol.  1113,  Geographical  and 
Statistical,  (1908),  P.  1275. 
jo 
-  Al-Wasal,  op.  cit.,  11.15-16 35 
After  the  signing  of  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  Iran  and  the 
Sharjah  government  in  1971  a  brancli  of  Melli  Iran  Bank,  a  guard  centre,  a  police 
station,  and  residence  for  soldiers  and  their  families  were  built  by  the  Iranian 
government  in  the  northern  part  of  the  island.  11 
3.2.2.  Greater  Tunb  island 
The  Greater  Tunb,  or  Tomb  according  to  Lorimer,  12  is  an  island  approximately 
circular  in  shape  and  about  21/4  miles  in  diameter.  13  The  Greater  Tunb  lies  at  a 
distance  of  65  nautical  miles  south-west  of  the  Strait  of  Hormuz.  It  is  about  15 
nautical  miles  south  of  the  Qeshm  island  coast  in  Iran  and  about  41  nautical  miles 
west-nor-th  of  AI-Jazirah  Al-Hamrah  coast  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  in  the  UAE.  14 
The  word  'tunb'  has  different  meanings  for  the  two  parties.  In  the  Tangestani 
dialect  (south  Iran)  it  means  hill.  15  The  meaning  of  'tunb'  in  Arabic  is  the  peg  of  a 
tent  or  a  long  rope  with  which  a  tent  is  tied.  16  It  can  be  argued  with  some  force  from 
this  meaning  that  the  island  is  related  to  the  Emirate  of  Ras  al-Uaimah,  because 
Ras  al-Khaimah  means  a  tent  erected  on  the  western  shore  of  the  Gulf  and  tied  to  the 
Gulf  by  the  islands  of  Tunb.,.  17 
'' 
-  Ibid.  P.  15. 
12 
-  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  P.  1908. 
1, 
-  Vinson  &  Elkins,  Attorneys  at  Law,  Report  on  the  Tunb  Islands,  Submitted  to  Ras  al-Khainlah 
Government,  IJOUston-Texas,  (1980),  P.  3.3. 
Tactical  Pilotage  Chart,  op.  cit_ 
See  Afsar,  L,  Jaznvh-i  Bu  Musu  va  jcizqvir-i  Tunh-i  Buzurg  m  Tunh-i  Kuchik  shumil-i  mvazu-i 
lahii,  jughrafivayi,  larikhi,  ýjtitnai,  iqtisadi  (Buinusa  island  and  Great  and  Little  Tonb  islands), 
(1993),  11.111.  Also  see  Pirouz  Mojtahed-Zadeh,  Iran's  Maritime  Boundaries  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  The 
case  of  Abu  Musa  Island,  The  Boundaries  of  A4odern  It-an,  (1994),  P.  106. 
16 
_  See  lbin  Mndwr,  Lsan  al-Arah  (classical  Arabic-Arabic  dictionary),  Vol.  8,  (1995),  11.205-6. 
Also,  A.  M.  A]-Fiwmy,  al-Hybah  al-AInir  (classical  Arabic-Arabic  dictionary),  P.  144. 
17 
_  See  A.  Abdoul,  4'nif  ul-Ju-ur  cil-,  4rabiah  ul-7hululh  hain  Wadoh  ol-Moglal-linaroli  Iva  liwqd  Z 
al-Motff  ýil-Irani  (The  crisis  of  the  three  Arabic  islands,  between  the  clarity  of  the  Einirati 
position  and  the  contradiction  of  the  Iranian  position),  a  paper  submitted  to  the  Conference  oftlic 
Peace  Islands,  Ras  a  I-  Khaimah,  330  November-  I  December  (1994),  P.  1  1. Cý 
There  was  no  precise  census  of  the  island's  inhabitants  bel'ore  their  deportation 
on  30  November  1971.  The  island's  population  was  approximately  about  200 
inhabitants.  18  They  were  Arabs  from  the  tribes  of  'Farnim  and  Hurez.  19  They  lived 
by  fishing,  agriculture  and  cattle  grazing  and  traded  in  fish  in  the  markets  of  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  and  Dubai.  Drinking  water  is  available  in  the  island.  The  school  and  police 
station  on  the  island  were  built  by  the  goverrinient  of  Ras  al-Khaimah.  There  is  also 
a  lighthouse.  At  present,  no  civilian  population  remains  on  the  island.  It  has  been 
adapted  to  an  Iranian  military  base.  20 
3.2.3.  Lesser  Tunb  island 
This  island,  also  known  as  Nabiyu  Tunb  or  Little  Tunb,  is  approximately  one  mile 
long  and  1/4mile  wide.  21  The  distance  between  the  island  and  Greater  Tunb  is  7 
nautical  miles.  It  lies  19  nautical  miles  south-west  of  the  Qeshm  island  coast  in  Iran, 
and  about  46  nautical  miles  north-west  of  Al-Jazirah  Al-Hamrah  of  Ras  al-Khaimah 
in  the  UAE.  The  shortest  distance  between  the  UAE  and  the  island  is  44  nautical 
miles  from  the  Umm  al-Qaiwain  coast. 
22 
The  island  contains  rocky  hills  of  a  dark  colour  at  its  north  part,  the  highest 
altitude  of  which  is  116  feet.  It  is  unpopulated,  because  of  the  lack  of  drinking 
water.  23 
18 
-  SCOR,  26  year,  16  1  Oth  meetint.:  9  December  197  1,1".  12.  Some,  however,  consider  the  island's 
inhabitants  at  that  time  to  number  more  than  400.  Al-khaleej,  2  December  197  1. 
'9-  Ochat  al-lhtilal  al-Irani  Li-JuZur  Timb  al-Kubru,  Tunh  al-Sughra,  Ahu  Musa  al-Tahainh  Li- 
Daivlca  (W-fmaruf  al-Arabiah  al-Mulahidah,  op.  cit.,  11.5. 
20 
_  Interview  with  Moharned  A.  Abu  Al-Qasni  and  his  son  Abdul  Rahman,  frorn  Great  Tunb  island, 
on  18  September  1993.  Also  see  Yjalat  Ras  al-Khaimah  (Ras  al-Khaimah  Magazine),  No.  74,  I 
December  1979.  P.  11. 
21 
-  Vinson  &  Elkins,  op.  cit.,  P.  3.3. 
22 
_,  Yactical  Pilotage  Chart,  op.  cit. 
13 
_  oraphical  and  Statistical,  (  1908),  P.  1909.  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1113,  Geog 
36 37 
3.3.  History  of  the  three  islands 
The  recorded  history  of  the  three  islands  goes  back  to  the  sixteenth  century;  they 
appear  in  old  maps  and  through  the  descriptions  of  travellers  who  visited  the 
Arabian/Persian  Gulf.  However,  the  initial  indication  of  sovereignty  over  the  three 
islands  goes  back  to  a  first  document  of  1864,24  which  confirms  that  the  islands 
belong  to  the  Qawasim  of  Oman. 
3.3.1.  Early  history 
The  earliest  map  which  shows  the  three  islands  in  the  Gulf  was  published  in  various 
editions  in  Strasbourg  between  1522  and  1547  by  C.  Ptolemy.  Certain  editions  of 
this  map  were  coloured,  but  there  is  no  consistency  in  this  colouring,  which  appears 
to  be  solely  for  decorative  reasons.  25 
After  this  map  was  published,  a  great  many  more  were  published  in  the 
sixteenth  century,  the  seventeenth  century,  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  nineteenth 
century,  by  different  authors  in  various  places  of  publication  such  as  London,  Paris, 
Amsterdam  and  Berlin.  All  showed  the  three  islands  in  different  delineations,  some 
gave  the  islands  the  colour  of  an  Iranian  province,  others  coloured  them  as  an 
Arabian  province.  Yet  others  did  not  colour  them  in  relation  to  either  of  the  two 
countries.  26  For  example,  a  map  containing  the  islands  drawn  by  Niebuhr,  a  captain 
of  engineers  in  the  Service  of  the  King  of  Denmark,  during  his  trip  to  the 
Arabian/Persian  Gulf  in  1761,  was  without  colours.  Neither  did  he  mention  to  whorn 
the  islands  belonged 
. 
27  Some  authors  placed  the  islands  in  various  locations.  Others 
24 
-  See  below,  P.  39. 
25 
_  M.  E.  Bathurst  &  Northcutt  Ely,  Sharjah's  Title  to  the  Island  of  Abu  Musa,  Vol.  111,  Submitted  to 
His  Highness  Shaikh  Khalid  bin  Moliarried  Al-Qasimi  Ruler  of  Sharjah  arid  its  Depeiidericies,  (  197  1 
11.12. 
26 
-  Ibid.  P.  12-48. 
27 
_  See  the  inap  in  M.  Niebuhr,  Travels  Thi-ough  Arabia,  and  othei-  Couno-ies  in  the  East,  translated 
into  English  by  Robert  Heron,  Vol.  11,  (1994),  1'.  136. 8 
delineated  them  as  being  near  the  southern  coast  (the  UAE  coast).  Yet  others 
delineated  them  as  being  near  the  northern  coast  (the  Iranian  coast).  Another 
problem  is  that  in  some  maps  the  three  islands  were  not  named.  28 
In  1818  Captain  Robert  Taylor  of  the  '3rd  Regiment  of  the  Bombay  Native 
Infantry,  an  assistant  political  agent  in  Turkish  Arabia,  set  down  brief  notes 
containing  historical  and  other  information  of  the  three  islands.  In  these  notes  he 
described  Abu  Musa  and  the  two  Tunbs,  their  location  and  levels.  29 
In  1830  Captain  George  Barnes  Brucks,  of  the  Indian  Navy,  prepared  a  men-ioir 
describing  navigation  in  the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf.  Contained  in  this  was  a  general 
geographic  description  of  the  three  islands,  Abu  Musa  and  the  two  Tunbs,  without 
mention  of  ownership.  30 
Another  early  mention  of  the  three  islands  is  in  the  India  Directory,  containing 
directions  for  sailing  to  and  from  the  East  Indies,  written  in  1836  by  James 
Horsburgh.  He  was  a  corresponding  member  of  the  Imperial  Academy  of  Sciences, 
St.  Petersburgh  and  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Northern  Antiquaries,  Copenhagen,  and 
Hydrographer  to  the  Honourable  East  India  Company.  In  the  Directory  he  defined 
the  three  islands  and  the  location  of  water  on  them.  He  said  that  they  had  no 
inhabitants  and  that  the  Prince  of  Wales  was  a  cruiser  anchored  near  thern.  31 
The  Persian  Gulf  Pilot,  compiled  by  Captain  C.  G.  Constable  and  Lieutenant 
A.  W.  Stiffe,  late  of  H.  M.  Indian  Navy,  in  1864,  mentioned  the  three  islands,  stating 
28 
-  Bathurst  &  Ely,  op.  cit.,  P.  12-48.  These  maps  also  mention  the  three  islands  with  names  near  to 
their  actual  names.  In  other  cases  they  mention  them  with  strange  unrecol.,  nized  names,  as  Baman  or 
Roniosa  to  Abu  Musa,  Thumb  or  Tornbe  to  Greater  Tunb,  and  Banitonb  or  Petornbo  to  Lesser  Turib. 
For  more  detail  on  the  many  names  of  the  three  islands  shown  in  the  maps,  see  the  list  in,  Ibid.  11.77- 
9. 
29 
-  In  this,  Captain  Taylor  called  Abu  Musa  'Bornosa'  and  said  it  was  an  uninhabited  island;  see 
IMBG,  Vol.  1,1798-1835,11.257-272. 
-  Ibid.  11.792-3. 
-  Ibid.  Vol.  2,1836-1864,  P.  15-6. that  they  were  barren  and  uninhabited,  were  without  water,  and  were  visited  by 
fishing  boats  firom  Sharjah.  32 
3.3.2.  History  of  the  three  islands  prior  to  1887 
As  discussed  in  chapter  one,  before  the  British  intervention  in  the  Arabi  an/Persi  an 
Gull'in  the  early  1800s,  an  Arab  tribal  federation  known  as  the  Qawasim  dominated 
both  sides  of  the  lower  Gulf  and  the  islands  in  between  from  its  main  bases  at  the 
town  of  Lingah  on  the  Iranian  coast  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  and  Sharjah  on  the  Arabian 
side. 
33 
By  1760  the  Qawasim  had  evidently  established  a  base  at  Lingah  after  the  death 
of  Nadir  shah  in  1747.  Such  historical  considerations  led  Laithwaite  from  the  India 
Office  to  write: 
It  is  not  clear  whether  any  effective  dominion  had  been  exercised 
by  Persia  in  the  islands  of  Tamb,  Abu  Muse  and  Sirri  prior  to  1750. 
It  seems  entirely  clear  that  no  effective  dominion  was  exercised  in 
any  of  them  by  her  between  that  date  and  the  seizure  of  Sirri  in  1887. 
In  the  intervening  period,  if  not  from  a  much  earlier  date,  the  islands 
were  apparently  part  of  the  hereditary  estates  of  the  Jowasimi  Arab 
Shailchs,  the  Shaikhs  on  the  Arab  shore  having  an  equal  interest  with 
those  on  the  Persian  littoral  [at  Lingah].  34 
The  first  British  recorded  evidence  regarding  Qawasim  tribal  ownership  of  the  three 
islands  was  a  letter  from  Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Saclar,  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khairnah  to 
Colonel  Pelly,  Political  Resident  at  BLIshire  in  December  28,1864: 
Last  year,  I  informed  you  of-  the  interference  of  the  Dubai  people 
in  regard  to  Abu  Musa  island  and  of'  their  taking  their  horses  and 
carnels  there.  This  island  belongs  to  rnc.  'runb,  Abu  Musa  and  Sir 
[Bu  Nair]  belong  to  me  from  the  time  ofrny  forefathers.  No  one  went 
there  without  my  permission  ... 
It  is  well  known  from  olden  times  that 
the  islands,  [i.  e.,  Abu  Musa,  Tunb  and  Sir]  belong  to  me.  Sirri 
belongs  to  the  Qawasim  of  Lingah,  Hen 
. 
jam  to  Seyid  Thcweini  and 
32 
-  Ibid.  P.  681-2. 
See  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  ],  Part  1,  Historical,  (  1915),  P.  63  1-2. 
Status  of  the  Islands  of  Tamb,  Little  Tamb,  Abu  Muse  and  Sirri,  Atioust  24,1928,  ABPD,  Vol.  13, 
1853-1957,  P.  80.  Also  see  the  same  documents  in  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P-33332. er 
Farur  to  the  Maraziks.  If  you  make  inquiries  about  this  [i.  e.  his 
15 
statement]  you  will  find  it  correct  . 
In  1869,  several  years  after  Shaikh  Sultan's  death,  the  Qawasirn  were  divided 
between  the  towns  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  Sharjah  and  Lingah.  36  Following  this 
division,  the  possession  of  Greater  Tunb  passed  to  Ras  al-Khaimah,  Abu  Musa  to 
37 
Sharjah  and  Sirri  to  Lingah 
. 
The  British  government  did  not  take  any  action 
concerning  the  ownership  of  the  Qawasim  islands  as  it  was  considered  an  internal 
affair. 
Shaikh  Khalifah  bin  Saeed,  the  ruler  of  Lingah,  evidently  was  aware  of  the 
inclusion  of  Greater  Tunb  within  Ras  al-Khaimah  territory.  In  1871,  when  Shaikh 
flumaid  bin  Abdullah,  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  complained  to  Shaikh  Khallfah 
about  unauthorized  landings  on  Greater  Tunb  by  dependents  of  Qawasim  at  Lingah, 
Shaikh  Khalifah  replied: 
After  compliments  -as  regards  your  last  letter,  in  which  you 
mention  about  the  going  of  the  Busmaithis  to  the  island  of  Tunb,  my 
brother,  the  Busmaithis  are  your  friends  and  party,  and  they  are  under 
your  orders;  but  you  should  prohibit  the  people  of  Dubai,  Ajman  and 
Umm  al-Qaiwain  and  Bassidore  who  all  go  to  that  place,  while  the 
Busmaithis  are  under  your  orders.  38 
In  October  1874  a  change  took  place  in  the  government  of  Lingah  which,  according 
to  Lorimer,  was  still  a  tribally  administered  Arab  principality,  in  consequence  of  the 
death  of  Shaikh  Khalifah  bin  Saeed 
. 
39  Friendly  relations  and  the  old  Understanding 
3ý 
_  IOR,  R/15/1/246,  Letter  from  Sultan  bin  Saqar  dated  28  December  1864  to  Political  Resident  in 
tile  Gulf. 
36 
_  Ras  al-Khairnah  was  ruled  by  Shaikh  Flurnaid  bin  Abdullah  from  1869-1900,  Sharjah  by  Shaikh 
Salini  bin  Sultan  from  1868-1883,  and  Lin-gah  by  Shaikh  Khalifah  bill  Saeed  froin  1868-1874. 
,7_  Vinson  &  Elkins,  op.  cit.,  P.  3.20.  There  is  a  different  account  of  this  division  in  1875  froin 
Lieutenant  Fraser,  Assistant  Resident  ill  the  Persian  Gulf',  lie  was  informed  by  Mirza  Abod  Kasini  that 
some  40  years  or  more  earlier  the  Qawasirn  apportion  i.  e.  the  Greater  Tunb,  Nabyan  Faroor,  Sirri  and 
Farur  to  the  Chief  of  Lingah.  See  Ibid.  P.  3.1  9.  Also,  M.  M.  Abdullah,  Dawlal  al-linarat  ul-Arcibiah 
al-Mutahidah  wa  Jirunha  (UAE  and  its  Neighbour),  (198  1),  P.  383. 
IOR,  R/I  5/1/246,  Letter  dated  27  November  1871  from  the  Ruler  of  Lingah  Klialifah  bill  Saced  to 
the  Ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  Flurnaid  bin  Abdullah. 
40 
39 
_  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1,  Part  11,  Historical,  P-2063 41 
over  Greater  Tunb  were  evidently  reestablished  between  the  new  ruler  of  Lingah 
40 
Shaikh  Ali  bin  Khalifah,  Shaikh  Khalifah's  young  son,  and  his  old  relative,  Shaikh 
Humaid  bin  Abdullah  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah.  Thus,  when  disputes  arose  again  iri 
late  1876  concerning  the  unauthorized  visits  to  Greater  Tunb  by  the  Busmaithis, 
Shaikh  Ali  wrote  a  letter  in  January  1877  to  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah: 
You  write  about  the  Busmaith  people,  that  you  wanted  me  to 
prohibit  them  going  to  the  island  of  Tunb,  where  they  do  various 
damages,  because  the  said  island  was  your  territory  and  that  there 
was  copious  correspondence  between  you  and  my  father,  and  that  the 
latter  prohibited  them  from  going  there.  This  is  a  fact,  and  I  am 
satisfied  that  the  Island  of  Tunb  is  a  dependency  of  the  Qawasirn  of 
Oman;  and  we  have  no  property  there  and  no  interference,  except 
with  your  consent;  since  I  considered  the  subjects  and  territories  as 
one,  I  assumed  the  authority  of  giving  them  permission  to  go  there, 
but  now  as  you  are  displeased,  and  you  want  that  they  should  be 
prohibited,  I  will  prohibit  them,  and  you  will  give  satisfaction,  and  I 
hope  that  God  may  preserve  you  as  a  proper  representative  of  all  who 
have  passed  away.  41 
3.3.3.  The  early  beginning  of  the  dispute  in  1887 
The  dispute  between  the  Qawasim  tribe  and  Iran  over  the  three  islands  started  after 
Iran  conquered  Lingah  on  15  September  1887  and  occupied  Sirri,  a  Qawasim  island 
which  was  indisputably  administered  by  the  Lingah  Shaikhs.  Within  a  few  days,  the 
Iranian  government  erected  a  flag-staff  and  hoisted  the  Iranian  flag  on  Sirri  island. 
At  the  same  time  the  group  who  had  erected  a  flag-staff  on  Sirri  proceeded  to 
Greater  Tunb  to  inspect  it  and  erect  a  flag-staff,  there  thereby  attempting  to  bring  it 
42 
also  under  Iranian  sovereignty  . 
Iranian  officials  evidently  thOLIght  possession  of  the  Lingah  mainland  entitled 
them  to  the  possession  of  all  the  islands  believed  to  have  been  administered  by  the 
"'-Shaikh  AIi  bin  Khalifah  III  I  ed  Lingall  From  1874  to  1878  after  the  death  of  Ii  is  father. 
41 
-  -y  1877  from  the  Ruler  ofl,  ingali  Ali  bin  Khalil',  h  to  the  IOR,  R/I  5/l/246,  Letter  dated  28  Januai  a 
Ruler  of  Ras  al-Khainiah  IfUrnaid  bin  Abdullah. 
42 
_  Vinson  &  Elkins,  op.  cit.,  P.  3.34. er 
ruler  of  Lingali.  Therefore,  the  Political  Resident  of  Britain  in  the  Gulf  and  the 
Minister  at  Teheran,  inquired  from  his  government  whether  the  islands  Sirri  and 
Tunb  were  tinder  British  protection,  and  whether  any  action  at  Teheran  was 
necessary.  The  government  of  India  replied,  "That  Sirri  and  Tamb  were  beyond  the 
zone  of  Persian  interference,  and  that  the  islands  belonged  to  Arab  Chiefs  under 
British  protection  in  common  with  Arabs  of  the  Persian  Littoral"  . 
43  And  Lorimer 
wrote:  "This  was  the  view  entertained  also  by  the  British  authorities,  who  had 
always  understood  that  the  superintendence  over  Sim  exercised  by  the  Shaikh  of 
Lingah  resulted  from  his  position  as  a  Shaikh  of  the  Qawasim,  and  not  from  his 
tenure  of  the  Persian  port  and  district  of  Lingah' 
. 
44 
On  16  October  1887  Shaikh  Saqar  bin  Khalid,  ruler  of  Sharjah,  protested  to  the 
Political  Resident  about  the  Iranian  occupation  of  Sirri  and  asked  that  similar  action 
at  Greater  Tunb  should  be  prevented.  45  However,  the  government  of  India  felt  some 
difficulty  in  taking  any  action  and,  after  consultation  with  the  Resident  in  the  Gulf, 
they  agreed  that  since  no  overt  action  have  been  taken  by  Iran  in  the  case  of  Turib, 
representations  at  Teheran  ShOLIld  be  confined  to  the  qUestion  of  Sirri.  46 
The  Iranian  government  responded  that,  for  the  preceding  nine  years,  taxes  had 
been  collected  and  paid  to  the  Iranian  government  from  both  Sirri  and  Tunb,  and  that 
documents  in  support  of  this  assertion  were  with  the  Bushire  governor.  When 
approached  by  the  Political  Resident  the  Bushire  governor  declared  he  had  no 
docurnents. 
47 
43 
-  See  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  13,  P.  M. 
44 
-  See  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1,  Part  11,  Historical,  P.  2066. 
45 
-  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,11.3333. 
46 
-  Ibid. 
47 
-  Ibid. 
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Shaikh  Saqar  bin  Khalid,  ruler  of  Sharjah  at  this  time,  was  also  contacted  by  the 
British  Residency;  he  told  the  Residency's  Agent  in  Shaijah  that  there  were  no 
inhabitants  on  Tunb,  no  village  and  no  fishermen  paying  any  taxes,  and  he  supported 
this  with  three  letters  from  Chiefs  of  Lingah,  admitting  the  Chief  of  Sharjah's 
ownership  of  Tunb.  48 
The  British  government  could  not  convince  the  Iranian  government  that  the 
Qawasims  of  Lingah  were  governing  the  island  of  Sim  within  their  capacity  as 
Shaikhs  of  Qawasim,  and  not  as  Iranian  governors.  Therefore,  the  British 
government  agreed  to  facilitate  the  progress  of  the  negotiations  with  the  Iranian 
government  in  August  1888,  to  accept  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  island  of  Sirri 
. 
49 
Despite  this,  the  Qawasim  Shaikhs  did  not  refrain  from  demanding  their  right  of  the 
return  of  the  island  under  their  control. 
3.3.4.  Temporary  Iranian  occupation  ofAbu  Musa  and  the  Greater  Tunb 
islands  in  1904 
After  Iran  occupied  I-ingah,  much  of  the  trade  left  to  the  opposite  side  of  the  Gulf, 
because  of  the  harassment  by  the  Iranian  Imperial  Custorris  towards  the  Lingah 
inhabitants.  Therealler,  some  Lingah  merchants  began  to  suggest  that  Abu  Musa 
50  island  should  be  made  a  port  ofeall  by  the  British  steamship  companies  . 
In  1903  the  government  of  India  was  concerned  that  Iran  might  attempt  to  annex 
Abu  Musa  or  Greater  Tunb.  It  therefore  advised  the  Shaikh  of  Shagah  to  hoist  his 
48 
-  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  13,  P.  81 
49 
_  Ibid.  P.  82.  The  British  and  Iranian  governments  resumed  discussions  regarding  Iran's  claim  to 
Sirri  in  1894.  The  British  government  failed  to  come  to  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problern,  and  the 
island  has  continued  to  be  occupied  by  the  Iranians  until  today-despite  all  the  assurances  made  by  the 
British  Resident  at  that  time,  Colonel  Wilson,  and  thOSC  Who  Succeeded  him  between  1897-1955  on 
the  ownership  of  the  island  by  the  M-Qawasim  tribe.  Despite  this,  the  Iranian  -overnment  has  no 
proof  of  its  ownership  of  the  island.  See  Vinson  &  Flkins,  op.  cit.,  P.  3.43-3.44. 
"' 
-  See  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1,  Part  1,1  listorical,  11.745. 44 
flag  on  both  islands,  and  this  he  did  in  the  summer  of  1903.  This  precaution  proved 
necessary  because  at  the  beginning  of  April  1904,  Belgian  employees  of  the  Iranian 
customs  authorities  removed  the  Qawasim  flags  from  the  islands  of  Abu  Musa  and 
Greater  Tunb,  dismantled  the  Sharjah  flag  staffs,  hoisted  the  Iranian  flag  in  their 
place,  and  left  two  Iranian  customs  guards  on  both  islands.  51  Lorimer  explained: 
There  was  reason  to  believe  that  the  action  taken  by  the  Persian 
goverm-nent  had  been  prompted  by  the  Russian  Legation  at  Tehran, 
who  ...  were  apprehensive  of  measures  on  the  part  of  His  Britannic 
Majesty's  government  for  the  consolidation  of  their  position  in  that 
12  quarter,  possibly  by  the  occupation  of  fixed  points  . 
This  action  by  the  Iranian  government  led  to  an  immediate  protest  from  the  Shaikh 
of  Sharjah,  who  appealed  to  the  British  government  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
prevent  such  interference  in  his  territory.  Therefore,  the  Viceroy  of  India  proposed 
that  a  gun-boat  be  sent  with  a  representative  of  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah  to  haul  down 
the  Iranian  flag,  reinstate  the  Qawasim  flag,  and  remove  the  Iranian  guards  to  Iranian 
territory.  53  However,  they  decided  to  give  the  Iranian  government  the  opportunity  to 
withdraw  from  the  islands.  On  24  May  1904  the  British  Minister  in  Tehran  reported 
to  the  government  of  India  that  the  Iranian  government,  while  reserving  its  right  to 
discuss  with  the  British  government  their  respective  clairn  to  Abu  Musa  and  Greater 
Tunb,  had  ordered  Bushire  to  remove  the  Iranian  flags  and  guards  from  Abu  Musa 
54 
and  Greater  Tunb 
. 
In  a  letter  to  the  Iranian  Forcign  Minister,  dated  II  June  1904,  the  Shah  ofIran 
stated: 
Although  Iran  views  the  islands  as  belonging  to  Iran,  Britain  has 
pressured  to  have  both  flags  lowered  at  those  places,  so  that  the  issue 
may  be  settled  by  arbitration.  We  do,  thereflore,  expect  that  the 
51 
_  Ibid. 
52 
_  Ibid.  Part  11,  P.  2138. 
5'-  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  13,  P.  82. 
"-  Ibid.  P.  82-3. 4 
British  would  not  allow  the  Shaikhs  to  hoist  their  flag  once  ours  have 
been  removed.  55 
On  14  June  1904  the  Iranian  flags  were  duly  removed  from  the  two  islands,  and  a 
few  days  later  the  Qawasim  flag  was  replaced  on  both  islands  by  the  ruler  of 
Shaýjah 
. 
56  The  Iranian  government  noted,  though,  that  it  considered  the  two  islands 
as  its  own  property,  and  suggested  that  neither  party  hoist  flags  in  the  two  places 
pending  the  settlement  of  the  question.  5  7 
The  British  Minister  promptly  replied  that  although  he  would  be  willing  to 
transmit  any  proofs  that  the  claims  of  Iran  to  the  islands  outweighed  those  of  the 
Shaikh  of  Sharjah,  he  could  not  agree  to  the  suggestion  that  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah  be 
prevented  from  rehoisting  his  flags  on  the  islands.  He  pointed  out  that  the  British 
government  had  made  no  reciprocal  request  regarding  the  Iranian  occupation  of 
Sirri.  The  Minister  concluded  his  reply  by  explaining: 
The  position  would  have  been  different  if  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah 
had  removed  an  existing  Persian  flag  from  Tamb  and  Abu  Musa; 
what  he  did  was  to  hoist  his  own  flag  upon  the  islands,  which  were 
not  yet  formally  occupied  by  any  other  government,  and  he  has  the 
right  to  fly  it  as  the  first  occupant  until  his  lawful  possession  of  these 
58  islands  is  disproved 
. 
However,  no  serious  attempt  was  made  by  the  Iranian  government  to  produce  proof 
of  Iran  ownership.  Lorimer  explains  "that  the  Persian  government  was  deterred  from 
urging  their  claims  to  the  two  islands  by  British  intimations  to  them  that,  if  it 
persisted,  the  claim  of  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah  to  Sirri  might  be  revived  and  supported 
by  the  British  governnient".  ý  9-  Fhe  Iranian  government  complained  to  the  British 
51 
_  Quoted  in  D.  H.  Bavand,  The  Historiml,  Political  and  Legal  bases  of'Iran's  Sovereignty  over  the 
Islands  oj'Titlnb  and  Abit  Musa,  (1994),  P.  72, 
56 
_  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1,  part  1,  Historical,  P.  746. 
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_  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,11.335. 
58 
-  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  13,  P.  83. 
59 
-  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  WEI,  Part  11,  Historical,  P.  2138. Chapter  3 
government  in  1905  about  the  erection  of  new  buildings  at  Tunb  by  the  Shaikh  of 
Sharjah.  Accordingly,  the  British  government  investigated  this  issue  and  found  it  to 
be  baseless. 
60 
3.3.5.  From  1912  to  1948 
In  the  beginning  of  1912  the  Qawasim  exercised  sovereignty  more  clearly  over  the 
three  islands;  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah  permitted  the  British  government  to  erect  a 
lighthouse  on  Greater  Tunb  island  61  after  the  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf,  Sir 
Percy  Cox,  was  granted  permission  by  the  Shaikh  subject  to  an  assurance  that  his 
62 
rights  of  sovereignty  were  not  affected  . 
In  February  1913  the  Iranian  Foreign  Office  raised  the  question  with  the  British 
Minister  at  Tehran,  urging  that  the  ownership  of  the  island  was  contested.  However, 
Sir  Percy  Cox  replied  to  the  Iranian  Foreign  Office- 
that  he  had  recently  made  it  clear  to  the  Persian  Governor  of  the 
Gulf  Ports  that  the  ownership  of  Tomb  was  not  open  to  question,  and 
since  the  correspondence  of  1905  the  subjects  of  the  Shailch  of 
Sharjah  and  his  flag  have  remained  established  on  the  island;  that  if 
the  question  was  now  reopened  His  Majesty's  Government  would  no 
doubt  revive  the  question  of  Sirri;  but  that  a  flat  refusal  to  discuss  it 
would  probably  be  best.  63 
This  answer  decided  the  Iranian  government  not  to  press  the  claim,  and  the 
lighthouse  was  constructed  at  Greater  Tunb  on  15  July  1913.64 
Another  exercise  of  Qawasim  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands  was  established 
in  early  1923,  when  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah  agreed  to  give  Messrs  F.  O.  Strich  a 
"-  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  133,  P.  8'  3. 
61 
-  Ras  al-Khaimah  and  Sharjah  were  united  from  1900  until  1921,  when  they  each  assumed 
independence  as  two  Emirates.  The  islands  of'Funb  were  considered  as  being  owned  by  Ras  al- 
Khaimah,  whereas  Sharjah  kept  the  island  of  Abu  Musa.  For  more  details  see  A.  J.  Al-Tadmori,  al- 
Juzural-Arabiah  al-Thalath  (The  Three  Arabian  Islands),  (1995),  P.  109. 
62 
-  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  13,13.83. 
63 
_  Ibid.  P.  84. 
46 
"-  Ibid. C 
65  concession  to  produce  red  oxide  at  Abu  Musa  for  five  years.  Several  days  later,  a 
note  asserting  Iranian  rights  over  both  Abu  Musa  and  Greater  Tunb  islands  66  was 
addressed  to  the  British  Minister  in  Tehran.  Sir  P.  Loraine,  the  Minister  concerned, 
adopted  an  uncompromising  attitude  and  returned  the  note  to  the  Prime  Minister 
with  a  strongly  worded  covering  letter.  No  reaction  was  taken  by  the  Iranian  side 
concerning  the  letter  of  the  British  Minister.  67 
In  1925,  however,  Iran  more  forcefully  asserted  its  claim;  the  Iranian  authorities 
sent  a  launch  to  Abu  Musa  which  inspected  the  red-oxide  deposits  and  removed  one 
bag.  The  British  Minister  in  Tehran  protested.  The  Iranian  government  replied  that 
Abu  Musa  belonged  to  Iran.  The  action  was  taken  by  the  Minister,  who  was 
reminded  of  the  1923  correspondence,  and  subsequently  warned  privately  that 
persistence  in  the  Iranian  claim  would  make  it  necessary  "to  request  the  government 
of  India  to  dispatch  a  ship  of  war  to  Abu  Musa  to  uphold  the  rights  of  the  Shaikh  of 
Sharjah".  The  Iranian  government  withdrew,  and  the  customs  authorities  were 
instructed  "not  to  take  any  steps  in  Abu  Musa  or  Tamb  pending  reply  from  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  regarding  status  of  these  islands".  68 
"-  See  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P.  39.  This  was  the  second  contract  signed  by  the  Shaikh  of 
Sharjah  to  the  red-oxide  concession  on  the  island  of  Abu  Musa.  The  first  one  was  in  1898,  signed  by 
three  persons  including  a  naturalized  British-Indian  subject.  In  1906  they  transferred  the  red-oxide 
concession  to  Messrs  Wonckhaus,  who  were  the  agents  in  the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf  of  the  I  larnburg- 
American  Line.  Therefore,  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah  cancelled  the  contract.  There  was  no  Iranian 
objection  to  this  agreement.  For  more  details  of  the  history  of  the  first  contract,  see  Ibid.  Vol.  6,1903- 
1923,  P.  159. 
66 
-  The  assertion  of  Iranian  rights  over  Abu  Musa  and  Greater  Tunb  came  after  the  Iranian 
concessionaire  of  the  Hormuz  red-oxide  concession,  Moin  al-TuJar,  a  person  of  great  wealth  and 
considerable  political  influence,  urged  the  Iranian  government  to  raise  the  Iranian  claim  to  Abu  Musa 
coupled  with  that  to  Bahrain,  and  refer  both  to  the  League  of  Nations.  See  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  ]  3, 
P.  84. 
67 
-  Ibid. 
69 
_  See  the  report  frorn  Sir  P.  Loraine  to  Sir  Austen  Charnberlain  oil  3)  1  May  1926,  in  IMBG,  op.  cit., 
Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P.  144-5, 
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In  July  1928  the  Iranian  government  again  asserted  its  claim  of  ownership  of  the 
three  islands;  an  Iranian  customs  launch  seized  and  detained  an  Arab  dhow 
approaching  Greater  Tunb 
. 
69  After  two  official  notes  of  protest  from  the  British 
Char&  d'Affaires  in  Tehran  to  the  Iranian  Minister  Foreign  Affairs,  the  release  of 
the  dhow  and  passengers  in  early  August  1928  was  achieved  . 
70  The  British  Charg& 
d'Affaires  officially  protested  in  his  4  August  1928  letter  that  Greater  Tunb  was  an 
Arabian  island.  The  Iranian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  replied  in  a  note  dated  21 
August  that: 
The  islands  of  Tunb  and  Abu  Musa  are  inseparable  parts  of 
Persian  territory  and  that  the  Persian  government  does  not  in  any  way 
recognize  [the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al-Khaimah]  as  independent  and  the 
owner  of  the  said  islands.  71 
In  1929  the  British  government  tried  to  sign  a  treaty  with  the  Iranian  government  to 
lease  Henjam  island  and,  during  the  negotiations  of  the  Anglo-Iraman  treaty  from 
1929  to  1935,  the  question  of  ownership  of  the  three  islands  was  raised.  According 
to  the  proposed  treaty,  the  British  government  suggested  that  the  Iranian  government 
agree  to  renounce  its  claims  upon  the  Arabian  islands  in  the  Gulf  In  return,  the 
British  government  would  recognize  the  Iranian  ownership  of  the  island  of  Sirri.  The 
72 
Iranians  evidently  rejected  this  proposal  . 
Subsequently,  the  British  government 
asked  the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  if  he  would  consider  the  sale  of  Greater  Tunb 
to  Iran.  After  discussion  between  the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  and  the  Shaikh  of 
Sharjah,  the  former  replied  that  he  would  not  agree  to  sell  the  island  at  any  price.  13 
69 
-  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  13,  P.  85. 
70 
-  For  more  details  about  the  seizure  of  an  Arab  dhow  at  Greater  Tunb,  see  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7, 
1920-1930,  P.  297-9. 
See  the  translation,  Ibid.  P,  344. 
For  more  details  on  the  Anglo-h-anian  negotiations  over  Henjam  island,  see  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  8, 
1930-1933,  P.  2-82  and  P.  365-556. 
"-  Ibid.  Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P.  64  1. 3 
On  the  other  hand,  Sir  Robert  Clive,  the  British  Minister  in  Tehran,  had  an 
unsatisfactory  conversation  with  Teymourtache,  the  Iranian  Minister  of  Court,  in 
which  he  offered  to  abandon  the  claim  to  Abu  Musa  if  Iran  could  be  given  Greater 
Tunb.  Sir  Robert  Clive  replied  that  this  island  did  not  belong  to  Great  Britain,  and 
the  Shaikh  who  owned  Greater  Tunb  declined  to  part  with  it.  74 
Subsequently,  the  Iranian  Minister  of  Court  changed  his  position;  he  indicated 
that  Iran  would  be  content  with  a  long  lease  of  Greater  Tunb  for  fifty  years,  paying 
over  to  the  Shaikh  whatever  Britain  paid  for  the  lease  of  Henjam,  and  would  allow 
the  Shaikh  to  maintain  gardens  on  the  island  and  exempt  him  from  payment  of 
customs  duties.  75  The  proposition  was  discussed  with  Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Salim,  76 
ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  in  January  193  1.  The  ruler  was  evidently  willing  to  enter 
into  such  an  arrangement,  but  only  on  several  conditions.  These  conditions 
reportedly  were  as  follows: 
I-  His  flag  should  continue  to  fly  and  his  representative  should 
remain. 
2-  His  subjects  should  not  be  interfered  with  without  reference  to 
himself 
3-  Persian  customs  vessels  should  not  come  to  the  Oman  Sea  to 
search  Arab  dhows  whether  belonging  to  his  subjects  or  to  his 
neighbouring  Shaikhs. 
4-  Absconding  divers  who  were  in  debt  should  be  handed  over. 
5-  Merchandise  imported  into  the  island  for  his  personal 
requirements  should  be  free  of  duty  and  also  foodstuffs  imported  by 
inhabitants. 
6-  The  annual  rental  was  to  be  paid  in  advance. 
7-  Any  flag-staff  erected  by  the  Persian  government  should  be  over  a 
building  and  not  on  the  ground. 
8-  The  conditions  should  be  enforced  by  the  British  government.  77 
74 
-  Ibid.  P.  645. 
75 
-  Ibid.  P.  645-6. 
76 
-  Ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  frorn  1919  to  1948. 
77 
-  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  8,1930-1933,  P.  100. 
49 Consequently,  as  Britain  felt  that  Iran  could  not  agree  to  such  restrictions  and, 
because  of  a  rupture  in  the  treaty  negotiations,  the  Shaikh's  answer  was  not 
communicated  to  the  Iranian  government.  78 
During  1933  and  1934,  Iran  again  acted  upon  its  claim  of  ownership  by  visiting 
Greater  Tunb  several  times.  The  first  such  visit  was  in  summer  1933,  when  an 
Iranian  naval  force  landed  on  Greater  Tunb  to  inspect  the  lighthouse.  In  1934,  on 
April  26th,  Iranian  officials  landed  and  interrogated  the  Rulers  agent.  After  that,  on 
13  September,  the  Iranian  sloop  Chahrokh  landed  a  party  at  the  island  and 
interrogated  the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al-Khaimah's  agent,  and  on  28  August  the  Iranian 
sloop  Palang  searched  an  Arab  dhow  within  the  territorial  waters  of  Greater  Tunb.  79 
Of  course,  this  action  by  the  Iranian  government  was  not  acceptable  to  the  British 
government  who  delivered  a  solemn  warning  to  the  Iranian  government  to  the  effect 
that  in  the  event  of  further  Iranian  interference  at  Tunb  it  would,  in  the  last  resort,  be 
defended  by  force.  80 
In  1935  the  Iranian  government  brought  up  the  question  of  concessions  over  the 
islands;  the  Iranian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  protested  on  29  March  to  His 
Majesty's  Minister,  about  the  agreement  made  between  Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Saclar 
ruler  of  Sharjah  and  Commander  Robert  Corbett  Bayldon  (Gold  Valley  Ochre  and 
Oxide  Company)  on  28  January  1935,  to  grant  a  concession  of  red  oxide  in  Abu 
Musa  island.  81  The  Iranian  Minister  considered  the  action  taken  by  the  English 
Ibid.  P.  10  1  -3. 
35,  P.  284.  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  9,1933-19) 
ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  13,  P.  135.  In  1935  the  British  Foreign  Office  indicated  that  this  threat  of  force 
was  communicated  to  Iran  at  the  highest  diplomatic  level.  This  reads  in  part  as  follows:  "On 
September  28th,  1934,  the  Secretary  of  State  made  it  clear  to  the  Persian  Minister  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  regarded  the  Persian  claim  to  Tamb  as  quite  unfounded,  and  both  he  and,  on  his 
instructions,  Sir  R.  Hoare,  warned  the  Persian  Government  that  any  Persian  attempt  at  aggression 
against  Tarnb  would  be  resisted  if  necessary  by  force".  See  IMBG,  op.  cit,  Vol.  10,1935-1937,  P.  124. 
"-  See  the  text  of  agreement  in  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  10,1935-1937,13.135. company  in  obtaining  the  concession  and  in  deriving  profit  from  the  natural 
resources  of  the  island  to  be  illegitimate  and  to  amount  to  the  misappropriation  of 
the  property  of  others.  82  The  British  government  replied  to  Iran  as  follows: 
His  Majesty's  Government  are  unable  to  accept  the  Persian  protest 
or  to  agree  that  Persia  has  any  ground  for  complaint  in  regard  to  the 
grant  of  red  oxide  concession  on  Abu  Musa  by  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah. 
As  the  Persian  Government  are  aware  His  Majesty's  Government 
have  never  admitted  the  Persian  claims  to  this  island  or  recognised 
that  she  has  any  rights  in  respect  of  it  and  they  are  not  prepared  to  do 
so  now.  83 
3.3.6.  From  1948  to  1968 
At  the  end  of  1948,  the  Iranian  government  raised  claims  to  Abu  Musa  and  Greater 
Tunb;  they  instructed  the  Counsellor  of  the  Iranian  Embassy  in  London  to  take  up 
with  the  British  Foreign  Office  the  question  of  ownership  of  the  two  islands.  In 
addition,  the  Iranian  government  wished  to  undertake  a  reorganisation  of  their 
administration  to  establish  small  administrative  offices  on  these  two  islands,  which 
they  claimed  to  be  under  Iranian  sovereignty.  Therefore,  the  Iranian  Counsellor 
wanted  to  approach  the  British  government  in  a  friendly  manner  before  the  Iranian 
government  took  any  action  and  to  make  sure  that  the  British  government  had  no 
objection.  84  The  British  answer  was  as  previously,  i.  e.  that  the  ownership  of  these 
islands  belonged  to  the  rulers  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah. 
On  23  September  1949,  the  Iranians  placed  a  flag-staff  on  Lesser  Tunb,  and 
intended  to  establish  a  customs  house  on  Greater  Tunb.  95  In  October  1949,  the 
British  government  sent  a  ship  to  remove  any  Iranian  flag-stafl'  found  at  Lesscr 
86 
Tunb.  The  Iranians  did  not  try  to  reinstate  their  flag  staffafter  it  was  dismantled 
. 
82 
-  Ibid.  P.  16  1. 
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-  Ibid.  P.  159. 
84 
-  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1'),  1948-1949,  P.  455. 
85  ABPD,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  13,  P.  26  1. 
86  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  15,1950-195  1,  P.  60  1. Chapler  3  52 
In  the  mid-fifties,  diplomatic  correspondence  was  resumed  concerning  proposed 
solutions  for  the  ownership  of  the  three  islands.  Among  the  British  proposals  was 
that  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  should  sell  the  two  Tunbs  islands  to  Iran  for  an 
agreed  price,  and  that  the  ruler  of  Sharjah  should  give  up  his  legitimate  right  of 
ownership  of  the  island  of  Sirri.  In  return,  Iran  should  give  up  its  claim  to  the  islands 
of  Abu  Musa  and  Bahrain.  This  was  built  on  a  hint  made  by  the  Iranian  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  the  British  Ambassador  that  Iran  would  be  happy  to  give  up 
forever  its  claims  in  Bahrain,  if  there  was  a  satisfactory  deal  for  Iran.  97 
The  ruler  of  Sharjah  showed  the  British  Resident  great  interest  in  the  proposed 
deal.  He  said  he  was  ready  to  give  up  his  rights  to  Sirri,  given  that  the  Iranians 
would  give  up  their  claims  to  Abu  Musa.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ruler  of  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  preferred  to  lease  the  two  islands  for  one  million  Rupees,  and  to  keep  his 
rights  in  oil  and  any  mineral  exploration  in  the  islands.  He  also  wanted  to  keep  the 
lighthouse.  He  also  expected  the  cancellation  of  all  taxes  to  be  paid  by  his 
subjeCtS.  88  The  Iranian  government  did  not  show  interest  in  the  deal  as  it  was  not 
ready  to  give  up  its  claim  to  Bahrain,  89  therefore,  the  British  government  could  not 
solve  the  dispute. 
Iranian  military  activities  in  the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf  escalated  during  the 
sixties,  in  an  attempt  to  irritate  the  British  government.  The  Iranians  warned  also 
that  they  would  establish  Iranian  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands  by  any  means.  90 
In  1961  an  Iranian  helicopter  landed  on  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb.  Photographs 
were  taken  of  the  island  and  the  lighthouse,  and  workers  at  the  lighthouse  were 
87 
-  Ibid.  Vol.  17,1954-1958,  P.  24  1. 
88 
-  Ibid.  P.  246. 
'9-  Ibid.  P.  282. 
90 
-  ABN  D,  Vol.  1,1963,  P.  624. questioned.  91  Despite  all  Iranian  efforts  to  convince  the  British  government  to 
establish  Iranian  control  over  the  islands,  the  British  government  protested,  on 
behalf  of  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  because  of  the  Iranian  breach  of  Arabian 
sovereignty  on  the  island.  Despite  all  the  diplomatic  efforts,  the  British  kept  the 
same  attitude  and  opinion,  i.  e.  that  the  three  islands  were  owned  by  the  rulers  of 
Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah.  This  attitude  continued  until  the  British  announcement 
of  its  withdrawal  from  the  Gulf. 
3.3.7.  The  British  withdrawalftom  the  Gu4f 
On  16  January  1968  the  British  announced  that  they  had  decided  to  withdraw  their 
forces  from  the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf  by  the  end  of  1971.  The  reasons  for  the 
withdrawal  were  economic,  political  and  military.  92  The  British  government  wanted 
to  solve  some  outstanding  problems  in  the  Gulf  region  before  withdrawal.  One  of 
these  problems  was  the  three  islands  which  Iran  was  trying  to  occupy.  As  the  Shah 
told  the  Secretary  of  State  on  2  May  1963;  "all  that  Iran  desired  was  that  we  should 
maintain  our  position  in  the  Gulf'.  93 
In  the  beginning  of  1969  the  British  attitude  became  favourable  to  Iran.  They 
proposed  solutions  in  favour  of  Iran,  such  as  giving  Iran  a  few  islands  for  the  Iranian 
abandonment  of  her  claim  to  Bahrain.  This  was  despite  the  previous  British 
insistence  that  ownership  of  the  islands  belonged  to  the  Qawasim  rulers.  And  such  it 
was  stated  in  the  confidential  diary  of  the  Iranian  Minister  of  Royal  Court,  Asadollah 
Alam,  on  17  February  1969: 
91 
-  W.  H.  Al-Atliami,  al-Naza  hina  Dawlat  al-lmaral  al-Arabiah  wa  Iran  hawlaJuZur  "Abu  Musa  wu 
Tunh  al-Kubra  wa  Tunb  al-Sughra  "fi  al-  Watheq  al-Britaniah  (The  Dispute  between  tile  IJAE  and 
Iran  over  Islands  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  in  the  British  Document),  (1993), 
P.  174. 
92 
_  See  14.11.  M-Alkim,  The  Foreign  Policy  qf  the  United  Arah  Emirates,  (1989),  1).  6. 
93 
-  ABND,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1,1963,  P.  619. This  afternoon,  the  British  ambassador,  Sir  Denis  Wright,  came  to 
see  me  ... 
In  strict  confidence  he  told  me  that  the  Islands  of  Tunbs  are 
certain  to  be  handed  over  to  Iran.  The  British  have  warned  the  Shaikh 
of  Ras  al-Khaimah  the  islands  lie  on  our  side  of  the  median  line  and 
that,  unless  he  comes  to  some  sort  of  understanding  with  us,  we  shall 
simply  take  them,  legally  or  if  needs  be  by  force.  The  Shaikh  is 
prepared  to  make  a  deal.  I  then  asked  about  the  island  of  Abu  Musa. 
The  ambassador  replied  that  it  lies  below  the  median  line.  I  told  him 
that  we  are  sufficiently  powerful  to  disregard  the  line,  we  joked  for  a 
while.  More  seriously  he  expressed  concern  that  our  policy  in  the 
Gulf  may  lead  to  trouble  with  the  Arabs.  'To  hell  with  it',  I  said. 
'What  have  the  Arabs  ever  done  for  us  ?  If  only  they  would  stop  all 
this  nonsense,  agree  to  pay  for  the  defence  of  the  Gulf,  and  let  us  get 
on  with  the  work'.  The  ambassador  questioned  the  extent  to  which 
the  Arabs  will  allow  us  a  free  hand.  After  all  they  persist  in 
describing  it  as  the  'Arabian'  Gulf  I  replied  that  we  are  prepared  to 
draw  up  a  fifty  years  defence  agreement  with  them,  and  that  all  in  all 
it  will  be  much  the  same  as  the  agreement  they  once  had  with  the 
94  British 
. 
After  about  one  month,  the  British  Ambassador  repeated  what  he  had  previously 
said  to  the  Iranian  Court  Minister.  Asadollah  Alam  said  in  his  diaries  that  on  19 
March: 
The  British  ambassador  met  me  in  the  afternoon.  We  discussed 
Bahrain  and  the  Gulf  islands  which  he  was  keen  to  present  as  two 
distinct  issues.  He  told  me  that  Tunbs  will  be  easy  for  us  to  recover 
but  not  Abu  Musa,  which  lies  too  close  to  the  Arabian  peninsula.  I 
replied  that  this  didn't  alter  Iran's  rights  nor  entitle  the  Arabs  to  hold 
on  to  Iranian  territory;  territory  which  HIM  [His  Imperial  Majesty] 
will  never  abandon.  The  ambassador  suggested  that  a  solution  to  the 
problem  of  Bahrain  will  almost  certainly  encourage  the  establishment 
of  a  Federation  of  Arab  Emirates,  at  which  stage  Iran  might  well 
occupy  Abu  Musa  in  the  interests  of  joint  security  in  the  Gulf.  We 
95  can  depend  on  support  from  the  British,  should  this  happen. 
The  attitude  of  the  British  Ambassador  encouraged  Iran  to  impose  her  might  over 
the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf,  and  warned  that  she  was  intending  to  impose  her  control 
over  the  islands,  even  if  force  had  to  be  used.  This  led  to  an  escalation  of  Iranian 
statements  concerning  the  three  islands  and  the  necessity  of  bringing  them  Linder 
9'-  A.  Alam,  The  Shah  and  1:  the  confidential  diary  of  Iran's  Royal  Court  1969-1977,  ed.  A.  Alikhani, 
(1991),  P.  34. 
"-  Ibid.  P.  43. 3 
Iranian  control.  The  Shah,  in  an  interview  with  the  Indian  magazine  Blitz,  confirmed 
this  when  he  said,  "in  the  absence  of  a  peaceful  solution  Iran  would  have  no 
alternative  but  to  take  the  islands  by  force".  96 
After  two  years  of  strenuous  and  delicate  diplomacy,  six  of  the  Trucial  States 
agreed  to  join  together  in  a  federation  to  be  called  the  United  Arab  Emirates.  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  declined  to  join  the  proposed  federation.  An  immediate  problem  faced  the 
proposed  federation,  however,  as  Iran  had  given  diplomatic  notice  that  she  would 
not  recognize  the  union  unless  it  yielded  to  her  the  Tunb  islands  and  Abu  Musa.  97 
The  British  government  appointed  Sir  William  Luce  as  a  special  envoy  to  the 
Arabian/Persian  Gulf  to  reconcile  the  differences.  On  I  November  1971,  lie 
proposed  that  Ras  al-Khaimah  and  Sharjah  concede  the  three  islands  to  Iran;  in 
return,  Iran  would  pay  a  large  sum  of  money  to  the  rulers  as  part  of  the  proposed 
deal.  Shaikh  Khalid  bin  Mohamed  ruler  of  Sharjah  and  his  cousin,  Shaikh  Saqar  bin 
Mohamed  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  rejected  the  offer  and  protested  that  the  British 
proposals  were  an  infringement  of  their  sovereign  rights  over  the  three  islands.  98 
The  British  envoy  had  in  fact  succeeded  in  reaching  a  final  settlement  between 
Iran  and  Sharjah  over  Abu  Musa  island.  On  29  November  197  1,  the  ruler  of  Sharjah, 
Shaikh  Khalid  bin  Mohamed,  announced  that  he  had,  apparently  reluctantly,  come  to 
96 
_  The  Times,  29  June  197  1,  P.  7. 
97 
-  See  J.  1.  Al-Rawi,  al-Juzur  al-Arabivah  al-Thalath  wa-mawqif  al-Qanun  al-Dawli  min  ihfilaliha 
bi-al-quwah  (The  three  Arab  Islands  and  the  Attitude  of  International  Law  Concerning  their 
Occupation  by  Force),  (198  1),  P.  55. 
It  is  worth  mentioning,  that  the  non  recognition  of  the  UAE  as  a  new  state  by  Iran  does  not  legality 
amount  to  a  decisive  argument.  For  example,  the  Institute  de  Droit  International  emphasised  in  its 
resolution  on  recognition  of  new  states  and  governments  in  1936  that  the  "existence  of  new  state  with 
all  the  legal  effects  connected  with  that  existence  is  not  affected  by  the  refusal  of  one  or  more  states  to 
recognise".  Restatement  (Third)  of  P-oreign  Relations  Law  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  1,  (1987),  P.  77- 
8.  Also  see  M.  N.  Shaw,  International  Law,  (199  1),  P.  245. 
'8 
-  See  Al-Khaleqj  (The  GuIO  Newspaper,  1-2  November  1971 56 
an  arrangement  with  Iran  to  share  sovereignty  over  Abu  Musa"  in  the  face  of  a  clear 
threat  that  the  island  would  be  taken  forcibly  should  he  not  comply.  100  By  this 
arrangement  Iranian  forces  would  occupy  and  position  themselves  in  key  strategic 
areas,  basically  the  range  of  hills  in  the  north  of  the  island.  In  return,  Iran  would  give 
fl.  5  million  a  year  in  aid  to  Sharjah  until  Sharjah's  annual  revenue  from  any  oil 
discovered  reached  f3  million.  '()' 
In  the  preface  to  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  Iran  and  Sharjah 
it  is  stated  that: 
Neither  Iran  nor  Sharjah  will  give  up  its  claim  to  Abu  Musa  nor 
recognize  the  other's  claim.  Against  this  background  the  following 
arrangements  will  be  made:  - 
I-  Iranian  troops  will  arrive  on  Abu  Musa.  They  will  occupy  areas 
the  extent  of  which  have  been  agreed  on  the  map  attached  to  this 
memorandum. 
2-  (a)  Within  the  agreed  areas  occupied  by  Iranian  troops,  Iran  will 
have  full  jurisdiction  and  the  Iranian  flag  will  fly. 
(b)  Sharjah  will  retain  full  jurisdiction  over  the  remainder  of  the 
island.  The  Sharjah  flag  will  continue  to  fly  over  the  Sharjah  Police 
Post  on  the  same  basis  as  the  Iranian  flag  will  fly  over  the  Iranian 
military  quarters. 
3-  Iran  and  Sharjah  recognize  the  breadth  of  the  island's  territorial 
sea  as  twelve  nautical  miles. 
4-  Exploitation  of  the  petroleum  resources  of  Abu  Musa  and  of  the 
seabed  and  subsoil  beneath  its  territorial  sea  will  be  conducted  by 
Buttes  Gas  and  Oil  Company  under  the  existing  agreement  which 
must  be  acceptable  to  Iran.  Half  of  the  governmental  oil  revenues 
hereafter  attributable  to  the  said  exploitation  shall  be  paid  directly  by 
the  company  to  Iran  and  half  to  Sharjah. 
99  In  the  correspondence  relating  to  the  Memorandum,  the  channel  of  communication  in  the 
arrangement  was  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  who  received  a  letter  from  the  ruler  of'  Shar 
, 
jah,  dated 
IS  November  1971,  in  which  the  latter  confinned  his  acceptance  of'  the  'Memoranduln  of' 
Understanding'.  The  British  Foreign  Secretary  informed  the  Iranian  Foreign  Minister  about  Sharjah's 
acceptance  of  the  arrangement.  In  reply,  the  Iranian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Abbas  Ali 
Khalatbari,  wrote  to  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  on  25  November,  "I  confirm  that  my  Government 
accepts  the  arrangements  for  Abu  Musa  as  set  out  in  the  enclosure  to  your  letter  of  24  November 
1971".  Accordingly,  on  26  November,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  sent  his  reply  to  the  ruler  of 
Shaýjah,  "I  refer  to  your  Highness's  letter  of  18  November  in  which  you  asked  for  confirmation  that 
the  Iranian  Government,  for  its  part,  accepted  the  arrangements  for  Abu  Musa  set  out  in  the  Annex  to 
your  letter".  AI-Khaleej,  4  September  1992. 
100  Ibid.  30  November  197  1. 
The  Times,  30  November  197  1,  P.  6. Chapter  3  57 
5-  The  nationals  of  Iran  and  Sharjah  shall  have  equal  rights  to  fish  in 
the  territorial  sea  of  Abu  Musa. 
6-  A  financial  assistance  agreement  will  be  signed  between  Iran  and 
Sharjah.  102 
Concerning  the  two  islands  of  Tunb,  no  settlement  was  reached.  103  The  governor  of 
Ras  al-Khaimah  stated,  after  his  meeting  with  William  Luce  on  30  October  1971, 
that  the  British  representative  had  offered  him-if  he  gave  up  the  two  islands  to  Iran-a 
yearly  payment  of  fl.  5  million  to  be  paid  by  Iran  for  nine  years,  plus  49  per  cent  of 
future  mineral  and  oil  revenues;  however,  he  had  declined  the  offer.  104 
On  30  November  1971,  the  day  before  the  British  treaty  of  protection  was  to 
expire  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates  become  independent,  the  Iranian  forces 
occupied  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs.  105  On  the  same  day  they  landed  on  Abu 
Musa  without  any  resistance,  because  of  the  previous  arrangement.  The  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  police  force  resisted  the  invasion.  The  outcome  was  that  four  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  policemen  and  three  Iranian  soldiers  were  killed.  106  Iranian  forces  gave  the 
inhabitants  of  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb  the  choice  of  either  leaving  or  remaining 
and  becoming  Iranian  citizens.  All  inhabitants  left  for  Ras  al-Khaimah.  107 
The  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  immediately  sent  letters  of  pr-est  to  the  Council 
of  the  League  of  Arab  States  and  to  several  Arab  governments,  requesting 
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-  Al-Khaleej,  4  September  1992.  Also  see  H  M.  Al-Baharna,  The  Arabian  Guýf',  %tes,  (1975), 
P.  345.  Also  see  M.  R.  Dabiri,  Abu  Musa  Island:  A  Binding  Understanding  or  M  is  understand  ing,  IJIA, 
Vol.  V,  Nos.  3&4,  Fall/Winter  1993-1994,  P.  577. 
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104 
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105 
-  After  the  Iranian  forces  occupied  the  islands,  Britain  decided  not  to  try  to  recover  tile  islands 
from  Iran.  The  reason  was  that  the  British  forces  would  have  had  to  leave  by  the  end  ofthe  British- 
Ras  al-Khairnah  defence  treaty  on  30  November.  A  diplomat  said:  "if'  Britain  sent  in  troops  today, 
under  the  treaty,  they  would  have  to  be  withdrawn  tomorrow",  the  Glasgow  Herald  newspaper,  I 
December  197  1,  P.  1. 
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_  AI-Khaleej,  I  December  1971.  Also,  the  Glasgow  Herald,  I  December  1971,  PA.  Sir  Alec 
Douglas-Home,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Affairs,  said  to  the  House  that 
one  Arab  policeman  and  three  Iranians  were  killed".  See  the  Times,  7  December  197  1,  P.  9. 
107 
-  Interview  with  Mohamed  A.  Abu  Al-Qasm  and  his  son  Abdul  Rahman,  from  GreaterTurib  island, 
on  18  September  1993. diplomatic  assistance  in  the  submission  of  the  issue  to  the  United  Nations  and  the 
United  Nations  Security  Council.  108 
The  United  Nations  Security  Council  met  on  the  9  December  1971  to  discuss 
the  situation.  In  addition  to  Iran,  six  Arab  states  joined  the  Security  Council 
session.  109  Because  Ras  al-Khaimah  was  not  yet  a  member  of  the  United  Nations, 
the  Permanent  Representative  of  Iraq  to  the  United  Nations  was  the  Shaikhdom's 
primary  spokesman.  Although  the  history  of  the  territorial  dispute  was  adequately 
briefed  by  the  Iraqi  representative,  and  the  representative  of  Iran  had  a  full 
opportunity  to  defend  the  charge,  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  deferred 
consideration  of  the  matter  to  a  later  date  to  allow  'efforts  of  quiet  diplomacy  to 
work  and  to  materialize'.  '  10  The  situation  remained  unchanged,  and  the  Iranian 
occupation  of  the  islands  continued.  After  Ras  al-Khaimah  joined  UAE  in  1972, 
diplomatic  efforts  on  an  international  scale  continued  the  claim  to  restore  the  islands 
to  their  legitimate  owners  until  the  Islamic  revolution  deposed  the  Shah  in  January 
1979. 
3.3.8.  Development  of  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands  after  1979 
The  question  of  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands  was  again  raised  in  1979  after  the 
Iranian  revolution.  The  government  of  the  UAE  became  optimistic  about  the 
possibility  that  the  new  regime  might  return  the  islands  to  their  owners.  According 
to  the  statements  made  by  the  officials  in  the  new  Iranian  regime,  they  did  not  accept 
the  injustices  caused  by  the  Shah's  regime,  and  said  that  the  Iranian  governincrit-at 
the  earliest  opportunity-would  do  an  overall  review  of  all  measures  and  treaties 
108 
-  Al-Tadmori,  op.  cit.,  P.  188. 
109 
-  The  Arab  states  in  attendance  at  the  UN  Security  Council  session  included  Algeria,  Iraq,  Kuwait, 
the  Libyan  Arab  Republic,  the  People's  Democratic  Republic  of'  Yernen  and  the  UAF.  SCOR,  26th 
Year,  1610th  Meeting:  9  December  1971,  P.  4. 
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taken  by  the  previous  government  and  there  was  a  chance  that  it  would  cancel  these 
measures.  It  was  expected  that  Iran  would  return  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and 
Lesser  Tunb  which  were  occupied  by  the  Shah.  111 
These  directions  in  the  new  Iranian  regime  brought  optimism  to  the  UAE 
government  that  the  case  of  the  islands  would  be  resolved.  Accordingly,  the 
governor  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  contacted  the  new  Iranian  government  to  remind  them 
of  the  Shah's  occupation  of  the  Tunbs  islands  and  to  ask  them  to  return  the  islands 
to  their  owners.  112  In  addition,  the  Iraqi  government  supported  the  UAE  government 
in  the  claim  for  the  three  islands  from  Iran.  This  support  came  from  the  Iraqi 
Ambassador  to  Lebanon  in  1979.  He  stated  that  the  return  of  the  three  islands  to 
Arab  sovereignty  was  set  as  one  of  the  three  conditions  for  future  Iraqi  relations  with 
the  new  Iranian  regime.  113 
At  the  onset  of  the  Iran-Iraq  war  in  1980,  Iranian  inflexibility  became  clear 
concerning  the  keeping  of  the  islands  and  the  refusal  to  have  any  discussion  on  their 
sovereignty.  The  first  president  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  Abolhassan  Bani 
Sadr,  stated  on  24  March  1980,  that  Iran  would  not  evacuate  or  return  the  three  Arab 
islands  and  that  the  Arab  countries  Abu  Dhabi,  Qatar,  Oman,  Dubai,  Kuwait,  and 
Saudi  Arabia  were  connected  with  the  United  States  and  were  not  independent.  '  14 
The  Iraqi  Foreign  Minister's  response  to  the  Bani  Sadr  statement,  in  his  letter  to 
UN  Secretary  General  on  2  April  1980,  stated  that: 
Iraq  would  like  to  emphasize  its  non  recognition  of  Iran's  illegal 
occupation  of  the  three  Arab  islands  and  the  consequences  that  may 
111 
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112 
-  Al-Fqjer  newspaper,  2  October  1981,  Also  see  the  text  of  the  letter  from  Shaikh  Saqar  bill 
Mohamed  Al-Qassimi,  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  to  the  Iranian  Leader,  Ayatollah  Khomaini,  of'  6 
February  1979,  AI-Tadmori,  op.  cit.,  P.  209. 
113  AI-Nahar  al-Arahi  wa  al-Dawli,  28  November  1979. 
SCOR,  )5th  Year,  Doc.  S/I  3918,1980,  P.  35. 3 
ensue  from  such  occupation,  and  demands  the  immediate  withdrawal 
of  Iran  from  those  islands.  '  15 
In  May  26,  the  former  Iranian  Foreign  Minister  sent  a  letter  to  the  UN  Secretary 
General,  in  which  he  argued  that  the  Iranian  occupation  of  1971  "is  nothing  but 
reassertion  of  Iran's  sovereignty  over  part  of  its  territories".  116 
On  6  August  the  government  of  the  UAE  protested  against  the  Iranian  assertion 
made  at  the  United  Nations.  The  UAE  Minister  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  stated  in 
a  letter  to  the  UN  Secretary  General  that  the  UAE  "re-emphasizes  its  firm 
attachment  to  the  islands,  which  form  an  integral  part  of  the  territory  of  our  state, 
whose  sovereign  rights  thereover  are  indisputable,  and  unimpeachable  and  to 
reaffirm  its  readiness  to  furnish  substantive  proof  to  that  effect".  117 
The  UAE  government  maintained  its  claim  to  the  three  islands  during  1980.  On 
the  other  hand,  Iran  continued  its  refusal  to  negotiate  over  the  islands,  It  also  claimed 
that  the  islands  were  Iranian  and  that  it  was  going  to  stay  in  the  islands  to  prevent 
their  use  as  American  military  bases.  118 
3.3.9.  Iran's  breach  of  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding 
At  the  beginning  of  1992  the  Iranian  government  breached  the  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  which  had  been  signed  with  the  government  of  Sharjah  regarding  the 
island  of  Abu  Musa  in  1971.  This  was  done  by  the  denial  of'  the  right  of'  the 
government  of  Sharjah  to  practice  its  sovereignty  over  part  of  the  island  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  Memorandum.  The  Iranian  government  asserted  sovereignty  over 
the  whole  of  the  island.  It  expelled  60  workers  from  the  island  who  were  working  iii 
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-  Ibid. 
116 
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the  Sharjah  area.  A  new  development  took  place  on  24  August  of  the  same  year 
when  the  Emirate  residents  and  workers  of  the  island  were  prevented  from  leaving  in 
their  boat  which  was  taking  them  to  the  island.  '  19  The  Iranian  government  justified 
this  practice  by  reference  to  its  responsibilities  for  the  security  of  the  island 
according  to  the  1971  arrangement.  It  argued  that  there  was  a  mutual  arrangement 
with  Sharjah  that  its  foreign  residents  had  to  get  an  entry  permit  from  the  Iranian 
authorities,  but  Sharjah  officials  denied  that  such  an  arrangement  existed.  120 
Some  countries  started  diplomatic  measures  to  reach  a  solution.  Accordingly, 
Iran  invited  the  UAE  for  bilateral  negotiations.  In  their  first  meeting  in  Abu  Dhabi 
September  1992,  the  UAE  asked  for  the  following:  121 
I-  The  ending  of  military  occupation  of  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb; 
2-  Iran  should  commit  itself  to  respect  the  provisions  of  the  1971  Memorandum  of 
Understanding,  with  respect  to  the  island  of  Abu  Musa; 
3-  Non  intervention  by  Iran,  in  any  way,  in  the  UAE's  practice  of  its  complete 
sovereignty  over  its  assigned  part  of  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  according  to  the 
Memorandum  of  Understanding; 
4-  The  cancellation  of  all  measures  taken  by  Iran  concerning  governmental 
departments  and  the  Emirate  and  non-Ei-mrate  residents  in  the  island  of  Abu  Musa; 
119 
-  Al-Khaleej,  25  August  1992.  Tile  number  of  people  prevented  from  entering,  the  island  of'  Abu 
Musa  by  the  Iranian  authorities  was  more  than  100  teachers,  workers  and  their  families.  They  were 
going  to  start  their  work  in  the  school  belonging  to  the  Ministry  of  Education  in  tile  UAF..  The 
representative  of  the  government  of  Sharjah  Mohamed  Khalifah  Bu-Ghamm  and  citizens  who  lived 
on  the  island  were  similarly  prevented  from  entering  the  island.  The  ship  'Khater'  was  kept  at  sea  1`61- 
three  days  without  permission  to  land  on  the  island.  The  captain  had  to  return  to  the  port  ofKhaled  in 
Sharjah  as  the  passengers'  sufferin-  was  growing 
120 
_  Ibid.  4  September  1992. 
121 
-  Al-Wasat,  No.  39,26  October  1992.  Also  Qdial  al-1hii1al  al-h-ani  Li-.  Juzur  Tunh  al-Kuhra,  Tunh 
al-Sughra,  Abu  Musa  al-Tahainh  Li-Dawlat  al-Imarat  al-Arabiah  al-Muiahidah,  op.  cit.,  1).  15-16. 
Also  H.  H.  Al-Alkim,  The  GCC  States  in  an  Unstable  World,  (  1994),  1'.  114-115. 62 
5-  Determination  of  a  convenient  framework  to  settle  the  question  of  sovereignty 
over  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  within  a  limited  time  scale. 
The  Iranian  side  refused  to  discuss  the  termination  of  the  military  occupation  of 
the  two  Tunb  islands.  It  also  refused  to  take  the  case  to  the  International  Court  of 
Justice.  122  This  resulted  in  the  collapse  of  the  negotiations.  After  the  negotiations 
came  to  a  dead  end  because  of  the  inflexible  Iranian  stand,  the  Emirate  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  in  his  address  to  the  UN  Secretary  General  on  30  September  1992, 
stated  the  willingness  of  the  UAE  to  find  a  peaceful  solution  for  the  case  according 
to  Article  33  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  with  the  consideration  of  the  Emirate 
sovereignty  over  the  three  islands.  123 
The  Iranian  government  breached  the  Memorandum  again  on  20  September 
1994,  when  it  established  an  airline  linking  Abu  Musa  and  Bandar  Abbas  124  in  an 
attempt  to  enforce  its  sovereignty  over  the  island.  This  was  followed  by  the 
125 
establishment  of  an  Iranian  court  on  the  island  in  1995 
. 
At  the  same  time,  the 
Iranian  authorities  prevented  the  residents  of  Abu  Musa  or  the  UAE  government, 
from  building  any  constructions,  even  if  these  were  on  the  part  of  the  island  assigned 
to  Sharjah  as  defined  by  the  Memorandum. 
In  an  attempt  from  the  State  of  Qatar  to  mediate  between  the  two  countries  and 
bring  them  to  the  negotiation  table,  and  to  achieve  a  solution  for  the  islands,  a 
meeting  was  held  in  Doha  in  September  1995  between  the  representatives  of  the  two 
countries.  However,  at  this  meeting  no  development  to  solve  the  conflict  took  place. 
It  failed  from  the  beginning  because  of'  the  insistence  of'  the  Iranian  delegation  to 
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123 
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adhere  to  their  previous  stand.  They  said  that  they  came  to  Doha  to  discuss  the  1992 
disagreements  regarding  Abu  Musa,  and  not  to  discuss  the  ownership  of  the  three 
islands.  On  the  other  hand,  the  UAE  delegation  insisted  that  they  went  to  Doha  to 
discuss  a  peaceful  solution  to  the  conflict  over  the  three  islands.  Another  reason  for 
the  failure  of  the  meeting  may  have  been  because  there  was  no  clear  working  paper 
to  define  what  should  be  discussed  by  the  two  countries.  126 
Nonetheless,  the  protests  from  the  UAE  did  not  prevent  Iran  from  enforcing  its 
sovereignty  over  the  islands.  In  a  later  development  the  Iranian  government  began 
the  construction  of  a  port  on  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  in  May  1996.127  This  one-sided 
measure  on  Iran's  part,  aiming  to  impose  its  domination  over  the  island,  was  no  help 
in  the  search  for  a  peaceful  solution  for  the  conflict. 
3.4.  Conclusion 
It  is  obvious  from  the  historic  review  of  the  islands  that  sovereignty  over  them  was 
unknown,  as  old  maps  were  not  clear  and  contained  many  contradictions.  Neither 
did  those  writing  on  the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf  identify  to  whom  they  belonged.  This 
was  the  case  until  the  British  dornintion  of  the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf  in  1880.  As 
Laithwaite  states: 
The  history  of  islands  prior  to  1750  is  obscure;  that  since  that  date 
such  authority  and  such  effective  occupation  as  there  has  been,  has 
its  source  in  the  Jowasimi  Arabs,  who  between  1750  and  1820 
exercised  in  the  Gulf  a  maritime  control  uncontested  by  Persia.  128 
This  is  because  correspondence  between  the  British  naval  forces  on  the 
Arabian/Persian  Gulf  and  the  British  government  concerning  clashes  between  the 
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British  fleet  and  the  Qawasim  fleet  in  the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf,  before  signing  the 
General  Treaty  of  Peace  in  1820,  mentioned  that  the  Qawasim  ships  used  the  islands 
of  Abu  Musa  and  Tunb  as  their  base  from  which  they  launched  their  attacks  on  the 
British  fleet. 
129 
Then  came  the  first  assurance  about  the  ownership  of  the  islands  in  a  letter  from 
the  governor  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  directed  to  Colonel  Pelly  in  1864  saying  that  the 
islands  belonged  to  him.  The  islands  continued  to  be  under  the  Qawasim  sovereignty 
until  its  occupation  by  the  Iranian  force  in  1971. 
It  is  obvious  that  Iran  did  not  have  any  history  of  sovereignty  over  the  islands, 
that  the  Iranian  claims  began  after  their  recovery  of  Lingah  from  the  Qawasim  in 
1887  and  after  their  occupation  of  the  island  of  Sirri.  It  is  also  obvious  that  the 
Iranian  claims  for  the  islands  were  announced  at  sporadic  intervals,  usually  with 
relevance  to  the  importance  of  the  islands  at  the  times  of  the  different  claims.  The 
first  Iranian  claim  and  occupation  of  the  islands  of  Greater  Tunb  and  Abu  Musa  in 
1904  was  related  to  the  importance  of  red  oxide,  and  with  instigation  from  the 
Russian  fears  of  the  British  domination  of  the  Arabian/Persian  Gulf.  130  Concerning 
the  recent  occupation  in  1971,  Iran  has  claimed  that  the  islands  were  under  Iranian 
sovereignty  and  that  it  has  historic  and  legal  proof  of  this. 
The  question  which  arises  is  whether  the  way  Iran  has  practiced  her  sovereignty 
over  the  three  islands  is  legal  or  not.  The  next  chapter  will  address  this  question  by 
examining  the  ways  of  territorial  acquisition  in  International  Law.  I  will  theri  look  at 
the  situation  concerning  the  three  islands  to  examine  the  Icgality  ofthe  sovereignty 
claims  of  the  two  disputing  parties. 
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CHAPTER  FOUR 
The  Acquis.  ition  of  Sovereiqnty  over  the  Three  Islands  in 
International  Law 
4.1.  Introduction 
Oppenheim  states:  "Nowadays,  however,  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  a  state 
normally  means  the  acquisition  of  sovereignty  over  such  territory".  '  A  title  to 
territorial  sovereignty  is  based  on  the  facts  which  the  law  recognizes  as  creating  a 
right.  The  various  modes  that  international  law  recognizes  as  creating  title  to 
territorial  sovereignty  reduce  to  one  common  factor  and  that  is  the  importance,  both 
in  the  creation  of  title  and  of  its  maintenance,  of  actual  effective  control. 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  shed  light  on  the  legal  methods  of  acquiring  sovereignty 
over  territory  and,  accordingly,  we  may  know  the  legal  aspects  of  the  claims  made 
by  the  two  disputing  parties  over  the  ownership  of  the  three  islands.  Traditional 
methods  of  acquiring  sovereignty  over  a  territory  are  explained;  these  include 
occupation,  cession,  and  acquisitive  prescription.  We  will  concentrate  on  the  use  of 
force  to  acquire  territory  and  the  extent  of  its  acceptance  by  the  international 
community  and  courts  as  a  method  for  acquisition  of  title  to  territorial  sovereignty. 
Finally,  the  concept  of  historical  consolidation  of  title  to  gain  legal  right  of 
ownership  over  a  territory  is  discussed. 
4.2.  Some  relevant  modesfor  the  acquisition  of  territorial  sovereignty 
In  traditional  international  law  five  modes  of  acquiring  territory  may  be 
distinguished,  namely:  occupation,  accretion,  cession,  prescription  and  conquest. 
'-  Oppenheim's  International  Low,  9th  edn.,  Vol.  I  -Peace,  Parts  2-4,  ed.  by  R. Jennings  and  A.  Watts, 
(1996),  P.  679. 
2_  Some  authors,  such  as  Brownlie,  regard  aqjudication  as  a  rnode  ofacquisition.  For  more  detail  see 
1.  Brownlie,  Principles  qfInternational  Law,  4th  edn.,  (  1990),  13.137.  Also  see  11.  Post,  Adjudication ChaDler  4 
These  modes  of  acquiring  territory  give  rise  to  two  kinds  of  titles.  An  original  title 
was  given  when  there  was  no  transfer  of  ownership  from  a  previous  sovereign, 
whereas  a  derivative  title  was  given  when  there  was  such  a  transfer.  Cession  is 
therefore  a  derivative  mode  of  acquisition,  whereas  occupation  and  accretion  are 
original.  Significantly,  there  are  differences  of  opinion  with  regards  to  conquest  and 
prescription  and  thus,  in  these  cases,  classification  is  irrelevant.  3 
Accretion  is  the  addition  of  new  territory  to  the  existing  territory  of  a  state  by 
operation  of  natural  factors  or  through  human  efforts,  '  as  when  new  islands  emerge 
in  the  state's  territorial  waters  as  a  result  of  volcanic  activity-such  as  the  island  of 
Surtsey  which  appeared  in  Icelandic  territorial  waters  in  1963  5 
-or  when  a  state 
converts  part  of  its  territorial  waters  into  land,  to  be  added  to  its  land  territory  by 
placing  marine  blocks  on  the  shore. 
The  geographic  reality  of  the  three  islands  does  not  qualify  either  party  to  claim 
them  on  this  basis.  The  three  islands  have  existed  in  the  Gulf  since  time 
immemorial.  Therefore,  since  this  form  of  acquisition  of  territory  is  not  relevant  to 
the  three  islands'  case,  it  need  not  be  discussed  further  here. 
What  I  will  discuss  are  the  modes  of  acquiring  territories,  relevant  to  the  dispute 
over  the  three  islands.  These  are  occupation,  cession,  acquisitive  prescription,  and 
conquest. 
as  Mode  of  Acquisition  of  Territory?  Fifty  Years  (?  f'lhe  International  Court  of,  histice,  ed.  V.  Lowe 
and  M.  Fitzmaurice,  (1996),  P.  237. 
3-  Brownfie,  Principles,  op.  cit.,  P.  132, 
'-  JL.  Brierly,  The  Law  of  Nations:  An  Introduction  to  the  International  Law  of'  peace,  (1963), 
P.  173. 
66 
'-  R.  M.  Wallace,  International  Law,  (1992),  1).  96 4 
4.2.1.  Occupation 
Oppenheim  defines  occupation  as  "the  act  of  appropriation  by  a  state  by  which  it 
intentionally  acquires  sovereignty  over  such  territory  as  is  at  the  time  not  under  the 
sovereignty  of  another  state".  6  Starke  defined  occupation  as  "establishing 
sovereignty  over  territory  not  under  the  authority  of  any  other  state  whether  newly 
discovered,  or-an  unlikely  case-abandoned  by  the  state  formerly  in  control"  .7 
Hence,  occupation  gives  a  state  original  title  to  territory;  it  is  the  means  of 
establishing  title  to  territory  which  is  terra  nufflus,  that  is,  owned  by  no  one  and 
therefore  susceptible  to  acquisition.  8  In  other  words,  the  concept  of  terra  nullius 
covers  areas  which  have  never  been  the  object  of  any  appropriation.  9A  concise 
explanation  of  the  concept  terra  nufflus  is  to  be  found  in  the  advisory  opinion  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  in  the  Western  Sahara  case  in  1975: 
The  expression  'terra  nullius'was  a  legal  term  of  art  employed  in 
connection  with  'occupation'  as  one  of  the  accepted  legal  methods  of 
acquiring  sovereignty  over  territory.  'Occupation'  being  legally  an 
original  means  of  peaceably  acquiring  sovereignty  over  territory 
otherwise  than  by  cession  or  succession,  it  was  a  cardinal  condition 
of  a  valid  'occupation'  that  the  territory  should  be  terra  nufflus-a 
territory  belonging  to  no-one-at  the  time  of  the  act  alleged  to 
constitute  the  'occupation'.  10 
In  the  past,  occupation  was  the  common  method  for  acquisition  of  territorial 
sovereignty.  This  was  because  many  areas  were  uninhabited,  not  owned  by  anyone 
or  not  yet  discovered.  In  the  beginning,  discovering  a  previously  unknown  territory 
was  enough  justification  for  the  discovering  Country  to  clairn  ownership  over  the 
discovered  territory,  even  if  the  discovering  did  not  involve  any  act  of  sovereignty. 
'-  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  P.  686. 
7-J.  G.  Starke,  Introduction  to  International  Law,  (1989),  P.  160. 
8-D.  W.  Greig,  International  Law,  (1976),  P.  16  1.  Also  see  M.  N.  Shaw,  Territory  in  International 
Law,  NYblL,  Vol.  ]  3,  (1982),  P.  82. 
9-  See  S.  T.  Bernardez,  Territory,  Acquisition,  E  PI  L,  Vol.  10,  (  1987),  11.500, 
10 
-  lCJ  Rep.,  (1975),  P.  39. 68 
This  is  what  had  happened  during  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  in  the  age  of 
the  first  European  expansion  outside  the  European  continent.  Territories  were  given 
by  Papal  grants  to  assure  sovereignty  over  them.  The  most  famous  of  these  grants 
was  from  Pope  Alexander  VI  in  1493  and  occurred  one  year  after  the  discovery  of 
America.  According  to  this  declaration,  the  Pope  distributed  the  territory  between 
Spain  and  Portugal.  '  Some  countries,  however,  argued  that  Papal  grants  were  only 
effective  for  the  beneficiary  countries  and  did  not  bind  other  countries.  Since  the 
sixteenth  century,  efforts  have  been  made  to  establish  principles  for  the  acquisition 
of  sovereignty  over  territories  which  did  not  belong  to  anyone  (terra  nufflus).  12 
The  concept  of  terra  nufflus  has  been  vigorously  criticised  by  modern  publicists. 
Judge  Ammoun,  in  his  separate  opinion  in  the  Namibia  case  (197  1),  observed: 
It  was  a  monstrous  blunder  and  a  flagrant  injustice  to  consider 
Africa  south  of  the  Sahara  as  terrae  nullius,  to  be  shared  out  among 
the  Powers  for  occupation  and  colonization,  when  even  in  the 
sixteenth  century  Victoria  had  written  that  Europeans  could  not 
obtain  sovereignty  over  the  Indies  by  occupation,  for  they  were  not 
terra  nullius.  13 
Professor  Jennings  notes  that  "this  sornewhat  lofty  attitude  towards  peoples  who  did 
not  enjoy  'civilization'  in  the  sense  of  living  under  a  State  organize-'  after  the 
manner  of  the  States  of  Europe  seemed  natural  enough  in  the  late  nineteenth  century, 
though  its  survival  in  the  term  'civilized  states'  may  cause  some  embarrassment 
now". 
14 
'' 
-  T.  J.  Lawrence,  The  Principles  (ýflnternafional  Law,  7th  edn.,  Revised  by  11.11.  Winfield,  (1930), 
11.146.  Also  D.  P.  O'Connel  I,  Internalional  Law,  2nd  ed.,  Vol.  1,  (1970),  P.  408. 
12 
_  See  A.  S.  Abu  Haif,  al-Qanoun  al-Dawli  al-Aam  (Public  International  Law),  12th  edn.,  (1995), 
P.  347.  Also  A.  A.  Ali,  al-Wcýgif  fi  ul-Qanoun  al-Dawli  al-Auni  (Concise  Public  International  Law), 
(1989),  P.  164-5.  Also  C.  Rousseau,  al-Qanoun  al-Dawli  al-Aam  (Public  International  Law), 
Translation  to  Arabic  by  S.  Klialifh  and  A.  Saind,  (1982),  1).  148. 
13 
-  lCJ  Rep.,  (1971),  P.  M. 
14 
_  R.  Y.  Jennings,  The  Acquisition  of  Territory  in  Inlernational  Law,  (1963),  P.  20. ChaDter  4 
From  there,  an  internationally  accepted  customary  concept  was  established 
during  the  nineteenth  century: 
(i)  The  occupied  territory  must  be  terra  nullius  (i.  e.,  territory  which  immediately 
before  acquisition,  belonged  to  no  state).  15  For  example,  in  the  dissenting  opinion  of 
Judge  Sette-Camara  in  the  case  concerning  the  Territorial  Dispute  between  Libyan 
Arab  Jamahiriya  and  Chad  in  1994,  he  stated: 
I  believe  that  the  reasons  aligned  by  Libya  to  contend  that 
effectivilis  could  not  play  a  decisive  role  in  this  case  were  valid.  The 
basic  question  was  a  question  of  title,  and  the  legal  title  has  been 
shown  to  reside  first  with  the  indigenous  population,  especially  the 
Senoussi  peoples,  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  later  Italy.  This  was  the 
title  that  Libya  inherited.  France  never  occupied  the  Libya-Chad 
borderlands  (whether  by  peaceful  means  or  by  conquest)  until  after 
1929,  by  which  time  occupation  by  force  was  unlawful  under 
international  law.  In  any  event,  the  territories  in  question  were  not 
terra  nullius,  so  that  the  occupation  by  a  French  military  presence 
was,  to  use  the  words  of  Chief  Justice  Hughes  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court,  'a  mere  usurpation'.  16 
Also  in  the  Land,  Island  and  Maritime  Frontier  Dispute  between  El 
Salvador/Honduras:  Nicaragua  intervening  in  1992,  the  Court  ruled  that: 
The  islands  were  not  terra  nufflus,  and  in  legal  theory  each  island 
already  appertained  to  one  of  the  three  States  surrounding  the  Gulf 
[of  Fonseca]  as  heir  to  the  appropriate  part  of  the  Spanish  colonial 
possessions,  so  that  acquisition  of  territory  by  occupation  was  not 
possible;  but  the  effective  possession  by  one  of  the  Gulf  States  of  any 
island  of  the  Gulf  could  constitute  an  eff 
., 
ýctivW,  though  a  post- 
colonial  one,  throwing  light  on  the  contemporary  appreciation  of  the 
legal  situation.  17 
At  present,  there  are  no  terra  nufflus  as  all  the  land  areas  of  the  world  are  under  the 
sovereignty  of  some  state,  '  8  with  the  exception  of  the  Antarctic.  19  1  Ferritories  whicli 
15 
_  See  M.  M.  Whiteman,  Digest  (?  f  Interntitional  Law,  Vol.  2,  P.  1030.  The  acquisition  ofa  title  to 
parts  of  the  high  seas  must  always  be  a  prescription  and  not  an  occupation,  for  the  high  seas  arc  not 
res  nullius.  See  Jennings,  op.  cit.,  11.23. 
16 
_  ICJ  Rep.,  (1994),  P.  100.  Also,  ILR,  Vol.  100,  P.  98. 
17 
-I  CJ  Rep.,  (  1992),  P.  5  66. 
18 
-  H.  Thirlway,  The  Law  and  Procedure  of'  the  International  Court  of  Justice  1960-1989,13YbI  I- 
(1995),  11.11.  Also  see  Bernardez,  op.  cit.,  P.  50  1. C 
are  disputed  or  which  are  inhabited  by  tribes  or  peoples  having  a  social  and  political 
organization  cannot  be  of  the  nature  of  terra  nullius.  As  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  said,  with  regard  to  the  case  of  Western  Sahara: 
Whatever  differences  of  opinion  there  may  have  been  among 
jurists,  the  State  practice  of  the  relevant  period  indicates  that 
territories  inhabited  by  tribes  or  peoples  having  a  social  and  political 
organization  were  not  regarded  as  terrae  nufflus.  It  shows  that  in  the 
case  of  such  territories  the  acquisition  of  sovereignty  was  not 
generally  considered  as  effected  unilaterally  through  'occupation'  of 
terra  nufflus  by  original  title  but  through  agreements  concluded  with 
local  rulers.  On  occasion,  it  is  true,  the  word  'occupation'  was  used 
in  a  non-technical  sense  denoting  simply  acquisition  of  sovereignty; 
but  that  did  not  signify  that  the  acquisition  of  sovereignty  through 
such  agreements  with  authorities  of  the  country  was  regarded  as  an 
ýoccupation'  of  a  'terra  nullius'  in  the  proper  sense  of  these  terms. 
On  the  contrary,  such  agreements  with  local  rulers,  whether  or  not 
considered  as  an  actual  'cession'  of  the  territory,  were  regarded  as 
derivative  roots  of  title,  and  not  original  titles  obtained  by  occupation 
of  terrae  nullius. 
In  the  present  instance,  the  information  furnished  to  the  Court 
shows  that  at  the  time  of  colonization  Western  Sahara  was  inhabited 
by  peoples  which,  if  nomadic,  were  socially  and  politically  organized 
in  tribes  and  under  chiefs  competent  to  represent  them.  20 
Considering  claims  over  the  Antarctic,  Article  4  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  signed  at  Washington,  on 
Z, 
I  December  1959  provides: 
"  1.  Nothing  contained  in  the  present  Treaty  shall  be  interpreted  as: 
(a)  a  renunciation  by  any  Contracting  Party  of  previously  asserted  rights  of  or  claims  to  territorial 
sovereignty  in  Antarctical 
(b)  a  renunciation  or  diminution  by  any  Contracting  Party  of  any  basis  of  claim  to  territorial  zn 
sovereignty  in  Antarctica  which  it  may  have  whether  as  a  result  of  its  activities  or  those  of  its 
nationals  in  Antarctica,  or  otherwise; 
(c)  prejudicing  the  position  of  any  Contracting  Party  as  regards  its  recognition  or  non-recognition  of' 
any  other  State's  right  of  or  claim  or  basis  of  claim  to  territorial  sovereignty  in  Antarctica. 
2.  No  acts  or  activities  taking  place  while  the  present  Treaty  is  in  force  shall  constitute  a  basis  for 
asserting,  supporting  or  denying  a  claim  to  territorial  sovereignty  in  Antarctica  or  create  any  rights  of 
sovereignty  in  Antarctica.  No  new  claim,  or  enlargement  of  an  existin-  claim,  to  territorial 
sovereignty  in  Antarctica  shall  be  asserted  while  the  present  Treaty  is  in  force",  UNTS,  Vol.  402,  No. 
5778,  P.  71.  Also  D.  J.  Harris,  Cases  and  Mutertal,  y  on  Inlet-national  Law,  (1991),  P.  213. 
For  more  detail  of  the  Antarctica  claim  see  G.  J.  Mangone,  Unrecognized  Boundaries:  The  Case  of 
Antartica,  Thesaurus  Acroasium,  Vol.  XIV,  (1985),  P.  145. 
Concerning  Outer  Space,  Article  2  of  Treaty  on  Principles  Governing  the  Activities  of  States  in  the 
Exploration  and  Use  of  Outer  Space,  including  the  Moon  and  other  Celestial  Bodies  text  provides 
"Outer  space,  including  the  inoon  and  other  celestial  bodies,  is  not  subject  to  national  appropriation 
by  claim  of  sovereignty,  by  means  of  use  or  occupation,  or  by  any  other  means",  LJKTS,  No.  10, 
(1968),  Cmnd.  35  19.  Also  Harris,  op.  cit.,  P.  222. 
20 
-  JCJ  Rep.,  (1975),  P.  39. 
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My  point  of  view,  therefore,  is  that  any  territory  which  is  inhabited  at  present  cannot 
be  lerrae  nullius  for  any  country  to  occupy  on  it  and  annex  it  to  her  sovereignty. 
This  condition  for  the  occupation  of  a  territory  is,  therefore,  irrelevant  in  present  day 
conditions. 
(ii)  There  must  be  an  announced  intention  by  the  occupying  state  to  acquire 
sovereignty  over  a  territory  in  order  to  enable  other  states  to  make  any  claims  of 
their  own.  21  It  happened  that  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  number 
of  states  desired  to  acquire  a  certain  territory  without  being  able  to  occupy  it 
effectively  at  once,  and  the  fear  that  another  state  would  anticipate  them  and  occupy 
this  territory  led  many  of  states  to  occupy  territories  through  two  means.  The  first 
method  was  to  get  the  chiefs  of  natives  inhabiting  'unoccupied'  territories  to  agree  to 
commit  themselves  as  a  'protectorate'  of  states  which  were  members  of  the 
international  community.  In  this  case  the  occupying  state  secured  its  position  in 
these  territories  against  the  expansion  of  the  other  colonising  states.  The  second 
means  was  by  securing  and  delineating  'spheres  of  influence'  22  through 
international  treaties  with  other  interested  powers.  In  this  case  the  interested  powers 
could  gradually  extend  their  sovereignty  over  their  individual  spheres  of'  influence 
without  coming  into  conflict  with  each  other. 
This  condition  of  'announced  intention'  appeared  during  the  period  of  European 
competition  to  occupy  territories  in  Africa.  It  was  agreed  between  the  parties  who 
signed  the  General  Act  of  the  Berlin  Congo  Conference  of'  1885  that  occupation 
should  be  notified  to  one  another.  23  This  was  abrogated  between  the  signatories  ot 
"-  Island  of  Palmas  case,  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  868. 
22 
-A  cnhpr.  -  nf  infliu-nrp  ic  "thý  tipQrrintinn  nf  torrifnru  Pvr  I  iiQixto  I  xi  rocr-irvi-ii  fnr  fi  it  iire  ncriin;  i  I  ion  hv 
a  state  which  had  effectively  occupied  adjoining  territories",  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  P.  69  1. 
23 
_  See  L.  Oppenheim,  Internationul  Liw,  Vol.  1,8th  edn.,  ed.  H.  Lauterpacht,  (1955),  11.559 4 
the  Convention  of  St.  Germain  of  10  September  1919.24  Accordingly,  after  this  day 
it  was  no  longer  a  condition  for  the  legality  of  acquisition,  that  the  acquiring  state 
inform  the  other  states  that  it  had  acquired  the  territory.  But  the  real  acquisition  by 
the  state  should  take  place  in  the  territory  to  prove  this  to  the  other  states. 
(iii)  The  occupation  must  be  real  or  'effective'  and  this  requires  the  actual 
exercise  of  sovereignty  over  territory.  Brownlie  defined  'effective  occupation'  as  "a 
technical  term  denoting  the  taking  of  possession  as  a  consequence  of  the  exercise  of 
25 
government  authority  in  an  area  which  does  not  belong  to  another  State".  In  the 
Legal  Status  of  Eastern  Greenland  case  (1933),  between  Denmark  and  Norway, 
Denmark  claimed  to  have  occupied  this  region  along  with  the  rest  of  Greenland 
early  in  the  eighteenth  century.  During  the  present  century  Norway  claimed 
sovereignty  over  the  area,  and  the  dispute  was  referred  to  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice.  The  Court  ruled: 
a  claim  to  sovereignty  based  not  upon  some  particular  act  or  title 
such  as  a  treaty  of  cession  but  merely  upon  continued  display  of 
authority,  involves  two  elements  each  of  which  must  be  shown  to 
exist:  the  intention  and  will  to  act  as  sovereign,  and  some  actual 
exercise  or  display  of  such  authority.  26 
Discovery  alone  does  not  establish  a  good  title,  giving  only  an  inchoate  and  not  a 
definite  title  of  sovereignty.  An  inchoate  title  must  be  completed  within  a  reasonable 
period  by  the  effective  occupation  of  the  territory  in  question.  27  In  the  Aland  oj 
Palmas  case  between  the  United  States  and  Netherlands,  the  United  States  clairned 
that  as  a  result  of  the  Spanish-American  war  in  1898,  Spain  handed  over  its  right  of 
24 
_  See  UKTS,  No.  18,  (1919),  Cnid.  477. 
25 
_  1.  Brownlie,  International  Law  at  the  Fiftieth  Anniversary  of  the  United  Nations:  General  Course 
on  Public  International  Law,  Recueil  des  Cours,  Vol.  255,  (1995),  P.  157. 
26 
_  pCIj'  Ser.  A/B,  No.  53,  P.  45-6. 
27 
_  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  P.  688-9.  Also  see  A.  Zayas,  Territory,  Discovery,  EPIL,  Vol.  10,  (1987), 
P.  504. 4 
territorial  sovereignty  to  the  United  States,  including  the  island  of  Palmas.  The 
United  States  claimed  that  Spain  had  sovereignty  over  the  island  because  of  its 
discovery  in  the  sixteenth  century  and  that,  according  to  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  all  the 
territorial  rights  of  Spain  were  transferred  to  the  United  States.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Dutch  claimed  the  island  on  the  basis  of  exercise  of  sovereignty  over  a 
considerable  length  of  time.  This  was  not  challenged  by  the  Spanish  precedence  of 
discovering  the  island  because  Spain  never  actually  practised  its  sovereignty.  Judge 
Max  Huber  in  this  case  adopted  the  view  that  discovery  does  not  create  a  definitive 
title  of  sovereignty,  but  only  an  inchoate  title.  If  the  state  does  not  practice 
sovereignty  over  the  territory  it  will  return  to  the  states  of  terra  nullius.  28 
Possession  and  administration  are  the  essential  elements  of  an  effective 
occupation.  By  the  former  is  meant  that  the  occupying  state  should  take  the  territory 
under  its  sway  (corpus)  with  the  intention  (animus)  of  acquiring  sovereignty.  This 
can  be  achieved  by  establishing  a  settlement  on  the  territory,  accompanied  by  some 
formal  act  which  announces  both  that  the  territory  has  been  taken  possession  of  and 
that  the  possessor  intends  to  keep  it  under  his  sovereignty.  Usually  such  a  formal  act 
consists  either  of  a  proclamation  or  of  the  hoisting  of  a  flag.  The  occupying  state 
must  establish  an  administration  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  act  of  taking 
possession,  which  indicates  that  the  territory  in  question  is  under  the  sovereignty  of 
the  new  possessor.  29 
For  example,  by  an  arbitral  decision  the  King  of  Italy  awarded  Clij)pet-ion 
Island  to  France  against  the  claims  of'Mexico  to  this  uninhabited  island  lying  in  the 
7 
29 
_  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  846. 
29 
_  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  111.688-9. Chanter  4 
Pacific  Ocean,  west  of  Mexico.  30  The  award  involved  the  doctrines  of  discovery  and 
effective  possession  in  territorial  sovereignty. 
A  French  expedition  had  visited  the  island,  measured  it,  landed  upon  it,  and 
notified  the  French  Consulate  in  Honolulu  and  the  Government  of  Hawaii  of  the  act 
of  taking  possession.  In  1897  the  French  navy  had  exercised  surveillance  of  the 
island,  finding  three  Americans  collecting  guano  there,  and  demanded  an 
explanation  from  the  United  States,  which  had  made  no  claim  to  the  island.  After  the 
departure  of  the  French  vessel,  Mexican  marines  landed  on  the  island  and  hoisted 
the  Mexican  flag  over  it.  Mexico  claimed  that  the  island  had  been  discovered  by  the 
Spanish  navy  and  that  by  virtue  of  the  1493  Papal  Bull  rightly  belonged  to  Spain. 
Territorial  rights  over  the  island  had  passed  to  Mexico  in  1836  as  the  successor  state 
of  the  Spanish  state.  31 
The  arbitrator  held  that  the  law  requires  "the  actual,  and  not  the  nominal,  taking 
of  possession"  as  a  necessary  condition  of  occupation.  In  ordinary  cases  this  would 
mean  the  establishment  by  a  state  of  an  organization  capable  of  making  its  law 
respected.  But  where  a  territory  "by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  was  completely 
uninhibited,  is,  from  the  first  moment  when  the  occupying  State  makes  its 
appearance  there,  at  the  absolute  and  undisputed  disposition  of  the  State,  from  that 
moment  the  taking  of  possession  must  be  considered  as  accomplished,  and  the 
32 
occupation  is  thereby  completed".  Even  if  France  did  not  exercise  her  power  there 
in  a  positive  manner,  it  did  not  forfeit  its  right  and  had  never  shown  any  intention  of 
abandoning  the  island. 
'0 
-  ILR,  Vol.  6,  (1931-1932),  P.  105.  Also  see  V.  Emmanuel,  Judicial  Decisions  Involving  Questions 
of  International  Law  (France-Mexico),  AJIL,  Vol.  26,  (1932),  P.  390. 
See  Emmanuel,  op.  cit.,  P.  391-2. 
32  ILR,  Vol.  6,  (1931-1932),  P.  107. 
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-V  ---  - 
I  lowever,  the  circurnstances  and  nature  of  the  territory  under  discussion  must  be 
taken  into  consideration.  For  example,  ifcertain  areas  of  the  territory  are  too  cold  to 
establish  a  COr1tII1UOUS  control  over  it,  then  the  concept  of  actual  occupation  should 
,  icant  in  relation  to  the  acquisition  of  territorial  sovereignty.  This  point  be  less  signit- 
was  highlighted  by  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  in  tile  Eastern 
Greenland  case: 
It  is  impossible  to  read  the  records  of  the  decision  in  cases  as  to 
territorial  sovereignty  without  observing  that  in  many  cases  the 
tribunal  has  been  satisfied  with  very  little  in  the  way  of  the  actual 
exercise  of  sovereignty  rights,  provided  that  the  other  state  could  not 
make  out  a  superior  claim.  This  is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of 
claims  to  sovereignty  over  areas  in  thinly  populated  or  unsettled 
countries.  33 
(h)  Occupation  should  be  carried  out  in  the  name  of  the  state,  even  in  the  cases 
where  the  occupation  is  actually  realised  by  individuals  or  companies.  The  Tribunal 
stressed  in  the  Brilish  Gidana-Brazil  Boundary  Award  (1904)  that  "to  acquire  the 
sovereignty  of  regions  which  are  not  in  the  dominion  of  any  State,  it  is  indispensable 
that  the  occupation  be  effected  in  the  name  of  the  State  which  intends  to  acquire  the 
sovereignty  of  those  regions"  34  Judge  Huber  in  the  Island  of  Palmas  case  went  to 
great  lengths  to  attribute  the  acts  of  the  Dutch  East  India  Company  to  the 
Netherlands,  thereby  emphasising  that  occupation  must  be  exercised  on  behalf  of  a 
state  if  it  is  to  be  effective.  Private  individuals  cannot  legitimately  purport  to  act  on 
behalf  of  the  state  of  which  they  are  a  national  without  that  state's  authorisation.  3ý  In 
the  Anglo-Nonvegian  Fisheries  case,  Judge  McNair  stated  that:  "the  independent 
activity  of  private  individuals  is  of  little  value  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  they  have 
acted  in  pursuance  of  a  licence  or  some  other  authority  received  frorn  their 
PCIJ,  Ser.  A/B,  No.  53,  P.  46. 
t-  BFSP,  Vol.  99,  (1905-6),  P.  910. 
See  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  858. 
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Governments  or  that  in  some  other  way  their  Governments  have  asserted  jurisdiction 
through  them".  36 
4.2.2.  Cession 
The  concept  of  cession  is  "the  transfer  of  sovereignty  over  state  territory  by  the 
owner-state  to  another  state".  37  Normally,  cession  is  formulated  through  the 
provisions  of  a  treaty  of  cession  that  may  specify  precisely  the  area  to  be  transferred 
as  well  as  the  condition  under  which  the  transfer  is  to  be  accomplished.  38 
A  cession  treaty  can  take  two  forms.  It  may  be  voluntary  or  forced.  Examples  of 
voluntary  cession  include  the  following:  in  1867  Russia  sold  her  Alaskan  territory  in 
America  to  the  United  States  for  7,200,000  dollars;  in  1899  Spain  sold  the  Caroline 
islands  to  Germany  for  25,000,000  pesetas;  and  in  1916  Denmark  sold  the  islands  of 
St  Thomas,  St  John  and  St  Croix  in  the  West  Indies  to  the  United  States.  Also  in 
1890  Britain  and  Germany  exchanged  Zanzibar  and  Heligoland,  and  in  1898  China 
leased  Kiaochow  to  Germany,  and  Hong  Kong  to  Great  Britain  for  a  term  of  99 
39 
years. 
The  second  form  usually  occurs  at  the  end  of  a  war  or  after  a  threat  of  force. 
When  traditional  international  law  considered  resort  to  war  legitimate,  it  was  legal  to 
give  up  territory  by  force.  It  was  possible  for  the  victorious  country  to  force  the 
defeated  country  to  give  up  its  right  of  sovereignty  over  a  certain  territory  by  a  peace 
treaty.  In  this  case  sovereignty  is  won  by  cession  not  conquest.  40  For  example,  iii  the 
36 
_  ICJ  Rep.,  (195  1),  P.  184 
37 
_  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  P.  679.  Also  Jennings  has  defined  cession  "as  the  transfer  of  territorial 
sovereignty  by  one  state  to  another  state".  op.  cit.,  P.  16. 
38 
_  M.  Akehurst,  A  Modern  Introduction  to  International  Law,  6th  edn.,  (  198  7),  1'.  144. 
39 
_  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  P.  680-2. 
40 
-  Jennings,  op.  cit.,  P.  19. er 
Potsdam  declaration  of  26  July  1945,  the  United  Kingdom,  the  United  States  of 
America,  China  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  agreed  that  Japan,  on 
its  surrender,  would  be  stripped  of  all  island  territory  in  the  Pacific,  'seized  or 
occupied'  by  it  since  the  First  World  War.  41 
Cessions  of  territory  have  often  been  part  of  a  treaty  of  peace  imposed  by  the 
victor.  A  treaty  imposed  by  certain  kinds  of  force  is  now  subject  to  the  rule 
expressed  in  Article  52  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  1969,  that 
the  treaty  is  void  "if  its  conclusion  has  been  procured  by  the  threat  or  use  of  force  in 
violation  of  the  principles  of  international  law  embodied  in  the  Charter  of  the  United 
42  Nations" 
. 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  Resolution  42/41  of  18  November 
1987,  reaffirms  that  "A  treaty  is  void  if  its  conclusion  has  been  procured  by  the 
threat  or  use  of  force  in  violation  of  the  principles  of  international  law  embodied  in 
the  Charter'  ,. 
43 
A  treaty  of  cession  should  mean  cession  of  sovereignty  and  not  the  lease  or 
cession  of  administration  to  another  country.  For  example,  in  1898  China  leased  for 
various  periods  different  territories  to  France,  Russia,  Britain  and  Germany.  By  the 
terms  of  these  leases  China  retained  the  sovereignty  over  the  leased  territories  and 
partcd  merely  with  the  exercise  of  her  sovereign  rights  for  a  limited  number  of' 
years.  44  Similarly,  according  to  the  fourth  Article  of  the  treaty  of  the  Sudanese- 
Ethiopian  borders,  signed  on  15  May  1902  between  Ethiopia  and  Britain,  Britain 
leased  from  Ethiopia  an  area  of  territory  near  Itang  on  the  River  Baro  to  use  it  as  a 
41 
_  See  Whiteman,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  3,  P.  591-2. 
42 
_  UKTS,  No.  58,  (1980),  Cmnd.  7964.  Also  see  1.  Brownlie,  Basic  Documents  in  International  Law, 
(1995),  P.  388. 
13  ILM,  Vol.  27,  (1988),  P.  1673.  It  should  be  noted  that,  in  principle  resolutions  of  the  General 
Assembly  only  have  the  force  recommendations  and  impose  no  legal  obligations.  See  Article  10  of' 
the  UN  Charter  and  also,  S.  M.  Schwebel,  Justice  in  International  Law,  (1994),  P.  499. 
"-  Abu  Haif,  op.  cit.,  P.  325-6. 
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commercial  centre.  It  was  agreed  that  the  lease  would  be  terminated  by  the  end  of 
the  Anglo-Egyptian  Government  in  the  Sudan.  45  From  5  July-12  August  1955, 
Britain  and  Ethiopia  exchanged  correspondence  to  end  the  lease  of  the  area.  46 
Again,  according  to  the  Anglo-Turkish  Treaty,  signed  on  4  June  1878,  the 
administration  of  the  island  of  Cyprus  was  given  to  Britain.  47 
Accordingly,  if  it  appeared  that  the  treaty  was  meant  for  the  lease  or  cession  of 
administration  of  a  territory,  then  the  sovereignty  of  this  territory  remains  under  the 
country  which  gave  the  lease  or  the  cession  of  administration  . 
48  In  an  Indian  case 
State  of  Madras  and  Cochin  Coal  Company,  49  the  High  Court  of  Kerala  held  that 
the  transfer  of  jurisdiction  over  a  portion  of  territory  from  one  state  to  another  does 
not  imply  a  cession  of  territory  or  the  abandonment  of  sovereignty  by  the  transferor 
of  the  jurisdiction.  Referring  to  the  Agreement  by  which  the  transfer  was  effected, 
the  Court  said  that  it  "did  not  cede  the  lands  themselves  but  only  jurisdiction  over 
them"  . 
50  Again,  in  the  Lighthouses  in  Crete  andSamos  case  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice  held  that  in  1913  the  island  of  Crete  and  Samos  must  be 
regarded  as  having  been  under  the  sovereignty  of  Turkey  which  therefore  could 
grant  or  renew  concessions  with  regard  to  these  islands.  Referring  to  Crete,  the  court 
said  that  notwithstanding  the  autonomy  conceded  to  her  by  Turkey,  the  island  "had 
not  ceased  to  be  a  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Even  though  the  Sultan  had  been 
obliged  to  accept  important  restrictions  on  the  exercise  of  his  sovereignty  in  Crete, 
45 
-  F.  A.  Taha,  The  Sudan-Ethiopia  Boundary  Dispule,  (1983),  P.  46. 
46 
-  UKTS,  No.  86,  (1955),  Cmd.  9646. 
47 
_  See  this  Treaty  in,  CTS,  Vol.  153,  (1878),  P.  67. 
48 
-  F.  A.  Taha,  al-Qanwn  al-Dwllv  wa  AInazaint  al-Hadud  (international  Law  and  Boundary 
Disputes),  (  1982),  P.  25. 
49 
_I  LIZ,  Vol.  26,  (195  8-11),  P.  116. 
50 
_  Ibid.  P.  117. 
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that  sovereignty  had  not  ceased  to  belong  to  him, however  it  might  be  qualified  from 
a  juridical  point  of  view". 
51 
The  intrusion  of  political  interpretation  led  some  writers  to  treat  the  cases  of 
leases  and  cession  of  administration  alluded  to  above  as  disguised  cessions  of 
territorial  sovereignty.  Lawrence,  for  instance,  said  that  the  attempt  to  separate 
sovereignty  from  possession  by  the  use  of  phrases  taken  from  the  law  of  usufruct 
was  in  its  very  nature  deceptive:  "The  terms  in  question  are  mere  diplomatic  devices 
for  veiling  in  decent  words  the  hard  fact  of  territorial  cession".  52 
Lauterpacht,  however,  criticised  these  opinions  and  referred  to  them  as  political 
explanations.  He  said: 
There  is  always  a  danger  in  the  attempt  to  comprehend  the 
realities  of  a  situation  at  the  expense  of  the  realities  of  the  law.  It  is 
not  the  business  of  the  law  to  give  a  political  interpretation,  however 
closely  approximating  to  the  facts,  of  the  legal  situation.  The  gap 
between  the  two  is  a  creature  of  the  parties  and  must  not  be  bridged 
by  attempts  at  realism.  53 
There  are  different  opinions  about  the  validity  of  cession,  concerning  the  actual 
handing  over  of  the  ceded  territory  to  the  cessionary.  Kelsen  sees  that  cession  is  not 
complete  until  the  actual  handing  over  of  the  ceded  territory,  and  it  becomes  a 
of  the  cessionary.  54  Oppenheim,  however,  states: 
the  validity  of  the  cession  does  not  depend  upon  tradition,  the 
cession  being  completed  by  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  cession,  thus 
enabling  the  new  owner  to  cede  the  acquired  territory  to  a  third  state 
at  once  without  taking  actual  possession  of  it.  55 
51 
-  PCIJ,  Ser.  A/B,  No.  71,  (193  7),  P.  103. 
52 
_  Lawrence,  op.  cit.,  P.  169. 
53 
-  H.  Lauterpacht,  International  Law,  VoH,  ed.  by  E.  Lauterpacht,  (1970),  P.  373. 
54 
_  H.  Kelsen,  General  Principles  of  Inlet-national  Law,  2nd  edn.,  by  R.  W.  Tucker,  (1966),  11.312-3. 
55 
_  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  P.  683. ChaDter  4 
Since  cession  transfers  sovereignty  from  the  ceding  state  to  the  cessionary  state, 
56 
therefore  the  ceding  state  must  have  sovereignty  over  the  ceded  territory.  In  the 
Island  of  Palmas  case,  the  United  States  based  its  claim  partly  on  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
of  1898,  which  transferred  to  the  United  States  all  rights  of  sovereignty  which  Spain 
possessed,  said  to  include  the  disputed  island.  The  arbitrator  held  that  the  treaty 
could  not  be  regarded  as  conclusive  for  "it  is  evident  that  Spain  could  not  transfer 
57 
more  rights  than  she  herself  possessed'  . 
Therefore  protectorate  and  trusteeship  states  cannot  cede  their  territories  unless 
the  relation  with  the  protector  states  allows  this.  On  the  other  hand,  a  neutralised 
state  can  only  cede  territory  to  another  state  with  the  consent  of  the  guaranteeing 
states. 
58 
In  a  case  when  a  cession  depends  on  a  plebiscite,  sovereignty  over  the  ceded 
territory  remains  with  the  ceding  state  until  the  date  of  plebiscite  which  confirms  the 
cession  treaty's  entry  into  force.  Oppenheim  stresses  the  invalidity  of  a  cession 
without  the  inhabitants'  confirmation  given  to  this  cession  by  plebiscite.  59  Professor 
Shihab,  agreeing  with  Oppenheim,  says  "it  is  illegal  to  transfer  the  sovereignty  over 
60 
a  territory  to  another  state  without  the  consent  of  the  people  concerned". 
The  connection  with  the  principle  of  self-determination,  which  was  one  ofthe 
principles  of  President  Wilson  after  the  First  World  War,  is  evident.  61  It  was 
presumed  to  apply  the  principle  of  self-determination  to  all  ceded  territories  after 
that  war.  But  it  is  doubtful  that  this  principle  was  applied  to  every  cession  carried 
"-  Ibid.  P.  680. 
57 
_  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  842. 
58 
-  Abu  Haif,  op.  cit.,  P.  352. 
'9 
-  Oppenheini's,  op.  cit.,  P.  684. 
'0 
-  M.  M.  Shihab,  al-Qanoun  a/-Davvh  al-Aam  (Public  International  Law),  (1987),  11.15  1. 
80 
"-  Abu  Haif,  op.  cit.,  P.  353 ChaDter  4 
out.  Although  in  the  Saar  Basin  case,  the  cession  was  dependent  on  the  plebiscite, 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  ceded  to  France  and  the  Austrian  Tyrol  to  Italy  without 
allowing  any  plebiscite.  62 
4.2.3.  Acquisitive  prescription 
Prescription  is  defined  as  "the  acquisition  of  sovereignty  over  a  territory  through 
continuous  and  undisturbed  exercise  of  sovereignty  over  it  during  such  a  period  as  is 
necessary  to  create  under  the  influence  of  historical  development  the  general 
conviction  that  the  present  condition  of  things  is  in  conformity  with  international 
order".  63  Johnson  defines  prescription  as  "the  means  by  which,  under  international 
law,  legal  recognition  is  given  to  the  right  of  a  state  to  exercise  sovereignty  over  land 
or  sea  territory  in  cases  where  that  state  has,  in  fact,  exercised  its  authority  in  a 
continuous,  uninterrupted,  and  peaceful  manner  over  the  area  concerned  for  a 
sufficient  period  of  time".  64 
In  international  law  'prescription'  has  three  meanings.  It  is  necessary  to 
distinguish  between  them  as  follows: 
(i)  Prescription  used  in  the  sense  of  'extinctive  prescription'  similar  to  the 
English  Law  as  'limitation',  that  is  a  failure  to  present  a  claim  within  a  reasonable 
time  which  may  result  in  the  loss  of  the  competence  to  enforce  it.  65 
(ii)  Immemorial  possession  is  one  kind  of  'acquisitive  prescription',  where  there 
is  a  possession  which  has  been  so  long  established  that  it  is  impossible  to  prove 
62 
_  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  P.  684.  For  more  detail  on  the  Austria  example  see  K.  Marek,  Identity  and 
Continuity  of  States  in  Public  International  Law,  (  1968),  P.  199. 
63 
-  Ibid.  P.  706. 
64 
-  D.  H.  N.  Johnson,  Acquisitive  Prescription  in  International  Law,  BYbII.,  Vol.  27,  (1950),  11.353. 
65 
-  Ibid.  P.  332. 
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whether  the  origin  of  this  state  of  affairs  is  legal  or  illegal,  and  it  is  therefore 
66 
presumed  to  be  legal 
. 
(iii)  Usucaption  in  Roman  Law  is  akin  to  acquisitive  prescription  but  the 
difference  between  the  two  is  that  the  former  required  good  faith  possession, 
whereas  international  law  recognises  prescription  both  in  cases  where  the  state  is  in 
good  faith;  possession  and  in  cases  where  it  is  not.  67 
There  has  always  been  opposition  to  prescription  as  a  mode  of  acquiring 
territory.  Some  writers  argue  that  while  acquisition  of  property  has  been  accepted  in 
private  law  by  prescription  it  cannot  be  accepted  as  a  mode  of  acquiring  sovereignty 
over  a  territory  in  international  law.  68  For  example,  in  the  Righl  of'Passage  case, 
between  Portugal  and  India  in  1960,  Judge  Moreno  Quintana  referred  to  prescription 
as  "a  private  law  institution  which  I  consider  finds  no  place  in  international  law".  69 
In  the  opinion  of  Sultan,  Ratib  and  Amer,  prescription  ignores  two  important 
elements:  justice  in  acquiring  the  right  of  title  and  the  wish  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
territory  concerned  for  self-determination,  70  but  the  majority  of  writers  have 
supported  acquisitive  prescription  as  a  rule  of  international  law.  71 
Therefore,  the  following  conditions  must  exist  in  order  for  acquisitive 
prescription  to  operate: 
66 
-  Ibid.  P.  335.  Also  Jennings,  op.  cit.,  P.  2  1. 
67 
-  See  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  P.  705-6. 
68 
-  See  H.  Sultan,  A.  Ratib  and  S.  Amer,  al-Qanoun  al-Dawli  al-Aam  (Public  International  Law), 
(1987),  P.  672. 
"" 
-  TO  Rep.,  (1960),  P.  88. 
70 
_  Sultan,  Ratib  and  Amer,  op.  cit.,  P.  672. 
71 
_  333.  Also  see  Abu  Hait'  op.  cit.,  P.  356.  See  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  P.  )31 ChaDter  4 
(i)  The  possession  of'the  prescribing  state  must  be  exercised  6  litre  de  soverain 
This  means  that  there  must  be  a  display  of  state  authority  and  the  absence  of 
recognition  of  sovereignty  in  favour  of  another  state.  72  A  state  cannot  acquire  a  title 
by  acquisitive  prescription  if,  although  administering  a  territory,  it  admits  that  the 
sovereignty  over  that  territory  belongs  to  another  state.  This  occurs  when  a  state 
acquires  territory  by  an  international  lease  or  when  a  state  cedes  the  administration 
of  part  of  her  territory  to  another  state.  In  these  circumstances  a  state  cannot  acquire 
these  territories  a  titre  de  soverain.  73  For  the  same  reason,  a  state  exercising  a 
protectorate  over  another  cannot  acquire  a  title  by  acquisitive  prescription,  no  matter 
how  long  it  administers  these  territories.  74  For  instance,  in  the  period  following 
1878,  it  was  impossible  for  Great  Britain  to  acquire  title  by  prescription  over  Cyprus 
because  certain  terms  in  the  Anglo-Turkish  Treaty  signed  at  Constantinople  on  4 
June  1878  showed  that  Great  Britain  recognized  the  continuing  sovereignty  of  the 
Sultan  of  Turkey  over  the  island.  A  similar  example  is  that  it  was  impossible  for 
Austria-Hungary  to  acquire  title  by  prescription  over  Bosnia-Herzegovina  because, 
under  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  of  13  July  1878,  the  sovereignty  of  the  Turkish  Sultan 
over  those  territories  was  recognized.  75 
Activities  exercised  by  private  persons  in  certain  territories  could  not  be 
considered  as  a  manifestation  of  state  authority  and  therefore  cannot  amount  to  the 
acts  of  a  sovereign  in  such  territories.  76  Professor  Waldock  said:  "The  acquisition  of 
sovereignty  is  a  state  act  and  if  the  act  of  a  discoverer  is  to  have  any  validity  in 
72 
_  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  P.  344. 
"-  Ibid. 
74 
_  M.  H.  Ghanom,  al-Wagizfi  al-Qanoun  ol-Dawli  al-Aam  (Concise  Public  International  Law), 
(1979),  P.  207. 
75 
_  Johnson,  op,  cit.,  P.  344. 
76 
-  Taha,  al-Qanwn,  op.  cit.,  P.  26. 84 
international  law  it  must  be  endorsed  by  the  state;  the  animus  occupandi  ultimately 
77 
must  be  that  of  the  state,  not  of  the  individual".  Schwarzenberger  also  said  that  the 
acts  of  individuals  by  themselves  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  substitute  for  the  display 
of  state  authority:  "Unless  authorized  in  advance  or  subsequently  ratified,  the 
activities  of  individuals  can  be  neither  attributed  nor  imputed  to  the  state  whose 
78 
nationals  they  are"  . 
The  question  of  the  legal  effect  of  acts  of  private  individuals  arose  in  the 
Allinquiers  and  Ecrehos  case.  Judge  Levi  Cameiro,  when  discussing  the  visits  of 
French  and  British  fishermen  to  the  disputed  islets,  expressed  an  opinion  which  at 
first  sight  would  convey  the  impression  that  he  was  of  the  view  that  the  private 
activities  of  individuals  could  per  se  create  title.  Judge  Carneiro  said  that: 
in  certain  cases,  and  in  certain  circumstances,  the  presence  of 
private  persons  who  are  nationals  of  a  given  State  may  signify  or 
entail  occupation  by  that  State.  Sovereignty  is  exercised  over  persons 
who  recognize  that  sovereignty  ... 
Such  individual  actions  are 
particularly  important  in  respect  of  territories  situated  at  the  border  of 
two  countries  which  both  claim  sovereignty  in  that  region.  79 
Judge  Carneiro  stated  that  he  had  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  limits  of  the  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  possessions  in  South  America,  whicl-  had  been  strictly  laid  down  in  the 
Treaty  of  Tordesilhas,  were  exceeded  by  persons  from  Brazil  in  search  for  gold  and 
emeralds.  Though  these  persons  were  frequently  disappointed  in  their  material 
expectations  "they  achieved  u1i  possidelis  for  Brazil  and  greatly  increased  her 
territory".  80 
77 
-  C.  H.  M.  Waldock,  Disputed  Sovereignty  in  the  Falkland  Islands  Dependencies,  BYbll,,  Vol.  25, 
(1948),  P.  323. 
78 
-  G.  Schwarzenberger,  Title  to  Territory:  Response  to  A  Challenge,  AJIL,  Vol.  5  1,  (1957),  11.3  16. 
79 
_  ICJ  Rep.,  (1953),  P.  104-5 
go 
-  Ibid.  P.  105. 85 
Although  the  private  activities  of  individuals  in  a  certain  territory  cannot  per  se 
constitute  a  basis  of  title,  they  may  nevertheless  provide  evidence  of  an  already 
existing  one.  81  In  the  Rann  of  Kutch  case  between  India  and  Pakistan  in  1968, 
contrary  to  what  tribunal  member  Judge  Bebler  in  his  separate  opinion  had 
suggested,  the  Tribunal  did  not  regard  the  grazing  of  the  Sind  cattle  in  the  three  Bets 
of  the  Rann  as  per  se  a  constitutive  basis  of  the  Sind  sovereignty  but  as  evidence  of 
it.  Thus,  after  awarding  the  three  Bets  to  Pakistan  on  the  basis  of  "effective  peaceful 
occupation  and  display  of  Government  authority",  the  Tribunal  remarked  that  "the 
inhabitants  of  Sind  who  openly  used  the  grazing  grounds  for  over  one  hundred 
years  ...  must  have  acted  on  the  basis  that  Dhara  Banni  and  Chhad  Bet  were  Sind 
territory  ".  82 
(ii)  The  possession  must  be  public 
Although  in  international  affairs  clandestine  possession  of  territory  is  difficult  to 
conceive,  it  is  essential  to  stress  the  importance  of  publicity  as  a  condition  of 
prescription.  According  to  Johnson  "Publicity  is  essential  because  acquiescence  is 
essential.  For  acquisitive  prescription  depends  upon  acquiescence,  express  or 
implied.  Acquiescence  is  often  implied,  in  the  interests  of  international  order,  in 
cases  where  it  does  not  genuinely  exist;  but  without  knowledge  there  can  be  no 
acquiescence  at  all"  . 
83 
However,  in  a  complicated  situation  of  competing  state  activity  publicity  will 
not  play  an  important  role  because  acquiescence  may  not  be  relevant  except  in  minor 
"-  See  G.  Fitzmaurice,  The  Law  and  Procedure  of  the  International  Law,  Vol.  1,  (1986),  P.  178.  Also 
see  the  same  writer,  The  Law  and  Procedure  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  195  1-4:  General 
Principles,  and  Sources  of  Law,  BYbIL,  Vol.  30,  (1953),  P.  48. 
82 
_  ILM,  Vol.  7,  (1968),  P.  689. 
83 
-  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  P.  347. Chapter  4 
respects.  84  In  the  Island  qf'Palmas  case  Judge  Huber  remarked  that:  "A  clandestine 
exercise  of  state  authority  over  an  inhabited  territory  during  a  considerable  length  of 
time  would  seem  to  be  impossible".  85  Also,  the  International  Court  of  Justice's 
judgment  in  the  Frontier  Land  case  which  concerned  a  territorial  dispute  between 
Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  the  difficulties  confronting  Belgium  in  detecting 
encroachments  upon  and  in  exercising  its  sovereignty  over  these  two  plots, 
surrounded  as  they  were  by  Netherlands  territory,  were  manifest.  86  Unlike  the  Court, 
Judge  Armand-Ugon  was  of  the  view  that  since  the  Convention  of  1843  and  the 
draft  Convention  of  1892,  the  Netherlands  continued  to  regard  the  disputed  plots  as 
theirs  "and  to  exercise  there  governmental  functions  in  a  public  and  peaceable 
,5  87 
way  . 
The  condition  that  the  possession  must  be  public  does  not  mean  that  the 
possessing  state  must  inform  other  interested  states.  Thus,  in  the  Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries  case,  the  Court  seems  to  have  imputed  to  the  United  Kingdom  constructive 
knowledge  of  the  Norwegian  system  of  delimitation.  The  United  Kingdom's 
ignorance  was  found  not  to  be  excusable: 
The  notoriety  of  the  facts 
... 
Great  Britain's  position  in  the  North 
Sea,  her  own  interest  in  the  question,  and  her  long  abstention  would 
in  any  case  warrant  Norway's  enforcement  of  her  system  against  the 
United  Kingdom.  88 
In  the  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  case  the  United  Kingdom  maintained  that  the  French 
government  must,  through  its  consular  representative,  have  been  aware  of  the  British 
assertions  of  sovereignty  in  respect  of  the  disputed  islets.  Thc  United  Kingdom 
84 
-  Brownlie,  Principles,  op.  cit.,  P.  158. 
85 
-  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  868. 
86 
-  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959),  P.  229. 
87 
_  Ibid.  P.  250. 
98 
-  ICJ  Rep.,  (195  1),  P.  139. 
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argued  that  it  was  difficult  to  believe  that  France  could  maintain  a  consul  in  Jersey, 
and  yet  not  be  aware  of  the  attitude  and  position  of  the  Jersey  authorities  respecting 
the  case  of  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos.  99 
(iii)  The  possession  must  be  continuous  andpeaceAl 
In  international  law,  the  uninterrupted  continuity  of  possession  is  an  important  factor 
in  acquiring  sovereignty  over  a  territory.  90  In  the  case  of  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  the 
United  Kingdom  claimed  that  the  state  which  aspires  to  gain  sovereignty  over 
territory  by  acquisitive  prescription  should  have  possessed  it  continuously.  This 
means  that  presence  in  the  territory  for  a  short  while  is  not  enough.  91 
Possession  maintained  by  force  in  the  face  of  persistent  and  violent  opposition 
does  not  amount  to  prescription,  for  it  is  contrary  to  the  main  purpose  of  the 
doctrine.  92  In  the  Island  of  Palmas  case,  Judge  Huber  refers  to  "continuous  and 
peaceful  display  of  state  authority  'so-called  prescription"'.  In  this  case  the  arbitrator 
had  to  decide  whether  sovereignty  over  the  island  belonged  to  the  Netherlands  or  to 
the  United  States.  The  United  States'  claim  was  based  on  discovery  of  the  island  by 
Spain.  But  the  arbitration  rejected  the  United  States'  claim  and  decided  in  favour  of 
the  Netherlands  on  the  basis  of  the  continuous  and  peaceful  display  of  sovereignty 
93  by  the  Netherlands.  Also,  in  the  Chamizal  Arbitration,  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico,  the  United  States  claimed  as  against  Mexico  a  tract  of  the  Rio  Grande 
on  the  basis  of  prescription,  but  the  claim  failed  on  the  ground  that  the  possession  of' 
the  United  States  had  not  been  without  challenge.  The  United  States  was  precluded 
from  acquiring  on  a  basis  of  prescription  by  the  terms  of  a  Convention  of  1884, 
89  ICJ  Pleadings,  Vol.  11,  P.  175. 
90 
-  Waldock,  op.  cit.,  P.  32  1 
9'-  ICJ  Pleadings,  Vol.  11,  P.  364. 
92  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  P.  345. 
93  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  868. which  endeavored  to  fix  the  rights  of  the  two  nations  with  respect  to  the  changes 
brought  about  by  the  action  of  the  waters  of  the  Rio  Grande.  Furthermore, 
possession  must  be  peaceable  to  provide  a  basis  for  prescription  and,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Commissioners,  diplomatic  protests  by  Mexico  prevented  title  arising.  A 
failure  to  take  action  which  might  lead  to  violence  was  not  held  to  jeopardize 
94 
Mexican  rights. 
Similarly,  in  the  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  case  between  the  United  Kingdon-i  and 
France,  Fitzmaurice,  Counsel  for  the  United  Kingdom,  argued  that  his  country's 
possession  of  the  disputed  islets  was  'peaceful'  for  the  United  Kingdom  "did  not 
invade  the  Minquiers  or  the  tcr6hous  or  commit  any  act  of  war  of  any  kind  in 
relation  to  them".  95  Explaining  the  requirement  of  'peacefulness'  in  the  acquisition 
of  a  prescriptive  title,  Fitzmaurice  said  that  it  extends  "to  preventing  the 
maintenance  of  possession  by  acts  in  the  nature  of  war  or  public  armed  force  or 
hostilities".  But  it  does  not  prevent  ordinary  police  acts  carried  out  in  the  territory 
concerned  in  the  process  of  administration  for  otherwise  the  prescribing  state  would 
be  deprived  "of  the  possibility  of  maintaining  law  and  order  in  territory  which  it  is 
undoubtedly  administering  de  fiacio  in  which  it  is  therefore  to  that  extent 
international!  y  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order".  96 
(iv)  The  possession  must  endure  jor  a  certain  length  oftime 
No  general  rule  in  international  law  can  be  laid  down  on  the  length  of  time  required 
for  the  establishment  of  prescriptive  title.  97  For  example,  in  the  Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries  case  Judge  Alvarez  said  "International  law  does  not  lay  down  any  specific 
94 
_  Ibid.  Vol.  XI,  P.  329. 
95 
_ 
ICj  Pleadings,  Vol.  11,  (1953),  P.  365. 
96 
_  Ibid. 
97 
-  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  P.  347. duration  of  time  necessary  for  prescription  to  have  effect.  A  comparatively  recent 
usage  ...  may  be  of  greater  effect  than  an  ancient  usage  insufficiently  proved".  98  But 
a  few  writers  have  tried  to  limit  prescriptive  time,  for  example,  Grotius  and  his 
followers  favoured  more  than  a  hundred  years  while  F.  de  Martens  and  Rivier 
required  'immemorial  possession.  99  However  the  majority  of  writers  conclude  that 
the  time  varies  with  the  facts  of  each  case  which  really  eliminates  time  as  a  special 
requirement.  100 
In  international  law  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  states  in  dispute  over  the 
sovereignty  of  certain  territory  from  agreeing  on  a  certain  period  of  time  required  for 
the  establishment  of  sovereignty  over  such  territory  by  prescription.  In  the  British 
Guiana-Venezuela  boundary  dispute,  the  treaty  of  1897  fixed  a  fifty  years  period  for 
the  requirement  of  establishing  title  by  prescription.  '01 
(y)  Acquiescence 
Acquiescence  constitutes  the  operative  factor  in  the  acquisition  of  title  by 
prescription.  "No  amount  of  activity  on  the  part  of  the  'prescri  I  ipting'  State  would 
avail,  without  the  passivity  and  inaction  of  the  original  sovereign".  102 
The  idea  of  acquiescence  occurs  in  circumstances  where  a  protest  is  called  for 
and  does  not  happen.  103  Jennings  considers  acquiescence  to  "arise  from  a  mere 
omission  to  protest  against  a  situation  where  a  right  to  protest  existed  and  its 
exercise  was  called  for".  104  Shaw  argues  "a  situation  arises  which  would  seem  to 
98 
-  ICJ  Rep.,  (195  1),  P.  152. 
99 
-  Ibid. 
100  Brownlie.  Principles,  op.  cit.,  P.  158. 
101 
-  BFSP,  Vol.  89,  P.  60 
89 
102  Fitzmaurice,  The  Law  and  Procedure,  op.  cit.,  P.  271  n.  1 
103  Brownlie.  Principles,  op.  cit.,  P.  160. 
104  Jennings,  op.  cit.,  P.  36. 4 
require  a  response  denoting  disagreement  and  since  this  does  not  transpire,  the  state 
making  no  oýjection  is  understood  to  have  accepted  the  new  situation".  105 
In  the  formation  of  prescriptive  rights  acquiescence  is  a  necessary  and 
significant  factor.  "Acquiescence  is  equivalent  to  tacit  or  implied  consent.  It  takes 
the  form  of  silence  or  absence  of  protest  in  circumstances  which,  according  to  the 
practice  of  states  and  the  weight  of  authority,  demand  a  positive  reaction  in  order  to 
preserve  a  right".  106  The  leading  case  on  acquiescence  is  the  Temple  of  Preah 
Vihear  which  concerned  a  border  dispute  between  Cambodia  and  Thailand.  107  The 
frontier  was  the  subject  of  a  treaty  in  1904  between  Slam  (now  Thailand)  and 
France,  as  the  protecting  power  for  Cambodia,  which  provided  for  a  delimitation 
commission.  The  border  was  duly  surveyed  but  was  ambiguous  as  to  the  site  of  the 
Preah  Vihear  temple  area.  Thailand  denied  acceptance  of  the  Annex  I  map  and  the 
frontier  line  indicated  thereon  by  the  adoption  of  a  passive  attitude.  She  argued  that 
her  conduct,  involving  at  most  a  failure  to  object,  could  not  suffice  to  render  her  a 
consenting  party  to  a  departure  from  the  watershed  line  specified  by  Article  I  of  the 
Treaty  of  1904.  In  rejecting  this  argument,  the  Court  specifically  found  that  the 
circumstances  "were  such  as  called  for  some  reaction,  within  a  reasonable  period,  on 
the  part  of  the  Siamese  authorities,  if  they  wished  to  disagree  with  the  map  or  had 
any  serious  question  to  raise  in  regard  to  it.  They  did  not  do  so,  either  then  or  for 
many  years,  and  thereby  must  be  held  to  have  acquiesced".  108  This  is  clear  finding 
105 
-  M.  N.  Shaw,  International  Law,  (1991),  13.298. 
106 
_  I.  C.  MacGibbon,  The  Scope  of  Acquiescence  in  International  Law,  BYbll,,  Vol.  31,  (1954), 
P.  182. 
107  ICJ  Rep.,  (1962),  P.  6.  Also  ILR,  Vol.  33,  P.  48. 
118  Ibid.  P.  2  In  his  separate  opinion  Judge  Fitzmaurice  said  that  fie  could  not  place  any  other 
interpretation  oil  Thailand's  conduct  other  than  that  she  accepted  the  Annex  I  line  as  representing  the 
frontier  in  the  Preah  Vibear  region.  lie  further  pointed  out  that  "even  negative  concluct-that  is  to  say  z:  1 
failure  to  act,  react  or  speak,  in  circurnstances  where  failure  so  to  do  must  imply  acquiescence  or 
acceptance-is  ...  quite  sufficient  for  this  purpose,  if  the  facts  are  clear".  Ibid.  P.  55. 91 
of  acquiescence  by  silence-,  there  was  no  estoppel  as  Cambodia  had  provided  no 
evidence  that  it  had,  in  the  years  following  the  delivery  of  the  maps,  acted  on  the 
basis  of  Thailand's  apparent  acceptance  of  the  map  so  as  to  change  its  position  to  its 
own  detriment. 
The  Court  did  not,  however,  rely  solely  on  the  conduct  of  Thailand  in  the  years 
immediately  following  the  production  of  the  relevant  map.  The  Court  relied  on  a 
broader  concept  of  preclusion  based  upon  Thailand's  conduct  over  many  years: 
Even  if  there  were  any  doubt  as  to  Siam's  acceptance  of  the  map 
in  1908,  and  hence  of  the  frontier  indicated  thereon,  the  Court  would 
consider,  in  the  light  of  the  subsequent  course  of  events,  that 
Thailand  is  now  precluded  by  her  conduct  from  asserting  that  she  did 
not  accept  it.  She  has,  for  fifty  years,  enjoyed  such  benefits  as  the 
Treaty  of  1904  conferred  on  her,  if  only  the  benefit  of  a  stable 
frontier 
... 
It  is  not  now  open  to  Thailand,  while  continuing  to  claim 
and  enjoy  the  benefits  of  the  settlement,  to  deny  that  she  was  even  a 
consenting  party  to  it.  '  09 
In  the  Anglo-Norwegian  Fisheries  case,  the  International  Court  of  Justice  further 
confirmed  the  validity  and  significance  of  the  doctrine  of  acquiescence  in  the  form 
of  absence  of  protest.  It  stated  that  Great  Britain  did  not  protest  against  the 
Norwegian  delimitation  system  of  its  territorial  seas  over  sixty  years.  '  10  This  means, 
as  Johnson  affirmed,  "display  of  authority  by  the  one  party,  acquiescence  in  that 
display  by  the  other  party-those  are  the  sine  qua  non  of  acquisitive  prescription".  III 
In  his  dissenting  opinion  in  the  Frontier  Land  case  Judge  Armand-Ugon  found  that 
the  Netherlands  government  had  exercised  preponderant  governmental  functions  in 
respect  of  the  disputed  plots  "without  these  having  given  rise  on  the  part  of'  the 
Belgian  Government  to  any  protest  or  any  opposition.  This  prolonged  tolerance  of 
109  Ibid.  P.  32. 
110 
-  ICJ  Rep.,  (1951),  P.  138. 
1  '' 
-  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  P.  345. 92 
the  Belgian  Government  in  this  respect  has  created  an  indisputable  right  of 
sovereignty  in  favour  of  the  Netherlands  Government".  112 
Bowett  asserts  that  "the  claim  to  acquire  rights  by  prescription  must  rest  upon 
the  acquiescence  of  States  generally,  or  at  least  those  States  adversely  affected  by  the 
claim".  11  3  In  addition,  a  claim  of  acquiescence  asserts  that  the  state  concerned  did 
accept  or  agree  on  that  point.  '  14  So  a  question  that  has  frequently  arisen  is  whether 
silence  by  one  state  in  the  face  of  a  claim  made  by  another  state  can  be  invoked  as 
evidence  of  acquiescence  in  that  claim.  115  In  the  Grisbadarna  Arbitration  116  of 
1909  between  Norway  and  Sweden,  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  considered 
the  acquiescence  of  Norway  in  certain  acts  of  Sweden  as  a  factor  which  supported 
the  validity  of  the  Swedish  claims.  The  ownership  of  fishing  banks  off  the  coast 
outside  territorial  waters  was  in  dispute,  and  the  Tribunal  indicated,  inter  alia,  the 
following  reason  why  the  Grisbaclarna  Bank  should  be  allotted  to  Sweden: 
The  circumstance  that  Sweden  has  performed  various  acts  in  the 
Grisbadarna  region,  especially  of  late,  owing  to  her  conviction  that 
these  regions  were  Swedish,  as,  for  instance,  the  placing  of  beacons, 
the  measurement  of  the  sea,  and  the  installation  of  a  light-boat,  being 
acts  which  involved  considerable  expense  and  in  doing  which  she  not 
only  thought  that  she  was  exercising  her  right  but  even  more  that  she 
was  performing  her  duty;  whereas  Norway,  according  to  her  own 
admission,  showed  much  less  solicitude  in  this  region  in  these 
various  regards.  117 
After  adverting  to  the  principle  quieta  non  movere,  the  Tribunal  concluded: 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1959),  P.  250. 
D.  W.  Bowett,  Estoppel  before  International  Tribunals  and  its  Relation  to  Acquiescence,  BYbIL, 
Vol.  33,  (1957),  P.  200. 
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-  See  H.  Thirlway,  The  Law  and  Procedure  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  1960-1989,  BYbI  L, 
Vol.  60,  (1989),  P.  29.  Also  see  J.  P.  Muller  and  T.  Cottier,  Acquiescence,  EPIL,  Vol.  1,  (1992),  P.  14. 
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-  Decision  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  in  the  Matter  of  the  Maritime  Boundary  Dispute 
between  Norway  and  Sweden,  AJ  I  L,  Vol.  4,  (19  10),  P.  226. 
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The  stationing  of  a  light-boat,  which  is  necessary  to  the  safety  of 
navigation  in  the  regions  of  Grisbadarna,  was  done  by  Sweden 
without  meeting  any  protest  and  even  at  the  initiative  of  Norway,  and 
likewise  a  large  number  of  beacons  were  established  there  without 
giving  rise  to  any  protests;  ... 
It  is  shown  by  the  foregoing  that 
Sweden  had  no  doubt  as  to  her  rights  over  the  Grisbadarna  and  that 
she  did  not  hesitate  to  incur  the  expenses  incumbent  on  the  owner 
and  possessor  of  these  banks  even  to  the  extent  of  a  considerable  sum 
of  money.  "  8 
Again,  in  the  Island  of  Palmas  case  between  the  United  States  and  the  Netherlands, 
the  Arbitrator  found  that  the  Netherlands  had  a  good  title  to  the  disputed  island 
which  it  had  "acquired  by  continuous  and  peaceful  display  of  State  authority  during 
a  long  period  of  time".  '  19  Evidence  of  acquiescence  by  Spain  and  other  states  in  the 
'open  and  public'  display  of  state  authority  over  the  island  sufficed  to  satisfy  the 
Arbitrator  that  the  requirement  that  the  display  must  be  peaceful  had  been  fulfilled. 
The  Award  stated: 
Since  the  moment  when  the  Spaniards,  in  withdrawing  from  the 
Moluccas  in  1666,  and  made  express  reservations  as  to  the 
maintenance  of  their  sovereign  rights,  up  to  the  contestation  made  by 
the  United  States  in  1906,  no  contestation  or  other  action  whatever  or 
protest  against  the  exercise  of  territorial  rights  by  the  Netherlands 
over  the  Talautse  (Sangi)  Isles  and  their  dependencies  (Miangas 
included)  has  been  recorded.  The  peaceful  character  of  the  display  of 
Netherlands  sovereignty  for  the  entire  period  to  which  the  evidence 
concerning  acts  of  display  relates  (1700-1906)  must  be  admitted.  120 
In  the  Gulf  of  Maine  case  between  Canada  and  the  United  States  of  America  in 
1984,12  1a  relevant  issue  related  to  the  conduct  of  the  parties  in  granting  sea-bed 
exploration  permits  over  disputed  areas  of  the  Georges  Bank.  Canada  claimed  that  it 
was  known  to  the  United  States  that  Canada  had  issued  such  permits,  and  that  the 
United  States  had  not  protested  or  shown  any  reaction;  and  while  the  United  States 
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93 also  issued  permits  in  the  disputed  area  it  did  nothing  to  inform  Canada  of  this. 
Canada  thus  relied  on  the  conduct  of  the  United  States  as  conveying  the  clear-even  if 
incorrect-message  that  accepted  the  Canadian  claims.  The  essence  of  the  Chamber's 
decision  on  these  arguments  was  as  follows: 
while  it  may  be  conceded  that  the  United  States  showed  a  certain 
imprudence  in  maintaining  silence  after  Canada  had  issued  the  first 
permits  for  exploration  on  Georges  Bank,  any  attempt  to  attribute  to 
such  silence,  a  brief  silence  at  that,  legal  consequences  taking  the 
concrete  form  of  an  estoppel,  seems  to  be  going  too  far. 
From  1965  onwards,  as  we  have  seen,  the  United  States  also 
issued  exploration  permits  for  the  northeastern  portion  of  Georges 
Bank,  that  is  to  say  in  the  area  claimed  by  Canada.  Here  again  it 
would  have  been  prudent  of  the  United  States  to  inform  Canada 
officially  of  those  activities,  but  its  failure  to  do  so  does  not  warrant 
the  conclusion  that  it  thereby  gave  Canada  the  impression  that  it 
accepted  the  Canada  standpoint,  and  that  legal  effects  resulted.  Once 
again  the  United  States  attitude  towards  Canada  was  unclear  and 
perhaps  ambiguous,  but  not  to  the  point  of  entitling  Canada  to  invoke 
the  doctrine  of  estoppel.  122 
In  the  Territorial  Dispute  case  between  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya  and  Chad  in 
1994,123  it  might  have  been  thought  that  the  Court  would  pronounce  on  the  relative 
strength  of  the  arguments  based  on  acquiescence  which  both  parties  had  deployed  in 
the  course  of  the  written  and  oral  pleadings.  The  judgment  is,  however,  largely  silent 
on  this  aspect  of  the  dispute.  The  Court  found  that  the  boundary  between  Libya  and 
Chad  was  defined  by  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Good  Neighbourliness  concluded 
between  France  and  Libya  on  10  August  1955.  The  Court  found  support  in 
subsequent  treaties  between  France  and  Libya,  or  between  Chad  and  Libya:  "for  the 
proposition  that  after  1955,  the  existence  of  a  determined  frontier  was  accepted  and 
acted  upon  by  the  parties".  '  24  The  Court  may  have  attached  marginal  significance  to 
the  consideration  that,  during  the  nine-year  period  between  the  independence  of 
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Libya  in  1951  and  the  independence  of  Chad  in  1960,  France  had  submitted  annual 
reports  to  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  on  the  territory  of  what  was  to 
become  Chad,  showing  the  area  of  Chad's  territory  as  1,284,00  square  kilometres, 
which  expressly  included  538,000  square  kilometres  for  the  BET  [Borkou,  Ennedi 
and  Tibesti].  The  Court  continued: 
As  will  be  clear  from  the  indications  above  as  to  the  frontier 
resulting  from  the  1955  Treaty 
....  the  BET  is  part  of  the  territory  of 
Chad  on  the  basis  of  that  frontier,  but  would  not  be  so  on  the  basis  of 
Libya's  claim.  Libya  did  not  challenge  the  territorial  dimensions  of 
Chad  as  set  out  by  France.  125 
However,  the  Court  made  no  express  finding  of  Libyan  acquiescence  in  the  frontier 
as  determined  by  the  Court.  This  is  among  the  many  matters  that  the  Court 
concluded  that  it  need  not  consider:  "The  Court's  conclusion  that  the  Treaty  contains 
an  agreed  boundary  renders  it  unnecessary  to  consider  the  history  of  the 
'Borderlands'  claimed  by  Libya  on  the  basis  of  title  inherited  from  the  indigenous 
people,  the  Senousi  Order,  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  Italy".  126 
The  issue  of  Libyan  acquiescence  was  addressed  in  the  separate  opinion  of 
Judge  Ajibola  who,  designated  by  Libya,  stated:  "the  silence  or  acquiescence  of 
Libya  from  the  date  of  signing  the  1955  Treaty  to  the  present  time,  without  any 
protest  whatsoever,  clearly  militates  against  its  claim".  127  Judge  Ajibola  asserted 
that  there  had  been  many  occasions  when  Libya  could  have  protested  to  Chad  or 
even  France  that  the  1955  Treaty  was  invalid  or  had  failed  to  create  the  expected 
boundary,  yet  Libya  was  silent. 
Diplomatic  protests  are  enough  to  halt  and  prevent  the  prescriptive  processes, 
but  this  may  serve  only  for  a  period  of  time.  A  protest  not  followed  up  by  other 
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action  becomes  in  time,  indirectly,  tacit  acquiescence.  128  In  the  Chamizal 
Arbitration  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  in  1910-11,  the  two  governments 
disputed  the  ownership  of  the  Charnizal  district.  This  district,  which  lay  between  the 
old  bed  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  its  present  bed,  had  been  formed  by  the  action  of  the 
water  upon  the  banks  of  the  river,  causing  the  river  to  move  southward  into  Mexican 
territory.  The  commissioners  ruled  that  Mexico  did  all  that  it  could  to  protest  against 
what  it  considered  to  be  a  violation  of  control  over  the  Charnizal  district  by  the 
United  States  when  Mexicans  had  desired  to  establish  a  customs  post  in  the  district 
in  1874  or  1875.  They  argued  that  it  did  not  matter  that  Mexico  did  nothing  more 
than  diplomatic  protest  since  violence  might  have  erupted  if  it  tried  to  enter  the 
disputed  territory. 
129 
Lauterpacht  argues  that  even  diplomatic  protest  is  not  necessary,  however, 
protest  may  be  advisable  though  not  essential  where  the  action  of  the  state  claiming 
to  acquire  title  is  so  wrongful  under  general  international  law  as  to  render  it  wholly 
incapable  of  becoming  the  source  of  a  legal  right.  In  his  opinion,  'there  are  acts 
which  are  so  tainted  with  nullity  ab  initio  that  no  mere  negligence  of  the  interested 
state  will  cure  it'.  '  30 
Diplomatic  protest  is  not  always  enough  to  challenge  a  claim  of  acquisitive 
prescription  and  acquiescence,  if  other  means  are  available  to  enforce  territorial 
sovereignty.  131  Such  means  may  include  presenting  the  case  to  the  United  Nations, 
or  using  one  of  the  methods  mentioned  in  Article  33  of  the  Charter  of  United 
128 
-  G.  Fitzmaurice,  The  Law  and  Procedure  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  1951-4:  Points  of 
Substantive  Law,  BYbIL,  Vol.  32,  (1955-6),  P.  33. 
"9-  RIAA,  Vol.  Xl,  P.  329. 
130 
-  H.  Lauterpacht,  Sovereignty  over  Submarine  Areas,  BYbIL,  Vol.  27,  (1950),  P.  397-8. 
"1-  See  the  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  case,  ICJ  Pleadings,  Vol.  1,  P.  554. 97 
Nations,  namely:  negotiation,  enquiry,  mediation,  conciliation,  arbitration,  judicial 
settlement,  or  resort  to  regional  agencies. 
On  this  matter  Fitzmaurice  says  that  "the  protests  of  a  state  which  makes,  or  has 
made,  proposals  for  arbitration  or  adjudication  that  have  been  rejected  or  ignored, 
will  retain  their  full  value  for  a  very  long  period".  132  In  the  Chamizal  Arbitration 
between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  in  1911,  the  Commissioners  ruled  "in  private 
law,  the  interruption  of  prescription  is  effected  by  a  suit,  but  in  dealings  between 
nations  this  is  of  course  impossible,  unless  and  until  an  international  tribunal  is 
established  for  such  purpose".  133  In  the  case  of  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos,  Judge  Lev, 
Carneiro  pointed  out  that  the  court,  which  the  commissioners  noticed  was  absent  in 
the  Chamizal  case,  had  now  been  established.  134 
In  the  case  of  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos,  the  United  Kingdom  claimed  that  the 
French  protests  on  the  British  practice  of  sovereignty  over  the  disputed  islands  were 
not  enough  to  prevent  acquisitive  prescription  of  the  territory  because  France  did  not 
make  use  of  all  the  methods  offered  by  intemational  law  to  settle  the  dispute.  For 
example,  France  could  have  resorted  to  arbitration  proceedings  as  mentioned  in  the 
Franco-British  Arbitration  Agreement  of  14  October  1903;  or  it  could  have 
presented  the  case  to  the  League  of  Nations.  It  could,  also,  have  presented  the  case  to 
the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  or  to  the  International  Court  by 
agreement-  and  there  were,  of  course,  other  possibilities.  135 
From  my  point  of  view,  the  silence  of  a  state  and  her  failure  to  demand  a 
territory  which  has  been  disputed  with  other  state  for  a  long  time,  and  without 
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presentation  of  the  dispute  to  an  arbitration  or  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  is 
an  acceptance  by  that  state  of  the  status  quo. 
4.2.4.  Conquest 
Conquest  is  a  mode  of  acquiring  territory  by  military  force  during  the  time  of  war.  '  36 
In  traditional  international  law,  since  states  resorted  to  force  in  the  pursuance  of  their 
national  interest,  and  war  was  not  illegal,  conquest  has  been  an  important  and 
generally  accepted  mode  of  acquisition  of  territory.  The  conquering  state  had  to 
annex  the  territory  formally  after  the  end  of  the  war.  Conquest  was  not  accompanied 
by  a  treaty,  but  was  usually  announced  by  a  proclamation.  '  37  For  example,  Great 
Britain  annexed  the  South  African  Republic  and  Orange  Free  State  in  1902,  and  Italy 
annexed  Ethiopia  in  1936.138 
However,  with  the  establishing  of  the  League  of  Nations,  followed  by  the 
Kellogg-Briand  Pact  in  1928  and  the  Stimson  Doctrine  in  1932,  the  resort  to  war 
between  states  was  limited.  Subsequently  Article  2  (4)  of  the  United  Nations  Charter 
prohibited  the  use  of  armed  force  between  states.  Conquest  since  then  has  come  to  a 
halt.  Therefore,  I  do  not  intend  to  consider  conquest  in  the  present  research  since  the 
two  disputing  parties  have  not  resorted  to  war.  There  is  no  defeated  and  no 
victorious  party.  The  reality  is,  though,  that  Iran  used  force  to  occupy  the  two  islands 
of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb.  This  raises  the  question  of  the  legality  of  the  use  of 
force  to  acquire  territory  between  states.  Does  the  use  of  force  grant  sovereignty  over 
an  occupied  territory  with  the  passage  of  time?  The  next  section  tackles  this 
question. 
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4.3.  The  legality  of  the  use  offorce  in  the  acquisition  of  a  territory 
The  international  community  has  suffered  heavily  from  the  use  of  war  between 
states  as  a  legal  way  for  the  acquisition  of  territory.  The  resulting  great  human  and 
material  losses  thus  encouraged  the  international  community  to  limit  the  use  of  wars 
as  means  of  acquiring  sovereignty  over  territories.  This  is  obvious  in  all  decisions, 
conventions  and  treaties  made  by  the  international  community  since  1907  which  call 
for  putting  an  end  to  wars  and  to  use  peaceful  means  to  solve  regional  and  border 
problems  between  states.  The  international  community  succeeded  in  this  respect. 
With  the  conclusion  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  in  1945  the  use  of  force  or  threat 
of  force  became  forbidden  by  contemporary  international  law  within  the 
international  community,  and  it  was  no  longer  possible  legally  to  accept  conquest  as 
a  legal  means  of  acquiring  sovereignty  over  territory.  139 
4.3.1.  Legal  development  of  the  prohibition  of  the  use  offorce 
The  prohibition  of  force  developed  gradually  within  the  international  community.  At 
the  Hague  Peace  Conference  of  1907,  tentative  and  modest  steps  were  taken  to  place 
the  first  legal  restrictions  upon  the  unqualified  right  of  states  to  resort  to  war  as  an 
instrument  of  national  policy.  A  resolution  of  the  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference 
in  1907  declared  annexations  null  and  void  in  cases  where  the  conqueror  refused  the 
request  of  the  vanquished  to  refer  their  dispute  to  a  court  of  arbitration.  On  the  same 
occasion,  further  efforts  were  made  to  limit  the  use  of  force  in  relations  between 
States.  Convention  11  of  the  1907  Hague  Conference,  which  was  initiated  by  the 
American  delegate  Horace  Porter  and  adopted  on  16  October  1907,  obliged  the 
contracting  powers  'not  to  have  recourse  to  anned  force  for  the  recovery  of  contract 
debts'.  Even  though  the  scope  of  the  Convention  was  limited  to  the  use  of  force  for 
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the  recovery  of  contract  debts,  and  although  exceptions  from  the  general  principle 
were  provided  for,  it  represented  a  first  step  towards  a  more  general  prohibition  of 
war. 
140 
In  1919,  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  laid  down  three  articles  which 
prohibited  member  states  from  resorting  to  war  in  disregard  of  certain  procedures.  141 
First,  under  Article  12  (1)  member  states  agreed  that,  if  any  dispute  arose  between 
them  which  was  likely  to  lead  to  rupture,  they  would  submit  the  matter  either  to 
arbitration  or  judicial  settlement,  or  to  enquiry  by  the  Council,  and  they  agreed  in  no 
case  to  resort  to  war  until  three  months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitration  or  the 
judicial  decision,  or  the  report  by  the  Council.  142  Second,  under  Article  13  states 
agreed  that  a  conflict  was  to  submit  suitable  disputes  to  arbitration  or  adjudication, 
to  carry  out  any  award  or  decision  rendered,  and  not  to  resort  to  war  against  a 
member  state  complying  with  the  award  or  decision.  143  Third,  under  Article  15  any 
dispute  likely  to  lead  to  rupture  which  was  not  submitted  to  arbitration  or 
adjudication  was  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  League  Council.  If  a  report  recommending 
terms  for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  was  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members  of 
the  Council,  exclusive  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  members  of  the  League  were 
obligated  not  to  resort  to  war  against  a  member  state  which  complied  with  the 
recommendations  of  the  report.  144 
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A  clear  prohibition  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  force,  however,  seems 
explicitly  to  be  contained  in  Article  10,  which  provided  that  "The  Members  of  the 
League  undertake  to  respect  and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the 
territorial  integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of  all  members  of  the 
League".  145  The  effect  of  Article  10  was  to  prohibit  absolutely  the  acquisition  of 
territory  by  force,  and  to  pledge  League  members  to  prevent  such  acquisitions  or  to 
reverse  them  when  they  occurred.  Brownlie  notes  that  "Article  10  of  the  Covenant 
provided  cogent  evidence  that  the  right  of  conquest  no  longer  existed",  since  it 
prohibited  the  use  of  force  with  the  motive  of  acquiring  territory,  even  where  a  state 
had  legal  claims  to  that  territory:  "there  is  no  very  clear  distinction  between  conquest 
and  resort  to  war  as  the  ultimate  means  of  settling  legal  disputes  over  territory.  This 
latter  distinction  was,  however,  made  by  the  draftsmen  of  Article  10  of  the  League 
Covenant-,  and  self-help  would  seem  to  have  been  prohibited  in  regard  to  territorial 
disputes".  146  In  this  sense,  external  aggression  within  the  terms  of  Article  10  was 
inclusive  of  any  war  aiming  at  or  resulting  in  the  forcible  transfer  of  territory;  for  all 
such  transfers  were  prohibited  under  Article  10.147 
Under  these  Articles  it  seems  that  the  Covenant  had  not  abolished  war  but 
restricted  and  delayed  it  for  a  period  of  time.  148  Korman  concludes:  "The  Covenant 
of  1919  had  stopped  short  of  making  all  aggressive  war  illegal:  its  provisions  were 
intended  to  prevent  war  by  providing  means  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
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international  disputes,  but  war  was  still  acknowledged  as  a  legitimate  means  of 
settlement  when  modes  of  peaceful  settlement  had  failed".  149 
On  27  August  1928,  in  an  attempt  to  reinforce  the  prohibition  of  war  between 
states,  the  General  Treaty  for  the  Renunciation  of  War  (also  known  as  the  Kellogg- 
Briand  Pact  or  the  Pact  of  Paris)  was  agreed  upon  by  sixty-three  states,  declaring  that 
they  condemned  'recourse  to  war  for  the  solution  of  international  controversies'  and 
renounced  it  'as  an  instrument  of  national  policy  in  their  relations  with  one 
another'.  150  Under  Article  2  of  the  treaty  the  states  agreed  "that  the  settlement  or 
solution  of  all  disputes  or  conflicts,  of  whatever  nature  or  of  whatever  origin  they 
may  be,  which  may  arise  among  them,  shall  never  be  sought  except  by  pacific 
means". 
151 
The  implications  of  the  Kellogg-Briand  Pact  for  the  acquisition  of  territory  by 
force  as  a  result  of  victory  in  a  lawful  war  against  violators  of  the  Pact  has  been 
summed  up  by  Brownlie  as  follows:  "Lawftil  belligerents  conducting  and  winning  a 
war  of  sanction  may  impose  restrictions  intended  to  prevent  recrudescence  of 
aggression  and  use  force  to  ensure  observance  of  restrictions  imposed".  152  Whereas 
Article  10  of  the  League  Covenant  had  prohibited  any  forcible  acquisition  of 
territory,  even  as  the  result  of  collective  action  taken  against  an  unlawful  aggressor: 
This  prohibition  would  not  ...  apply  to  a  war  of  sanction  leading  to 
the  imposition  of  measures  of  security  on  the  aggressor  by  states 
acting  in  the  name  of  the  international  community.  Measures  of 
security  intended  to  prevent  future  threats  to  the  peace  may  include 
movement  of  populations  and  frontier  changes  ... 
On  the  hypothesis 
that  the  Second  World  War  involved  a  war  of  sanction  against  the 
Axis  States,  the  territorial  provisions  relating  to  East  Prussia  and  the 
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Oder-Neisse  territories  in  the  Potsdam  Agreement  provide  an 
example  of  measures  of  this  sort.  '  53 
The  Kellogg-Briand  Pact  was  more  restrictive  than  the  League  Covenant  in  its 
prohibition  of  the  resort  to  war  by  states,  it  was  less  so  in  the  allowance  it  made  for 
forcible  territorial  changes  when  resulting  from  victory  in  a  war  of  sanction  against 
an  aggressor.  154 
One  of  the  consequences  of  the  illegality  of  the  use  of  force  was  that  states 
refused  to  recognize  territorial  changes  based  on  the  title  of  conquest.  The  most 
celebrated  case  of  non  recognition  occurred  in  January  1932;  Mr.  Stimson,  United 
States  Secretary  of  State,  enunciated  a  doctrine  of  non-recognition.  This  declaration 
of  policy  was  due  to  events  in  the  Far  East.  In  193  1,  Japan,  then  a  member  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  invaded  Manchuria  which  was  legally  under  the  sovereignty  of 
China.  Subsequently,  the  Japanese  forces  overran  and  conquered  Southern 
Manchuria.  The  United  States  refused  to  recognise  this  new  situation  or  any  treaties 
with  China  legalising  it  and,  to  clarify  this  attitude,  Mr.  Stimson,  in  a 
communication  to  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  Governments,  announced  that: 
The  United  States  cannot  admit  the  legality  of  any  situation  de 
facto  nor  does  it  intend  to  recognise  any  treaty  or  agreement  between 
those  Governments,  or  agents  thereof,  which  may  impair  the  treaty 
rights  of  the  United  States 
...  and  that  it  does  not  intend  to  recognize 
any  situation,  treaty,  or  agreement  which  may  be  brought  about  by 
means  contrary  to  the  covenants  and  obligations  of  the  Pact  of  Paris 
of  August  27,1928.155 
On  II  March  1932,  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  adopted  the  following 
resolution  with  the  abstention  of  China  and  Japan  "The  Assembly 
... 
declares  that  it  is 
incumbent  upon  the  Members  of  the  League  of  Nations  not  to  recognize  any 
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situation,  treaty,  or  agreement  which  may  be  brought  about  by  means  contrary  to  the 
Covenant  to  the  League  of  Nations  or  to  the  Pact  of  Paris".  '  56 
Following  the  Second  World  War,  the  abolition  of  the  'right  of  conquest'  or 
threat  by  use  of  force  by  states  has  clearly  been  reaffirmed  in  Article  2  (4)  of  the 
United  Nations  Charter  which  reads  as  follows: 
All  Members  shall  refrain  in  their  international  relations  from  the 
threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political 
independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any  other  manner  inconsistent  with 
the  purposes  of  the  United  Nations. 
Under  this  Article  the  prohibition  is  not  confined  to  the  use  of  force  but  extends  to 
the  threat  of  force.  Moreover,  the  prohibition,  on  a  literal  reading  at  least,  is  backed 
by  a  system  of  collective  sanctions  against  any  offender,  as  Article  51  provides: 
Nothing  in  the  present  Charter  shall  impair  the  inherent  right  of 
individual  or  collective  self-defence  if  an  armed  attack  occurs  against 
a  Member  of  the  United  Nations,  until  the  Security  Council  has  taken 
measures  necessary  to  maintain  international  peace  and  security. 
Measures  taken  by  Members  in  the  exercise  of  this  right  of  self- 
defence  shall  be  immediately  reported  to  the  Security  Council  and 
shall  not  in  any  way  affect  the  authority  and  responsibility  of  the 
Security  Council  under  the  present  Charter  to  take  at  any  time  such 
action  as  it  deems  necessary  in  order  to  maintain  or  restore 
international  peace  and  security. 
With  the  renunciation  of  war  and  the  use  of  force,  conquest  became  no  longer  a  legal 
means  for  acquiring  territory  as  an  unlawful  act  cannot  normally  produce  a  result 
beneficial  to  the  law-breaker.  157  The  renunciation  of  war  has  been  confirmed  in 
many  statements  and  resolutions,  particularly  the  ones  concerning  the  Middle  East 
occupied  territories.  For  example,  Security  Council  Resolution  242  of  22  November 
1967,  emphasises  'the  inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  war'  and 
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affirmed  that  the  Charter  principles  required  'withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed  forces 
from  territories  occupied  in  the  recent  conflict'.  158 
The  principle  was  regarded  as  axiomatic  in  the  Declaration  of  Principles  of 
International  Law  Concerning  Friendly  Relations  and  Co-operation  among  States  in 
accordance  with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  adopted  by  the  General 
Assembly  Resolution  2625  (XXV)  of  24  October  1970.  The  first  section  of  the 
Declaration,  which  concerns  the  principle  that  states  shall  refrain  in  their 
international  relations  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity 
or  political  independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any  other  manner  inconsistent  with  the 
purposes  of  the  United  Nations,  shows,  in  paragraph  10,  how  states  interpret  the 
Charter's  prohibition  of  the  use  of  force  and  its  consequences  for  belligerent 
occupation  and  acquisition  of  territory: 
The  territory  of  a  State  shall  not  be  the  object  of  military 
occupation  resulting  from  the  use  of  force  in  contravention  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Charter.  The  territory  of  a  State  shall  not  be  the 
object  of  acquisition  by  another  state  resulting  from  the  threat  or  use 
of  force.  No  territorial  acquisition  resulting  from  the  threat  or  use  of 
force  shall  be  recognized  as  legal.  Nothing  in  the  foregoing  shall  be 
construed  as  affecting: 
(a) Provisions  of  the  Charter  or  any  international  agreement  prior  to 
the  Charter  regime  and  valid  under  international  law;  or 
(b)  The  powers  of  the  Security  Council  under  the  Charter.  159 
The  United  Nations  General  Assembly  Resolution  2949  (XXVII)  of  8  December 
1972,  also  reaffirms  "that  the  territory  of  a  state  shall  not  be  the  object  of  occupation 
or  acquisition  by  another  state  resulting  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force".  160 
In  connection  with  Article  39  of  the  Charter,  efforts  have  been  made  within  the 
United  Nations  to  define  the  notion  of  'act  of  aggression'.  They  finally  resulted  in 
158 
_  YbLJN,  Vol.  21,  (1967),  P.  257-8.  Also  see  Harris,  op.  cit.,  P.  205-8. 
159  ILM,  Vol.  9,  (1970),  P.  1294.  Also  see  Brownlie,  Basic,  op.  cit.,  P.  36 
. 
Also  Harris,  op.  cit., 
P.  1005. 
160 
_  YbUN,  Vol.  26,  (1972),  P.  180 Chanter  4 
Resolution  3314  (XXIX)  which  was  adopted  by  the  United  Nations  General 
Assembly  on  14  December  1974.16  1  Article  I  of  the  Resolution  defines  aggression 
as: 
the  use  of  armed  force  by  a  State  against  the  sovereignty, 
territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  another  State,  or  in 
any  other  manner  inconsistent  with  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations,  as  set  out  in  this  definition.  162 
Under  Article  3  (a)  of  this  resolution,  the  acts  which  qualifý  as  an  act  of  aggression 
were  emphasised  as: 
The  invasion  or  attack  by  the  armed  forces  of  a  State  of  the 
territory  of  another  State,  or  any  military  occupation,  however 
temporary,  resulting  from  such  invasion  or  attack,  or  any  annexation 
by  the  use  of  force  of  the  territory  of  another  State  or  part  thereof.  163 
Moreover,  the  resolution  of  the  General  Assembly  of  5  February  1982,  at  its  ninth 
emergency  special  session,  declared  "that  Israel's  decision  of  14  December  1981  to 
impose  its  laws,  jurisdiction  and  administration  on  the  occupied  Syrian  Golan 
Heights  constitutes  an  act  of  aggression  under  the  provisions  of  Article  39  of  the 
Charter  of  United  Nations  and  General  Assembly  resolution  3314  (XXIX)5,.  164 
Even  if  a  lawful  use  of  force  (use  of  force  in  self-defence  according  to  Article 
51  of  Charter),  would  fall  outside  the  prohibition  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by 
force,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  self-defence  as  justifying  the  acquisition  of  title 
to  territory  because  the  use  of  force  in  this  situation  may  justify  temporary 
occupation  of  territory  but  never  the  permanent  acquisition  of  title.  '  65 
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Again,  on  18  November  1987  the  General  Assembly  resolution  42/22 
containing  the  Declaration  on  the  Enhancement  of  the  Effectiveness  of  the  Principle 
of  Refraining  from  the  Threat  or  Use  of  Force  in  International  Relations,  declared 
that: 
Every  State  has  the  duty  to  refrain  in  its  international  relations 
from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or 
political  independence  of  any  state,  or  from  acting  in  any  other 
manner  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of  the  United  Nations.  Such  a 
threat  or  use  of  force  constitutes  a  violation  of  international  law  and 
of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  entails  international 
responsibility.  1  66 
4.3.2.  Non-recognition  of  acquisition  of  territory  by  the  threat  or 
use  offorce 
With  regards  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  collective  system  under  the  United  Nations, 
questions  arise  concerning  the  fate  of  territory  occupied  by  the  use  of  force  against 
the  rule  of  intemational  law,  from  which  the  international  community  was  not  able 
to  force  the  occupying  state  to  depart.  Is  it  permissible  that  the  occupying  state 
acquires  territory  based  on  the  recognition  of  the  international  community,  or  the 
absence  of  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  members  of  the  international  community,  or 
based  on  acquisitive  prescription?  167 
Jennings  suggests  that  the  title  in  this  case  can  be  acquired  through 
consolidation  which  depends  on  the  procedure  of  international  recognition  as  a  legal 
means  to  acquire  territory,  including  those  territories  acquired  by  force. 
Consolidation  does  not  require  the  acquiescence  of  the  occupied  territory  but  the 
acquiescence  and  approbation  of  third  states  generally.  Jennings  finds  that  there  is 
not  any  difference  between  a  title  created  by  illegal  force  and  a  procedure  for 
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recognition  of  title  by  the  international  community  because,  in  this  case,  the 
international  community  would  be  exercising  a  quasi-legislative  function.  168  But  if 
the  reaction  of  third  states  was  an  attitude  of  non-recognition,  Jennings  adds,  "in 
these  circumstances  it  seems  illogical  to  suppose  that  any  form  of  prescription  even 
by  adverse  possession  could  begin  to  run".  169 
Taha  sees  that  Jennings'  proposals  mean  a  renewal  of  conquest,  in  an  indirect 
way,  as  a  title  to  acquire  territory.  Moreover,  these  proposals  contradict  the 
international  law  rule  which  obliges  the  international  community  not  to  recognize 
any  territorial  acquisitions  or  alterations  which  result  from  the  use  of  force.  '  70 
Therefore,  since  the  adoption  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  in  1945,  followed 
by  the  establishment  of  the  United  Nations  as  a  working  body,  there  has  been  a 
discernible  trend  towards  a  doctrine  of  the  non-recognition  of  territorial  changes  that 
have  resulted  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or 
political  independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any  other  manner  inconsistent  with  the 
purposes  of  the  United  Nations  (such  threat  or  use  of  force  is  prohibited  by  Article  2 
(4)).  This  is  reflected  in  a  number  of  internationally  recognized  Articles  and 
resolutions.  Article  17  of  the  Charter  of  the  Organization  of  American  States,  of  30 
April  1947,  states  that: 
The  territory  of  a  state  is  inviolable;  it  may  not  be  the  object,  even 
temporarily,  of  military  occupation  or  of  other  measures  of  force 
taken  by  another  state,  directly  or  indirectly,  on  any  grounds 
whatever.  No  territorial  acquisition  or  special  advantages  obtained 
either  by  force  or  by  other  means  of  coercion  shall  be  recognized.  171 
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Also  Article  II  of  the  Draft  Declaration  on  the  Rights  and  Duties  of  States,  prepared 
by  the  International  Law  Commission  in  1949,  provides  that  every  state  is  under  a 
duty  to  refrain  from  recognising  any  territorial  acquisition  by  another  state  obtained 
through  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political 
independence  of  another  state,  or  'in  any  other  manner  inconsistent  with 
international  law  and  order'.  "'  The  same  principle  is  included  in  Article  52  of  the 
Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  1969,  "A  treaty  is  void  if  its  conclusion 
has  been  procured  by  the  threat  or  use  of  force  in  violation  of  the  principles  of 
international  law  embodied  in  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations".  173 
The  illegality  of  forced  transfers  of  territory,  and  the  obligation  of  non- 
recognition  of  forced  acquisitions,  is  expressly  asserted  in  the  1970  Declaration  on 
Principles  of  International  Law,  which  provides,  in  paragraph  10,  that  "the  territory 
of  a  State  shall  not  be  the  object  of  acquisition  by  another  State  resulting  from  the 
threat  or  use  of  force.  No  territorial  acquisition  resulting  from  the  threat  or  use  of 
force  shall  be  recognized  as  legal".  174  Moreover,  the  1974  Definition  of  Aggression, 
which  includes,  as  part  of  that  definition,  "any  annexation  by  the  use  of  force  of  the 
territory  of  another  state  or  part  thereof',  175  affirms  in  Article  5  paragraph  3  both  the 
illegality  of  forced  acquisitions  and  the  obligation  of  non-recognition:  "No  territorial 
acquisition  or  special  advantage  resulting  from  aggression  are  or  shall  be  recognized 
as  lawful".  176 
The  non-recognition  of  the  use  of  force  was  also  stressed  by  the  General 
Assembly  resolution  of  5  February  1982,  which  determines  that:  "all  actions  taken 
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by  Israel  to  give  effect  to  its  decision  relating  to  the  occupied  Syrian  Golan  Heights 
are  illegal  and  invalid  and  shall  not  be  recognized".  177  A  further  General  Assembly 
resolution  42/41  of  18  November  1987  states  that: 
Neither  acquisition  of  territory  resulting  from  the  threat  or  use  of 
force  nor  any  occupation  of  territory  resulting  from  the  threat  or  use 
of  force  in  contravention  of  international  law  will  be  recognized  as 
legal  acquisition  or  occupation.  178 
One  more  example  of  the  non-recognition  of  the  use  of  force  occurred  on  18  August 
1990,  when  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  unanimously  adopted  Resolution 
662,  in  which  the  Council  decided  that  the  declared  Iraqi  annexation  of  Kuwait 
'under  any  form  and  whatever  pretext  has  no  legal  validity,  and  is  considered  null 
and  void'.  All  states  and  institutions  were  called  upon  not  to  recognize  the 
annexation,  and  to  refrain  from  actions  which  might  be  interpreted  as  indirect 
recognition. 
179 
Even  though  an  unlawful  act  cannot  normally  create  legal  title  to  a  territory  in 
international  law,  states  may  recognise  illegal  acquisition  with  the  passing  of  time,  if 
there  was  no  protest  during  a  reasonable  period  of  time  and  the  consequence 
resulting  from  this  recognition  was  the  crention  of  a  new  situation  of  legality.  180 
This  is  what  Israel  has  tried  to  do  in  the  occupied  territories  of  the  West  Bank  and 
Golan  Heights  by  creating  a  situation  of  fait  accompli  through  changing  the 
population  characteristics  of  these  territories  and  demolishing  villages,  but  also  by 
building  settlements  and  towns  in  these  areas,  or  by  emptying  them  of  their  Arab 
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population,  driving  them  into  neighbouring  Arab  countries  and  preventing  them 
from  retuming. 
181 
4.4.  Historical  consolidation  of  title 
Awards  of  international  courts  show  that  it  is  not  easy  to  define  whether  a  disputed 
territory  was  awarded  to  a  state  on  the  basis  of  acquisitive  prescription  or 
occupation,  as  the  method  followed  by  international  courts  has  been  to  compare  and 
weigh  contradicting  sovereignty  claims.  The  courts  then  uphold  the  stronger 
evidence,  without  paying  attention  to  the  mode  of  acquisition  of  territory.  182  In  the 
Eastern  Greenland  case,  for  example,  the  Court  admitted  that  in  many  cases 
tribunals  had  been  satisfied  'with  very  little  in  the  way  of  actual  exercise  of 
sovereignty  rights,  provided  that  the  other  state  could  not  make  out  a  superior 
claim'.  In  such  circumstances,  although  theory  lays  down  methods  of  acquiring 
territory,  tribunals  are  usually  concerned  with  deciding  between  rival  claims  neither 
of  which  might  satisfý  such  theoretical  requirements.  183 
Therefore,  some  authors  have  suggested  freeing  territorial  acquisition  from  the 
limitations  of  private  law,  thus  making  it  more  suitable  for  practical  reality. 
Following  this  line,  Charles  de  Visscher  suggested  the  concept  of  historical 
consolidation.  The  idea  is  a  trial  to  bring  together  all  the  elements  which  led  to 
territorial  acquisition  in  one  operation.  He  described  it  as  follows: 
The  fundamental  interest  of  the  stability  of  territorial  situations 
from  the  point  of  view  of  order  and  peace  explains  the  place  that 
consolidation  by  historic  titles  holds  in  international  law  and  the 
suppleness  with  which  the  principle  is  applied.  It  is  for  these 
situations,  especially,  that  arbitral  decisions  have  sanctioned  the 
principle  quieta  non  movere,  as  much  out  of  consideration  for  the 
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importance  of  these  situations  in  themselves  in  the  relations  of  states 
as  for  the  political  gravity  of  disputes  concerning  them.  184 
Charles  de  Visscher  was  inspired  by  the  award  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
conceming  the  Norwegian  Fisheries  case  185  in  which  he  himself  was  a  judge.  The 
case  concerned  the  method  used  by  Norway  to  define  its  territorial  sea.  Instead  of 
using  the  coastlines  of  the  islands  to  measure  its  territorial  sea,  it  invented  in  1898  a 
delimitation  method  based  on  straight  lines  between  the  projection  of  the  coast  or 
outer  edges  of  islands.  Accordingly,  Norway  included  in  its  territorial  water  parts  of 
the  high  sea.  Therefore,  the  Court  had  to  decide  whether  the  Norwegian  method  of 
delimiting  territorial  waters  was  valid  on  the  basis  of  an  historic  title,  even  if  it 
should  be  held-which,  in  fact,  it  was  not-that  the  method  was  invalid  under  general 
international  law.  In  its  opinion,  the  Court  ruled: 
Norway  can  justify  the  claim  that  these  waters  are  territorial  or 
internal  on  the  ground  that  she  has  exercised  the  necessary 
jurisdiction  over  them  for  a  long  period  without  opposition  from 
other  states,  a  kind  of  possessio  longi  temporis,  with  the  result  that 
her  jurisdiction  over  these  waters  must  now  be  recognized  although  it 
constitutes  a  derogation  fTom  the  rules  in  force.  '  86 
After  thus  stating  the  Norwegian  government's  attitude,  however,  the  Court  did  not 
expressly  indicate  whether  it  approved  this  attitude  or  not.  But,  having  regard  to  the 
general  tenor  of  the  judgment,  it  seems  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  Court  did 
approve  it.  The  Court  also  made  the  following  observations  on  the  question  of 
Norway's  historic  title: 
From  the  standpoint  of  international  law,  it  is  now  necessary  to 
consider  whether  the  application  of  the  Norwegian  system 
encountered  any  opposition  from  foreign  states. 
Norway  has  been  in  a  position  to  argue  without  any  contradiction 
that  neither  the  promulgation  of  her  delimitation  Decrees  in  1869  and 
"'-  C.  de  Visscher,  Theory  and  Reality  in  Public  International  Law,  English  translation  by  P.  E. 
Corbett,  (1968),  P.  209. 
185 
_  lCJ  Rep.,  (195  1),  P.  116. 
186 
_  Ibid.  P.  130. 
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in  1889,  nor  their  application,  gave  rise  to  any  opposition  on  the  part 
of  foreign  States.  Since,  moreover,  these  Decrees  constitute,  as  has 
been  shown  above,  the  application  of  a  well-defined  and  uniform 
system,  it  is  indeed  this  system  itself  which  would  reap  the  benefit  of 
general  toleration,  the  basis  of  an  historical  consolidation  which 
would  make  it  enforceable  as  against  all  States. 
... 
The  notoriety  of 
the  facts,  the  general  toleration  of  the  international  community,  Great 
Britain's  position  in  the  North  Sea,  her  own  interest  in  the  question, 
and  her  prolonged  abstention  would  in  any  case  warrant  Norway's 
enforcement  of  her  system  against  the  United  Kingdom.  187 
Therefore,  Professor  Charles  de  Visseher  interpreted  the  term  'consolidation'  as 
"  proven  long  use,  which  is  its  foundation,  merely  represents  a  complex  of  interests 
and  relations  which  in  themselves  have  the  effect  of  attaching  a  territory  or  an 
expanse  of  sea  to  a  given  state".  188  Blum  has  defined  'historical  title'  as  "the 
possession  by  a  State,  over  certain  land  or  maritime  areas,  of  rights  that  would  not 
non-nally  accrue  to  it  under  the  general  rule  of  international  law,  such  rights  having 
been  acquired  by  that  State  through  a  process  of  historical  consolidation".  '  89 
Consolidation  by  historic  title  thus  differs  from  the  other  modes  of  acquisition 
of  territory;  as  Blum  says  "all  the  other  titles  rest  on  an  instantaneous  act  having  an 
immediate  effect,  to  which  act  the  origins  of  such  titles  can  be  traced,  the  historic 
title  is  the  outcome  of  a  lengthy  process  comprising  a  long  series  of  acts,  omissions 
and  patterns  of  behaviour  which,  in  their  entirety,  and  through  their  cumulative 
effect,  bring  such  a  title  into  being  and  consolidate  it  into  a  title  valid  in 
international  law".  190  Professor  Charles  de  Visscher  pointed  that  such  consolidation 
differs  from  acquisitive  prescription  in  the  sense  that  it  can  apply  to  territories  that 
could  not  be  proved  to  have  belonged  formerly  to  another  state.  It  also  differs  from 
occupation  in  that  it  can  be  admitted  in  relation  to  parts  of  the  sea,  as  well  as  to  land. 
Ibid.  P.  138-9. 
Visscher,  op.  cit.,  P.  209. 
189 
_  Y.  Z.  Blum,  Historic  Rights,  EPIL,  Vol.  7,  (1984),  P.  120. 
190  Y.  Z.  Blum,  Historic  Titles  in  International  Law,  (1965),  P.  335. Chapter  4  114 
This  consolidation  is  also  distinguished  from  international  recognition  by  the  fact 
that  it  can  be  held  to  be  accomplished  not  only  by  acquiescence,  acquiescence  in 
which  the  time  factor  can  have  no  part,  but  more  easily  by  a  sufficiently  prolonged 
absence  of  opposition  either  in  the  case  of  land  or  in  maritime  waters.  191 
Although  consolidating  factors  are  important,  it  is  still  the  fact  of  possession 
that  is  the  foundation  and  the  sine  qua  non  of  the  process  of  consolidation. 
Therefore,  the  process  cannot  begin  to  operate  until  actual  possession  is  first 
enjoyed.  Furthermore,  it  may  not  always  be  easy  to  distinguish  between  evidence  of 
true  legal  title  and  evidence  of  an  alleged  political  right  or  claim  to  have  the  title 
transferred.  Thus,  the  process  of  consolidation  cannot  begin  unless  and  until  actual 
possession  is  already  an  accomplished  fact  and,  although  no  time  is  laid  down,  it 
remains  true  that  it  cannot  be  completed  until  a  considerable  period  of  time  has 
elapsed. 
192 
The  introduction  of  the  notion  of  'consolidation'  as  a  mode  of  acquiring 
territory  has,  according  to  Schwarzenberger,  thrown  light  on  the  process  of 
'evolution  and  expansion  of  international  society'.  He  makes  the  point  that  by 
having  recourse  to  the  concept  of  consolidation,  three  essential  features  of  this 
process  become  apparent.  "First,  consolidation  of  title  is  normally  a  gradual  process. 
Secondly,  in  the  beginning,  every  title  is  necessarily  a  relative  title,  and  its  holder 
aspires  to  transform  it  into  an  absolute  title.  Thirdly,  the  more  absolute  a  title 
becomes,  the  more  it  rests  on  multiple  foundations".  193 
191 
-  Ibid.  For  more  exposition  of  this  point  see  D.  H.  Johnson,  Consolidation  as  A  Root  of  Title  in 
International  Law,  CLJ,  (1955),  P.  215-25.  Also  Brownlie,  Principles,  op.  cit.,  P.  166.  Also  Blum, 
Historic  Titles,  op.  cit.,  (1965),  P.  336. 
192 
_  Jennings,  op.  cit.,  P.  26. 
193 
_  Schwarzenberger,  op.  cit.,  P.  31  1. 4 
However,  according  to  our  explanation  of  the  concept  of  historic  title,  we  can 
see  that  there  are  similarities  between  the  conditions  for  the  acquisition  of  territory 
according  to  acquisitive  prescription  and  the  acquisition  of  territory  according  to 
historic  title.  As  mentioned  earlier,  when  discussing  the  acquisition  according  to 
acquisitive  prescription,  194  the  same  conditions  are  required  for  the  acquisition  by 
historic  title;  namely,  there  must  be  a  display  of  state  authority,  the  absence  of 
recognition  of  sovereignty  in  favour  of  another  state,  and  that  this  practice  of 
sovereignty  should  be  public,  peaceful  and  continuous  for  a  period  of  time.  '95 
Despite  all  this,  the  idea  of  historic  consolidation  to  a  title  has  not  always  been 
accepted  by  some  authors.  Munkman,  for  example,  doubted  that  the  notion  of 
consolidation  could  be  relied  upon  in  any  dispute.  In  her  opinion,  it  is  no  more  than 
a  vague  notion,  which  adds  one  to  the  many  traditional  reasons  for  acquiring 
territorial  sovereignty  over  a  particular  territory.  Munkman  also  observed  that  the 
notion  of  consolidation  does  not  explain  the  essence  of  mixed  interests  and  relations. 
It  also  requires  the  passing  of  time,  as  it  is  always  built  on  'long  use'  and  'long 
absence  of  opposition'.  196 
O'Connell  thinks  that  de  Visscher  did  not  differentiate  between  the  acquisition 
of  territorial  sovereignty  according  to  international  law,  as  is  the  case  in  territories 
without  a  previous  owner  res  nufflus,  and  acquiring  territorial  sovereignty  against 
international  law.  O'Connell,  therefore,  prefers  to  refer  to  the  first  situation  as 
194 
_  Above,  P.  82. 
'9'-  See  Blum,  Historic  Rights,  op.  cit.,  P.  122-4.  Also  see  M.  A.  A.  AI-Said,  Mda  Mshrwait  Asanid  al- 
Siadh  al-Israeilihfi  FIstin:  Drashfi  Itar  al-Qanoun  al-Dawli  al-Aam  (The  Extent  of  the  Legality  of 
the  basis  of  Israeli  Sovereignty  in  Palestine:  a  study  within  the  framework  of  the  Public 
International  Law),  (1975),  P.  46. 
196 
_  A.  L.  W.  Munkman,  Adjudication  and  Adjustment-International  Judicial  Decision  and  the 
Settlement  of  Territorial  and  Boundary  Disputes,  BYbIL,  Vol.  46,  (1972-3),  P.  103-4. 
115 4 
'occupation',  and  to  the  second  as  'historic  right'.  '  97  The  term  'historic  right', 
according  to  O'Connell,  means  a  right  which  was  acquired  against  international  law, 
through  historic  practice  by  a  state,  which  was  originally  not  legitimate,  where  the 
international  community  did  not  object  to  this  practice.  198 
4.5.  The  legality  of  methods  of  the  disputing  parties  in  the  acquisition  of 
sovereignty  over  the  three  islands 
4.5.1.  The  legality  of  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  three  islands 
It  is  clear,  from  our  definition  of  the  disPute  between  Iran  and  the  UAE,  that  the 
three  islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  were  not  undiscovered  at 
the  time  of  the  Iranian  occupation  in  November  1971.199  The  evidence  for  this  is  the 
frequent  trips  made  to  the  islands  by  fishermen  from  Sharjah  in  1864,  according  to 
Captain  C.  G.  Constable  of  the  British  Navy  in  India.  Another  pure  piece  of  evidence 
is  the  British  observation  that  the  ships  of  the  Qawasim  were  based  in  the  two 
islands  of  Abu  Musa  and  Greater  Tunb  during  the  conflict  between  the  British  and 
the  Qawasim  over  the  control  of  the  Gulf.  Furthermore,  the  two  islands  Abu  Musa 
and  Greater  Tunb  were  inhabited  by  UAE  citizens  when  Iranian  troops  occupied  the 
islands. 
200 
197 
-  O'Connell,  op.  cit.,  P.  406-7  and  42  1. 
198 
-  Taha,  al-Qanwn,  op.  cit.,  P.  33. 
199  See  M.  A.  A]-Roken,  Historical  and  Legal  Dimensions  of  the  United  Arab  Emirates-Iran  Dispute 
over  Three  Gulf  Islands,  ht1p.  11www.  uaeinteract.  cotWgov11hree.  himl,  (1996),  P.  7.  Also  see  the  same 
writer,  al-Buad  al-Tariky  wa  al-Qanwni  Llkelaf  ben  Dawlat  al-Imarat  al-Arabiah  al-Mutahidah  wa 
Iran  Hwl  al-Juzur  al-Thalath  (Historical  and  Legal  Dimensions  of  the  United  Arab  Emirates- 
Iran  Dispute  over  Three  Gulf  Islands),  Al-Taawun,  No.  28,  (1992),  P.  16.  Also  see  the  same  writer, 
al-Buad  al-Tariky  wa  al-Qanwni  Llkelaf  ben  Dawlat  al-Imarat  al-Arabiah  al-Mutahidah  wa  Iran 
Hwl  al-Juzur  al-Thalalh  (Historical  and  Legal  Dimensions  of  the  United  Arab  Emirates-Iran 
Dispute  over  Three  Gulf  Islands),  a  paper  submitted  to  the  Conference  of  the  Peace  Islands,  (1994), 
P.  2. 
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_  See  Chapter  3,  P.  38  and  57 4 
Can  we  accept  that  the  three  islands  were  under  Iranian  sovereignty  before  the 
British  existence  in  the  Gulf  region,  and  that  they  were  neglected  by  the  Iranians, 
according  to  the  Iranian  claim?  20  1  The  question  which  arises  is  whether  Iran 
possessed  sovereignty  over  the  islands  or  not.  And  where  is  the  evidence  for  this? 
Blum  suggests  that  the  answer  should  result  from  answering  the  following  three 
questions: 
(a)  Has  the  exercise  of  authority  been  continuous? 
(b)  Has  authority  been  exercised  'with  the  intention  and  will  to  act  as 
sovereignT. 
(c)  Is  there  sufficient  evidence  of  the  manifestation  of  State  authority 
in  a  manner  appropriate  in  the  circumstances?  202 
He  is  of  the  opinion  that  if  the  answers  to  these  questions  are  in  the  affirmative;  then 
we  are  faced  with  an  effective  actual  sovereignty  practiced  by  the  state. 
It  goes  without  saying  that  one  of  the  conditions  of  the  occupation  of  any 
territory  is  "effectiveness"-that  is,  the  actual  practicing  of  sovereignty  over  that 
territory  by  the  claimant  state.  The  mere  discovery  of  territory  is  not  enough  to 
acquire  sovereignty  over  the  discovered  territory.  The  history  of  the  three  islands 
does  not  show  any  actual  sovereignty  by  Iran.  It  has  been  proven  by  British 
documents  that  since  1750  the  Iranians  have  not  practiced  sovereignty  over  the 
islands.  203 
As  mentioned,  Iranian  troops  occupied  the  two  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser 
Tunb  on  30  November  1971.  On  the  previous  day  the  governments  of  Iran  and 
Sharjah  had  agreed  to  sharing  between  them  the  administration  of  the  Abu  Musa 
201 
_  j.  Mumtaz,  al-Wda  al-Qanwni  Lbad  Juzur  al-Khaleej.  -  Abu  Musa  w-Tunb  al-Kbry  w-al- 
Sghry(Legal  Status  of  Some  Gulf  Islands:  Abu  Musa,  and  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs)  Shu'un  al- 
Awsat  Journal,  No.  47,  December  (1995),  P.  6  1. 
202 
-  Blum,  Historic  Titles,  op.  cit.,  P.  I  10. 
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203 
-  See  Chapter  3,  P.  63. C 
island.  204  The  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  did  not  transfer  their 
sovereignty  over  the  islands  to  Iran. 
Concerning  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  over  the  island  of  Abu  Musa, 
this  did  not  state  that  the  government  of  Sharjah  transferred  its  sovereignty  over  the 
island  to  Iran,  despite  the  use  of  the  term  'claim'  instead  of  'sovereignty'  which  was 
much  more  appropriate.  The  choice  of  the  term  'claim'  was  probably  to  find  an 
equilibrium  between  the  legal  rights  of  Sharjah  and  the  Iranian  political  claims.  205 
Article  2  (a)  of  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  confirms  the  sovereignty  of 
Sharjah  over  the  island,  as  it  states  that  Iran  will  enjoy  a  mere  'jurisdiction'  over  the 
206  part  which  would  be  occupied  by  its  troops,  and  not  'sovereignty' 
. 
The 
Memorandum  describes  the  Iranian  situation  as  follows:  "They  will  occupy  areas" 
and  "Are  occupied  by  Iranian  troops",  whereas  the  situation  of  Sharjah  was 
107  described  as  follows:  "Sharjah  will  have  full  jurisdiction". 
Therefore,  the  arrangements  resulting  from  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding 
which  specify  To-Administration'  are  that  Iran  would  carry  out  the  administration 
of  the  area  occupied  by  its  troops,  while  Sharjah  would  carry  out  the  administration 
of  the  remaining  areas  of  the  island.  Further,  the  rights  of  searching  for  and 
producing  oil,  and  fishing  on  its  territorial  waters,  would  be  shared  with  the 
continuation  of  the  full  legal  sovereignty  of  Sharjah  until  the  dispute  between  the 
two  countries  was  settled.  208 
'0' 
-  See  the  text  of  Memorandum  of  Understanding  in  Chapter  3,  P.  56. 
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_  M.  A.  Shokri,  Msalt  al-Juzur  fi  al-Khaleej  al-Arabi  wa  al-Qanun  al-Dawli  (The  Case  of  the 
Islands  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  and  International  Law),  (1972),  P.  46. 
206 
_  Ibid.  P.  46-7. 
207 
-  A]-Roken,  Historical  and  Legal  Dimensions,  op.  cit.,  P.  13. 
208 
-  Shokri,  op.  cit.,  P.  51-2. 
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On  the  other  hand,  Iran  does  not  have  the  right  to  claim  that  Britain  transferred 
its  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands  to  Iran  before  terminating  the  treaties  with  the 
governments  of  the  Trucial  States  (currently  known  as  the  UAE)  and  its  withdrawal 
from  the  Gulf  Britain  was  never  the  owner  of  these  islands.  The  Treaty  of  1892  did 
not  grant  Britain  the  right  of  selling  or  transferring  any  of  the  territories  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  Emirates  which  signed  the  treaty.  Britain  was  granted,  by  the 
treaty,  the  right  to  manage  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  Emirates,  without  any  right  of 
ownership.  209  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  court  ruled  in  the  Palmas  case  that:  "Spain 
could  not  transfer  more  rights  than  she  herself  possessed". 
Iran  may  also  claim,  after  a  period  of  time  since  her  occupation  of  the  islands  on 
30  November  1971,  her  acquisition  of  sovereignty  over  the  islands  according  to 
ýacquisitive  prescription'.  Such  a  claim,  however,  does  not  fulfil  the  conditions  for 
acquiring  sovereignty  over  territory  according  to  the  principle  of  'acquisitive 
prescription',  which  was  explained  earlier.  210 
As  for  the  island  of  Abu  Musa,  we  have  explained  that  Sharjah  did  not  transfer 
its  sovereignty  over  the  island,  according  to  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding. 
Therefore,  the  administration  of  a  part  of  the  island  by  Iran  cannot  be  considered  a 
cause  for  acquisitive  prescription  over  territory,  no  matter  how  long  it  exercises 
administration  over  the  island.  To  acquire  territory,  administration  must  be  carried 
out  by  its  owner  in  order  to  practice  its  sovereignty  over  the  territory.  Moreover,  Iran 
211 
recognizes  that  sovereignty  over  this  island  has  not  been  finally  settled  . 
Concerning  the  two  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb,  the  situation  is  that  of 
occupation  by  the  use  of  force,  which  does  not  fulfil  the  condition  of  peaceful 
209 
_  See  the  text  of  Treaty  in  Chapter  2,  P.  28. 
210 
-  Above,  P.  82. 
211 
_  See  Chapter  9,  P.  222. I 
acquisition  necessary  for  the  awarding  of  sovereignty  over  territory  according  to  the 
principle  of  acquisitive  prescription.  Moreover,  the  UAE  has  never  acquiesced  or 
kept  silent  over  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  two  islands.  The  UAE  has  registered  its 
rejection  of  the  occupation  by  all  means,  and  claimed  its  rights  of  sovereignty  over 
these  islands  from  day  one  of  the  Iranian  occupation  on  30  November  197  1.  This  has 
been  achieved  in  many  ways-such  as  by  the  resistance  of  the  police  force  of  Greater 
Tunb  which  belongs  to  Ras  al-Khaimah;  diplomatic  protest  by  the  sending  of  a 
telegram  to  the  United  Nations  and  raising  the  case  in  the  Security  Council  on  9 
December  1971.  Since  then,  the  UAE  has  not  ceased  to  raise  the  issue  of  the  Iranian 
occupation  of  the  islands  and  its  claim  of  sovereignty  over  them  in  all  international 
and  regional  meetings. 
212 
4.5.2.  The  UAE  is  the  ri&ful  sovereign  of  the  three  islands 
According  to  Dr.  Shokri,  the  governments  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  and  Sharjah  fulfilled 
the  conditions  of  actual  and  known  acquisition  of  the  islands  before  and  during  the 
British  control  of  the  Gulf,  which  proves  their  ownership  of  the  islands  by 
acquisitive  prescription  . 
213  Dr.  Al-Roken  has  a  different  point  of  view.  He  says: 
While  the  majority  of  the  conditions  required  for  acquisitive 
prescription  to  hold  exist,  the  last  one  raises  doubts  as  to  the  very 
source  and  base  of  the  UAE's  title  to  the  three  islands.  If  applied  in 
favour  of  the  UAE,  this  condition  may  be  seen  as  an  implicit 
recognition  of  Iran's  original  claim  to  them.  Impressively,  this  is  not 
so,  and  therefore,  the  Emirates  should  not  use  this  method  due  to  the 
danger  it  involves.  214 
Al-Roken  argues  that  the  UAE  should  base  her  legal  right  on  the  principle  of 
'immemorial  possession'.  He  says: 
212 
_  See  Chapter  3,  P.  57-8. 
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_  Shokri,  op.  cit.,  P.  30-1. 
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In  such  a  case,  the  origin  of  the  status  quo  remains  unknown  or 
doubtful.  And  since  it  is  impossible  to  establish  whether  this  status 
quo  is  legitimate  or  otherwise,  evidence  emerges  supporting  its 
legitimacy.  The  UAE  has  been  holding  the  three  islands  for  over  two 
and  half  centuries  and  it  is  therefore  impossible  to  prove  whether  or 
not  this  possession  was  legitimate  at  the  time  it  occurred,  namely  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.  215 
However,  Bathurst  and  Ely  argue  that  the  UAE  should  base  her  sovereignty  and 
legal  ownership  over  the  islands  on  the  basis  of  the  'Historical  Consolidation  of 
Title',  since  the  islands  did  not  belong  to  any  particular  state  before  the  emergence 
of  the  Qawasim  as  a  regional  power.  Then  the  islands  were  controlled  by  the 
Qawasim  who  continued  to  rule  the  islands  peacefully  and  effectively.  During  this 
period  the  two  Emirates  practiced  all  manifestations  of  sovereignty,  such  as  the 
administration  of  public  services,  customs,  mining  and  petroleum  concessions  as 
well  as  raising  their  flags  on  the  islands.  216 
In  my  view,  the  UAE's  legal  ownership  of  the  three  islands  should  be  based  on 
the  evidence  of  her  practicing  sovereignty  over  the  islands  before  Iran  and  present 
the  case  to  an  Arbitration  or  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  This  point  will  be 
discussed  in  a  separate  chapter  later  on.  217 
4.6.  Conclusion 
We  conclude  from  the  above  that  the  two  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb  were 
not  a  terra  nullius  at  the  time  of  their  occupation  by  the  Iranian  troops  on  30 
November  1971,  and  that  the  government  of  Sharjah  did  not  transfer  her  sovereignty 
over  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  to  Iran  by  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding. 
215 
_  Ibid. 
216 
_  M.  E.  Bathurst  and  N.  Ely,  &  Messrs.  Coward  Chance,  Sharjah's  Title  to  the  Island  of  Abu  Musa, 
Submitted  to  His  Highness  Shaikh  Khalid  bin  Mohamed  Al-Qasimi  Ruler  of  Sharjah  and  its 
Dependencies,  Vol.  1-Opinion,  (197  1),  P.  15-8. 
217 
_  See  Chapter  8,  P.  182. er 
Moreover,  Iran  cannot  base  her  sovereignty  over  the  islands  on  the  principle  of 
acquisitive  prescription  after  the  passing  of  a  period  of  time,  since  it  did  not  occupy 
the  islands  by  peaceful  means.  The  rejection  of  the  use  of  force  according  to  the 
United  Nations  Charter  has  been  manifested  in  many  resolutions,  the  last  of  which 
was  the  refusal  of  the  use  of  force  to  annex  Kuwait  to  Iraq.  One  wonders,  then,  how 
Iran  justifies  its  occupation  of  the  two  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb.  And  on 
what  basis  does  it  share  with  Sharjah  the  administration  of  the  island  of  Abu  Musa? 123 
CHAPTER  FIVE 
Analysis  of  the  Iranian  Claim  of  Sovereignty  over  the 
Three  Islands 
5.1.  Introduction 
The  basis  of  Iran's  claims  of  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands  was  rehearsed  in  the 
statements  made  by  the  Iranian  representative  to  the  United  Nations  Security 
Council  at  the  meeting  on  9  December  1971.  He  said:  "The  Iranian  title  to  the 
islands  was  long-standing  and  substantial....  British  maps  marked  them  as  being 
Persian. 
... 
A  highly  authoritative  encyclopedia,  published  as  recently  as  1967  to 
cover  the  events  of  the  last  50  years,  by  another  major  power.  ... 
They  identified 
them  as  Iranian  territory".  '  In  addition,  in  June  1971,  the  Shah  emphasized  the 
islands'  strategic  importance  for  Iran.  2 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  shed  light  on  the  Iranian  claims  for  the  three  islands 
it  occupied  in  197  1.  The  purpose  is  to  know  the  extent  of  Iran's  right  to  claim  these 
islands.  The  chapter  highlights  two  points.  Firstly,  the  merits  of  Iran's  claim  to  the 
three  islands,  and  secondly,  the  refutation  of  Iranian  arguments. 
5.2.  The  merits  of  Iran's  claim  to  the  three  islands 
According  to  the  Iranian  representative's  speech  to  the  UN  on  9  December  197  1,  the 
Iranian  claim  to  the  three  islands  is  based  on  three  arguments.  The  first  is  Iran's 
historical  right  to  these  islands.  The  second  is  the  British  recognition  of  Iranian 
sovereignty  over  the  islands.  The  third  is  the  strategic  value  of  the  islands  for  Iran. 
'-  SCOR,  26  Year,  16  10  the  Meeting:  9  December  197  1,  P.  18. 
2 
-The  Times,  29  June  197  1,  P.  7. Chypter  5  124 
5.2.1.  Historical  right  of  ownership 
Alleged  historical  rights  are  the  first  of  Iran's  claims  to  the  three  islands  Abu  Musa, 
and  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs.  The  Iranian  newspaper  Keyhan  International  on 
30  May  1970  reported  "The  three  islands  have  belonged  to  Iran  since  time 
immemorial  and  have  always  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  country.  About  eighty 
years  ago,  the  British  Government,  for  imperialistic  considerations,  unlawfully  and 
temporarily  separated  them  from  Iran  by  preventing  Iran  from  exercising  its 
established  sovereign  rights  over  them".  3 
Also,  Iranian  high  officials  showed  on  many  occasions  their  insistence  on  Iran's 
historical  claims  of  the  three  islands.  When  Zahedi,  the  Shah's  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  in  197  1,  was  asked  about  the  Iranian  claims  for  some  islands  in  the  Gulf,  he 
replied  that:  "The  islands  had  always  been  a  part  of  Iran  and  they  will  continue  to  be 
ý4  so'  . 
The  Shah  in  an  interview  with  the  Iranian  newspaper  Keyhan  International, 
dated  23  October  1971,  stated  the  following  in  connection  with  the  Gulf.  -  "what  we 
are  demanding  is  what  has  always  belonged  to  our  country  throughout  history 
... 
It  is 
perfectly  natural  and  reasonable  that,  now  that  imperialism  is  withdrawing,  Iran 
should  regain  what  has  always  been  its  possession  historically".  5 
The  argument  of  historical  claim  by  the  government  of  Iran  in  support  of  its 
sovereignty  over  the  three  islands  was  stated  as  follows: 
(i)  The  naming  of  the  Gulf  as  the  Persian  Gulf  is  a  proof  that  the  coasts  and 
islands  of  this  Gulf  belong  to  Iran.  The  first  Iranian  claim  to  the  whole  Gulf  area 
3_  Quoted  in  P.  Mojtahed-Zadeh,  Iran's  Maritime  Boundaries  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  The  Boundaries  of 
Modern  Iran,  ed.  by  K.  Mclachlan,  (1994),  P.  119. 
4-  Al-Khaleej,  29  June  197  1. 
'-  Quoted  ftom  SCOR,  26Year,  16  10  the  Meeting:  9  December  197  1,  P.  5. 125 
was  officially  announced  in  a  letter  from  the  Persian  Prime  Minister  on  15  March 
1844  addressed  to  the  British  government.  6  The  Persian  Minister  Haji  Meerza 
Aghassi  stated  that  the  whole  Gulf  "from  the  commencement  of  Shatt  Al-Arab  to 
Muscat  belongs  to  Persia,  and  all  the  islands  of  the  sea,  without  exception,  and 
7  without  participation  of  any  other  government,  belong  entirely  to  Persia" 
. 
This  argument  is  supported  by  statements  of  Arab  and  Muslim  historians  and 
geographers.  As  Dr.  Mojtahed-Zadeh  says:  "All  the  works  of  the  Arab  and  Muslim 
historians  and  geographers  concerning  the  geography  and  history  of  the  region  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  during  the  Islamic  period  emphasize  that  all  the  islands  located  in  the 
Gulf  belong  to  Iran.  What  the  British  have  to  do  is  to  look  up  a  book  such  as  Nuzhat 
AI-Qulub  by  Hamd-Allah  Mustafa  to  find  the  following:  'The  islands  located 
between  Sind  and  Oman  in  the  Persian  Gulf  belong  to  Persia.  The  biggest  of  these 
,,  8  islands  are  Qishm  and  Bahrain' 
. 
In  addition,  Dr.  Davoud  Bavand  said  "the 
territories  and  islands  of  the  Persian  Gulf  belonged  to  the  14th  Satrapy  of  the  empire 
[an  old  province  in  Iran]  from  521-485  B.  C'5.9 
Therefore,  this  argument  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  political  and 
military  domination  of  Iran  over  the  Gulf  in  successive  periods  meant  that  in  ancient 
and  medieval  times  the  th.  -ree  islands  would  have  had  to  belong  to  Iran.  '  0 
6_R.  Schofield,  Borders  and  Territoriality  in  the  Gulf  and  the  Arabian  Peninsula  during  the  Twentieth 
Century,  Territorial  Foundations  of  the  Gu4fStates,  ed.  R.  Schofield,  (1994),  P.  3  5. 
7 
-  Quoted  from  SCOR,  26Year,  16  10  the  Meeting:  9  December  197  1,  P.  5. 
8_  Aalam  Al-Khaleej,  Monthly  newspaper,  No.  31,  January  1996,  P.  8.  Also  see  P.  Mojtahed-Zadeh, 
al-Khlafat  al-Hdwdih  w-al-Iqlimih  bin  al-Aarab  w-al-Iraniin  (Territorial  and  Boundaries  Disputes 
between  the  Arabs  and  the  Iranians),  al-Alaqat  al-Arabih  al-Iraniah:  al-Iýahat  al-Rahnh  w-Afaq  al- 
Mstqbl  (Arab  Iranian  Relationships:  Present  Directions  and  Future  Horizons),  Centre  for  Arab 
Unity  Studies,  (1996),  P.  494. 
9-  D.  H.  Bavand,  The  Historical,  Political  and  Legal  Bases  of  Iran's  Sovereignty  over  the  Islands  of 
Tumbs  and  Abu  Musa,  (1994),  P.  15. 
10  G.  Mirfendereski,  The  Ownership  of  the  Tonb  Islands:  A  Legal  Analysis,  Small  Islands,  Big 
Politics:  The  Tonbs  and  Abu  Musa  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  ed.  H.  Amirahmadi,  (1996),  P.  120. Chgpter  5  126 
(ii)  Iran  claims  that  the  three  islands  had  been  owned  by  Iran  before  they  were 
occupied  by  Britain  in  1903  11  'on  the  assumption  that  they  were  essential  to  combat 
piracy'  in  the  Gulf  Great  Britain  had  'in  pursuit  of  its  imperial  interests'  considered 
the  islands  as  belonging  to  the  Arab  Shaikhs  of  the  Trucial  States  and  had 
transferred  them  to  the  de  facto  administration  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  when 
Iran  was  'politically  weak'.  12  The  Iranian  newspaper  Keyhan  International  of  30 
May  1970  which  reported  this  argument  on  Iran's  historical  sovereignty  of  the  three 
islands  stated:  "The  three  islands  have  belonged  to  Iran  since  time  immemorial  and 
have  always  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  country.  About  eighty  years  ago,  the 
British  government,  for  imperialistic  considerations,  unlawfully  and  temporarily 
separated  them  from  Iran  by  preventing  Iran  from  exercising  its  established 
sovereign  rights  over  them".  13  Also  in  a  June  1971  interview,  the  Shah  claimed  that 
the  three  islands  had  been  'grabbed'  at  a  time  when  Iran  had  no  central 
government.  14 
An  academic  Iranian  study  explains  the  historic  rights  argument  of  ownership  of 
the  three  islands  as  follows:  "The  islands  were  Iran's,  it  was  claimed,  because  they 
were  under  its  sovereignty  until  eighty  years  ago.  At  that  time,  it  was  contended, 
Britain  interfered  with  the  exercise  of  this  sovereignty  by  using  force,  and 
subsequently  claimed  the  islands  for  its  wards,  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaymah.  The 
islands  were  thus  Iran's  for  historical  reasons,  and  their  seizure  under  duress  and 
II 
-  J.  Mumtaz,  al-Wda  al-Qanwni  Lbad  Juzur  al-Kaleej.  -  Abu  Musa  w-Tunb  al-Kbry  w-al-Sghry 
(Legal  Status  of  Some  Gulf  Islands:  Abu  Musa,  and  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs),  Shu'un  al- 
Awsat  Journal,  No.  47,  December  1995,  P.  58. 
12 
-  Border  and  Territorial  Disputes,  ed.  by  J.  13.  Allcok,  (1992),  P.  382-3.  Also  H.  M.  Al-Baharna,  The 
Arahian  Guý(States,  (1975),  P.  341-2. 
13 
_  Quoted  in  Mojtahed-Zadeh,  A  Political  Geography  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  The  Islands  of  Tunb  and 
Abu  Musa,  Unpublished  Paper,  (1992),  P.  25.  See  the  same  text  in  Mojtahed-Zadeh,  Political 
Geography  of  the  Strait  of  Hourmuz,  (1990),  P.  20. 
14 
-  D.  Caldwell,  Flashpoints  in  the  Gulf.  Abu  Musa  and  the  Tunbs  Islands,  MEP,  Vol.  IV,  No.  3, 
March  (1996),  P.  52. Chqpter  5 
.. 
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interference  by  an  'imperialist'  power  could  not  diminish  its  sovereignty.  Nor  could 
the  'imperialist'  country  on  its  departure  seek  to  perpetuate  its  'colonialist  legacy'  by 
ceding  Iran's  property  to  other  states".  15 
The  likelihood  of  the  belonging  of  the  three  islands  to  Iran  appears  even 
stronger  at  a  time  when  the  Iranian  domination  extended  to  the  lower  coast  of  the 
eastern  Gulf,  thereby  placing  the  islands  at  least  theoretically  under  Iranian 
sovereignty.  The  political  and  commercial  domination  of  Iran  over  the  Gulf  was  in 
the  times  of  the  Seleucid  (312-150  B.  C.  ),  Parthian  (238  B.  C.  -A.  D.  224),  Sassanid 
(A.  D.  224-641),  Buyid  (A.  D.  945-1055),  SeIjuq  (A.  D.  1055-1194),  until  the  arrival 
of  the  Portuguese  in  the  Gulf  in  the  early  1500s.  Iranian  dominion  in  the  Gulf  as  the 
local  rulers  of  Hormuz  remained  unabated.  With  the  exception  of  an  occasional 
internecine  quarrel  regarding  succession  or  disagreement  with  the  Iranian  central  or 
provincial  authority,  very  little  change,  if  any,  seems  to  have  occurred  in  regard  to 
the  control  of  Hormuz  over  the  coasts  and  islands  of  eastern  Gulf.  16 
Therefore,  Dr.  Mumtaz  sees  that  at  the  time  of  the  British  occupation  of  the 
three  islands  in  1903,  these  islands  were  not  without  an  owner;  therefore  they  were 
not  terra  nullius,  they  actually  belonged  to  Iran.  He  alleges  that  they  were  neglected 
by  the  Iranian  goverment  because  of  the  scarcity  of  inhabitants  on  the  island  of  Abu 
Musa.  Greater  Tunb  was  only  used  by  fishermen  and  the  Lesser  Tunb  was 
uninhabited  because  of  its  lack  of  drinking  water.  Further,  he  argues  that  Iran's 
negligence  of  practicing  its  control  over  the  islands  had  not  lead  to  the  loss  of  its 
sovereignty  over  them,  and  therefore  they  were  not  legally  available  for 
occupation.  '  7 
15 
_  S.  Chubin  and  S.  Zabih,  The  Foreign  Relations  of  Iran,  (1974),  P.  222-3. 
16 
_  Mirfendereski,  op.  cit.,  P.  120-2. 
17 
_  Mumtaz,  op.  cit.,  P.  58-9. 128 
(iii)  The  heart  of  Iran's  claim  over  the  three  islands  has  been  based  on  the  fact 
that  the  Qawasim  Shaikhs  of  Lingah  were  for  a  long  time  Iranian  subjects  governing 
Lingah  as  Iranian  officials.  Therefore,  the  Iranian  government  suggested  that  it  was 
in  this  capacity  that  they  had  administered  the  three  islands,  which  had  thereby 
become  Iranian  territory.  18  In  addition,  the  Qawasim  Shaikhs  of  Lingah,  in  the 
meantime,  demonstrated  their  loyalty  to  the  Iranian  government  throughout  their 
history  at  Lingah,  and  assisted  Iranian  expeditions  on  various  occasions  against 
rebellious  Arab  tribes  of  the  region.  '  9 
5.2.2.  British  maps  as  recognition  ofIranian  sovereignty 
Iran  also  claims  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands,  Abu  Musa  and  the  Tunbs  islands, 
on  the  basis  of  several  British  maps,  which  colour  the  islands  the  same  as  the  Iranian 
border.  The  Iranian  representative  to  the  United  Nations  stated  rhetorically,  "For 
more  than  a  century,  beginning  in  1770,  British  maps  marked  the  Tunb  islands  as 
being  Persian.  A  mistake  can  be  made  once,  perhaps,  but  what  sort  of  mistake  is  it 
that  can  be  made  for  120  years?  ".  20 
This  Iranian  argument  based  on  British  maps  had  been  advanced  before  by  the 
Shah  of  Iran  Mohammed  Reza  in  an  interview  aboard  a  private  flight  taking  him  to  a 
winter  vacation  in  Switzerland  in  early  February  1971;  he  stated:  "They  [the  three 
islands]  belonged  to  us  and  we  have  British  Admiralty  maps  and  other  documents  to 
prove  it".  21 
Thus,  Iran's  argument  is  based  on  a  number  of  official  and  semi-official  British 
maps  published  since  1770,  as  well  as  an  unofficial  map  of  Persia  prepared  under 
18 
_  See  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P.  474. 
"-  See  Mojtahed  -Zadeh,  A  Political  Geography  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  op.  cit.,  P.  14. 
20 
_  SCOR,  26  year,  16  10  the  meeting:  9  December  19  7  1,  P.  18. 
21 
-  The  Glasgow  Herald,  17  February  197  1,  P.  9. Chg,  pter  5  129 
the  auspices  of  Lord  Curzon  in  1892,  and  the  Survey  of  India  Map  of  1897.22  But 
Iran's  particular  claim  to  the  islands  is  based  on  a  map  of  Persia  prepared  in  1886  by 
the  Intelligence  Branch  of  the  British  War  Office.  23  This  shows  the  Abu  Musa  and 
Tunbs  islands  in  the  same  colours  as  that  of  the  Iran  border.  A  copy  was  presented  to 
Nasir  al-Din  Shah  as  a  gift  by  the  British  Minister  in  Tehran  during  the  summer  of 
1888  on  the  instruction  of  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Lord  Salisbury.  24  Nasir  al-Din 
Shah  and  subsequent  rulers  of  Iran  have  referred  to  the  map  in  connection  with  the 
Iranian  claim  to  the  three  islands. 
5.2.3.  The  strategic  value  to  Iran  of  the  three  islands 
The  Iranian  claim  of  the  strategic  importance  of  the  three  islands  began  after  the 
announcement  of  the  British  withdrawal  from  the  Gulf  in  1968.  Iran  argued  that  the 
security  of  the  Gulf  and  its  navigation  corridors  was  its  responsibility.  It  was, 
therefore,  essential  that  Iran  controlled  the  islands  because  of  their  location  at  the 
entrance  to  the  Gulf.  This  was  proposed  by  Asadollah  Alam,  Iran's  Royal  Court 
Minister,  to  the  Shah.  As  he  said  in  his  diary  for  10  November  1969:  "Audience. 
Reported  yesterday's  conversation  with  ambassador.  When  I  came  to  his  remarks 
about  the  islands,  HIM  [His  Imperial  Majesty]  nearly  exploded;  'He's  talking  out  of 
his  arse',  he  exclaimed,  'the  islands  belong  to  us'.  'We  must  try  to  be  pragmatic',  I 
said,  'Your  Majesty's  chief  interest  lies  in  occupying  the  islands  to  facilitate  our 
defence  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  You  have  already  declared  that  any  oil  found  there 
"-  See  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P.  337. 
23 
_  See  The  Three  Iranian  Islands  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  MEQ  (Center  for  Scientific  Research  and 
Middle  East  Strategic  Studies),  Vol.  1,  No.  2,  Fall  (1994).  Also  Bavand,  op.  cit.,  P.  58.  Also  Schofield, 
op.  cit.,  P.  35.  Also  Vinson  &  Elkins,  Attorneys  at  Law,  Report  on  the  Tunb  Islands,  Submitted  to  Ras 
al-Khaimah  Government,  Houston-Texas,  (1980),  P.  3.106. 
24 
_  See  this  map  in  The  British  Library  at  Shelf  mark  No.  50970  (4  1)  and  in  Oriental  and  India  Office 
Collections  at  Shelf  mark  No.  W/LPS/21/1310/106.  Also  seeAppendix  B,  Map4,  P.  298. 0 
could  be  shared  between  us  and  the  Arabs.  In  other  words  we  are  after  occupation, 
not  total  possession"'.  25 
The  strategic  importance  of  the  islands  for  Iran  to  guarantee  the  security  of  the 
Gulf  became  one  of  the  reasons  behind  Iranian  claims  over  the  three  islands.  This 
was  assured  by  the  Shah  when  he  said:  "They  are  of  strategic  importance  to  us  as 
much  as  to  the  Persian  Gulf  states  and  to  the  peace  and  security  of  our  region.  Their 
geographic  position  can  make  them  issues  of  tremendous  military  value".  26 
After  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  Tunbs  islands  on  30  November  1971,  the 
Iranian  representative  to  the  UN  Security  Council  Mr.  Afshar  justified  the 
occupation  by  virtue  of  the  geographic  proximity  of  the  islands  to  the  Iranian  coast 
more  than  to  the  UAE  coast.  He  said:  "these  islands  form  part  of  a  group  of  islands, 
virtually  constituting  an  archipelago,  all  of  which  have  always  been  part  of  Iran. 
Moreover,  the  Greater  Tunb  lies  only  17  miles  from  the  Iranian  mainland  and  the 
Lesser  Tunb  22  miles  off-shore.  On  the  other  hand,  both  islands  lie  almost  50  miles 
away  from  Ras  al-Khaimah  on  the  other  side  of  the  Persian  GUIp.  27 
The  Iranian  occupation  of  the  three  islands,  because  of  their  strategic 
importance,  is  based  on  the  following  reasons: 
(i)  To  guarantee  the  security  of  Iran  shores  and  waters,  international  navigation 
and  Iranian  national  security  after  the  British  withdrawal  from  the  region  and  the 
weakness  of  the  Gulf  States,  Iran  claims  it  is  necessary  that  it  controls  the  three 
islands.  This  is  to  ensure  that  the  Strait  of  Hormuz  stays  open  to  navigation,  as  it  is 
the  only  outlet  for  Iranian  oil.  This  was  also  seen  as  essential  to  prevent  the  Gulf 
25 
-  A.  Alam,  The  Shah  and  I.  -  The  Confidential  Diary  of  Iran's  Royal  Court  1969-1977,  ed.  A. 
Alilchani,  (199  1),  P.  10  1- 
26 
_  Quoted  in  Mojtahed-Zadeh,  Political  Geography  of'the  Strait  of  Hourmuz,  op.  cit.,  P.  19. 
27 
_  SCOR,  26  year,  16  1  Oth  Meeting:  9  December  197  1,  P.  18. Chapter  5  131 
from  falling  under  communist  influence.  Foreign  Minister  Ardeshir  Zahedi  stated  on 
12  November  1970,  "Look  to  the  Chinese  communists  in  Aden.  If  these  islands  go, 
all  our  interests  will  be  damaged" 
. 
28  The  same  justification  was  used  by  the  Shah: 
"Their  geographical  position  can  make  them  issues  of  tremendous  military  value. 
Only  the  other  day  the  South  Yemenis  issued  a  communique  vowing  to  bring 
revolution  to  the  whole  region  of  the  Persian  Gulf'.  29 
The  same  argument  was  put  on  its  head  after  the  fall  of  the  Shah  and  the  arrival 
of  Khomeini  to  power.  This  time,  Iranian  national  security  was  to  be  protected  from 
United  States'  influence  in  the  Gulf  Abu  al-Hassan  Bani  Sadr,  the  first  president  of 
the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  stated  in  March  1980:  "At  the  end  of  the  Gulf  there  is 
the  Strait  of  Hormuz  through  which  oil  Passes.  They  [the  Arab  Gulf  govemments] 
are  afraid  of  our  revolution.  If  we  allow  them  to  have  the  islands  they  will  control 
the  Strait.  In  other  words  the  United  States  would  control  the  waterway  ... 
Is  it 
possible  to  give  such  a  gift  to  the  United  States?  If  all  of  them,  the  littoral  states  of 
the  Gulf,  were  independent,  we  would  have  returned  the  islands  to  them".  30 
(ii)  The  second  point  which  Iran  used  to  justify  its  occupation  of  the  islands  for 
strategic  reasons,  is  that  the  proximity  of  the  Tunbs  islands  to  the  Iranian  mainland 
provides  evidence  of  Iran's  sovereignty  over  the  islands.  31 
5.3.  The  refutation  of  the  Iranian  arguments 
After  reviewing  the  Iranian  arguments  concerning  Iran's  rights  over  the  three 
islands,  one  should  question  the  strength  of  the  Iranian  historical  arguments  over  the 
28 
_  MEJ,  Vol.  XXV,  No.  2,  (197  1),  P.  234-5. 
29 
-  Quoted  in  Mojtahed-Zadeh,  Political  Geography  of  the  Strait  of  Hourmuz,  op.  cit.,  P.  19. 
30 
_  Quoted  in  H.  H.  AI-Alkim,  The  Foreign  Policy  of  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  (1989),  P.  160.  Also 
see  Al-Alkim,  The  United  Arab  Emirates  Perspective  on  the  Islands'  Question,  Round  Table 
Discussion  on  The  Dispute  over  the  Guýf  Islands,  (l  993),  P.  29. 
31 
-  See  Chubin  and  Zabih,  op.  cit.,  P.  223. Chapter  5  132 
three  islands.  Does  the  strategic  value  of  a  particular  territory  award  sovereignty 
over  it?  The  British  maps'  recognition  of  Iranian  sovereignty  over  the  islands  will  be 
discussed  in  a  later  chapter. 
5.3.1.  The  weakness  of  the  Iranian  historical  argument 
(i)  The  Iranian  claim  for  the  three  islands  is  based  on  the  claim  that  the  whole 
Gulf  is  Persian  is  not  substantiated  by  any  historical  or  legal  facts  or  documents. 
Throughout  history,  the  Gulf  has  been  known  by  different  names.  In  olden  times,  it 
was  called  the  'Lower'  or  'Bitter'  Gulf,  whereas  the  Ottomans  called  it  the  Gulf  of 
Basra.  The  inhabitants  of  Hasa  used  to  call  it  the  Gulf  of  Qatif.  Most  probably,  it 
was  Alexander  the  Great  who  named  it  the  Persian  Gulf  in  326-325  B.  C.  32 
However,  in  the  first  century  the  Roman  author  Pliny  named  the  Gulf,  the 
Arabian  Gulf.  33 
when  he  described  the  Charax  city  (it  could  be  Al-Mohamerah)  . 
34 
He  stated: 
Charax  is  a  city  situate  at  the  furthest  extremity  of  the  Arabian 
(i.  e.  Persian)  Gulf  at  which  begins  the  more  prominent  portion  of 
Arabia  Felix  (Eudaemon):  it  is  built  on  an  artificial  elevation,  having 
the  Tigris  on  the  right,  and  the  Eulaeus  on  the  left,  and  lies  on  a  piece 
of  ground  three  miles  in  extent,  just  between  the  confluence  of  those 
streams.  It  was  first  founded  by  Alexander  the  Great.  By  his  order  it 
was  to  be  called  Alexandria.  35 
32 
-  The  Macedonian  Admiral  Niarcos  arrived  at  Iraq  coming  from  India  by  the  Gulf  His  scientific 
maritime  trip  was  ordered  by  the  Macedonian  Emperor  Alexander  the  Great  to  discover  the  source  of 
the  Euphrates  River.  In  his  trip,  he  followed  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Gulf  (the  Iranian  Coast),  whereas 
the  westem  coast  (the  Arab  Coast)  remained  unknown  to  him.  According  to  the  accounts  of  his  trip, 
the  Emperor  called  it  the  Persian  Gulf.  Since  then  it  has  been  known  by  this  name.  See  K.  Qalachi, 
A  I-Khaleej  A  I-Arabi  (Arabian  GO),  (1992),  P.  7-8. 
33 
-  The  Iranians  claim,  that  in  the  fifties,  Arab  nationalists  were  the  first  to  call  the  Persian  Gulf,  the 
Arabian  Gulf  See  S.  H.  Amin,  International  and  Legal  Problems  of  the  Gu4f,  (1981),  P.  36.  Also 
Alam,  op.  cit.,  note  1,  P.  34. 
34 
-  A.  Wilson,  The  Persian  Gulf,  (1954),  note  4,  P.  30. 
31 
_  Ibid.  P.  49. 5 
Also,  the  English  historian  Roderic  Owen,  who  visited  the  Gulf  in  the  twentieth 
century,  believed  it  to  be  a  Persian  Gulf  However,  once  he  knew  it  more  he  thought 
it  fair  to  name  it  the  Arabian  Gulf  He  said: 
No  English  map  shows  the  Arabian  Gulf-,  a  matter  of  some 
concern  for  those  who  live  there.  A  traveller  has  to  proceed  as  though 
bound  for  the  Persian  Gulf-will  probably  think  that  that's  where  he  is 
when  he  reaches  Kuwait  or  Bahrain,  only  to  be  told  that  that's  where 
he  isn't.  Persian  Gulf?  These  dry  expanses  of  brown  sand,  those  blue 
expanses  of  shallow  water-and  everything  above  and  especially 
everything  below-are,  have  been,  will  be,  integral  parts  of  the 
Arabian  Gulf. 
This  was  one  of  the  many  things  I  did  not  know  before  going 
there.  It  was  the  first  Arab  statement  of  opinion  I  heard  and  it  was 
repeated  at  intervals  over  a  year  of  wandering  until  now  it  is  an  effort 
to  think  of  such  a  place  as  a  Persian  Gulf.  Since  this  is  an  account  of 
aj  ourney  where  after  the  initial  effort  I  regularly  took  the  line  of  least 
resistance,  where  I  purposely  deprived  myself  of  purpose,  willed 
myself  to  have  no  will  and  heaped  the  result  on  to  the  lap  of  Allah,  I 
shall  refer  to  this  burning,  humid  gulf  of  the  world  as  'Persian' 
before  my  arrival  and  as  'Arabian'  after;  for  that  is  only  polite.  36 
It  is  known  historically  that  the  Iranians  were  not  sailors;  they  have  never  had  marine 
power.  How,  then,  could  they  have  controlled  the  Gulf  and  its  islands  as  they  claim? 
Those  who  wrote  on  the  Gulf  mentioned  that  the  Kings  of  Persia  failed  always  to  be 
masters  of  the  seas.  37  Never  had  they  been  able  to  control  the  coasts  of  the  Gulf. 
Niebuhr,  who  visited  the  region  in  1762,  said:  "Our  geographers  are  wrong,  as  I  have 
elsewhere  remarked,  in  representing  a  part  of  Arabia  as  subject  to  the  monarchs  of 
Persia.  So  far  is  it  from  being  so,  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  Arabs  possess  all  the  sea- 
coast  of  the  Persian  empire,  from  the  mouths  of  the  Euphrates,  nearly  to  those  of  the 
Indus". 
38 
36 
-  R.  Owen,  The  Golden  Bubble:  Arahian  Guýf  Documenlary,  (1957),  P.  13. 
"-  Niebuhr  wrote:  "It  is  ridiculous  in  our  geographers,  to  represent  a  part  of  Arabia,  as  subject  to  the 
Kings  of  Persia;  when,  so  far  from  this,  the  Persian  monarchs  have  never  been  masters  of  the  sea- 
coast  of  their  own  dominions,  but  have  patiently  suffered  it  to  remain  in  the  possession  of  the 
Arabians",  op.  cit.,  P.  8. 
38 
-Ib  id.  op.  c  it.,  P.  13  7. 
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Furthermore,  Iranian  officials  have  professed  that  they  are  not  a  people  of  the 
sea  and  that  they  are  ignorant  of  navigation  in  the  Gulf  As  the  Iranian  Consul  in 
Brussels  mentioned,  in  one  of  his  memoranda  to  the  Iranian  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  in  1926: 
It  is  regretted  that  the  lack  of  Iranian  interest  in  navigating  in  the 
Persian  Gulf  (the  only  free  route  between  Iran  and  the  world),  will 
not  prevent  foreign  policies  in  it.  This  lack  of  interest  led  to  the 
foreign  practice  of  sovereignty  over  it,  which  limited  financial  and 
political  interests  for  foreigners 
....  And  when  the  Iranians  started 
establishing  a  naval  force  in  the  Gulf  in  the  time  of  Nader  Shah,  they 
bought  ships  from  Europe  and  other  countries.  They  even  started 
their  own  ship-building  in  Bushire 
.... 
But,  because  of  the  Iranians' 
fear  of  the  sea,  the  Shah  was  obliged  to  employ  navigators  from 
India.  Therefore,  when  the  war  started  between  Iranians  and  Arabs 
these  Indians  refused  to  confront  them  because  they  were  Sunni  [the 
official  religion  of  Iran  is  Shia  Islam  and  the  official  religion  of 
Arabs  countries  is  Sunni  Islam].  So,  after  killing  Iranian  high-ranking 
officials,  they  led  the  ships  out  of  the  Iranian  territorial  waters.  After 
this  incident,  no  naval  force  has  been  formed  in  the  Gulf  since  then 
until  the  end  of  war  with  Afghan.  This  war  taught  the  Iranians  the 
disadvantage  of  the  lack  of  naval  forces;  now  they  were  given  the 
incentive  once  more.  By  the  year  1865  they  owned  two  or  three  ships 
with  Indian  navigators  and  British  leadership.  39 
It  seems  that  Iran  is  building  its  claim  for  the  three  islands  on  the  Gulfs  being 
known  as  'the  Persian  Gulf.  Therefore,  they  conclude  that  all  the  islands  in  the  Gulf 
should  be  Iranian.  However,  such  a  basis  is  not  a  sound  are  since  the  name  of  a 
region  does  not  grant  sovereignty  over  it.  Otherwise,  Oman  could  have  claimed 
sovereignty  over  all  the  Iranian  lands  located  on  the  Gulf  of  Oman  and,  equally, 
India  could  have  claimed  all  the  lands  located  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  40  The  Iranian 
author,  Professor  Mirfendereski,  has  conceded  that  "claims  of  sovereignty  over  the 
39 
-  Our  translation.  The  original  text  is  written  in  the  Persian  language,  Doc.  No.  97,  Kazidh  Asnad 
Kaliý  Faris  (Selected  Documents  of  Persian  Gulf),  VoLl,  Islands  of  Persian  Gulf,  Institute  for 
Political  and  International  Studies,  (1989),  P.  297-300. 
40 
_  M.  H.  Al-Aidarous,  al-llaqat  al-Arabiah  al-Iraniah  1921-1971  (Arab-Iranian  Relations  1921- 
1971),  (1985),  P.  23. 5 
Tonbs  based  solely  on  Arab  or  Iranian/Persian  ethnic  considerations  are  inarguable 
at  law". 
41 
(ii)  It  is  a  well-established  historical  fact  that  Britain  did  not  occupy  the  islands  of 
Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  by  its  own  forces  as  claimed  by  Iran.  This 
was  stated  by  Sir  William  Luce  in  his  negotiations  in  the  Gulf  before  the  Iranian 
occupation  of  the  islands.  He  said  that  the  British  govermnent  had  not  seized  Abu 
Musa  from  the  Iranians  to  offer  it  to  Sharjah.  42  The  facts  were  that,  since  the  British 
presence  in  the  Gulf  and  the  conflicts  with  Qawasim  which  were  followed  by  the 
treaty  of  1820,  the  British  government  considered  the  three  islands  as  being  owned 
by  the  Qawasim.  Furthermore,  Britain  had  never  practised  actual  control  on  these 
islands  from  the  time  it  established  its  presence  in  the  Gulf  until  the  end  of  its 
protection  in  1971.43  It  would  ask  permission  before  undertaking  any  action  on  the 
islands.  For  example,  it  had  asked  the  permission  of  the  Shaikh  of  Qawasim  to  build 
the  lighthouse  on  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb.  44 
It  is  claimed  that  the  British  prevented  Iran  from  regaining  possession  of  the 
three  islands  after  Britain  had  given  them  to  the  Trucial  Coast  Qawasim.  This  is 
untrue.  Historical  accounts  establish  that  the  British  intervened  and  actually 
prevented  the  Trucial  Coast  Qawasirn  from  taking  military  action  against  Iran  after 
45 
the  Iranian  conquest  of  Lingah  in  1887 
. 
Lorimer  wrote: 
41 
_  Mirfendereski,  op.  cit.,  P.  118. 
42 
_  See  M.  A.  Shokri,  Msalt  al-Juzurfi  al-Khaleej  al-Arabi  wa  al-Qanun  al-Dawli  (The  Case  of  the 
Islands  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  and  International  Law),  (1972),  P.  33. 
43 
_  See  J.  1.  AI-Rawi,  al-Juzur  al-Arabiyah  al-Thalalh  wa-mawqif  al-Qanun  al-Dawli  min  ihlilaliha 
bi-al-quwah  (The  three  Arab  Islands  and  the  Attitude  of  International  Law  Concerning  their 
Occupation  by  Force),  (1981),  P.  20.  Also  T.  M.  Abd,  al-lhtilal  al-Askari  al-Irani  li-Juzur  Abu 
Musa,  Tunb  al-Kubra,  Tunb  al-Sughra,  (Iranian  Military  Occupation  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  and 
Lesser  Tunbs  Islands),  (1983),  P.  70. 
44 
_  See  Chapter.  3,  P.  46. 
45 
_  See  1MBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P.  469. 
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In  October  1899  the  Persian  Government,  alarmed  by  a  report  that 
the  expelled  Shaikh  of  Lingah  and  his  supporters  had  found  an 
asylum  in  Trucial  Oman,  appealed  to  the  British  Government  to 
prevent  their  collecting  a  force  for  the  recovery  of  Lingah;  and 
suitable  warnings  were  accordingly  addressed  to  the  Trucial  Shaikhs 
by  the  British  authorities.  Again  in  January  1900  the  Persian 
Government  complained  that  Muhammad-bin-Khalifah  the  ex- 
Shaikh  of  Lingah,  was  harboured  by  the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al-Khaimah; 
they  asked  that  the  British  Government  should  prevent  a  descent  by 
him  upon  Lingah,  which  was  apprehended;  and  they  added  a  mighty 
threat  that  they  would  take  action  themselves  against  the  Shaikh  of 
Ras  al-Khaimah,  a  proceeding  which,  as  was  reported  by  the 
Resident,  might  easily  result  in  the  loss  of  their  only  vessel,  the 
'Persepolis'.  A  second  warning  was  consequently  sent  to  the  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  chief  by  H.  M.  S.  'Melpomene'.  46 
(W)  This  Iranian  argument  was  first  advanced  in  1887  after  the  Iranian 
goverment  deposed  the  last  Shaikh  and  took  over  the  government  of  Lingah 
themselves,  and  soon  afterwards  they  invaded  Sirri  island.  At  this  time,  the 
Qawasim  of  Oman  were  unable  to  withdraw  from  Lingah  and  Sirri  because  the 
British  government  forced  them  to  enter  into  treaty  relations,  by  which  they  bound 
themselves  to  observe  perpetual  peace  and  to  refer  all  disputes  to  the  British  resident 
at  the  Gulf.  47  Therefore,  the  Iranian  government  may  have  believed  that  Abu  Musa 
and  the  Tunbs  islands  were  part  of  Qawasim  territory  as  Sirri  was,  allocated  to  the 
Qawasim  rulers  of  Lingah  who  were  subject  to  Iran's  sovereignty  immediately 
before  their  expulsion  from  Lingah. 
British  historical  documents  prove  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  three  islands,  Abu 
Musa  and  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs,  was  held  by  the  Trucial  Shaikhs  of  Sharjah 
as  representatives  of  the  Qawasim  Arab  chiefs  before  and  after  the  Iranian 
48 
occupation  of  Lingah 
. 
However,  in  accordance  with  Arab  custom  and  because  the 
46 
_  J.  G.  Lorimer,  Gazetteer  of  the  Persian  Gulf  Oman  and  Central  Arabia,  Vol.  1,  Historical,  Part  1, 
(1915),  P.  743-4. 
47 
-  See  IMBG,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  7,1920-2930,  P.  469. 
48 
-  Ibid.  P.  33  1. 
136 Chqpter  5  137 
Shaikh  of  Lingah  was  a  near  relative  of  the  Shaikbs  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah, 
they  consented  to  the  ruler  of  Lingah  exercising  administration  over  the  three 
islands.  49  After  the  extinction  of  the  Lingah  principality  from  the  Qawasim  in  1887, 
the  administration  of  the  three  islands  was  transferred  from  Lingah  to  the  Qawasim 
Coast  of  Oman,  while  Abu  Musa  was  attached  directly  to  Sharjah  and  the  Tunbs 
islands  to  Ras  al-Khaimah. 
This  administrative  division  was  maintained  when  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah 
were  temporarily  re-united  in  1900  and  when  they  became  entirely  separate  in  192  1, 
with  the  result  that  Abu  Musa  has  always  belonged  to  the  Shaikh  of  Sharjah,  and  the 
Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs  to  the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al-Khaimah.  Therefore,  although  the 
Shaikhs  of  Lingah  who  administered  the  islands  were  at  one  period  Iranian  vassals 
and  even  Iranian  officials,  this  fact  was  not  at  all  responsible  for  their  connection 
with  the  three  islands.  50  D.  W.  Lascelles  of  the  British  Foreign  Ministry  stated  in  his 
Memorandum  of  4  September  1934,  "The  Jowasimi  owned  Tamb  and  Abu  Musa 
long  before  any  of  their  number  established  themselves  on  Persian  soil;  the 
dominant  Shaikh  of  the  clan  (and  the  greater  part  of  the  clan)  never  ceased  to  reside 
on  the  Trucial  Coast;  the  rights  of  the  Lingah  Shaikhs,  which  were  in  any  case 
derived  from  their  family  connexion  and  not  from  their  position  in  Persia,  were  at  all 
times  shared  with,  and  subordinate  to,  the  rights  of  the  Shaikhs  on  the  Trucial  Coast; 
and  when  the  Lingah  Shaikhs  were  finally  driven  from  Persia,  any  shadow  of 
connexion  between  their  rights  and  Persia  went  with  them.  For  the  rest,  the 
Jowasimi  have  never  acknowledged  Persian  sovereignty  over  the  islands,  and 
49 
_  Ibid.  Vol.  9,1933-1935,  P.  277. 
'0 
-  Ibid. documentary  evidence  of  their  rights  has  been  produced  to  the  Residency  Agent  on 
the  Trucial  Coast".  51 
Since  the  Qawasim's  control  of  Lingah  in  1750,  the  Lingah  part  of  Qawasim 
continued  to  be  loyal  and  subordinate  to  the  Qawasim  of  the  coast  of  Oman,  until  the 
exit  of  the  last  Shaikh  of  Lingah  in  1887.  The  result  of  these  strong  relations 
between  the  two  parts  of  Qawasim,  was  that  when  the  inhabitants  of  Lingah  were 
harassed  by  Iranian  officials,  they  chose  to  move  to  live  in  the  coast  of  Oman.  52 
Niebuhr  mentioned  the  loyalty  of  those  Arabs  who  lived  on  the  Persian  coast:  "But  I 
cannot  pass,  in  equal  silence,  over  the  more  considerable  colonies,  which,  although 
they  are  also  settled  without  the  limits  of  Arabia,  are,  however,  nearer  to  it.  I  mean 
the  Arabs  upon  the  Southern  Coast  of  Persia,  who  are  commonly  in  alliance  with, 
and  sometimes  subject  to  the  neighbouring  Schiechs.  A  variety  of  circumstances 
concur  to  indicate,  that  these  tribes  were  settled  along  the  Persian  Gulf,  before  the 
conquests  of  the  Caliphs,  and  have  ever  preserved  their  independence".  53 
Also,  letters  between  the  Qawasim  of  Lingah  and  the  Qawasim  of  Oman  prove 
the  strong  loyalty  of  the  Lingah  Qawasim  to  the  Qawasim  of  the  coast  of  Oman. 
When  Shaikh  Ali  bin  Khalifah  began  governing  Lingah,  his  letter  of  January  1877  to 
Shaikh  Humaid  bin  Abdullah  the  governor  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  gave  assurances  that 
he  would  execute  his  demand  to  prevent  the  group  of  Busmaith  from  going  to  the 
island  of  Tunb.  54  Another  example  is  shown  in  the  letter  sent  by  Shaikh  Yusuf  bin 
Mohammed  the  governor  of  Lingah  (who  governed  Lingah  after  the  assassination  of 
Shaikh  Ali  bin  Khalifah)  on  30  March  1884  to  Shaikh  Humaid  bin  Abdullah  the 
51 
-  Ibid.  P.  277-8. 
52 
-  See  Lorimer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1,  Historical,  Part  1,  P.  745. 
-  Niebuhr,  op.  cit.,  P.  8. 
54 
_  See  this  letter  in  Chapter.  3,  PA  1. I 
governor  of  Ras  al-Khaimah.  In  his  letter  he  assured  the  loyalty  and  obedience  of  the 
Qawasim  of  Lingah  to  the  Qawasim  of  the  Coast  of  Oman.  He  said: 
I  have  received  your  letter.  Hajji  Abu  al-Qasim,  the  Residency 
Agent,  came  to  me  and  informed  me  of  your  complaint  about  the 
island  of  Tunb.  In  reality  the  island  belongs  to  you  the  Qawasirn  of 
Oman,  and  I  have  kept  my  hand  over  it,  considering  that  you  are 
agreeable  to  my  doing  so,  and  that  our  relations  with  you  are  intimate 
and  friendly.  But  now  when  you  do  not  wish  my  planting  date  offsets 
there,  and  the  going  across  of  the  Busmaithis  to  cut  grass  there,  God 
willing,  I  shall  prohibit  them  and  our  mutual  relations  are  friendly.  55 
5.3.2.  Strategic  value  of  the  islands  does  not  award  sovereignty 
No  matter  who  Iran  is  trying  to  prevent  from  controlling  the  Gulf,  the  Soviet  Union 
in  the  past  and  the  United  States  now,  this  is  not  a  sufficient  justitication  for  it  itself 
to  occupy  the  three  islands.  At  present,  the  United  States  has  a  strong  control  over 
the  Gulf  without  any  threat  to  navigation  or  national  security.  While,  on  the  contrary, 
Iran  was  a  source  of  insecurity  for  navigation  in  the  Gulf  during  the  Iran-Iraq  war 
when  it  planted  mines  for  ships.  In  addition,  during  the  eight-years  Iran-Iraq  war,  the 
Iranians  used  Abu  Musa  as  a  base  for  speed-boat  attacks  on  shipping  and  oil 
installations.  56  However,  all  this  is  denied  by  Iran,  who  maintains  that  the  attacks 
were  carried  out  by  warships  of  the  United  States  Navy,  during  a  period  when  Iran 
was  the  victim  of  a  war  imposed  upon  it  by  Iraq;  the  forces  of  that  country 
57 
subjecting  its  oil  installations  and  commercial  shipping  to  eight  years  of  attack  . 
There  is  still  insufficient  justification  for  Iran  to  appoint  itself  the  policeman  of 
the  Gulf,  ignoring  the  Arab  Gulf  States  because  of  their  military  weakness.  It  should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  Iran  owns  many  islands  at  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf,  nearer  to 
the  Strait  of  Hormuz  and  therefore  more  strategic  than  the  three  islands;  for 
55 
_  Quoted  in  Vinson  &  Elkins,  op.  cit.,  P.  3.3  1. 
56 
-  The  Times,  2  September  1992,  P.  9. 
57 
_  Dissenting  opinion  of  vice-president  Schwebel,  Oil  Plafforms  case  between  Islamic  Republic  of 
Iran  and  United  States  of  America,  ICJ  Rep.,  12  December  (1996),  P1. Chapter  5  140 
example,  Lark  island  which  is  21  miles  from  the  Strait  of  Hormuz  and  located  close 
to  the  deep  water  channels  of  the  Strait  of  Hormuz  normally  used  by  super-tankers. 
Also,  Qeshm  island  which  controls  much  of  the  entrance  to  the  Strait  of  Hormuz.  It 
is  the  biggest  island  in  the  Gulf,  and  is  located  27  miles  from  the  Strait.  Hengam 
island  is  situated  on  the  edge  of  the  deep-water  channels  of  the  Strait  of  Hormuz,  35 
miles  from  the  Strait.  58 
Furthermore,  Iran  signed  an  agreement  with  Oman  on  25  July  1974  to  delimit 
the  continental-shelf  boundary  between  two  States  from  the  eastern  part  of  the  Gulf 
through  the  Strait  of  Hormuz  to  the  Gulf  of  Oman.  In  this  agreement  the  security  of 
the  Strait  of  Hormuz  was  considered  in  determining  the  boundary.  Prior  to  signing 
the  agreement,  the  leaders  of  the  two  States  issued  a  joint  communiqu6  expressing  a 
shared  desire  for  agreements  aimed  at  maintaining  stability  in  the  region  and 
insuring  freedom  of  passage  through  the  Strait  of  Hormuz.  59  What,  then,  is  Iran's 
justification  for  occupying  the  islands? 
Geographic  proximity  is  not  a  justification  for  a  claim  of  sovereignty  over  a 
particular  region.  The  legal  study  about  the  two  Tunb  islands,  prepared  by  Vinson 
and  Elkins  for  the  government  of  Ras  a]-Khaimah,  clarifies  this  point:  "The 
geographic  factor  is  not  an  independent  basis  for  claiming  sovereignty  but  may 
under  certain  circumstances  afford  some  evidence  of  its  existence.  For  example, 
where  an  effective  display  of  sovereignty  over  some  territory  can  be  proven,  the 
geographic  factor  may  be  relevant  in  assessing  the  extent  of  the  territory  affected  by 
the  display". 
60 
"-  See  Appendix  B,  Map  2,  P.  296.  For  more  details  of  these  islands,  see  Mojtahed-Zadell,  Political 
Geography  of  ihe  Strait  of  Hourmuz,  op.  cit.,  P.  I  1-  15. 
'9-  See  UNTS,  Vol.  972,  (1975),  P.  265.  Also  see  J.  1.  Charney  and  L.  M.  Alexander,  International 
Maritime  Boundaries,  VoLl  1,  (1993),  P.  1503-15  10. 
60 
_  Vinson  &  Elkins,  op  cit.,  P.  3.112. 5 
Therefore,  geographic  proximity  does  not  give  permission  to  a  state  to  occupy  a 
part  of  another  state  because,  geographical  proximity  alone  does  not  confer 
sovereignty  over  territory.  61  For  example,  in  the  Island  of  Palmas  case,  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Netherlands,  the  United  States  argued  for  sovereignty  over 
Palmas  based  on  its  proximity  to  the  Philippines.  62  The  arbiter,  however,  rejected 
this  argument  with  the  following  rule:  "Nor  is  this  principle  of  contiguity  admissible 
as  a  legal  method  of  deciding  questions  of  territorial  sovereignty;  for  it  is  wholly 
lacking  in  precision  and  would  in  its  application  lead  to  arbitrary  results",  63  and  in 
addition  held  that  "the  title  of  contiguity,  understood  as  a  basis  of  territorial 
sovereignty,  has  no  foundation  in  international  law".  64 
Similarly,  in  the  North  Sea  Continental  Sheýf  cases  between  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  and  Denmark;  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands  in  1969,65  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands,  claimed  that  the  test  of 
appurtenance  must  be  proximity  or  more  accurately  closer  proximity:  all  those  parts 
of  the  shelf  being  considered  as  appurtenant  to  a  particular  coastal  state  if  they  are 
closer  to  it  than  they  are  to  any  point  on  the  coast  of  another  state.  However,  the 
judgment  rejected  the  argument  of  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  that  continental- 
shelf  rights  were  based  on  'proximity'  to  the  coast,  and  stated: 
More  fundamental  than  the  notion  of  proximity  appears  to  be  the 
principle-constantly  relied  upon  by  all  the  parties-of  the  natural 
prolongation  or  continuation  of  the  land  territory  or  domain,  or  land 
sovereignty  of  the  coastal  State,  into  and  under  the  high  seas,  via  the 
bed  of  its  territorial  sea  which  is  under  the  full  sovereignty  of  that 
State.  There  are  various  ways  of  formulating  this  principle,  but  the 
underlying  idea,  namely  of  an  extension  of  something  already 
"-  See  R.  Y.  Jennings,  R.  Y.,  The  Acquisition  of  Territory  in  International  Law,  (1963),  P.  74-6.  Also 
see  1.  Scobbie,  The  Spratly  Islands  Dispute:  An  Alternative  View,  OGLTR,  Vol.  5,  (1996),  P.  175. 
61 
-  RJAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  866-7. 
63 
-  Ibid.  P.  855. 
64 
_  Ibid.  P.  869, 
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-  ICJ  Rep.,  (1969),  P.  3- 
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possessed,  is  the  same,  and  it  is  this  idea  of  extension  which  is,  in  the 
Court's  opinion,  determinant.  Submarine  areas  do  not  really 
appertain  to  the  coastal  State  because-or  not  only  because-they  are 
near  it.  They  are  near  it  of  course;  but  this  would  not  suffice  to  confer 
title,  any  more  than,  according  to  a  well-established  principle  of  law 
recognized  by  both  sides  in  the  present  case,  mere  proximity  confers 
per  se  title  to  land  territory.  What  confers  the  ipso  jure  title  which 
international  law  attributes  to  the  coastal  State  in  respect  of  its 
continental  shelf,  is  the  fact  that  the  submarine  areas  concerned  may 
be  deemed  to  be  actually  part  of  the  territory  over  which  the  coastal 
State  already  has  dominion,  -in  the  sense  that,  although  covered  with 
water,  they  are  a  prolongation  or  continuation  of  that  territory,  an 
extension  of  it  under  the  sea.  From  this  would  follow  that  whenever  a 
given  submarine  area  does  not  constitute  a  natural-or  the  most 
natural-extension  of  the  land  territory  of  a  coastal  State,  even  though 
that  area  may  be  closer  to  it  than  it  is  to  the  territory  of  any  other 
State,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  appertaining  to  that  State;  -or  at  least  it 
cannot  be  so  regarded  in  the  face  of  a  competing  claim  by  a  State  of 
whose  land  territory  the  submarine  area  concerned  is  to  be  regarded 
as  a  natural  extension,  even  if  it  is  less  close  it.  66 
The  Iranian  claim  over  the  islands  because  of  their  proximity  is  not  supported 
by  any  legally  sound  argument.  Professor  Mirfendereski  concludes: 
In  international  law,  factors  or considerations  based  on  geography 
or  location,  such  as  contiguity,  security  interest,  strategic  value, 
inclusion  in,  or  proximity  to  areas  of  national  maritime  jurisdiction 
do  not  confer  title  to  an  offshore  island.  These  considerations, 
however,  like  proximity,  do  provide  a  basis  for  allotting  an  island  to 
one  state  rather  than  another,  either  by  agreement  between  the 
parties,  or  by  a  decision  not  necessarily  based  on  law.  To  thiý7  -xtent, 
therefore,  claims  to  the  Tonbs  based  solely  on  such  geographical 
factors  are  defeasible  at  law.  67 
5.4.  Conclusions 
We  conclude  that  the  Iranian  historical  argument  of  sovereignty  over  the  three 
islands  is  based  on  weak  evidence.  British  documents  showed  that  Iran  had  not 
practised  any  kind  of  sovereignty  over  the  islands  from  1750  until  the  date  of  their 
occupation.  Dr.  Mumtaz  says  "Persia  had  never  attempted  to  control  these  islands  in 
any  materialistic  way.  It  was  satisfied  to  practice  its  control  over  the  islands  from  a 
66 
-  Ibid.  P.  3  1. 
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distance,  and  in  a  relaxed  manner.  It  did  not  establish  any  body  on  the  islands  to 
guard  its  rights".  68 
As  to  the  argument  of  the  strategic  value  of  the  islands  for  Iran,  this  is  political 
not  legal.  According  to  Jennings,  a  political  claim  has  no  legal  validity  except  by 
agreement  between  the  two  states  concerned.  69 
The  last  point  which  remains  to  be  discussed,  and  on  which  Iran  builds  her 
claims,  is  the  map  of  1886,  and  the  question  of  the  validity  of  this  map  as  evidence 
for  the  acquisition  of  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands. 
68 
_  Mumtaz,  op.  cit.,  P.  59. 
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CHAPTER  SIX 
Maps  as  Evidence  of  Territorial  Sovereiqnty  in 
International  Law 
6.1.  Introduction 
Generally  maps,  whenever  produced  as  evidence,  are  of  great  importance  in 
territorial  sovereignty  disputes.  Therefore,  each  party  tries  to  present  what  maps  they 
have  to  prove  their  sovereignty  over  the  disputed  territory.  However,  the  value  of 
maps  as  evidence  is  left  to  the  court  dealing  with  the  dispute.  It  is  up  to  the  court  to 
decide  whether  to  consider  a  certain  map  or  not,  according  to  the  criteria  of  the 
technical  qualities  of  the  map  and  its  source. 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  discuss  the  extent  of  the  acceptance  by  courts 
and  arbitrations  of  maps  as  evidence  for  territorial  sovereignty,  since  the  basis  of  the 
Iranian  claim  for  the  three  islands,  Abu  Musa  and  the  Tunbs,  is  built  in  part  on  the 
1886  map  which  was  presented  to  the  Shah  in  1888  by  the  Intelligence  Branch  of  the 
British  War  Office.  This  map  shows  the  three  islands  in  the  same  colour  as  the 
Iranian  border. 
Thus,  I  will  try  in  this  chapter  to  examine  the  definition  and  classification  of 
maps.  Then  I  will  state  the  elements  of  the  evidential  value  for  maps.  Finally,  I  will 
highlight  the  evidential  value  of  official  maps,  with  emphasis  on  the  possibilities  of 
courts'  acceptance  of  maps  as  evidence  of  territorial  sovereignty. 
6.2.  The  definition  and  classification  of  maps  in  international  law 
Professor  Hyde  defined  maps  in  international  law  as  "a  portrayal  of  geographical 
facts,  and  usually  also  of  political  facts,  associated  with  thern;  for  the  cartographer 
commonly  endeavors  to  reveal  not  only  what  nature  has  wrought,  but  also  what 5 
states  have  decreed  with  respect  to  her  words".  '  This  means  that  the  cartographer 
depicts  also  the  political  entity  with  which  it  is  associated,  not  only  mountains, 
rivers,  cities  and  bays.  2 
Maps  are  in  two  classes:  private  and  official.  Private  maps  are  prepared  by  a 
private  individual  or  companies  or  non-  governmental  scientific  societies,  whereas 
official  maps  are  prepared  by  the  official  surveyor  or  cartographer  of  a  state  or  are 
maps  annexed  to  delimitation  treaties.  3 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  private  maps  cannot  be  treated  as  official  maps  in 
terms  of  their  probative  value,  and  courts  are  definitely  more  cautious  in  admitting 
maps  published  by  private  persons  than  official  maps.  4  For  example,  in  the 
Clipperton  Island  case  between  France  and  Mexico  in  193  15 
,  the  government  of  the 
Mexican  Republic  to  support  its  contention  produced  a  geographical  map  obtained 
from  the  Archives  of  the  Mexican  Society  of  Geography  and  Statistics.  The 
arbitrator  stated: 
the  official  character  of  this  map  cannot  be  affirmed,  because  it  is 
not  certain  that  it  was  drawn  by  order  and  under  the  care  of  the  state, 
or  because  the  manuscript  memorandum  which  one  reads  there, 
namely,  that  it  was  used  at  the  Royal  Tribunal  of  the  consulate  of 
Mexico,  does  not  confer  official  character  upon  it.  6 
'-  C.  C.  Hyde,  Maps  as  Evidence  in  International  Boundary  Disputes,  AJIL,  Vol.  27,  (1933),  P.  31  L 
2_  Ibid. 
'-  S.  Akweenda,  The  Legal  Significance  of  Maps  in  Boundary  Questions:  A  Reappraisal  with 
Particular  Emphasis  on  Namibia,  BYbIL,  Vol.  60,  (1989),  P.  206.  See  the  same  writer,  International 
Law  and  the  Protection  of  Namibia's  Territorial  Integrity:  Boundaries  and  Territorial  Claims, 
Unpublished  Thesis,  Vol.  1,  (1989),  P.  219.  Also  F.  A.  Taha,  al-Qanwn  al-Dwly  wa  Mnazainl  ul-I-Idud 
(International  Law  and  Boundary  Disputes),  (1983),  P.  13  5. 
4 
-  Akweenda,  op.  cit.,  BYbIL,  Vol.  60,  (1989),  P.  219.  Also  see  G.  Ress,  The  Delimitation  and 
Demarcation  of  Frontiers  in  International  Treaties  and  Maps,  Thesaurus  Acroasium,  Vol.  XIV,  (1985), 
P.  419. 
5-  V.  Emmanuel,  Judicial  Decisions  Involving  Questions  of  International  Law:  France-Mexico,  AJIL, 
Vol.  26,  (1932),  P.  390. 
6_  Ibid.  P.  393. Similarly,  in  the  Island  of  Timor  arbitration  between  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal  in 
1913,  Charles  Lardy,  who  acted  as  sole  Arbitrator  of  the  Permanent  Court  of 
Arbitration,  stated  that  a  private  map  "could  not  be  weighed  in  value  with  the  two 
official  maps  signed  by  the  commissioners  or  delegates  of  the  two  states".  7 
6.3.  The  criteria  ofprobative  value  of  maps  in  international  law 
No  matter  what  kind  of  maps  Iran  is  presenting,  whether  official  or  non-official,  the 
fundamental  criteria  of  cartography  must  be  observed  for  any  map  to  be  considered 
as  evidence  in  the  territorial  dispute.  Professor  Brownlie  points  out  that  the  validity 
of  private  or  official  maps  depends  on  their  technical  qualities;  therefore,  "a 
privately  published  map  may  have  as  much  significance  as  an  official  map  if  its 
8 
technical  quality  is high" 
. 
6.3.1.  The  technical  qualities  of  maps 
The  technical  quality  of  a  map  should  be  that  natural  and  political  facts  are  recorded 
in  a  clear  and  precise  way,  according  to  surveying  operations.  Therefore,  the 
cartographer  must  combine  a  high  degree  of  geographic  skill  with  an  unusual 
competence  in  deciphering  political  documents.  9 
Undoubtedly,  at  the  present  time,  the  photographs  and  maps  of  an  aerial  survey 
may  register  an  exact  portrayal  of  the  utmost  value  to  a  commission  or  a  tribunal 
burdened  with  the  task  of  ascertaining  the  location  of  the  boundary.  10  However, 
most  maps  used  as  proofs  in  territorial  disputes  were  made  before  the  times  of  aerial 
survey  techniques.  As  Professor  Hyde  says: 
Until  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  cartographers 
lacked  reliable  geographical  data  concerning  many  features  of  the 
7 
-  Ibid.  Vol.  9,  (1915),  P.  240  at  P.  259. 
8-  See  1.  Brownlie,  African  Boundaries:  A  Legal  and  Diplomatic  Encyclopaedia,  (1979),  P.  5. 
9  fore  International  Tribunals,  (1975),  11.372-3. 
-  D.  V.  Sandifer,  Evidence  Be 
10 
-  See  Akweenda,  op.  cit.,  BYbIL,  Vol.  60,  (1989),  P.  207-8 6 
Western  Hemisphere.  As  those  features  sometimes  formed  the  bases 
on  which  states  proceeded  to  act  in  establishing  boundaries,  the  early 
map-makers  not  infrequently  proved  to  be  bad  blunderers  when  they 
undertook  to  depict  the  territorial  limits  of  particular  countries. 
Ignorance  of  essential  topographical  facts  occasionally  led  the 
geographers  to  locate  mountains  or  rivers  in  fantastic  positions  that 
nature  herself  had  avoided,  or  to  assign  to  them  names  by  which  they 
were  not  commonly  or  locally  known.  " 
For  example,  in  the  Palmas  Island  case  between  the  United  States  and  Netherlands 
Judge  Max  Huber  defined  technical  precision  as  the  first  condition  to  accept  a  map 
as  evidence.  He  said:  "The  first  condition  required  of  maps  that  are  to  serve  as 
evidence  on  points  of  law  is  their  geographical  accuracy".  12 
Again  in  the  Taba  award  between  Egypt  and  Israel  in  1988,  Egypt 
systematically  derived  information  concerning  coordinates,  elevation,  and  distances 
regarding  its  disputed  pillar  locations  to  the  west  of  Wadi  Taba  from  its  1935-38 
map  of  the  Sinai.  The  Tribunal  did  not  consider  these  map-based  indications  to  be 
conclusive  "since  the  scale  of  the  map  (1:  100,000)  is  too  small  to  demonstrate  a 
location  on  the  ground  as  exactly  as  required  in  these  instances  where  the  distances 
between  disputed  pillar  locations  are  sometimes  only  of  a  few  metres".  13 
6.3.2.  Compatibility  of  maps  with  reality  and  their  sources 
A  map,  to  be  of  probative  value,  must  not  contradict  proven  facts.  It  must  not 
contradict  official  documents  acquired  by  the  court.  Any  information  put  on  a  map 
from  hearsay  sources  and  not  at  first  hand  also  discredits  it  as  evidence.  Any 
information  taken  from  another  map  of  unknown  source  is  a  reason  for  discrediting  a 
map.  As  Sandifer  says:  "Maps  when  they  have  no  conventional  or  statutory 
47 
11 
-  Hyde,  op.  cit.,  P.  311-2. 
12 
-  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  853. 
"-  ILM,  Vol.  27,  (1988),  P.  1472.  Also  I  LR,  Vol.  80,  (1989),  P.  287. 6 
significance,  should  be  regarded  merely  as  representing  the  opinions  of  the  persons 
who  constructed  them".  14 
In  the  Palmas  Island  case,  Judge  Huber  stated  that:  "If  the  Arbitrator  is  satisfied 
as  to  the  existence  of  legally  relevant  facts  which  contradict  the  statements  of 
cartographers  whose  sources  of  information  are  not  known,  he  can  attach  no  weight 
to  the  maps,  however  numerous  and  generally  appreciated  they  may  be".  15 
Weissberg  also  rightly  says:  "Such  a  tendency  has  been  particularly  noticeable 
whenever  the  map  describes  territory  of  which  the  authors  have  had  little 
knowledge,  is  geographically  inaccurate,  or  is  sketched  in  order  to  promote  a 
country's  claim".  16 
The  best  example  in  which  the  cartographic  documentation  had  assumed 
'unaccustomed  proportions'  is  the  Frontier  Dispute  case  between  Burkina  Faso  and 
Mali  in  1986.17  The  two  disputant  parties  produced  a  considerable  body  of  maps, 
sketches  and  drawings  of  the  disputed  frontier.  The  Chamber  found  that  none  of 
these  maps  was  annexed,  referred  to  or  even  enclosed  in  the  administrative 
document  which  the  Chamber  had  to  interpret,  therefore,  it  stated  that  it  had  adopted 
"special  vigilance  from  the  outset  when  examining  the  file  of  maps".  18  The  law  of  4 
September  1947  'for  the  re-establishment  of  the  territory  of  Upper  Volta  (Burkina 
Faso)',  made  no  reference  to  any  map;  all  it  contained  was  a  reference  in  general 
terms  to  the  boundaries  'of  the  former  colony  ...  on  5  September  1932'.  19  Neither  of 
the  two  disputant  parties  had  been  able  to  identify  the  map,  if  there  was  one,  which 
"-  See  Sandifer,  op.  cit.,  P.  236. 
15 
-  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  853. 
16 
-  G.  Weissberg,  Maps  as  Evidence  in  International  Boundary  Disputes,  AJIL,  Vol.  57,  (1963), 
P.  78  1. 
17  ICJ  Rep.,  (1986),  P.  554.  Also  ILR,  Vol.  80,111.44  1. 
Ibid.  P.  584. 
19 
Ibid.  P.  583. 
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was  used  by  the  French  law-makers  in  1947  in  order  to  obtain  a  clearer  picture  of 
those  boundaries.  20  With  respect  to  a  certain  French  order  2336  of  1927  and  its 
erratum,  Mali  had  produced  a  map  bearing  the  inscription  'New  frontier  of  Upper 
Volta  and  Niger  (according  to  the  erraturn  of  5  October  1927  to  the  order  dated  31 
August  1927)';  however,  the  Chamber  stated:  "that  map  offers  no  information  as  to 
which  official  body  compiled  it  or  which  administrative  authority  approved  the  line 
shown  on  it".  2'  The  official  map  that  was  annexed  to  letter  191  CM2  from  the 
Governor-General  of  French  West  Africa  dated  19  February  1935,  was  found  to  be 
missing.  Finally,  a  French  order  2728  AP  of  27  November  1935  defined  the 
boundaries  of  the  cercle  of  Mopti  'as  transcribed  on  the  maps  annexed'  thereto,  but 
here  again  the  parties  had  been  unable  to  find  the  maps  in  question.  The  Chamber  in 
this  case  concluded  that: 
Not  a  single  map  available  to  the  Chamber  can  reliably  be  said  to 
reflect  the  intentions  of  the  colonial  administration  expressed  in  the 
relevant  texts  concerning  the  disputed  frontier. 
... 
Thus  the  Chamber 
is  confronted  with  an  unusual  situation  which  does  not  ease  its 
burden.  It  has  no  map  available  to  it  which  can  provide  a  direct 
official  illustration  of  the  words  contained  in  the  four  texts  already 
mentioned,  which  are  essential  to  the  case,  even  though  their  authors 
had  intended  two  of  these  texts  to  be  accompanied  by  such  maps.  22 
Of  all  the  maps  produced  by  the  parties,  two  appear  to  be  of  special  overall 
significance,  as  the  parties  devoted  much  attention  to  them.  Burkina  Faso,  in 
particular,  had  referred  expressly  to  them  in  its  submission.  These  were  a  1:  500,000 
scale  map  of  the  colonies  of  French  West  Africa,  1925  edition,  compiled  by  the 
Geographical  Service  of  French  West  Africa  at  Dakar  and  printed  in  Paris  by 
Blondel  la  Rougery;  and  the  1:  200,000  scale  map  of  West  Africa,  issued  by  the 
149 
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French  Institut  G6ographique  National,  which  was  originally  published  between 
1958  and  1960.  The  IGN  submitted  a  Note  to  the  Chamber  explaining  the 
delimitation  depicted  on  these  two  maps.  According  to  that  note,  tile  1:  200,000  maps 
of  the  Mali/Burkina  Faso  frontier  had  been  surveyed  before  the  two  states  became 
independent.  The  note  give  the  following  explanation  of  how  the  frontiers  were 
recorded  on  those  maps: 
Then,  with  the  help  of  the  texts,  the  cartographers  tried  to  locate 
the  frontier  in  relation  to  the  map  base.  Unfortunately,  the  inaccuracy 
of  the  texts  made  it  impossible  to  draw  a  sufficiently  reliable 
boundary  in  certain  areas.  Some  names  quoted  in  the  texts  could  not 
be  found,  others  referred  to  villages  which  had  disappeared  or  been 
moved,  or  again  the  actual  nature  of  the  terrain  (course  of  rivers, 
position  of  mountains)  appeared  different  from  that  described  in  the 
former  itinerary  surveys. 
The  actual  frontier  was,  therefore,  recorded  in  the  light  of 
information  supplied  by  the  heads  of  the  frontier  districts  and 
according  to  information  gathered  on  the  spot  from  the  village  chiefs 
13  and  local  people  . 
From  this  text  the  Chamber  drew  a  conclusion  that  the  IGN  which  compiled  the  map 
was  'a  body  neutral  towards  the  parties'  to  the  dispute.  Referring  specifically  to  the 
1:  200,000  scale  map,  it  stated  that  "although  it  does  not  possess  the  status  ofa  legal 
title,  is  a  visual  portrayal  both  of  the  available  texts  and  of  informatiori  obtained  oil 
,  24  the  ground'  . 
However,  it  warned  that  observation  was  not  sufficient  to  permit  it  to 
infier  that  the  boundary  depicted  in  successive  editions  of  the  IGN  map  correspoilded 
entirely  with  the  boundary  iiiherited  from  the  colonial  administration.  It  had  to 
consider  how  Ear  the  evidence  offered  by  this  or  any  rnap  corroborated  the  other 
evidence  produced.  The  Chamber  ruled  that  it: 
cannot  uphold  the  information  given  by  the  map  where  it  is 
contradicted  by  other  trustworthy  information  coricerimig  the 
intentions  of  the  colonial  power.  However,  having  regard  to  the  date 
on  which  the  surveys  were  made  and  the  iieLitrality  of  the  source,  the 
Ibid.  P.  584-6. 
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Chamber  considers  that  where  all  other  evidence  is lacking,  or  is  not 
sufficient  to  show  an  exact  line,  the  probative  value  of  the  IGN  map 
becomes  decisive.  25 
Another  example,  in  the  Minquiers  cind  Eci-ehos  case  between  France  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  26  Judge  Levi  Carneiro,  in  his  individual  opinion,  declined  to  take 
the  evidence  of  maps  into  consideration.  The  issue  in  this  case  was  sovereignty  over 
a  group  of  islets  called  the  Minquiers  and  the  Ecrehos.  The  United  Kingdom  cited 
the  1905  and  1932  editions  of  the  map  drawn  by  Stieler,  which  depicted  the  disputed 
islets  as  British  territory.  The  French  Agent,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  several 
other  maps  during  the  oral  arguments,  some  of  which  showed  the  Ecrehos  as  British 
but  made  no  reference  to  the  Minquiers.  Other  maps  submitted  by  France  omitted 
both  groups  of  islets  or,  in  some  cases,  showed  the  Ecrehos  as  falling  outside  British 
sovereignty.  Judge  Carneiro  remarked  that  "the  evidence  supplied  by  inaps  ...  is  not 
always  decisive  in  the  settlement  of  legal  questions  relating  to  territorial 
sovereignty",  27  but  he  added  that  maps,  "may,  however,  constitute  proof  ofthe  fact 
that  the  occupation  or  exercise  of  sovereignty  was  well  known".  28  In  view  of  the 
conflicts  in  the  maps  submitted  by  the  parties,  Judge  Carneiro  observed  that  "a 
searching  and  specialized  study  would  be  required  in  order  to  decide  which  of'  the 
contending  views  in  respect  of  maps  should  prevail.  At  any  rate,  maps  do  not 
constitute  a  sufficiently  important  contribution  to  enable  a  decision  to  be  based  on 
them"  . 
29  For  these  reasons,  Judge  Carneiro  concluded  that  he  could  not  take  the 
evidence  ofmaps  into  consideration.  30 
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6.4.  The  prohative  value  of  official  maps  in  international  law 
In  my  opinion,  official  maps  may  be  of  two  kinds  to  be  of  probative  value  in 
establishing  the  sovereignty  over  a  territory  before  a  court  or  arbitration.  The  first 
category  contains  maps  annexed  to  treaties,  and  the  second  maps  published  by 
governments. 
6.4.1.  Maps  annexed  to  territorial  treaties 
Maps  are  often  annexed  to  territorial  treaties,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  course  of  the 
boundary.  Therefore,  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  maps  which  are  annexed 
to  treaties  and  stipulated  to  be  part  of  these  treaties  on  the  one  hand,  and  maps  which 
are  annexed  to  treaties  but  which  are  not  stipulated  as  parts  of  the  treaties  on  the 
other  hand. 
The  first  category  of  map  has  the  same  legal  force  as  the  agreement,  and 
therefore,  impose  obligations  on  the  parties.  31  This  opinion  was  expressly 
recognised  in  the  Frontier  land  case  between  Belgium  and  Netherlands.  32  Article  33 
ofthe  Convention  between  Belgium  and  Netherlands  in  1843,  provided: 
The  descriptive  minute,  the  detailed  survey  maps  and 
topographical  maps,  scale  1/10,000 
,  prepared  and  signed  by  the 
Commissioners,  shall  remain  annexed  to  the  present  Convention  and 
shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  though  they  were  inserted  in 
their  entirety.  33 
Another  example  was  M  issue  in  the  treaty  determining  the  bOLIndary  betwecri 
Ethiopia  and  Kenya  in  1970,  Article  2  of  which  provides: 
The  boundary  line  referred  to  in  Article  I  above  is  also  delineated 
on  the  series  of  thirty  (30)  maps  (hereinafter  rct'erred  to  as  the 
Boundary  Commission  Maps)  published  as  Series  SK  73)  by  the 
"I  -iter,  The  International  Le  a]  Aspects  of'  The  --  Talia,  op.  cit.,  P.  136.  Also  see  the  same  wi  E9 
Boundaries  of  The  Sudan  with  Ethiopia  and  Kenya,  I  hipublislied  Thesis,  Vol.  ],  (  197-3),  11.174. 
32 3_  Cj  Rep.,  (1959),  P.  209. 
-  Ibid.  P.  215. Chanter  6 
Survey  of  Kenya  in  1970  which  maps  shall  form  an  integral  part  of 
the  present  Treaty.  34 
In  cases  where  maps  are  integral  parts  of  treaties,  the  question  often  arises  as  to  how 
the  discrepancies  or  contradictions  between  the  treaty  and  the  maps  is  solved.  In 
principle,  there  should  be  an  article  of  the  treaty  stating  how  to  deal  with  this 
conflict.  35  Some  treaties  state  clearly  that  the  text  should  prevail,  for  example,  the 
Protocol  defining  the  Boundary  between  French  Equatorial  Africa  and  Anglo- 
Egyptian  Sudan  in  1924,  provided: 
In  cases  where  the  details  of  the  map  do  not  appear  to  correspond 
exactly  with  the  wording  of  the  protocol  it  is  the  wording  of  the 
protocol  which  must  be  strictly  followed.  36 
On  the  other  hand,  other  treaties  state  that  in  case  of  conflict  between  text  and  maps, 
the  maps  prevail.  The  Agreement  of  the  Demarcation  Boundary  between  Nigeria  and 
Cameroon  in  19131,  provided  in  Article  21: 
In  case  the  above  description  of  the  boundary  does  not  agree 
exactly  with  the  boundary  as  shown  on  the  maps  accompanying  the 
present  Agreement,  and  which  are  regarded  as  forming  an  integral 
part  thereof,  it  is  expressly  understood  that  the  position  of  the 
boundary  as  shown  on  the  maps  shall  decide  any  dispute.  37 
If,  however,  the  treaty  is  silent  on  the  issue  of  how  to  solve  any  contradiction 
between  the  text  and  the  maps,  there  is  no  general  rule  to  decide  how  such  a  conflict 
38 
should  be  solved.  However,  some  authors  and  judges  argue  that  it  is  often  the 
treaty  rather  than  the  map  which  is  followed,  39  and  they  rel'cr  to  Article  29  of  the 
Peace  Treaty  of  Versailles  in  1919  as  having  clearly  identified  the  boundaries  of 
Brownlie,  op.  cit.,  P.  792. 
35  See  Akweenda,  op.  cit.,  BYbIL,  Vol.  60,  (1989),  P.  21  1.  Also  Talia,  op.  cit.,  11.138. 
36  -  UKTS,  No.  28,  (1924),  Cind.  222  1.  See  also  Brownlie,  op.  cit.,  11.636, 
37 
-  See  Brownlie,  op.  cit.,  P.  564. 
See  Oppenheim's,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  1,  (1992),  11.663. 
39  of  Judge  Moreno  Quintana,  10  Rep.,  (1962),  P.  70.  Also  D.  1  1.  Johnson,  The  Separate  opi  i  t, 
Case  Coliccriling  the  Temple  of  Preah  Vihear,  ICTQ,  Vol.  11,  (  1962),  11.1203. Chavier  6 
Germany  on  the  map,  namely  those  'drawn  in  red  on  a  one-in-a-million  map'  which 
was  annexed  to  the  Peace  Treaty.  This  Article  provides  that:  "in  the  case  of  any 
discrepancies  between  the  text  of  the  Treaty  and  this  rnap  or  any  other  map  which 
may  be  annexed,  the  text  will  be  final".  40 
The  correct  position  was  stated  by  Judge  Fitzi-naurice  in  the  Temple  qf'Preah 
Vihear  case  between  Cambodia  and  Thailand  in  1962,41  when  the  Court  was  faced 
with  the  proposition  that  the  map  should  prevail: 
There  is  of  course  no  general  rule  whatever  requiring  that  a 
conflict  of  this  kind  should  be  resolved  in  favour  of  the  map  line,  and 
there  have  been  plenty  of  cases  .....  where  it  has  not  been,  even 
though  the  map  was  one  of  the  instruments  forming  part  of  the  whole 
treaty  settlement  (as  here),  and  not  a  mere  published  sheet  or  atlas 
page-in  which  case  it  would,  in  itself,  have  no  binding  character  for 
the  parties.  The  question  is  one  that  must  always  depend  on  the 
interpretation  of  the  treaty  settlement,  considered  as  a  whole,  in  the 
42  light  of  the  circumstances  in  which  it  was  arrived  at  . 
It  is  possible  to  say  that  there  is  no  general  rule  to  state  clearly  how  to  settle  the 
conflict.  But,  according  to  normal  rules  of  interpreting  treaties,  the  conflict  between 
the  treaty  and  the  map  should  be  settled  by  accepting  the  treaty  rather  than  the 
43 
map. 
In  the  second  category  where  maps  are  annexed  to  a  treaty  but  do  not  form  an 
integral  part  of  it,  such  maps  are  considered  of  less  significance.  In  this  case,  maps 
are  simply  used  to  clarify  and  illustrate  the  treaty  and  are,  therefore,  of'  less  authority 
than  the  treaty.  In  a  case  of  discrepancies  between  the  treaty  and  a  map  ofthis  kind, 
the  map  cannot  override  the  treaty.  44 
40  BFSP,  Vol.  112,  (1919),  P.  27. 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1962),  P.  6. 
42 
Ibid.  P.  65-6. 
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For  example,  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  had  to  consider  such 
a  case  in  its  advisory  opinion  concerning  the  Delimitation  of  the  Polish- 
Czechoslovakian  Frontier  (Queslion  (#'JaivorZina);  here  it  was  called  upon  to 
construe  the  decision  of  the  Conference  of  Ambassadors  of  28  July  1920,  defining 
the  boundary,  to  which  were  annexed  two  maps  on  which  the  boundary  was  marked. 
The  Court  did  not  regard  maps  of  even  such  primary  importance  as  decisive,  but 
said: 
It  is  true  that  the  maps  and  their  tables  of  explanatory  signs  cannot 
be  regarded  as  conclusive  proof,  independently  of  the  text  of  the 
treaties  and  decisions;  but  in  the  present  case  they  confirm  in  a 
singularly  convincing  manner  the  conclusions  drawn  from  the 
documents  and  from  a  legal  analysis  of  them;  and  they  are  certainly 
not  contradicted  by  any  document.  45 
It  is  noted  that  a  map  which  is  attached  to  a  treaty,  without  mentioning  that  it  is  a 
part  of  the  treaty,  is  merely  for  clarifying  the  treaty  without  binding  any  of  the 
parties.  The  question  is,  would  it  be  considered  a  legal  proof  if  all  the  parties  ofthe 
treaty  applied  it  despite  being  in  contradiction  with  the  text  of  the  treaty? 
In  cases  where  maps  were  not  inseparable  parts  ofthe  treaties  at  issue  and  thus 
not  binding  on  the  parties,  they  can  become  binding  as  a  result  of  the  subsequent 
conduct  of  the  disputing  parties.  For  example,  in  the  Temple  of'Preah  Vihear  case 
between  Cambodia  and  Thailand  (1962),  46  Cambodia  alleged  a  violation  on  the  part 
of  Thailand  of  its  territorial  sovereignty  over  the  regiori  of  the  Temple  of'  Preah 
Vihear  and  its  precincts.  Thailand  replied  by  affirming  that  the  area  in  qLICStion  was 
situated  on  the  Thai  side  of  the  common  boundary  between  the  two  countrics,  and 
was  under  its  sovereignty. 
45 
-  l>C  1  J,  Sei-.  B,  N  o.  8,11.3  3. 
46 
-  ICJ  Rep.,  (1962),  11.6. el, 
The  boundary  of  the  area  tinder  discussion  was  laid  down  in  a  settlement  made 
in  the  period  1904-1908,  between  France  (the  protecting  Power  over  Cambodia  until 
the  latter's  independence  in  1954)  and  Slam  (as  Thailand  was  then  called).  The 
sovereignty  over  Preah  Vihear  depended  on  the  Treaty  of  13  February  1904,  and 
upon  events  subsequent  to  that  date.  47  However,  the  exact  course  of  the  boundary 
was,  by  virtue  of  Article  3  of  this  Treaty,  to  be  delimited  by  a  Franco-Siamese 
Mixed  Commission.  The  Commission  surveyed  the  Dangrek  range  of  mountains,  in 
which  the  Temple  is  situated.  It  prepared  various  maps.  At  that  time,  the  Siamese 
Government  did  not  possess  adequate  means  for  the  preparation  and  publication  of 
maps,  therefore  it  had  officially  requested  French  topographical  officers  to  map  the 
region.  The  maps  were  printed  and  published  by  a  well-known  French  cartographical 
firm,  H.  Barrere.  But,  before  they  were  published,  another  boundary  Treaty  was 
signed  on  23  March  1907.  The  task  of  delimiting  the  region  under  discussion  was 
subsequently  given  to  a  Second  Mixed  Commission  set  up  under  the  Treaty  of  1907. 
Eleven  maps  were  in  due  course  cornmunicated  to  the  Siamese  Government,  as 
being  those  it  had  requested.  Amongst  them  was  one  of  that  part  of  the  Dangrek 
range  in  which  the  Temple  is  situated,  and  on  It  was  depicted  a  boundary  purporting 
to  be  the  outcome  of  the  work  of  the  delimitation  and  showing  the  whole  Preah 
Vihear  promontory,  including  the  Temple  area,  as  being  on  the  Cambodian  side. 
This  map  was  filed  by  Cambodia  as  Annex  I  to  its  Memorial.  48 
Cambodia  relied  principally  on  this  Annex  I  map  in  support  of  its  claim  to 
sovereignty  over  the  Temple.  Thailand,  on  the  other  hand,  contested  any  clairn  based 
on  the  map  on  the  grounds  that  the  map  was  not  the  work  ofthc  Mixed  Commission 
. 47 
Ibid.  P.  16. 
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and  had,  therefore,  no  binding  character  and  also  that  at  Preah  Vihear  the  map 
embodied  a  material  error. 
49 
The  Court  accepted  the  first  contention,  since  the  record  did  not  show  whether 
the  rnap  was  based  on  any  decisions  or  instructions  given  by  the  Commission  to  the 
surveying  officers  while  it  was  still  ftinctioning.  However,  the  Court  maintained  that 
there  could  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  the  map  was  based  on  the  work  of  the 
surveying  officers  in  the  Dangrek  sector. 
The  Court,  nevertheless,  found  the  Siamese  had  received  and  accepted  the  map. 
Therefore,  it  rejected  Thailand's  argument  as  follows: 
It  is  an  established  rule  of  law  that  the  plea  of  error  cannot  be 
allowed  as  an  element  vitiating  consent  if  the  party  advancing  it 
contributed  by  its  own  conduct  to  the  error,  or  could  have  avoided  it, 
or  if  the  circumstances  were  such  as  to  put  that  party  on  notice  of  a 
possible  error.  The  Court  considers  that  the  character  and 
qualifications  of  the  persons  who  saw  the  Annex  I  map  on  the 
Siamese  side  would  alone  make  it  difficult  for  Thailand  to  plead 
error  in  law.  These  persons  included  the  members  of  the  very 
Commission  of  Delimitation  within  whose  competence  this  sector  of' 
the  frontier  had  lain.  50 
It  is  clear  from  the  Temple  case  that  acquiescence  of  the  parties  of  the  dispute  by 
applying  the  map  to  the  text  of  tne  treaty  made  it  obligatory  to  the  parties  of'  the 
dispute.  The  question  which  now  arises  is,  if  the  map  was  not  annexed  to  the  treaty 
between  the  disputing  parties  but  was  issued  from  a  official  authority,  would  such  a 
map  be  obligatory  for  the  other  party? 
6.4.2.  Maps  published  by,  governments 
This  category  of  map  IS  iSSLied  by  oft-icial  departments  of'  a  country  1-01'  VM'IOLIS 
reasons.  It  is  usually  one  ofa  series  of  inaps  or  a  page  in  an  official  atlas.  ý'  SLICII  a 
map  reflects  a  government's  views  of'  its  bOLIndarics  with  other  IlClghbOffing 
19 
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countries.  An  official  map  is  produced  according  to  the  sole  will  ofthe  government 
without  coordination  with  other  concerned  parties.  52  There  is  no  legal  rule  to  say 
that  this  kind  of  map  can  bind  other  countries  which  are  ostensibly  affected  by  the 
information  stated  on  it 
. 
53 
In  his  appraisal  of  the  evidentiary  value  of  maps  in  international  boundary 
disputes,  Professor  Hyde  said  that  a  map  published  by  a  state  or  under  its  auspices 
and  which  it  was  disposed  to  use  as  a  means  of  publicly  revealing  its  position,  might 
be  fairly  accepted  as  establishing  that,  when  issued,  it  represented  what  that  state 
deemed  to  be  the  limits  of  its  domain.  He  also  said  that  when  a  series  of  official 
maps  kept  on  telling  the  same  story  and  substantially  depicting  the  same  limits,  it 
might  be  justifiably  concluded  that: 
they  mark  a  frontier  beyond  which  the  interested  state  cannot  go 
without  some  fresh  and  definite  and  respectable  process  of 
acquisition...  Thus,  in  the  course  of  a  boundary  arbitration  the  most 
obvious  function  of  an  official  map  issued  under  the  auspices  of  a 
particular  litigant  may  be  that  of  holding  that  litigant  in  leash 
. 
54 
While  MacGibbon  says  that  tribunals  do  not  give  great  importance  to  territorial 
claims  based  on  maps,  he  is  of  the  opinion  that  "Failure  to  protest  against  such  a 
claim  has  been  relied  on  as  a  recognition  of  its  validity".  -5 
In  the  Rann  ql*Kutch  case  between  India  and  Pakistau  in  196  856 
, 
India  relied 
heavily  on  surveys  and  maps,  which  were  published  by  the  survey  of  Iridia  froin 
1907  onward  with  increasing  frequency.  In  the  words  of'  the  Counsel  for  Pakistari, 
52 
_  M.  S.  Abdul  Rahman,  aI-Jwanb  al-()(immiah  Llswial  Nzainal  al-lhlwd  al-I)waliah  (The  Legal 
Aspects  of  Solving  International  Boundary  Disputes),  (  1994),  P.  287. 
53-  See  Talia,  al-Qamm,  op.  cit.,  P.  140. 
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-I  lyde,  op.  cit.,  P.  3  15. 
55 
_  I.  C.  Mac(;  ibbon,  The  Scope  of'  Acquiescence  in  International  Law,  13Ybll,,  Vol.  31,  (1954), 
P.  180-  1. 
5(, 
-  ILR,  Vol.  50,11.2. Chgpler  6 
India  had  based  practically  its  'entire  case  on  maps.  57  India  claimed  that  the  maps 
'establish  affirmatively'  or  they  'substantiate'  or  'indicate'  where  the  boundary  was, 
while  the  Surveys  could  'determine'  a  boundary,  in  the  sense,  explained  in  oral 
argurnent,  of  'presenting  pictorially'  and  thereby  'defining'  an  existing  boundary.  ý8 
Pakistan,  on  the  other  hand,  claimed  that  it  had  produced  maps  mainly  to 
dernonstrate  that  the  evidence  derived  from  the  maps  on  which  India  relied  was  not 
free  from  error.  '9  The  Chairman  of  the  Commission  concluded: 
They  form  the  third  and  most  convincing  ground  of  India's  case. 
These  maps  were  published  by  the  Survey  of  India  from  1907 
onwards  with  increasing  frequency.  In  the  course  of  time,  such  a 
coterminous  boundary  appears  to  have  become  a  constant  feature  on 
all  maps  produced  by  that  Department  for  the  variety  of  purposes  that 
maps  are  intended  to  serve.  They  were  also  widely  distributed,  and  to 
the  highest  British  authorities  ..... 
When,  however,  the  true  extension 
of  sovereignty  over  a  territory  becomes  the  subject  of  investigation 
and  inquiry,  and  especially  of  an  exhaustive  judicial  inquiry,  the 
evidentiary  value  of  the  maps  was  lessened  as  far  as  the  relevant 
boundaries  were  concerned,  and  they  were  made  to  yield  to  evidence 
of  superior  weight,  particularly  evidence  of  the  exercise  of' 
jurisdiction.  60 
It  is  possible  to  say  that  a  mistake  in  a  formal  map  issued  by  the  government  when  it 
is  a  party  in  the  dispute  is  not  impossible.  But  if  the  map  was  issued  by  a  party 
unrelated  to  the  dispute  and  if  it  is  subsequently  shown  that  there  is  a  inistake  in  the 
map,  would  such  a  map  be  legal  evidence  to  acquire  the  disputed  territory'? 
6.5.  The  map  of  1886  as  evidence  to  allocate  sovereignty  over  the 
three  is/ands 
In  the  sovereignty  dispute  between  Iran  and  UAE,  Iran  claims  sovereignty  over  the 
three  islands  AbLi  MLIsa  and  Tunbs  on  the  basis  of'  a  number  of  official  arid  scini- 
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official  British  inaps  published  since  1770,61  which  indicate  by  colour  that  the 
islands  were  Iranian  territory.  Iran's  sovereignty  claim  to  the  islands  is  particularly 
based  on  the  'Map  of  Persia'  which  was  prepared  in  1886  by  the  Intelligence  Branch 
of  the  British  War  Office.  62  This  is  a  map  of  Persia  in  six  sheets,  drawn  to  a  scale  of' 
1:  16  miles,  which  bears  the  Intelligence  Branch  Reference  No.  597.  Sheet  5 
illustrates  the  eastern  end  of  the  Gulf  and  shows  the  northern  (Iran)  coast  outlined  in 
red.  The  southern  (UAE)  coast  is  not  coloured.  The  three  islands  are  coloured  red  . 
63 
A  copy  of  this  map  was  presented  to  Nasir  al-Din  Shah  as  a  gift  by  the  British 
Minister  in  Tehran  during  the  summer  of  1888  on  the  instruction  of  British  Foreigri 
Secretary  Lord  Salisbury. 
6.5.1.  The  technical  qualities,  reality  and  sources  of  the  map  of  1886 
The  map  was  printed  in  1886  when  modern  cartography  and  aerial  photography  were 
unknown.  The  cartographers  were  also  ignorant  of  the  borders  between  the  states 
and  disputes  concerning  them.  Maps  as  old  as  this  have  often  included  mistakes.  64 
In  addition,  the  compatibility  of'  the  map  of'  1886  with  reality  and  its  sources 
should  be  questioned.  First,  the  1886  British  War  Office  map  was  derived  1'rorn  an 
earlier  map  prepared  in  1876  entitled  'Persia'  65  compiled  by  Captain  O.  B.  C.  St.  John 
(Royal  Engineers).  The  map  was  drawn  to  a  scale  of'  1:  16  miles  on  24  sheets  and 
61 
-  See  SCOR,  26  year,  16  10  the  Meetin,,:  9  December  197  1,  P.  18. 
62 
_  See  The  Three  Iranian  Islands  in  the  Persian  Gult',  MFQ  (Center  for  Scientific  Research  and 
Middle  East  Strategic  Studies),  Vol.  ],  No.  2,  Fall  1994.  Also  D.  H.  Bavand,  lrm's  Sovercý,  ýwi,  ovcr 
the  lslai7dy  ofTumb  cind  Abu  Mzis(i,  (  1994),  11.58.  Also  R.  Schorield,  Borders  and  Territoriality  in  the 
Gulf'  and  the  Arabian  Peninsula  during  tile  Twentieth  Century,  Terriloritil  Follml(ItIons  (?  f  the  (;  11ý/ 
Stwes,  ed.  R.  Schofield,  (1994),  P.  35. 
See  this  inap  in  The  British  Library  at  Slieffmark  No.  50970  (41)  and  in  the  Oriental  and  India 
Office  Collections  at  Shelf  mark  No.  WATS/2  I  /B  10/  106.  Also  see  Appendix  B,  Map  4,11.298. 
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o"  the  Dispute  over  the  Guýflshm(A,  (1993),  11.50. 
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published  at  Stanfords  Geographical  Establishment  at  Charing  Cross,  London.  The 
map  was  neither  coloured  nor  dated.  Generally  speakino,  islands  in  the  Gulf  were  Lý 
66  delineated  on  the  inap,  but  without  indicating  the  ownership  of  the  three  islandS. 
Secondly,  the  British  cartographers  were  not  familiar  with  the  Gulf  region. 
Therefore,  their  information  was  derived  from  previously  published  sources  and 
maps,  rather  than  by  checking  and  surveying  on  the  ground.  Dr.  Richard  Schofield 
says  about  the  British  maps: 
It  is  very  difficult  to  know  what  store  to  put  on  maps,  because 
cartographers  have  made  mistakes  on  many  occasions  especially 
within  the  British  Foreign  Office.  I  am  not  saying  that  the  maps  were 
mistaken,  but  the  Foreign  Office  has  only  a  certain  amount  of 
resources  at  any  one  time,  and  its  cartographers  may  not  always  have 
had  all  the  facts  at  their  disposal,  especially  as  the  local  records  of' 
Britain's  administration  of  the  Gulf  were  then  out  in  the  G  Ulf.  67 
Thirdly,  documents  and  correspondence  between  Qawasim  Lingah  on  the  north 
shore  and  Qawasirn  Oman  on  the  south  shore  contradict  the  map  used  by  Iran,  as  the 
Qawasim  Lingah  recognized  Qawasirn  Oman's  ownership  of  the  three  islands.  " 
6.5.2.  The  probativeforce  of  the  map  qf  1886 
The  maps  relied  upon  by  ]ran,  and  particularly  the  map  of  1886,  were  not  an  integral 
part  of  any  treaty  between  the  Iranian  and  British  governments  or  Trucial  States 
(UAE)  concerning  Sovereignty  over  the  Gulfregion. 
Iran  claims  that  it  received  the  1886  map  from  the  British  government  as  an 
official  matter,  and  that  Britain  was  representing  the  Trucial  States  or  Qawasirn 
managing  their  foreign  affairs  at  the  time,  bUt  this  is  not  correct.  The  date  of 
drawing  the  map  and  the  date  of'  presenting  it  to  the  Shah  in  1888  was  bef'ore  the 
66 
_  See  this  map  in  The  British  Library  at  Slielfmark  No.  50970  (17).  Also  see  Appendix  B,  Map 
P.  299. 
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_  Schofield,  Abu  Musa  and  the  Tunbs:  The  historical  background,  op.  cit.,  P.  50. 
68 
_  See  Chapter  3,  P.  40-  1. ChaDter  6 
signature  of  the  treaty  between  the  British  goverin-nent  and  Qawasim  which  took 
place  in  March  1892.  It  is  only  after  this  date  that  the  Qawasim  gave  Lip  the 
69 
management  oftheir  foreign  affairs  to  the  British  government  . 
Therel'ore,  the  1886  map  was  produced  by  a  state  that  had  no  relatloii  to  the 
region.  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  before  and  after  the  dates  of  drawing  and 
presenting  the  map  of  1886  to  the  Shah,  the  British  government  strictly  and  formally 
denounced  the  Iranian  claim  to  the  islands.  This  was  formally  mentioned  in  the 
report  on  4  September  1934,  prepared  by  Mr.  D.  W.  Laselles  of  the  British  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  sent  to  the  British  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf-,  in  it  he 
summarized  the  attitude  of  the  British  government  towards  the  claims  by  the  Iranian 
government  for  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands,  including  relying  on  the  inap  of 
1886.  He  wrote: 
its  importance  as  an  argument  is  largely  counteracted  by  the  fact 
that  both  before  and  after  the  date  oii  which  the  map  was  presented 
the  Persian  claim  was  emphatically  and  officially  repudiated  by  His 
Majesty's  Government.  70 
Accordingly,  the  contradiction  in  the  information  of  the  map  of  1886  issued  by  the 
British  government,  and  the  documents  issued  by  the  same  government,  make  the 
map  ol'no  legal  value  as  evidence,  since  the  information  in  the  rnap  contradicts  the 
events  ofthe  dispute,  as  I  mentioned  earlier. 
6.6.  Conclusion 
After  the  foregoing  consideration  and  reviewing  the  mentioned  cases,  it  must  be 
concluded  that  tribunals  are  often  reluctant  to  place  niuch  value  on  maps.  71  111 
See  the  text  of  treaty  in  Chapter  2,11.28. 
See  IMBG,  Vol.  9,1933-1935,11.274. 
Akweenda,  op.  cit.,  BYbIL,  Vol.  60,  (1989),  P.  253. ChaDter  6 
addition,  international  courts  and  countries'  pleadings  in  different  disputes  consider 
maps  with  caution,  and  raise  doubts  about  their  probative  and  legal  values.  72 
Maps  solely  by  their  existence  cannot  constitute  a  title  to  territorv.  The 
probative  force  of  maps  can  only  be  acquired  by  their  incorporation  into  the  text  of  a 
treaty  or  a  judgment;  otherwise  they  remain  merely  information,  the  accuracy  of 
which  varies  as  a  function  of  their  technical  qual  Ity.  73  Perhaps  the  most  extreme 
reservation  regarding  maps  is  contained  in  the  Frontier  Dispute  case  between 
Burkina  Faso  and  Mali  in  1986  when  the  International  Court  stated: 
Maps  can  still  have  no  greater  legal  value  than  that  of 
corroborative  evidence  endorsing  a  conclusion  at  which  a  court  has 
arrived  by  other  means  unconnected  with  the  maps.  74 
These  doubts  raised  by  courts  and  by  states  in  their  pleadings  are  caused  by  the 
ignorance  of  cartographers  in  the  fields  of  princi  iples  of  topography  and  territorial 
disputes.  In  addition,  they  rely  on  information  from  hearsay  not  on  an  original  survey 
of  the  actual  situation.  Moreover,  maps  are  frequently  copies  from  other  maps.  75 
This  results  in  compound  errors  and  inaccuracies  in  drawing.  As  Akweenda  says  "ill 
almost  every  boundary  question  the  cartographer's  source  of  information  is  a  matter 
of  primary  importance".  76 
In  the  Temple  of  Precth  Vihear  case  Judge  Moreno  Quintana  observed  that 
territorial  sovereignty  was  not  a  matter  to  be  treated  lightly,  especially  when  the 
legitimacy  of  its  exercise  was  sought  to  be  proved  by  means  ofan  unal-11.11CIlticatcd 
72 
-  Taha,  al-Qanwn,  op.  cit.,  P.  135. 
73 
-  R.  Adler,  Positioning  and  Mapping  International  Land  Boundaries,  BTB,  Vol.  2,  No.  1,  ed.  C. 
Schofield  and  P.  flocknell,  (1995),  11.29. 
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-  ICJ  Rep.,  (1986),  P.  583. 
75 
_  See  Sandifer  op.  cit.,  P.  374.  Also  Hyde,  op.  cit.,  AJIL,  Vol.  27,  (1933)l 
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map.  Judge  Quintana  also  said  that  as  evidence,  maps  "have  only  a  complementary 
value  which  is  in  itself  without  legal  effect".  77 
In  my  opinion,  it  is  wrong  to  base  Iran's  sovereignty  over  the  three  Islands 
according  to  the  1886  map  or  other  maps  for  the  following  reasons: 
(i)  These  maps,  and  the  1886  map  in  particular,  were  not  agreed  on  according  to 
any  treaty  between  the  two  disputing  parties. 
(ii)  The  British  government  expressly  rejected  Iran's  sovereignty  over  the  three 
islands  before  and  after  drawing  the  1886  map. 
(iii)  The  map  was  drawn  by  a  third  party  which  was  not  related  to  any  of  the 
disputing  parties. 
(iv)  The  existence  of  documents  contradict  the  maps  concerning  information  of 
ownership  of  the  three  islands. 
It  is  possible  that  after  the  passing  of  a  period  of  time  since  its  occupation  ofthe 
islands,  and  after  taking  sorne  steps  to  improve  or  consolidate  its  legal  position,  Iran 
would  ask  for  arbitration  or  other  means  of  settlement  of  its  dispute  with  the  UAF. 
This  will  then  raise  the  question  of  the  critical  date;  is  this  the  date  of  the  Iranian 
occupation  of  the  islands  on  30  November  1971?  Or  the  date  ofagreeing  to  submit 
to  arbitration? 
"-  ICJ  Rep.,  (1962),  P.  69-7  1. 165 
CHAPTER  SEVEN 
The  Selection  of  the  Critical  Date  of  a  Dispute 
7.1.  Introduction 
A  court  which  is  confronted  with  an  international  dispute  relating  to  territorial 
claims  needs  to  determine  at  what  time  the  dispute  must  be  presumed  to  have  arisen. 
In  the  dispute  between  Iran  and  UAE  over  the  sovereignty  of  the  three  islands  Abu 
Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb,  the  question  arises  as  to  the  date  when  the 
dispute  crystallized.  According  to  this  date,  all  conscious  subsequent  actions  to 
reinforce  sovereignty  from  both  parties  to  the  dispute  are  illegal  or  ineffective. 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  determine  the  critical  date  at  which  the  dispute 
crystallized.  We  will  define  firstly  the  concept  of  critical  date  and  its  forms.  Then, 
we  will  clarify  the  date  when  points  of  the  dispute  crystallized  and  became  ready  to 
be  decided.  Finally,  we  will  look  at  the  extent  of  courts'  acceptance  of  actions 
subsequent  to  the  critical  date. 
7.2  The  concept  of  the  critical  date 
The  idea  of  critical  date  seems  first  to  have  been  used  by  Judge  Max  I  luber  in  the 
Island  of'Palmas  case,  between  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  States  in  1928.  The 
distinguished  arbitrator  referred  to  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  10  December  1898,  as  the 
Ccritical  moment'  in  that  case,  I  and  went  on  to  say:  "the  question  arises  whether 
sovereignty  ...  existed  at  the  critical  date,  i.  e.  the  moment  Of'COIICILISlon  and  coming 
into  force  of  tile  Treaty  of  Paris".  2 
I 
-  RIAA,  Vol.  11,13.843. 
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Some  writers,  such  as  Johnson,  have  defined  the  'critical  date'  as  "the  date  after 
which  the  actions  of  the  parties  cannot  affect  the  legal  situation".  3  Another  possible 
definition  is  given  by  Gerald  Fitzmaurice,  and  is  derived  from  the  United  Kingdom 
argument  in  the  case  of  the  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos-,  it  is  as  follows: 
The  date  by  reference  to  which  -  or  ... 
by  reference  to  the  legal  and 
factual  position  existing  at  which  -  the  merits  of  the  Parties'  claims 
are  to  be  determined; 
The  date  on  which  the  situation  is  deemed  to  have  become 
crystallized; 
The  date  [after  which]  the  acts  of  the  Parties 
...  cannot  alter  the 
legal  position  so  as  either  to  improve  or  prejudice  the  claim  of  either 
Party; 
The  date 
...  on  the  basis  of  the  position  [at  which],  as  it  [then] 
existed  ...,  the  respective  claims  of  the  Parties  will  ... 
have  to  be 
evaluated; 
The  date  as  at  which  the  issue  of  sovereignty  falls  to  be 
determined.  4 
On  the  other  hand,  some  writers,  such  as  Jennings  and  Brownlie,  argue  that  it  is  not 
easy  to  give  a  clear  definition  of  the  critical  date,  because  this  takes  different  forms 
according  to  the  circumstances.  They  argue  that  diff-erent  dates  of  events,  awards, 
formal  announcements  or  treaties  concerning  the  dispute  are  very  often  described  as 
critical  dates.  For  example,  in  the  Legal  Status  of  Eastern  Greenland  case  between 
Norway  and  Denmark,  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  had  to 
pronounce  on  the  validity,  as  against  Denmark,  of  a  Norwegian  Royal  Decree  of  10 
July  1931,  in  which  Norway  had  proclaimed  her  sovereignty  over  Eastern 
Greenland.  The  Court  held  that  the  Royal  Decree  was,  in  effect,  the  matter  'whicli 
D.  H.  N.  Johnson,  Acquisitive  Prescription  in  International  Law,  BYbIL,  Vol.  27,  (1950),  P.  342-n.  4. 
The  sarne  writer  defined  in  an  article  written  in  1954  the  critical  date  as  "the  date  after  which  the  acts 
or  ornissions  of  the  Parties  cannot  affect  the  le-al  situation",  The  Minquiers  and  FIcrehos  Casc,  ICLQ, 
Vol.  3,  (1954),  P.  208. 
4-G.  Fitzmaurice,  The  Law  and  Procedure  Of'117C  Inlerll(lliOntll  ('0111-1  0f.  J7ISIiCe,  Vol.  1,  (  1986),  11.260 
n.  1.  Also  see  the  same  writer,  The  Law  and  Procedure  ofthe  International  Court  of  Justice  195  1-4: 
Points  of  Substantive  Law,  BYbIL,  Vol.  32,  (1955-6),  P.  20,  n.  2. 
50 
-  1.  Brownlie,  Principles  qf'Public  International  Law,  (1990),  11.130.  Also  R.  Y.  Jennirils,  The 
Acquisition  qj'Territoty  in  International  Law,  (  1963),  P.  3  1. Chapter  7 
6 
gave  rise  to  the  ... 
dispute',  from  which  statement  it  followed  that  "The  date  at 
which  such  Danish  sovereignty  must  have  existed  in  order  to  render  the  Norwegian 
occupation  invalid  is  the  date  at  which  the  occupation  took  place,  viz.,  July  10th, 
193  1  ".  7  The  Court  did  not  select  as  the  critical  date  the  period  at  which  the  dispute 
was  born.  The  dispute  between  the  two  countries  in  all  probability  began  as  early  as 
1814,  when  the  union  between  them  came  to  an  end.  There  was  also  ample  evidence 
that  from  1921  onwards  Norway  openly  challenged  Denmark's  rights  over  Eastern 
Greenland. 
In  another  case  the  court  selected  the  date  of  an  award  or  subsequent 
demarcation  as  the  critical  date.  In  the  Argentine  and  Chile  Frontier  case  (1966),  the 
court  said: 
In  so  far  as  the  court  is  asked  to  interpret  and  fulfill  the  Award  of 
1902,  there  is  obviously  a  sense  in  which  the  critical  date  is  1902 
itself-or  at  the  latest  1903,  the  date  of  the  demarcation.  Neither  Party 
is  free  to  put  forward  a  claim  that  flies  in  the  face  of  the  Award 
.' 
A  third  example  is  the  Rann  of  Kutch  Arbitration  case,  between  India  and  Pakistan. 
Although  India  and  Pakistan  did  not  expressly  join  in  accepting  a  precise  critical 
date,  their  pleadings  tended  to  show  a  wide  -ieasure  of  agreement  that  certain  dates 
were  obviously  'relevant.  One  such  date  was  13  October  1819  when  the  East  India 
Company  concluded  the  last  of  three  treaties  with  the  Rulers  of'  Kutch.  Both  parties 
were  in  agreement  that  the  boundary  of  Kutch  had  remained  unchanged  since  the 
time  when  Kutch  became  a  vassal  state  under  the  British  by  virtue  of  that  Treaty.  To 
ascertain  the  boundary  of  Sind,  the  date  of  the  enactment  ofthc  India  Independence 
Act,  namely,  18  July  1947,  was  regarded  by  the  parties  as  being  relevant.  "  As 
6_  pC  I  j,  Ser.  A/B,  No.  53,  P.  26. 
Ibid.  P.  45. 
ILR,  Vol.  38,11.80. 
ILM,  Vol.  7,  (1968),  P.  633-656. 7  168 
regards  this  latter  date,  the  Tribunal  itself  observed  that  since  the  parties  had 
developed  their  cases  with  primary  reference  to,  and  reliance  on,  evidence  relating  to 
the  long  period  of  the  British  rule  in  the  Indian  sub-continent,  'the  time  of' 
Independence  is  of  decisive  importance'.  '  0 
These  examples  illustrate  that  international  courts  differ  in  choosing  the  factors 
determining  the  critical  date.  In  an  article  published  in  1957  Fitzmaurice  gave  a  list 
of  possible  criteria  for  determining  the  critical  date.  In  his  view,  the  following  are 
the  main  possibilities  for  the  selection  of  the  critical  date: 
(1)  the  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  dispute; 
(ii)  the  date 
...  when  the  challenging  or  plaintiff  state  first  makes  a 
definite  claim  to  the  territory; 
(iii)  the  date 
...  when  the  dispute  "crystallized"  into  a  definite  issue 
between  the  Parties  as  to  territorial  sovereignty; 
(iv)  the  date  when  one  of  the  Parties 
...  takes  active  steps  to  initiate  a 
procedure  for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute,  such  as  negotiations, 
conciliation,  mediation  ...  or  other  means  falling  short  of  arbitration 
or  judicial  settlement; 
(v)  the  date  on  which  any  of  these  procedures  [mentioned  in  (iv) 
above]  is  actually  resorted  to  and  employed; 
(vi)  the  date  on  which,  all  else  failing,  the  matter  is  proposed  to  be  or 
is  referred  to  arbitration  or  judicial  settlement.  ' 
No  matter  what  the  form  of  the  critical  date  is,  what  concerns  us  in  the  case  of  the 
three  islands  is  to  determine  the  date  in  which  the  points  of  dispute  were  crystallized 
and  became  concrete.  Fitzmaurice,  in  the  pleadings  of  the  Minquiers  antl  Ecrehos 
case,  described  the  critical  date  as  "the  date  on  which  the  differences  of  opinion  that 
have  arisen  between  the  Parties  have  crystallized  into  a  concrete  issue  giving  rise  to 
a  formal  dispute".  12  A  similar  description  was  given  by  the  Court  ol'Arbitration  in 
the  DubuilSharjah  Boi-der  case,  "The  critical  date  is  that  by  reference  to  which  the 
Ibid.  P.  666. 
Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  BYbIL,  Vol.  32,  (1955-6),  P.  23-24. 
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dispute  can  be  seen  to  have  crystallised  or  to  have  become  concrete  ,  '.  13  Hersch 
Lauterpacht  described  the  critical  date  as  "The  date  by  reference  to  which  a 
territorial  dispute  must  be  deemed  to  have  crystallised".  14 
Jennings  says  that  if  by  the  "critical  date"  is  meant  the  date  at  which  the  points 
of  dispute  were  crystallized,  then  it  differs  from  the  critical  date  which  Max  Huber 
refers  to  in  the  dispute  of  the  Island  of'Palmas.  Jennings  considers  the  date  of  the 
treaty  of  cession  will  always  be  a  critical  date,  even  if  this  was  not  when  the  points 
in  dispute  were  crystallized,  and  even  if  there  was  no  dispute  in  the  first  place.  This 
is  because  the  treaty  constitutes  the  root  of  title  for  the  party  which  claims 
sovereignty  under  it.  15 
7.3.  The  date  on  which  the  dispute  crystallized 
The  date  of  the  crystallization  of  the  dispute  is  the  date  on  which  the  disputing 
parties  stopped  negotiating.  It  is  the  date  when  the  parties  adopted  their  final 
positions.  16  In  other  words,  the  concept  of  the  critical  date  aims  to  freeze  the  legal 
positions  of  the  different  parties  on  that  date.  17  It  also  aims  to  avoid  any  action  taken 
by  any  of  the  parties  after  the  date  of  the  crystallization  of  the  dispute  in  order  to 
improve  or  consolidate  their  legal  positions.  This  means  that  the  legal  rights  ofthe 
disputing  parties  are  to  be  defined  according  to  their  legal  positions  at  the  time  ol'the 
19  critica  ate. 
13 
_I  LR,  Vol.  91,  (199'  )),  P.  59  1. 
14  H.  Lauterpacht,  The  Development  qjInternational  Law  by  the  International  Court,  (1958),  P.  242. 
Jennings,  op.  cit.,  P.  334. 
See  F.  A.  'raha,  al-Qanivn  al-Dw/Y  wa  inna-mint  al-Ildud,  (International  Law  and  Boundary 
Disputes),  (1982),  P.  127. 
Y.  Z.  Blum,  Historic  Titles  in  h7ternalional  Law,  (1965),  11.209. 
Jennings,  op.  cit.,  P.  32. 70 
In  all  territorial  disputes,  it  is  the  tribunal's  ultimate  duty  to  define  the  critical 
date  and  take  its  final  decision  after  hearing  and  looking  at  all  the  evidence  produced 
by  the  parties.  19  For  example,  in  the  Taba  case  between  Egypt  and  Israe  1,2  0  Egypt 
claimed  that  the  critical  date  was  established  as  24  July  1922  by  the  reference  in  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  to  'the  recognized  international  boundary  between  Egypt  and  the 
former  mandated  territory  of  Palestine'.  This  was  the  date  on  which  the  Council  of 
the  League  of  Nations  adopted  the  Mandate  for  Palestine 
.21 
However,  during 
negotiations  Egypt  agreed  to  consider  14  May  1948,  which  was  the  date  of  the 
termination  of  the  British  mandate-or  any  other  date  during  the  mandate  period-as 
the  critical  date.  The  two  parties  agreed  that  no  changes  occurred  to  the  borders 
during  this  period.  The  court,  despite  the  agreement  of  both  parties,  chose  29 
September  1923  the  date  of  implementing  the  mandate,  as  the  convincing  critical 
date  for  this  case.  22 
The  tribunal  must  ensure  that  the  requirements  of  justice  are  observed  in  the 
choice  of  the  critical  date,  because  this  choice  affects  the  determination  of  the  case; 
as  Fitzmaurice  explained  in  the  Allinquiers  and  Ecrehos  case:  "the  conception  of  a 
critical  date  is  intended  to  do  justice  to  the  real  merits  of  each  country's  case,  and 
for  that  reason  it  must  not  be  put  too  early  or  too  late".  23 
The  choice  of  a  critical  date  which  is  too  late  could  def'cat  the  fundamental 
object  of  the  critical  date,  namely,  to  prevent  one  of  the  parties  froIll  Unilaterally 
"-  See  Fitzmaurice,  The  Law  and  Procedure,  op.  cit.,  11.266.  Also  Oppenlicilli's  Jj7jc,  j,  jj4jjjotj4jj 
Vol.  I  -Peace,  Parts  2-4,9th  edition,  ed.  by  R.  Jennings  and  A.  Watts,  (  1996),  11.7  11.  Also  Brownlie, 
op.  cit.,  P.  130.  Also  see  M.  S.  Abdul  Rahman,  al-divanb  al-Oanwniuh  I.  Isivial  Nýainw  al-lOwt]  al- 
Dwaliah  (The  Legal  Aspects  of  Solving  International  Boundary  Dispiftes),  (  1994),  P.  290. 
2') 
-  11,  R,  Vol.  80,  (1989),  P.  226. 
21 
_  Ibid.  P.  228. 
22 
_  Ibid.  P.  284. 
23 
-  ICJ  Pleadings,  Vol-11,  (1953),  11.69. Chapter  7  171 
improving  its  position  by  means  of  acts  performed  after  the  issue  had  been  definitely 
joined.  A  party  might  thus  reject  a  proposal  for  arbitration  or  other  means  of 
settlement  of  the  dispute  but,  subsequently,  after  taking  various  steps  to  improve  its 
position,  it  might  then  indicate  its  willingness  to  go  to  arbitration.  Fitzmaurice 
argued  that  in  this  type  of'  case  it  would  be  unfair  on  the  other  party  which  had 
always  been  willing  to  accept  arbitration  if  the  date  of  the  eventual  submission  to  a 
tribunal  was  to  be  selected  as  the  critical  date.  He  therefore  suggested  that  in  such  a 
24 
case  the  critical  date  ought  to  be  that  on  which  arbitration  was  first  proposed  . 
On  the  other  hand,  Fitzmaurice  warned  that  the  choice  of  a  critical  date  which  is 
too  early  would  be  to  place  a  premium  on  the  making  of  paper  claims  which  the 
party  concerned  need  not  follow  up  or  insist  upon:  "because  it  would  be  secure  in 
the  knowledge  that  the  mere  making  of  the  claim  would  operate  to  freeze  the  legal 
position  and  to  shut  out  or  nullify  the  value  of  all  subsequent  acts  of  the  other 
party". 
25 
7.4.  The  extent  of  the  courts'  acceptance  of  actions  subsequent 
to  the  critical  date 
The  selection  of  the  critical  date  has  the  result  that  the  evidence  and  acts  before  the 
date  oil'  crystal  I  ization  of  the  dispute  must  be  taken  into  consideration  by  tile  court, 
given  that  they  are  relevant  to  the  dispute  and  applicable  to  the  evidence  relating  to 
sovereignty.  26  Therefore,  the  court  should  not  take  into  considerat'011  111Y 
subsequent  acts  which  any  of  the  parties  had  wilfully  taketi  with  the  purpose  of 
improving  its  legal  position.  On  this,  Fitzinaurice  says: 
24 
-  Ibid.  P.  69. 
25 
_  Ibid. 
26 
-  See  Abdul  Rahman,  op.  cit.,  11.293. 172 
One  object  ofthe  critical  date  is  to  prevent  one  of  the  parties  from 
unilaterally  improving  its  position  by  means  of  sorne  step  taken  after 
the  issue  has  been  definitely  joined.  17 
This  is  why  the  choice  of  the  critical  date  often  becomes  ail  issue  of  dispute  among 
the  different  parties,  as  every  party  does  its  utmost  to  choose  the  date  which  best 
supports  its  position  as  opposed  to  that  of  the  other  parties.  For  example,  in  the 
DubailSharjah  border  case,  28  the  government  of  Sharjah  claimed  in  the  beginning 
that  the  critical  date  should  be  1955,  when  rulers  had  agreed  to  a  delimitation  of 
their  boundaries  by  the  British  authorities,  which  was  considered  a  recognition  of  the 
existence  of  a  dispute  between  them.  Another  option,  also  put  forward  by  Shar 
.j 
ah, 
was  to  choose  2  December  1971  as  a  critical  date.  This  was  the  date  on  which  the 
UAE  came  to  in  existence,  as  the  UAE  had  as  a  pre-condition  of  its  formation  the 
existence  of  well-settled  boundaries  between  the  various  Emirates.  29 
The  government  of  Dubai  did  not  accept  the  claim  put  forward  by  Sharjah.  It 
stated  that  in  this  particular  case  there  was  no  significant  role  for  the  choice  of  a 
critical  date.  If,  however,  a  critical  date  must  be  defined,  it  should  be  the  date  of  the 
30 
conclusion  of  the  Arbitration  Agreement  on  30  November  1976,  which  recognised 
the  existence  of  a  dispute  between  the  Emirate  of  Dubai  and  the  Emirate  of' 
31  Sharj  A. 
The  court  did  not  accept  1955  as  the  critical  date,  because  the  actual  claims  of' 
both  parties  in  this  dispute  were  not  the  same  as  the  clalms  they  had  inade  iii  1955. 
Also,  it  did  not  accept  it  to  be  2  December  1971,  when  the  UAF  was  I'Ormcd, 
2'-  ICJ  Pleadings,  Vol.  11,  (1953),  P.  69. 
29 
_  ILR,  Vol.  91,  (1993),  P.  5433.  Also  see  D.  W.  Bowett,  'I'lic  Dubai/Shai-  jah  Boundary  Arbitration, 
BYbIL,  Vol.  65,  (1994),  P.  I  11. 
29 
_  Ibid.  P.  591. 
reement,  see  Ibid.  11.550.  -  For  more  detail  about  the  Arbitration  A,,,, 
-  Ibid.  P.  592. Chavier  7 
because  the  existence  of  stable  and  defined  boundaries  between  the  Emirates  was  a 
generally  accepted  pre-condition  for  the  establishment  of'  the  Federation.  32 
Therefore,  the  court  rejected  the  concept  of  the  critical  date  in  this  case  because 
found  that  has  not  played  a  major  role  in  territorial  disputes.  However,  in  the  view  of 
the  court,  that  if  a  critical  date  existed,  this  date  could  only  be  that  of  the  date  of 
33 
signature  of  the  Arbitration  Agreement  on  30  November  1976 
. 
As  clarified  earlier,  actions  which  are  intentionally  made  by  one  of  the  parties 
after  the  date  of  crystallization  of  the  points  of  the  dispute  to  strengthen  its  position 
are  not  accepted  by  the  court.  Contrary  to  this,  a  tribunal  may  take  into  consideration 
actions  which  were  carried  out  after  the  critical  date  because  of  the  possible 
happening  of  events  which  point  to  indirect  evidence  and  support  for  activities 
which  took  place  before  the  critical  date.  34  As  Goldie  said: 
They  do  not  create  or  perfect  title;  nor  may  they  be  adduced 
directly  in  proof  of  title,  but  only  indirectly  and  to  corroborate  and 
explain  the  probative  events  occurring  before  the  critical  date.  35 
For  example,  in  the  Island  qf'Palmas  case,  as  will  be  recalled,  Judge  Huber  selected 
the  year  1898,  when  the  Treaty  of  Paris  came  into  force,  as  the  critical  date.  The  visit 
of  an  American  General  to  the  island  in  1906  was,  on  the  other  hand,  designated  by 
him  as  the  origin  of  the  dispute  because  it  was  the  first  contact  by  the  Americans 
36 
with  the  island 
. 
In  admitting  evidence  of  events  occurring  between  1998  and  1906, 
Judge  Huber  said  that: 
the  events  falling  between  the  Treaty  of'  Pat-is,  December  10th, 
1898,  and  the  rise  of  the  present  dispute  in  1906,  cannot  in 
thernselves  serve  to  indicate  the  legal  situation  of'  the  island  at  the 
32 
-  Ibid.  P.  593. 
-  Ibid.  P.  594. 
See  L.  F.  E.  Goldie,  The  Critical  Date,  ICTQ,  Vol.  12,  (1963),  11.1251.  Also  see  Blum,  op.  cit., 
P.  217-19.  Also  Talia,  op.  cit.,  1).  128. 
Goldie,  op.  cit.,  P.  1254. 
16  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  836. 
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critical  moment  when  the  cession  of  the  Philippines  by  Spain  took 
place.  They  are  however  indirectly  of  certain  interest,  owing  to  the 
light  they  might  throw  on  the  period  immediately  preceding.  37 
In  the  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  case,  the  United  Kingdom  argued  that  in  the  absence 
of  any  treaty  or  of  an  international  instrument  or  act  forming  the  clear  ground  of 
focus  of  the  dispute,  the  Court  had  no  alternative  but  to  regard  the  compromis  itself 
as  the  focal  point  of  the  dispute  and,  therefore,  as  the  critical  date.  38  However, 
following  the  precedent  of  the  Island  of  Palmas  case,  the  United  Kingdom  further 
argued  that  if  the  court  were  to  select  some  date  earlier  than  the  date  of  the 
compromis,  namely,  29  December  1950,  as  the  critical  date,  evidence  of  events 
between  that  date  and  29  December  1950,  "cannot  properly  be  excluded  entirely  and 
that  it  proves  the  existence  of  our  title  on  the  earlier  date  also,  even  if  that  title 
cannot  be  established  by  events  occurring  at  or  before  that  date".  3  9 
The  United  Kingdom  maintained  that  the  principle  involved  was  analogous  to 
'the  principle  of  subsequent  practice':  "Just  as  the  subsequent  practice  of  parties  to  a 
treaty,  in  relation  to  it,  cannot  alter  the  meaning  of  the  treaty,  but  may  yet  be 
evidence  of  what  that  meaning  is,  or  of  what  the  parties  had  in  mind  in  concluding  it, 
so  equally  events  occurring  after  the  critical  date  in  a  dispute  about  territory  cannot 
operate  to  alter  the  position  as  it  stood  at  that  date,  but  may  nevertheless  be  evidence 
of,  and  throw  light  on,  what  that  positioii  was".  40 
France,  on  the  other  hand,  argued  that  there  was  a  sell'-evidcnt  critical  date 
resulting  from  the  Anglo-French  Fishery  Convcntion  of  1839  pursuant  to  which  the 
parties  had  made  certain  arrangements  forjoint  fishery  rights  in  an  area  that  included 
Ibid.  P.  866. 
ICJ  Pleadings,  Vol.  1,  P.  549-550. 
'9-  Ibid.  Vol.  11,  P.  95. 
40 
-  Ibid.  P.  94. 7 
the  waters  of  the  disputed  islets.  According  to  the  French  argument  the  effect  of  that 
Convention  was  to  disqualify  either  party  from  Subsequently  claiming  any  exclusive 
sovereignty.  Thus  whichever  party  was  sovereigri  in  1839,  it  continued  to  be  so  in 
1950.  Evidently  the  essence  of  the  French  argument  was  to  exclude  from 
consideration  by  the  court  events  occurring  in  the  period  18339-195  0.41 
In  the  event  the  Court  did  not  expressly  choose  a  critical  date.  It,  however, 
rejected  the  French  argument  as  to  the  critical  date,  for  at  the  date  when  the  1839 
Convention  was  concluded  no  dispute  as  to  the  sovereignty  over  the  Minquiers  and 
Ecrehos  groups  had  then  arisen.  The  parties  had  disagreed  on  the  question  of  the 
exclusive  right  to  fish  oysters  but  they  had  never  linked  that  to  the  question  of 
sovereignty  over  the  disputed  islets.  In  such  circumstances  the  Court  found  no 
reason  "why  the  conclusion  of  that  convention  should  have  any  effect  on  the 
question  of  allowing  or  ruling  Out  evidence  relating  to  sovereignty,  ý.  42 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  while  not  expressly  ruling  in  favour  of  the  British 
argument  as  the  critical  date,  the  Court's  approach  was  generally  advantageous  to 
the  British  case.  Thus,  though  it  found  that  the  dispute  crystallized  in  the  period 
1886-1888  when  France  for  the  first  time  claimed  sovereignty  over  the  groups,  it 
held  that  the  acts  subsequent  to  this  period  should  be  taken  into  consideration  owing 
to  the  special  eircurnstances  of  the  case,  namely  that  the  activity  In  respect  of  tile 
groups  "had  developed  gradually  long  before  the  dispute  as  to  sovereignty  arose,  and 
it  has  since  continued  without  interruption  and  in  a  similar  manner  -.  4;  1  lowever,  tile 
Court  vindicated  the  fundamental  ob  ject  of  the  concept  of  the  critical  date  by 
pointing  out  that  subsequent  acts  would  be  inadmissible  it'  such  acts  were 
175 
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deliberately  performed  "with  a  view  to  improving  the  legal  position  of  the  party 
44 
concerned"  . 
Again,  in  the  Argentine-Chile  Frontier  Case,  45  Argentina  claimed  that  the 
critical  date  should  be  fixed  according  to  the  Argentina-Chile  Mixed  Boundary 
Commission  in  1941  "as  an  event  which  should  have  an  inhibitory  effect  upon  any 
attempt  to  establish  sovereignty  over  a  disputed  frontier  region  merely  through  the 
46 
exercise  of  administrative  acts"  . 
On  the  other  hand,  Chile  rejected  this,  and 
claimed  that  the  critical  date  should  be  in  1945  or  at  latest  1952,  because  "her 
administration  over  the  disputed  area  was  so  well  established  that  any  Argentine 
activity  subsequent  to  those  dates  must  simply  be  regarded  as  an  effort  to  present  a 
new  claim". 
47 
The  Court  of  Arbitration  observed  that  the  parties  were  not  "so  very  far  apart  in 
their  ideas  as  to  when  the  critical  date  should  be  fixed".  However,  after  speculating 
on  three  possible  critical  dates,  namely,  the  date  of  the  Award,  the  date  of 
demarcation  and  the  date  of  the  submission  of  the  dispute  to  arbitration,  it  held  that 
the  notion  of  the  critical  date  was  of  little  relevance  in  the  case  and,  therelore, 
"examined  all  the  evidence  submitted  to  it,  irrespective  of'  the  date  of'  the  acts  to 
which  such  evidence  relates".  48 
It  is  noteworthy  that  though  the  question  ofthe  critical  date  did  not  arise  in  the 
Teml3le  qf  Preah  Mew-  case,  the  Court  seemed  to  have  applied  the  principle  that 
later  acts  and  events  were  evidence  ofearlier  states  offacts.  As  will  be  recalled,  the 
Court  found  that  the  paramount  olýjcct  of  the  settlements  of'  tile  1904-1908  period 
4.1 
-  [bid.  P.  59. 
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was  to  put  an  end  to  the  state  of  tension  that  then  prevailed  and  to  achieve  frontier 
stability  on  the  basis  of  certainty  and  finality.  The  Court  further  found  that  by 
specifically  cxcludino  frontiers  from  the  process  of  revi  II  of  previous  treaties 
which  the  Treaties  of  1925  and  1937  would  have  otherwise  effected,  the  Parties  bore 
witness  to  the  paramount  importance  they  attached  to  finality  in  this  field:  "Their 
attitude  in  1925  and  1937  can  properly  be  taken  as  evidence  that  they  equally  desired 
finality  in  the  1904-1908  period' 
,.  41) 
7.5.  The  date  of  the  crystallization  of  the  dispute  over  the  three 
islands 
As  should  be  evident,  the  determination  of  the  critical  date  can  exert  a  crucial 
influence  on  the  outcome  of  judicial  proceedings.  There  are  only  a  few  dates  in  the 
dispute  between  Iran  and  UAE  over  the  three  islands  which  can  be  considered  as  the 
critical  date.  The  first  is  15  September  1887  which  was  the  date  of  the  end  of  the 
Qawasim's  rule  over  Lin-ah  and  the  start  of  Iranian  control  over  it,  which  led  to  the 
Iranian  occupation  of  the  island  of  Sirri  and  their  claim  to  the  island  of  Greater 
Tunb.  This  was  based  on  the  claim  that  the  two  islands  belonged  to  Lingah  which 
then  fell  Linder  Iranian  sovereignty.  50 
However,  this  date  cannot  be  considered  a  critical  date  for  the  dispute  over  the 
island  of  Greater  Tunb,  because  there  was  no  follow-up  or  persistence  of  tile 
sovereignty  claim  to  Greater  Tunb  by  the  Iranian  government.  After  the  protest  made 
by  the  ruler  of  Shar 
, 
Jah  on  16  October  1887  against  the  Iranian  occupation  of'  the 
island  of  Sirri  to  the  British  government  in  India,  he  asked  them  to  take  the 
necessary  measures  to  prevent  the  Iranians  from  occupyIng  the  Island  of  Greater 
77 
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Turib.  Since  the  British  government  did  not  see  any  move  by  Iran  to  occupy  the 
island  ofGreater  Tunb,  it  found  it  sufficient  to  protest  against  the  Iranian  occupation 
of  the  island  of  Sirri.  The  Iranian  government  answered  that  it  had  evidence  to  prove 
Iranian  sovereignty  over  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb  and  Sim.  Accordingly,  Iran 
presented  its  evidences  to  the  British  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf.  Consequently, 
the  British  Political  Resident  asked  the  ruler  of  Shajah  to  present  what  he  had  to 
prove  his  ownership  of  the  islands.  After  the  study  of  the  evidence  presented  by  both 
parties,  it  appeared  to  the  British  Political  Resident  that  the  documents  presented  by 
the  Iranian  government  did  not  prove  their  ownership  of  the  islands,  and  that  the 
islands  belonged  to  the  ruler  of  Sharjah.  The  Iranian  government  kept  silent  after 
51 
this,  and  took  no  measures  to  occupy  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb. 
The  second  date  which  could  be  chosen  as  the  critical  date  is  April  1904,  when 
the  Belgian  employee  of  the  Iranian  Customs  Department  removed  the  flag  of 
Qawasirn  from  the  islands  of  Abu  Musa  and  Greater  Tunb.  He  then  raised  the 
Iranian  flag.  52  It  is  difficult,  though,  to  accept  this  as  a  critical  date,  for  the  Iranian 
government  removed  its  flag  a  few  days  later  from  both  islands.  This  resulted  from  a 
protest  made  by  the  ruler  of  Sharjah  to  the  British  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf, 
which  led  to  a  British  protest  to  the  Iranian  government  concerning  the  actions  of  the 
Customs'  employee.  53 
Thus  there  is  diffICUlty  in  accepting  either  of  these  dates  as  relevant  because 
they  did  not  signify  the  crystallization  of  the  diSPLIte  between  the  two  parties  since 
negotiation  between  the  two  disputing  parties  did  not  end  over  the  ownership  ofthe 
islands. 
51  IMBG,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,11.33). 
52  Lorimer,  op  cit.,  Vol.  1,  Part  1  -1  listorical,  11.745. 
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In  this  respect  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  in  the  case 
concerning  Alavrommatis  Palestine  Concessions,  had  defined  a  dispute  as  "a 
disagreement  on  a  point  of  law  or  fact,  a  conflict  of  legal  views  or  of  interests 
between  two  persons  ,.  ý4  ThIs  definition  has  since  been  applied  and  clarified  on  a 
number  of  occasions.  In  the  case  concerning  Interpretation  ql'Pe(ice  Trealies  vvilh 
Bulgw-hi,  Hwwctrj,  untl  Romania,  in  the  advisory  opinion  of  330  March  1950  the 
Court,  after  examining  the  diplorriatic  exchanges  between  the  States  concerned, 
noted  that  "the  two  sides  hold  clearly  opposite  views  concerning  the  question  of  the 
performance  or  non-performance  of  certain  treaty  obligations"  and  concluded  that 
"international  disputes  have  arisen".  ý5  Furthermore,  in  its  Judgment  of  21  December 
1962  in  the  Souih  West  Aftica  cases,  the  Court  made  it  clear  that  in  order  to  prove 
the  existence  of  a  dispute 
it  is  not  sufficient  for  one  party  to  a  contentious  case  to  assert  that 
a  dispute  exists  with  the  other  party.  A  inere  assertion  is  not 
sufficient  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  dispute  any  more  than  a  mere 
denial  of  the  existence  of  the  dispute  proves  its  non-existence.  Nor  is 
it  adequate  to  show  that  the  interests  of  the  two  parties  to  such  a  case 
are  in  conflict.  It  must  be  shown  that  the  claim  of  one  party  is 
positively  opposed  by  the  other.  56 
In  my  opinion,  in  the  present  case,  the  dispute  crystallized  between  the  two  disputing 
parties  on  29  November  1971  for  the  island  of  Abu  Musa,  and  on  30  November 
1971  for  the  two  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb  when  negotiations  between  the 
two  disputing  parties  collapsed  and  each  party  defined  its  final  stand  in  the  case. 
5" 
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7.5.1.  The  date  of  the  crystallization  ofthe  dispute  over  Abu 
Musa  island 
The  date  which  ShOLIId  be  considered  critical  in  this  case  is  29  November  1971  as 
this  is  the  date  ofcrystallization  of  the  dispute  between  the  two  parties.  It  is  the  date 
the  Memoranduni  ol'Understanding  was  agreed  between  the  government  of  Sharjah 
and  the  government  of  Iran.  It  is  the  date  on  which  both  parties  adopted  attitudes 
towards  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  and  its  division  according  to  the  articles  of  the 
Memorandum. 
7.5.2.  The  date  of  the  crystallization  of  the  dispute  over  the 
Tunbs  islands 
The  critical  date  for  the  two  islands  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  should  be  the  day 
of  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  two  islands  on  30  November  1971,  by  the  use  of 
force.  The  Iranian  government  Justified  its  occupation  as  the  return  of  the  islands  to 
the  Iranian  territory  after  their  occupation  by  British  forces.  ')7  The  government  of 
Ras  al-Khaimah  condemned  this  act  and  considered  it  an  occupation  by  force  of  its 
territory.  It  requested  that  the  international  community  intervene  to  return  the 
islands.  Thus,  this  was  the  day  on  which  the  dispute  between  the  two  parties 
crystallized.  Each  party  insisted  on  its  right  of  sovereignty  over  these  islands,  and  the 
diplomatic  negotiations  for  solving  the  dispute  peacefully  which  had  preceded  the 
occupation  collapsed. 
58 
7.6.  Conclusion 
As  the  above-nientioned  examples  show,  the  choice  of  the  critical  date  plays  a 
significant  role  in  any  dispute,  which  makes  every  party  insist  on  choosing  a  date 
S7 
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which  supports  its  position.  The  definition  of  the  date  on  which  the  dispute  was 
crystallized  is  the  responsibility  of  the  court  concerned.  Courts  do  not  recognize  any 
subsequent  wilful  actions  by  a  party  to  consolidate  its  legal  position.  Arbitrators, 
however,  do  not  pay  much  attention  to  the  choice  of  the  critical  date  in  every  case. 
They  often  look  at  all  the  evidence  without  consideration  of  dates,  or  the  dates  of 
acts  on  which  this  evidence  is  based 
. 
59 
Therefore,  I  think  that  neglect  by  the  Court  of  the  choice  of  the  critical  date,  the 
date  when  the  dispute  crystallized,  would  constitute  an  injustice  towards  one  of  the 
parties  which  had  evidence  of  its  sovereignty  on  the  disputed  territory  prior  to  the 
critical  date.  As  the  court  in  DitbailSharjah  border  case  stated:  "In  any  event,  in 
many  judicial  or  arbitral  decisions  the  role  of  the  critical  date  was  minimal, 
especially  where  the  question  was  which  party  had  sovereignty  at  the  present 
time"  . 
60 
On  the  other  hand,  this  neglect  encourages  the  other  party,  which  had  no 
evidence  to  support  its  clairn  to  sovereignty  before  the  critical  date,  to  delay  solving 
the  dispute  or  taking  it  to  the  court  until  it  imposes  its  complete  sovereignty  on  the 
disputed  territory. 
To  prove  the  UAE's  ownership  of  the  three  islands,  I  will  clarify  in  the  next 
chapter  the  ways  in  which  sovereignty  was  exercised  over  the  three  islands  by  the 
governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  before  their  occupation  by  Iran  on  30 
November  1971. 
181 
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CHAPTER  EIGHT 
The  UAE  Exercise  of  Sovereiqntv  over  the  Three  Islands 
8.1.  Introduction 
What  is  meant  by  a  territorial  dispute  arising  from  conflicting  claims  of  sovereignty 
over  a  particular  territory?  I  mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter  the  basis  on  which  Iran 
built  its  claim  of  sovereignty  and  occupation  of  the  three  islands  Abu  Musa  and  the 
Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs  on  30  November  1971.1  The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  shed 
light  on  the  acts  of  sovereignty  that  were  exercised  by  the  UAE  represented  in  the 
actions  of  government  of  Sharjah  over  the  island  of  Abu  Musa,  and  the  government 
of  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  islands  of  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb,  until  the  date  of 
the  Iranian  occupation  of  these  islands.  Acts  of  sovereignty  are  the  proofs  which  are 
studied  by  any  international  tribunal  or  court  in  determining  a  dispute  over  a  given 
territory. 
I  will  first  look  at  the  kinds  of  acts  of  sovereignty  which  are  accepted  by  the 
international  courts  as  evidence  of  sovereignty  over  a  territory.  I  will  then  look  at  the 
different  kinds  of  overeign  acts  exercised  by  the  government  of  Sharjah  over  the 
island  of  Abu  Musa  and  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  islands  ofthc 
Greater  and  Lesser  TLInbs.  I  will  also  examine  the  inhabitants'  sense  of  allegiance 
and  their  cooperation  with  the  two  governments.  Finally,  I  will  clarif'y  the  extent  of 
acceptance  and  recognition  by  Iran  and  other  countries  ofthc  sovereignty  ol'Shai-jah 
and  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  islands,  and  the  allegiance  oftheir  inhabitants  to  these 
two  goveriunents. 
'-  See  Chapter  5,  P.  123. 183 
8.2.  Types  of  material  adduced  as  evidence  of  territorial  sovereignty 
As  mentioned  earlier,  '  in  most  cases  of  territorial  disputes  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  and  arbitral  tribunals  do  not  look  at  the  traditional  methods  of  the  acquisition 
of  territory,  they  look  at  the  actual  practice  of  sovereignty  by  each  of  the  disputing 
parties  and  the  evidence  each  party  presents  as  proof  Therefore,  since  the  case  in 
question  is  an  argument  over  a  territory,  each  party  will  need  to  present  as  much 
evidence  as  possible  to  show  the  manifestation  of  state  authority  to  support  its 
argument.  3 
An  international  court  or  tribunal  will  need  to  strike  a  balance  between 
conflicting  evidence  and  support  the  most  plausible.  For  example,  in  the  Minquiers 
and  Ecrehos  case  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  France,  the  Court  indicated 
certain  acts  as  having  special  value  as  evidence  of  title:  "of  the  manifold  acts 
invoked  by  the  United  Kingdom  Government  the  Court  attaches,  in  particular, 
probative  value  to  the  acts  which  relate  to  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  and  local 
administration  and  to  legislation".  4 
It  is  difficult  to  examine  all  types  of  evidence  presented  by  the  different  parties 
to  a  dispute  because  they  change  from  one  case  to  another.  I  will  try,  therefore,  to 
highlight  a  few  examples  of  evidence  presented  by  some  countries  to  prove  their 
territorial  sovereignty  to  the  court.  For  example,  the  actual  administration  by  the 
state  over  a  territory  is  a  manifestation  of  the  state's  administrative  authority  in  the 
territory,  which  can  be  practised  in  many  Forms.  Thus,  a  state  claiming  its  ownership 
of  a  territory  SIlOLdd  present  a  proof  of'  its  administration  of  the  territory.  It  is  Lip  to 
the  court  to  accept  all,  most  or  none  oftlic  prool's  and,  accordingly,  issue  a  decision. 
See  Chapter  4,  P.  I 11. 
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For  example,  in  the  Argentine  und  Chile  Arbitration  case  1966,  the  Court  accepted 
the  Chilean  evidence  which  consisted  of  material  frequently  employed  for 
SUbstantiating  clain-is  to  territorial  sovereignty,  such  as  registration  of  land  titles, 
imposition  of  land  tax;  registration  of  settlers  with  the  police;  registration  of  births, 
marriages  and  deaths;  animal  brand  registers;  imposition  of  military  service; 
electoral  rolls,  legal  transactions;  police  administration  and  judicial  activity  of 
various  types;  taking  of  censuses;  provision  of  health  and  educational  facilities.  ý 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Temple  case  between  Thailand  and  Cambodia,  both 
parties  adduced  evidence  of  acts  of  sovereignty  allegedly  performed  by  them  in  the 
Preah  Vihear  area.  This  evidence  included  official  visits,  administrative  tours, 
elephant  hunting,  road  repairs,  collection  of  taxes,  medical  inspection,  and  the 
upkeep  of  the  Temple.  Thailand  and  Cambodia  also  relied  on  what  the  Court 
described  as  'arguments  of  physical,  historical,  religious  and  archaeological 
character'.  But  the  Court  declined  to  regard  them  as  'legally  decisive'. 
Elaborating  on  this  latter  point,  Judge  Fitzmaurice  said  that  considerations  ofa 
topographical,  historical  and  cultural  character  might  have  sorne  legal  relevance  "in 
a  case  about  territorial  sovereignty  which  turns  on  the  weight  of'  factual  evidence 
that  each  party  can  adduce  in  support  of  its  claim,  and  not  on  any  more  concrete  and 
positive  element,  such  as  a  treaty" 
Another  form  of  evidence  for  the  practising  of  sovereignty  by  a  state  over  a 
territory  is  its  enactment  of  legislation  and  applying  it  to  the  residents  m  the  tcri-ItOrY. 
Sovereignty  is  also  practised  by  practising  the  right  of  executing  punishment  on 
Award  of  Her  Majesty  Queen  Flizabeth  11  for  the  Arbitration  of'  a  controversy  betwcen  Thc 
Argentine  Republic  and  The  RCPLIblic  ot'Chile,  1966,11.75-6.  Also  ILR,  WAS,  11.88. 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1962),  1.15. 
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those  who  disobey  the  laws,  whether  citizens  or  foreigners.  For  example,  one  of  the 
acts  treated  as  significant  by  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  Hi  the 
LegalSlatus  qf  Eastern  Greenland  case  was  legislation.  The  Court  pointed  out  that: 
Legislation  is  one  of  the  most  obvious  forms  of  the  exercise  of 
sovereignty  power.  8 
Legislation  is  not  considered  a  manifestation  of  sovereignty  if  its  airn  is  to  organize 
the  affairs  of  the  state's  citizens  in  the  territory.  The  same  goes  for  practising  the 
management  of  criminal  and  civil  rights  cases  for  those  citizens,  as  it  is  established 
in  international  law  that  a  state  may  issue  legislation  for  its  citizens  who  live  in  a 
territory  which  does  not  belong  to  the  state  without  any  influence  on  the  legal 
position  of  this  territory.  The  legal  right  of  a  state  according  to  international  law 
maybe  either  ratione  soll,  which  is  the  right  of  the  state  to  which  the  territory 
belongs,  or  ratione  personae  which  is  the  right  of  the  state  over  its  citizens  wherever 
they  are.  9  For  example,  in  the  case  of  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  between  the  UK  and 
France,  it  was  argued  by  France  that  the  practising  of  criminal  control  by  the 
authorities  in  Jersey  over  the  citizens  of  the  UK  was  according  to  r(itione  personue 
and  not  ratione  soli.  I  ()  The  International  Court  of  Justice  rejected  this  claim  and 
ruled  that  the  evidence  presented  by  the  UK  proved  that  according  to  the  law  in 
Jersey  it  was  a  regional  and  not  a  personal  element.  11  Thus,  referring  to  the  exercise 
of  criminal  jurisdiction  by  the  Courts  of  Jersey  in  respect  of'offerices  cornmitted  oti 
the  Ecrehos,  the  Court  observed  that 
the  Courts  of  Jersey,  in  criminal  cases  such  as  these,  have  no 
. 
jurisdiction  in  the  matter  of  a  criminal  offence  committed  outside  the 
Bailiwick  of  Jersey,  even  though  the  offence  be  committed  by  a 
'-  PCIJ,  Series  A/B,  No.  53,  P.  48. 
9-F.  A.  Taha,  al-Qcomw  ul-Dw/Y  wa  Almizaint  al-lldud  (International  Law  and  Boundary 
Disputes),  (1983),  1).  88. 
10 
-  ICJ  Pleadings,  Vol.  1,  P.  402, 
-See  the  oral  al-gyfflnent  Of  M  r.  II  alTiSO11,  COLHISel  t'  r  the  I  JK,  Ibid.  Vo  1.11,11.178.  0 8 
British  subject  resident  in  Jersey,  and  that  Jersey  authorities  took 
action  in  these  cases  because  the  Ecrehos  were  considered  to  be 
within  the  Bailiwick.  12 
The  residents  of  the  territory  and  the  extent  of  their  allegiance  to  one  ofthe  disputing 
parties  is  also  evidence  for  proving  the  sovereignty  of  a  state  over  the  territory.  This 
is  evident  in  the  desert,  where  tribal  systems  prevail.  The  sense  of  allegiance  to  the 
tribes  and  the  control  of  one  state  over  them  proves  the  sovereignty  of  that  state  in 
the  territory.  For  example,  in  the  DubailSharjah  border  arbitration  of  1981,13  Dubai 
and  Sharjah  had  been  under  the  protection  of  Great  Britain  since  1892,  but  without 
clearly  defined  boundaries.  The  extent  of  the  territory  controlled  by  a  particular 
Ruler  depended  on  which  tribes  gave  allegiance  to  him.  In  1937,  however,  when  the 
discovery  of  oil  led  companies  to  seek  concessions  from  the  Rulers,  Great  Britain 
took  steps  to  define  these  boundaries. 
As  regards  the  land  boundary,  a  British  official,  Julian  Walker,  surveyed  the 
territory  and,  on  the  basis  of  his  reports,  the  British  Political  Agent,  Mr.  Tripp,  made 
a  series  of  decisions  or  awards  in  1956-57  establishing  the  land  boundary,  although 
no  map  accompanied  these  awards.  The  Ruler  of  Dubai  declined  to  accept  these 
awards,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  both  Rulers  had  requested  the  British 
government  in  1954  to  arbitrate  these  boundaries.  14 
The  continuing  uncertainty  over  the  location  ofthe  land  hOUndary  impeded  good 
relations  between  the  two  Emirates,  and  two  areas  caused  special  friction.  The  first 
was  the  Al  Mamzer  peninsula,  part  of  the  coast  adjacent  to  DUbai  and  scparated 
from  Sharjah  town  by  Khan  Creek.  The  Tripp  award  had  placed  the  boundary  on  this 
peninsula  some  distance  west  of'  the  creek,  so  that  Shar 
, 
Jah  claimed  territory  on 
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which  Dubai  wished  to  extend  its  harbour.  The  second  was  Hadhib  Azana,  an  area 
further  inland  and  south-west  of  Sharjah  Town,  on  which  Sharjah  was  building  an 
industrial  estate  but  subýject  to  protest  from  Dubai.  15 
In  the  inland  desert  area,  the  line  established  by  the  Tripp  decision  had  followed 
certain  natural  features.  This  was  the  line  claimed  by  Sharjah.  Dubai  claimed  a  line 
further  to  the  north  and  east.  16  The  nomadic  tribe  whose  'dirah'  or  homeland  this 
area  was,  was  the  Bam  Qitab,  and  the  Sharjah  government  claimed  that  the  disputed 
territory  belonged  to  it  as  the  Bani  Qitab  were  subject  to  Sharjah's  control  and  owed 
it  allegiance.  The  government  of  Dubai,  on  the  other  hand,  believed  that  even  if 
there  was  any  allegiance  it  was  only  intermittent  and  that  the  Ruler  of  Sharjah  had 
no  real  control  over  the  Bani  Qitab.  It  added  that  on  several  occasions  this  tribe 
allied  itself  with  Dubai  and  that  action  taken  by  Dubai  in  the  region  showed  that  it 
exercised  effective  control  there.  17 
The  Court,  after  hearing  these  arguments  from  both  parties,  examined  the 
problem  of  allegiance  and  Sharjah's  control  over  this  tribe,  theri  the  questiori  ofthe 
Barn  Qitab's  alliance  with  Dubai  and  the  authority  of  the  latter  over  the  disputed 
territories,  and  finally  the  location  of  this  tribe.  18  1 Hie  Court  ruled: 
In  examining  the  frontier  in  the  interior,  the  Court  has  noted  the 
pre-eminent  importance  in  this  desert  region  peopled  by  nornads  of 
the  allegiance  which  the  tribes  owed  to  a  IZL]Ier.  According  to  local 
custom,  it  is  by  way  of  the  control  of  a  territory  by  a  tribe  owing  liffli 
allegiance  that  a  Ruler  may  possess  a  territory. 
In  the  present  case  the  Court  has  shown  that  the  Bani  Qitab  who 
inhabit  the  disputed  territory  owed  allegiance  to  the  IZLIICI'  Of'Shar 
' 
jah, 
even  if  at  times  there  were  temporary  interruptions  ofthis  link.  The 
Court  has  also  noted  that  the  Bani  Qitab  was  a  strong  tribe  in  control 
of  its  territory.  Of  course,  the  Bani  Qitab  showed  a  spirit  of 
independence  and  the  Ruler  of  Sharjah  had  many  dill'icultics  with 
-Ibid. 
Ibid.  P.  545. 
Ibid.  P.  636. 
Ibid. 188 
them,  but  the  British  authorities  always  recognised  that  the  territory 
inhabited  by  the  Bani  Qitab  was  a  part  of  Sharjah. 
The  Goverm-nent  of  Dubai  having  invoked  its  alliance  with  the 
Bam  Qitab  the  Court  has  indicated  that  such  an  alliance  had  no  legal 
effect,  the  tribe  not  having  by  reason  of  the  alliance  changed  its 
allegiance. 
As  for  the  alleged  acts  of  control  by  Dubai  itself,  the  Court  has 
shown  that  such  acts  were  done  either  during  an  alliance  or  that  their 
importance  was  insufficient  to  found  a  claim  to  an  effective  control 
of  the  region.  The  Bam  Qitab  have  not  become  independent  and  their 
territories  must  still  be  a  part  of  Sharjah. 
The  Court  has  also  found  that  since  1957  nothing  has  happened  to 
modify  the  situation  in  this  region  or  to  impair  the  legal  title  of 
Shaiýjah  which  it  possessed  before  this  date  and  which  was  confirmed 
by  the  decision  of  Mr.  Tripp-a  decision  applied  by  both  Parties.  '  9 
Further,  Munkman  argues  that  in  most  territorial  disputes  which  concern  inhabited 
territories,  the  way  inhabitants  believe  they  belong  to  a  state  reflects  the  actual 
administration  of  the  territory  by  that  state,  because  in  most  administrative 
procedures  the  voluntary  cooperation  of  the  inhabitants  is  necessary.  20 
In  the  case  of  the  three  islands,  Abu  Musa  and  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs,  the 
governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  practised  complete  sovereignty  of  all 
kinds,  administrative  and  legislative  over  these  islands.  In  addition,  the  inhabitants 
felt  allegiance  to  the  Qawasim  as  the  owners  and  rulers  of'  these  islands. 
Furthermore,  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  had  granted 
concessions  to  search  for  minerals  on  the  islands  and  in  their  territorial  waters  to 
foreign  Companies  from  1898  until  1971.  All  this  was  with  the  knowlccIgc  ol'the 
Iranian  government  who  kept  silent  about  the  exercise  of'  sovereignty  by  tile 
governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah,  which  indicates  its  acceptance  of'  the 
Qawasims'  ownership  of  the  islands. 
'9 
-  Ibid.  P.  65  1-2. 
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I  will,  therefore,  later  try  to  present  in  detail  some  of  the  evidence  of  exercise  of 
sovereignty  by  the  government  of  Sharjah  over  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  and  the 
exercise  of  sovereignty  by  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  two  islands 
of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb  up  to  the  Iranian  occupation  of  these  islands  on  30 
November  1971. 
8.3.  The  exercise  of  sovereignty  by  the  Sharjah  government 
over  Abu  Musa  island 
The  government  of  Sharjah  exercised  all  forms  of  sovereignty  over  the  island  of  Abu 
Musa,  Such  as  administrative  and  legal  authority  in  the  person  of  the  ruler  of  Sharjah 
or  his  representative  on  the  island,  or  the  police  appointed  by  the  government  to 
keep  law  and  order.  This  was  carried  out  peaceably  and  with  uninterrupted 
continuity.  Even  after  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  northern  part  of  the  island,  the 
government  of  Sharjah,  according  to  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  oii  29 
November  1971,  exercised  sovereignty  over  the  southern  part  without  any  changes. 
I  will  try  to  present,  in  detail,  examples  of  the  different  ways  by  whicli  the 
government  of  ShaKjah  exercised  sovereignty  over  the  island  ofAbu  Musa.  This  is 
supported  by  documents  which  have  not  been  used  before  to  analyse  the  dispute 
between  the  UAE  and  Iran  over  the  three  islands. 
8.3.1.  Flag  hoisling 
The  government  of  Sharjah  raised  her  flag  over  the  island  of'  Abu  Musa  in  1887. 
This  was  not  the  date  of  the  discovery  of  the  island  by  Sharjah.  As  we  mentioned 
earlier,  the  Qawasirn's  ownership  of'  the  island  goes  back  to  immemorial 
possession.  21  However,  the  government  of'  Sharlah  raised  its  Ilag  on  the  island  ol 
21 
-  See  Chapter  4,  P.  120. er  8 
Abu  Musa  as  a  sign  of  ownership  of  the  island.  This  was  done  after  the  Irani 
Z7,  ian 
government  expelled  the  Qawasim  from  Lingah  and  imposed  her  authority  on  it;  and  Z, 
also  after  her  occupation  of  the  island  of  Sirri.  Accordingly,  the  British  Political 
Resident  in  the  Gulfadvised  the  then  ruler  of  Sharjah  to  raise  his  nag  on  the  island 
of  Abu  Musa,  to  prevent  Iran  from  occupying  the  island  and  to  prove  Sharjah's 
sovereignty.  22  Tie  government  of  Sharjah  raised  its  flag  continuously  on  the  island 
(with  the  exception  of  short  intervals  when  the  Iranian  government  took  the  flag 
23 
away  from  the  island)  ,  until  the  day  of  the  occupation  of  the  northern  part  of  the 
island  by  Iranian  forces  on  30  November  1971.  Since  that  date,  the  flag  of  Sharjah 
has  continued  to  be  raised  on  the  southern  part  of  the  island  only,  according  to 
Article  2(b)  in  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding.  24 
8.3.2.  Issuing  passports  for  the  residents 
The  residents  of  Abu  Musa  island  registered  at  the  passport  office  in  Sharjah  as 
residents  and  citizens  of  Sharjah.  They  were  all  granted  passports  as  nationals  of 
Sharjah,  without  any  objection  from  the  Iranian  government,  and  have  used  their 
passports  to  visit  Arabic  countries,  India,  Pakistan  and  Iran.  For  example,  a  certain 
Mr.  Assad  Fudel  Abdullah,  born  in  the  island  of'Abu  Musa,  was  given  passport  No. 
4792,  issued  by  the  ruler  ol'Sharjah  Shaikh  Khalid  bin  Mohamed  Al-Qasim],  on  15 
August  1967.  Because  of  the  nature  of  his  work  as  a  sea  captain,  Mr.  Assad  would 
travel,  using  this  passport,  to  all  parts  of  Iran-such  as  Bandar  Abbas  and  Shiraz- 
without  facing  any  objections  on  the  part  ofthe  Iranian  govermnent.  )ý 
22 
-  See,  IMBG,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P.  334. 
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8.3.3.  Establishing  public  services 
The  exercise  of  sovereignty  of  the  Sharjah  government  over  AbLI  MUSa  island  has 
been  manifested  by  establishing  public  services  on  the  island,  such  as  a  clinic, 
schools,  a  police  station,  and  by  the  management  and  administration  of  all  sorts  of 
public  services,  including  the  supply  of  electricity  and  water  to  the  island's  residents. 
8.3.3.1.  Schools 
In  1963,  the  government  of  Sharjah  established  and  completed  the  building  of  the 
first  school  on  Abu  Musa  island.  At  first,  the  school  numbers  were  quite  small-one 
class  for  boys  and  another  for  girls;  thereafter,  it  expanded  to  become  two  separate 
schools.  The  government  of  the  time  requested  help  in  terms  of  management  and 
administration  from  the  Kuwaiti  Education  Office  in  Dubai.  In  1968,  the  Education 
Department  in  Sharjah  took  charge  of  managing  and  administering  Sharjah  schools, 
through  the  Kuwaiti  Education  Office.  Amongst  these  schools  were  those  in  Abu 
26 
Musa  island  . 
8.3.3.2.  Public  health 
At  the  beginning  of  the  1970s,  Abu  Musa  island  witnessed  the  establishment  of  a 
small  medical  clinic  to  offer  health  care  to  residents.  The  general  practitioner  was 
27 
employed  by  the  government  of  Sharjah 
. 
8.3.3.3.  Police  station 
Towards  the  end  of  the  1950s,  the  superintendent  cillef  constable  of  Sliar 
. lali,  it 
British  subject,  applied  to  the  ruler  of  Shar  jah  For  planning  permission  to  establish  a 
police  station  on  Abu  Musa  island  to  maintain  security  and  prevent  crime.  Planning 
2'-  interview  on  17/11/96  with  Mohamed  Diyah  Al-MUSa,  the  GelICYal  Malla,  "Cl'Ol'Shill'jall  TCleViSiOll 
and  formerly  a  teacher  in  Sharjah  schools. 
27 
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government  in  Abu  Musa  island. Chavier  8 
permission  was  granted  by  the  ruler  of  Sharjah,  and  the  bulldlng  of  the  small  poll., 
station,  in  which  the  residents  helped,  was  not  costly.  The  Sharjah  police  force  was 
put  in  charge  of  the  station's  running.  Ahmed  Mubarak  bin  Dukhan  was  the  First 
chief  constable  at  the  station  and  has  been  succeeded  by  many  others  until  the 
present  ay.  M 
8.3.3.4.  The  supply  of  Electricity  and  Water 
The  ruler  of  Sharjah,  Shaikh  Khalid  bin  Mohamed  Al-Qasimi,  ordered  the  Finance 
Department  in  Sharjah  to  pay  for  a  generator  to  supply  Abu  Musa  island  in  1967. 
This  was  done  to  satisfy  the  residents'  needs  and  supply  their  houses  with  electricity, 
replacing  the  kerosene  they  formerly  used  to  light  their  homes.  The  electrical 
engineer,  Sultan  bin  Khadim,  was  in  charge  of  installing  the  100  kw  Lister  generator 
which  was  delivered  from  Sharjah  to  the  island  using  a  boat  belonging  to  the  Sharjah 
government.  Diesel  is  still  being  delivered  as  fuel  for  the  generator  from  Sharjah  by 
sea,  along  with  drinking  water.  29 
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  Sharjah  government  continued  to  improve  and 
develop  Abu  Musa  island's  electricity  and  water  supply  up  until  the  Iranian  invasion 
began  at  the  north  of  the  island  in  1971.  Even  after  the  invasion,  in  1972,  three 
Volvo  generators  of  160  kW  were  installed.  in  1977,  a  Rolls  Royce  gerierator  ol'520 
kW  was  installed,  in  addition  to  the  others.  In  1979,  yet  another  generator  of  tile 
Rolls  Royce  type  and  of  520  kW  power  was  added.  In  1982,  two  G.  M.  (Gencral 
Motors)  generators  were  installed,  of'  620  kW  power.  in  1990,  a  large  G.  M. 
generator  of  1000  kW  power  was  added,  and  Iri  1994,  two  generators  01,  (,  atcl-pIllar 
iliake  and  of  728  kW  power  were  installed.  Regarding  water  supply,  two 
28 
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desalination  units  were  set  up  in  1977-,  French-made,  they  supply  125  ml  per  day. 
There  has  also  been  an  installation  of  three  diesel  generators,  French-made  and  ot 
140  kW  power  in  the  desalinating  station  to  supplement  the  supply  of  electricity.  30 
8.3.4.  Financial  subsidies  of  the  island 
The  government  of  Shaijah  provides  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  with  public  services.  It 
also  appoints  civil  servants  to  administer  these  services  and,  of  course,  pays  them 
salaries.  The  government  of  Sharjah  is  thus  exercising  her  sovereignty  by  managing 
the  different  financial  affairs  of  the  island. 
8.3.4.1.  Paying  the  salaries  of  employees 
The  government  of  Sharjah  pays  the  monthly  salaries  of  teachers  in  Abu  Musa 
School  and  of  its  Janitor.  It  also  pays  the  electricity  board  employees  and  mernbers 
of  the  police  forces.  Since  there  was  no  bank  in  Abu  Musa,  the  head  teacher 
Mahmud  Ebraheem  Al-Hamarnah  used  to  travel  to  Sharjah  at  the  beginning  of  each 
month  to  receive  all  the  salaries  of  employees  on  the  island.  The  Finance 
Department  in  Sharjah  used  to  issue  the  payroll  and  the  head  teacher  would  in  turn 
pay  each  employee  his  or  her  salary.  31 
8.3.4.2.  Supporting  the  residents  financially 
The  goverru-nent  of  Sharjah  used  to  support  the  residents  ofthe  island  financially  it' 
they  needed  to  build,  repair  or  improve  their  houses.  'I'lley  got  the  support  they 
needed,  no  matter  what,  to  improve  their  daily  lif'c  and  in  addition  the  government 
193 
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would  distribute  food  or  clothes  to  the  residents  of  the  island  on  different 
32 
occasions. 
8.3.5.  Collectingfies  and  inland  revenue 
The  representative  of  the  Shar  jah  government  on  Abu  Musa  island  used  to  collect 
fees  frorn  pearling  boats  and  those  ships  which  delivered  goods  or  needed  water  or 
some  protection  from  gales  etc.,  amongst  which  used  to  be  Iranian  ships,  who  were 
33  charged  the  same  fees 
. 
The  procedure  was  to  register  the  ship  with  the 
representative  of  the  ruler  and  record  the  fees.  A  copy  of  this  invoice  was  kept  for 
filing  with  the  governor's  offices  and  another  copy  was  issued  to  the  customer  who 
paid  the  duty.  The  representative  had  to  go  periodically  to  Sharjah  to  deposit  the 
taxes,  fees,  and  dues  collected.  The  administration  of  finance  regarding  these 
charges  was  the  rules  of  the  Chamber  of  Sharjah.  This  continued  up  until  the  Iranian 
34  Army  took  over  the  northern  part  of  the  island  . 
In  addition,  the  representative  of  the  ruler  would  collect  taxes  from  the  residents 
of  Abu  Musa  island.  Captain  Richard  Courage,  of  H.  M.  S.  Flamingo  and  the  Senior 
Naval  Officer  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  in  the  report  ofhis  visit  to  the  island  ofAbLi  Musa 
in  21  March  1951,  stated: 
The  island  is  owned  by  the  Sheikh  of'Shar 
. 
jah,  who  also  owns  the 
only  shop  in  the  one  small  village.  Taxes  are  collected  for  Shar 
- 
lah  by 
I  a  Sheikh's  representative.  15 
32 
_  Interview  on  20/11/1996  with  Mohamed  Khalil'ah  Bu-Ghanim,  representative  of'  the  Sharjah 
clovernment  on  Abu  Musa  island. 
33 
-  FO  371/174709,  Iranian  buoy  off  Abu  Musa,  Special  Report  from  F.  D.  W.  Brown,  Political 
Residency  in  Bahrain,  I  April  1964. 
34 
_  interview  on  20/11/1996  with  Mohamed  Khalifilh  BLI-Ghanim,  representative  of'  the  Shal-jah 
(Yovernment  oil  Abu  Musa  island. 
See  this  report  in  IMBG,  Vol,  15,1950-195  1,11.595. 195 
8.3.6.  Seeking  visas  (permissions)  for  visiting  or  leaving  the  island 
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  point,  the  government  of  Sharjah  exercised  its 
sovereignty  over  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  by  imposing  fees  on  the  ships  which 
docked  at  the  island,  or  on  the  person  profiting  from  its  voyage.  The  landing  ofsh'Ps 
or  persons  to  the  island  did  not  take  place  without  prior  permission  from  the  Ruler  of 
Sharjah  or  his  representative  on  the  island.  All  individuals  who  wished  to  enter  the 
island  either  for  visiting  or  for  profit-making  from  the  islands'  wealth  had  to  have 
acquired  a  permission  prior  to  their  entry.  In  addition,  this  manifestation  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  ruler  of  Sharjah  was  not  only  practised  and  applied  in  relation  to 
foreigners  but  also  in  relation  to  citizens  who  wished  to  move  from  one  island  to 
another.  In  every  case  a  permission  had  to  be  sought  beforehand. 
For  example,  on  17  August  1914,  the  vice-ruler  of  Lingah  wrote  a  letter  to 
Shaikh  Khalid,  the  Ruler  of  ShaKjah  asking  for  permission  on  behalf  ofRashid  bin 
Nasir  and  his  team,  who  had  travelled  with  him  from  Sirri  island  to  Abu  Musa 
island.  They  wanted  to  transfer  their  goods  and  properties  from  the  island  of  Abu 
Musa  and  wished  to  return  back  to  their  homeland,  the  island  of  Sirri.  36 
8.3.7.  Stopping  any  acts  of  aforeign  country  over  the  island  or 
territorial  waters 
The  government  of  Shaýjah  practised  its  authority  over  the  island  ol'AbLI  Musa  and 
its  territorial  waters  by  preventing  any  other  state  from  practising  any  kind  of 
authority  over  the  island.  This  was  reflected  in  complaints  to  the  British  Political 
Resident  or  by  effacing  the  acts  of  any  foreign  state  done  in  relation  to  the  island. 
,6-A.  J.  Al-Tadmori,  (IIJ117111-  cd-Arubitih  ýd-Thcdafh  (The  three  Arabian  Islands),  Ras  al-Khainial): 
Ras  al-Khairnall  Nationality  Press,  (1995),  1).  413. 8 
For  example,  on  29  December  1864  Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Saqar,  the  ruler  of  Ras 
al-Khaimah  (he  was  also  in  charge  of  Sharjah),  wrote  to  Colonel  Pelly,  Political 
Resident  in  the  Gulf,  to  explain  his  order  to  take  actIon  against  the  people  of  Dubai 
when  they  crossed  the  boundaries  and  entered  Abu  Musa  island  to  pasture  their 
cattle.  He  indicated  that  he  was  most  dissatisfied  with  their  action  and  said:  "No  one 
went  there  without  my  permission".  37 
Again,  in  April  1904,  the  ruler  of  Sharjah  raised  a  direct  objection  to  the 
lowering  of  his  flag  and  the  raising  of  the  Iranian  flag  on  Abu  Musa  by  a  Belgian 
employee  of  the  Iranian  Customs  and  Excise.  He  argued  that  this  was  entirely 
unacceptable  and  asked  the  British  government  to  take  action  against  this  according 
39  to  the  1892  treaty;  this  treaty  was  aimed  at  preventing  any  Persian  intrusion  . 
Further,  the  Ruler  of  Sharjah  asserted  his  sovereignty  over  the  territorial  waters 
of  Abu  Musa  island  when  an  Iranian  ship  laid  a  navigational  buoy,  ostensibly  for 
Iranian  shipping  boats,  off  the  Sharjah  island  of  Abu  Musa  island  on  22  February 
1964 
. 
39  Shaikh  Saqar  bin  Sultan  Al-Qasirm,  the  governor  of  Sharjah,  reacted 
violently  by  rejecting  this  action  which  might  interfere  with  the  authority  of  Sharjah 
over  Abu  Musa  island  and  its  territorial  waters.  He  ordered  the  buoy  to  be  removed 
40  and  officially  declared  the  fact  of  its  removal  publicly  on  17  April  1964. 
37 
_  IOR,  R/  1  5/l/246. 
38 
_  See  IMBG,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,  P.  33334. 
39 
-  FO  371/17/4709,  Iranian  buoy  off  Abu  Musa,  Special  Report  from  1ý.  D.  W.  Brown  Political 
Residency  in  Bahrain,  I  April  1964. 
40 
_  Ibid.  Decree  from  Saqar  bin  Sultan  Al-Qasimi,  Ruler  of'Sharjah  and  Dependence,  20  April  1964. 
See  Appendix  A,  Doc.  3,  P.  264. 
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8.3.8.  Signing  of  contracts  granting  concessions  over  the  island  of 
Abu  Musa 
Normally,  when  a  state  grants  a  concession  by  a  contract,  it  indicates  that  the  state 
owns  the  subject  of  the  concession.  It  also  indicates  that  the  beneficiary 
acknowledges  this  ownership.  Otherwise,  the  contract  would  be  meaningless. 
Therefore,  the  government  of  Sharjah  exercised  their  sovereignty  over  the  island  of 
Abu  Musa  through  the  contracts  which  granted  concessions  for  others  to  search  for 
minerals  on  the  island.  This  is  evidence  of  their  ownership  of  the  island  and  in  each 
instance,  the  acceptance  of  the  other  party  of  this  ownership. 
Historically,  the  first  concession  was  to  explore  for  red-oxide  in  the  island  of 
Abu  Musa,  and  this  began  in  1898.  It  was  the  initiative  of  the  vice-ruler  of  Sharjah, 
Shaikh  Salem  bin  Sultan,  the  uncle  of  Shaikh  Saqar  bin  Khalid,  the  Ruler  of  Sharjah. 
The  concession  was  concluded  by  three  people,  Hassan  bin  Samaiyeh,  a  British 
subject  who  resided  in  Lingah,  his  son  Abdullah  bin  Hassan,  and  another  person 
named  Isa  bin  Abdul  Latif.  4  1  Lingah  was  then  under  Iranian  occupation  but  the 
Iranians  did  not  object  to  the  concession  being  signed.  42 
On  I  June  1906,  Hassan  bin  Samaiyeh  signed  a  contract  with  Mr.  Robert 
Wonckhaus,  the  representative  of  one  of  the  German  companies  in  Bahrain.  This 
contract  authorised  the  German  company  to  buy  all  red-oxide  products  froin  tile 
island  of  Abu  Musa.  The  contract  was  for  four  years,  and  Mr.  Wonckhaus  had  the 
option  of  extending  this  period  if  lie  so  wished,  without  iieedirig  to  seek  the 
permission  of  either  the  rLder  or  the  VICe-I'LIICI'  ofSharlah.  "; 
41 
-  -iginal  agreement  in  IMBG,  Vol.  6,1903-1923,11.164.  See  the  translation  of  tile  oi 
42 
-  See  Letter  No.  91  from  the  Mayor  in  the  Ports  of'  Persian  (;  tilt'  to  the  Foreign  Ministry  in  Iran, 
dated  14  Shawwal  1328  H,  Kazhih  Asnml  Kalqj  FW-is  (Selected  Documents  of  Persian  Cull),  Vol.  1, 
Islands  of  Persian  Gulf,  Institute  for  Political  and  International  StL]diCS,  (  1989),  P.  28  1. 
"-  See  this  contract  in  IMBG,  Vol.  6,1903-1923,  P.  166. Chamer  8 
By  this  Hassan  bin  Samaiyeh  was  in  breach  of  his  contract  with  the  Ruler  of 
Sharjah.  It  also  meant  that  the  Ruler  of  Sharjah  was  in  breach  of  his  treaty  of  1892 
with  the  British  government.  The  treaty  prohibited  any  foreign  contractors  from 
entering  into  any  agreement  or  relation  other  than  with  Britain.  Should  the  vice-ruler 
enter  into  this  treaty  with  Germany  to  invest  in  red-oxide  production,  then,  he  would 
be  breaching  the  conditions  of  the  British  treaty.  Thus,  the  Ruler  of  Shalliah 
cancelled  the  new  contract  with  the  German  company,  which  had  been  signed  and 
granted  by  Hassan  bin  Samaiyeh.  This  resulted  in  the  German  company  ceasing  its 
44  activities  in  Abu  Musa  island 
. 
Following  this,  the  British  company,  Messrs.  F.  O.  Strich  acquired  the 
concession  for  searching  for  red-oxide  on  the  island  of  Abu  Musa.  The  company 
signed  a  contract  in  1923  with  the  Ruler  of  Sharjah,  Shaikh  Khalid  bin  Ahmed,  for 
45  five  years  . 
Again,  on  28  January  1935,  Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Saclar,  the  ruler  of'Sharjah  signed 
another  contract  to  invest  in  red-oxide  production  on  the  island  of  Abu  Musa.  'rhe 
contract  was  signed  with  Commander  Robert  Corbett  Bayldon  R.  N  (Retired)  of' 
Henley-on-Thames,  UK,  and  continued  up  until  the  mid  1960s 
. 
46 
8.3.9.  Administration  ofjustice  in  the  island 
The  government  of  Sharjah  exercised  jurisdiction  by  taking  action  against  any  crlllle 
in  the  province  of  the  Abu  Musa  island  and  enforced  security  through  the  police 
station,  or  their  representative  before  the  police  station  was  established.  For 
example,  in  1882  the  ruler  of  Sharjah  was  told  that  IIIS  house  in  Abu  Musa  island 
198 
44 
_  Ibid.  13.162. 
45 
Ibid.  Vol.  7,1920-19  30,  P.  39. 
, 16 
-  -eenient  ill  Ibid.  vo).  1  o,  1935-1937,11.135.  See  the  text  ofagt 199 
had  been  burgled,  but  there  was  no  clear  indication  as  to  how  much  had  been  stolen. 
An  investigation  was  carried  out  and  foot  prints  were  kept  on  file  for  examination. 
The  governor  sent  for  a  specialist  to  examine  the  foot  prints  and  appointed  an 
investigative  team  to  search  for  the  offender  and  make  a  list  of  what  had  been  stolen. 
The  investigation  showed  that  the  offenders  had  broken  into  private  boxes  in 
Shaikh's  house  thinking  that  these  were  money-boxes.  The  specialist  recognised  the 
foot  prints  as  belonging  to  a  man  from  Habashah  and  two  others  from  the  Gull'. 
After  further  investigations,  it  was  found  that  these  men  were  followers  of  the  ruler 
of  Umm  al-Qaiwain. 
47 
It  is  clear  from  this  case  that  the  governor  of  Sharjah  practiced  criminal 
. 
jurisdiction  over  the  island  of  Abu  Musa,  by  his  undertaking  investigations  once  he 
heard  about  the  theft,  whereas  the  government  of  Iran  had  no  role  to  play  in  this 
case. 
8.4.  The  exercise  ofsovereignty  by  the  Ras  al-Khaimah  government 
over  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb  islands 
Before  explaining  evidences  presented  by  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  to 
prove  its  practising  of  sovereignty  over  the  two  islands  ot'Greater  and  Lesser'Funbs, 
it  should  be  made  clear  that  sometimes  the  three  islands  followed  one  government, 
sometimes  the  government  of  Sharjah.  At  other  times  It  WOUld  be  the  government  of 
Ras  al-Khaimah  that  the  islands  followed.  ]'his  is  because,  during  those  tinics,  the 
two  Emirates  were  Unified  under  a  Qasinil  ruler. 
In  the  same  way  that  the  government  of'  Shar  jah  exercised  sovereignty  over  the 
island  of  Abu  Musa,  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khairriah  exercised  sovereignty  over 
47 
_  IOR,  R/15/1/246,  A  letter  Irom  Haji  AbU  al-Kasem  Residency  Agents  in  Sharjah  to  the  British 
Political  Resident  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  dated  24  November  1882.  See  Appendix  A,  Doc.  4,  P.  265. Chapter  8  2_00 
the  two  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Turib.  This  was  carried  out  in  all  Forms  of 
sovereignty  suitable  for  these  two  islands  in  an  effective  and  continuous  fashion, 
until  their  occupation  by  Iranian  forces  on  30  November  1971.  Since  that  date,  the 
government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  has  lost  all  forms  of  authority  in  the  two  islands.  The 
inhabitants  of  Greater  Turib-the  one  of  the  two  which  was  inhabited  -deserted  the 
island.  Without  inhabitants,  the  Iranian  control  over  the  two  islands  became 
complete.  Therefore,  our  explanation  of  the  exercise  of  sovereignty  by  the 
government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  two  islands  will  examine  the  period  up  to 
the  date  of  their  occupation. 
8.4.1.  Flag  hoisting 
The  date  of  raising  the  flag  of  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  two 
islands  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  date  of  raising  the  Sharjah  flag  over  the  island  of 
Abu  Musa,  which  was  in  1887.  This  was  undertaken  for  the  same  reason,  i.  e.  the 
Iranian  occupation  of  the  island  of  Sirri.  Since  then  the  flag  was  raised  continuously 
(with  a  few  exceptions  where  the  Iranian  government  took  it  away  from  both 
islands)  until  the  date  of  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  two  islandq  on  30  Novernber 
1971.48 
8.4.2.  Issuing  passports.  for  the  residents 
As  with  the  residents  of  Abu  Musa  island,  the  same  passport  procedure  applied  to 
the  residents  of  the  Greater  Tunb.  They  registered  at  the  passport  office  in  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  as  nationals  and  were  all  granted  passports  to  use  on  their  visits  to  other 
countries  with  no  obýjcction  raised  by  the  Iranian  government.  On  18  February  1964, 
for  example,  a  certain  Mohamed  I  lassan  Abdullah,  born  In  Greater  Turib,  was  giveil 
See  IMBG,  VoI.  7,1920-1930,  P.  3-14 
48  Also  see  Telegrams  File  of'GreaterTunb  Police  Station  by 
Ras  al-Khaimah  Police  fleadqUaftel-S,  Telegram  dated  12/5/197  1. 8  201 
passport  No.  5843  from  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  to  use  while  working 
abroad.  He  travelled  to  various  Arab  states,  including  Qatar.  The  passport  was  issued 
as  being  valid  for  all  Arab  countries,  India,  Pakistan  and  Iran.  49 
8.4.3.  Establishing  public  services 
The  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  practised  its  full  administrative  sovereignty  by 
constructing  and  managing  public  services  in  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb.  It  also 
offered  different  services  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  island,  in  proportion  to  the  size  of' 
population,  such  as  education,  security,  electricity,  water,  and  health  care.  The  Al- 
Salumi  Building  Company  was  in  charge  of  building  any  public  utilities  in  Greater 
Tunb  island  before  the  Iranian  invasion  of  the  island.  50 
8.4.3.1.  School 
In  Greater  Tunb  island,  Al-Qasimiah  School,  a  mixed  school,  was  established  as  a 
result  of  planning  permission  issued  by  the  governor  of  Ras  a]-Khan-nah.  'I'lic 
government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  authorised  the  Qatari  Education  Office  to  manage 
and  administer  the  school,  since  the  office  was  in  charge  of  managing  all  the  schools 
in  Ras  al-Khaimah  at  that  time  in  the  mid-1960s.  Najm  Abbud  A'-Isa  was  the  first 
teacher  and  head  teacher  at  this  school.  In  1968,  the  Education  Department  M  Ras 
al-Khaimah  took  over  through  the  auspices  of  the  Qatari  Education  011-icc  in  Ras  al- 
Khaimah.  The  Greater  Tunb  School  was  arnong  these  schools  administered  froni  the 
Education  Department  in  Ras  al-Khaimah.  -ý 
49 
_  See  Appendix  A,  Doc.  5,  P.  267. 
50 
_  -ams  File  of  Greater  Tunb  Police  Station  by  Ras  al-Khainiali  Police,  Tcle-mm  dmu  See  Tele,  i 
28/10/1971. 
Interview  on  18/9/1993  with  Abdul  Ralinian  Moliamcd  Abu  A]-Qasni,  Activities  chaii  man  at  the 
Education  Office  in  Ras  al-Khainiah,  and  a  rcsidents  0fGII'CatCI-TUIIh  iShInd. Chcpfer  8  202 
8.4.3.2  Police  station 
The  police  station  in  Greater  Tunb  island  was  established  towards  the  end  of  the 
1960s,  and  planning  permission  was  granted  by  the  governor  of  Ras  al-Khaimah 
Shaikh  Saqar  bin  Mohamed  Al-Qasimi.  This  station  was  administered  centrally  From 
the  police  headquarters  in  Ras  al-Khaimah.  The  first  policeman  in  charge  of  the 
station  was  Abdullah  Mohamed  Humaid.  The  mission  of  this  station  expired  when 
52 
the  Iranian  army  invaded  the  island. 
8.4.3.3.  The  supply  of  Electricity  and  Water 
Greater  Tunb  island  was  provided  with  a  Diesel  generator  by  the  government  of  Ras 
al-Khaimah.  Again  the  fuel  was  delivered  from  Ras  al-Khaimah  and  still  being 
delivered  regularly  until  1971.53  In  addition,  regular  maintenance  was  organised 
through  the  Electricity  Board  in  Ras  al-Khaimah  up  until  the  Iranian  Invasion.  54 
Water  is  available  in  this  island  and  thus  there  was  no  need  to  deliver  it  from  Ras  al- 
Khaimah.  However,  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khairnah  paid  to  niakc  water 
available  for  all  public  buildings.  For  instance,  the  government  of'  Ras  al-Khairnah 
paid  500  Riyals  per  month  in  1970  to  supply  Tunb  police  station.  5 
8.4.3.4.  Health  services 
Since  there  were  no  advances  in  health  care  in  the  Gulf  region  bcl'ore  the  1970s  mid 
the  population  was  small  on  Greater  Tunb  island,  a  patient  would  be  required  to  visit 
one  of  the  Emirates  in  order  to  receive  treatment.  I  lowever,  should  niany  lall  sick, 
S2 
_  interview  on  511  1/1996  with  Shaikh  Talib  bin  Saclar  Al-Qasijni,  Chict'  ConstabIc  of'  Ras  al- 
Khaimah. 
"'-  See  Telegrams  File  of'  Greater  Timb  Police  Station  at  Ras  al-Khainiah  Police  I  lead(Inartcl*s, 
Telegram  from  the  General  Manager  of  Electricity  in  Greater  Tunt);  Ahmed  Molianied  Malinuid,  1ý  Z, 
dated  10/6/1970. 
54 
_  Ibid.  Telegram  dated  7-22/8/1970 
Z, 
5-'-  Ibid.  Telegram  dated  20/6/1970. Chapter  8  203 
then  the  government's  representative  or  the  police  station  on  the  island  would  ask 
the  Emirates'  governor  for  a  medical  doctor  to  treat  them.  56 
8.4.4.  Financial  subsidies  of  the  islands 
In  addition  to  the  offering  and  managing  of  public  services  for  the  inhabitants  of  the 
island  of  Greater  Tunb,  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  practised  sovereignty  by 
organising  financial  matters  such  as  paying  wages  for  civil  servants  on  the  island. 
The  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  was  responsible  for  paying  the  employees' 
salaries  (teachers  and  policeman).  It  also  paid  the  Imam,  57  who  was  receiving  200 
Riyal  per  month.  58  After  Iran  invaded,  the  residents  were  deported  and  payments  by 
Ras  al-Khaimah  accordingly  stopped. 
8.4.5.  Collectingfees  and  inland  revenue 
The  Ras  at-Khaimah  government  clearly  exercised  sovereignty  over  the  Greater 
Tunb  island  by  imposing  and  collecting  fees,  taxes  and  inland  revenue.  These  taxes 
and  fees  were  collected  from  all  ships  entering  the  island's  waters  to  trade  or  to  fish 
or  to  dive  for  pearls.  Taxes  were  evidence  that  the  island  was  under  the  control  of 
the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah.  For  example,  Biscoe,  the  British  Political 
Resident  in  the  Gulf,  in  his  report  to  convince  the  governor  of'  Iýas  al-Khall"zill  to 
lease  Tunb  island  to  the  Iranian  government,  indicated  that  it'  this  took  place,  then 
"The  Shaikh  should  continue  to  be  entitled  to  collect  from  the  pcarling  boats  his 
customary  dues".  59  The  fee  was  one  Riyal  for  the  ship  awaiting  at  Tunb  Island  zind 
56 
_  I-anis 
File  of  Greater  Tunb  Police  Station  at  Ras  al-Khaimah  Police  Headquarters,  Sec  'felep 
Telegrams  date  22/8/1970,3/12/1970,18/5/197  1  and  14/11/197  1. 
57  The  Imain  is  *he  person  who  looks  after  the  Mosque. 
See  Telegrams  File  of'  Greater  Timb  Police  Station  at  Ras  al-Kl,  ýjijjjalj  police  I  leadqual-ICI-S, 
Telegram  date  17/7/197  1. 
"' 
-  See  this  report  in  IMBG,  Vol.  8,1930-  1933,11.87. Chapter  8  204 
was  collected  by  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  or  its  representative.  60  In 
addition,  taxes  were  gathered  from  the  ships  passing  by  the  lighthouse.  " 
8.4.6.  Seeking  visos  (permissions)  for  visiting  the  islands 
The  routine  legal  position,  known  to  residents  of  the  island,  is  that  it  was  required  by 
law  to  acquire  a  visa  (permission:  leave  to  stay,  leave  to  remain)  through  a  standard 
application  forrn  available  from  the  governor's  offices.  Therefore,  legally,  any 
visitor  who  wished  to  visit  or  leave  the  island  was  expected  to  check-in  or  check-out 
as  a  standard  routine.  Any  other  procedure  to  enter  or  leave  the  island  was 
considered  illegal. 
For  example,  in  1936,  the  British  Agent  in  Trucial  Oman  wrote  to  Shaikh  Sultan 
bin  Salem  Al-Qasimi,  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  to  seek  a  visa  for  his  visit  to  the 
Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb  islands.  The  visit  was  to  take  place  as  soon  as  the  visa  was 
granted  so  that  the  Agent  could  visit  the  engineer  Mr.  Brant,  who  worked  on  Abu 
Musa  island.  The  objective  of  the  visit  was  to  look  for  red-oxide.  62 
The  British  Agent  wrote  again,  on  7  February  1937,  to  Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Salem 
to  inform  him  of  their  findings  and  to  say  that  Golden  Valley  and  Co.  was  interested 
in  buying  the  red  oxide.  The  company  sought  a  visa  for  its  engineer  to  allow  lurn  to 
take  samples  of  the  red  oxide  in  the  islands  ofLesser  and  Greater  Tunb,  bel'ore  the 
full  agreement  could  be  signed.  63 
On  the  same  subject,  the  British  Agent  wrote  a  letter  on  I  February  1938,  to 
Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Salern  to  inform  him  that  the  red-oxide  engineer  needed  to  visit 
"'-  See  Telegrams  File  of  Greater  Turib  Police  Station  at  Ras  al-Khalmah  Police  lleadquar(er.  s, 
Telegram  date  12/9/1970. 
61 
-F0371/13721,  Letterfrom  IndiaOfficetol3ritish  MinistryofForckm  Affairs,  -'s  (Molm  1929 
62 
_  Vil  I  Sol,  &E.  1kins,  Reporton  the  Tuilb  Islands,  Attorneysat  I.  a%v,  no  10, 
11.90. 
Ibid.  Doc.  No.  15,11.95. 205 
Greater  Tunb  for  four  or  five  days  to  test  the  metal  and  explaIn  to  Shalkh  li's 
findings.  64 
On  9  May  1971,  an  Iranian  boat  with  100  passengers  coming  from  Bandar 
Abbas  and  going  to  Dubai  asked  for  permission  to  stop  at  Greater  Turib  as  all  the 
passengers  wanted  to  visit  the  island.  However,  the  constable  in  charge  at  the  police 
station  asked  them  to  wait  for  him  to  seek  the  advice  of  his  senior  officer,  because 
all  permissions  had  to  be  granted  centrally  through  the  Police  and  Security 
Headquarters  in  Ras  al-Khaimah.  The  superintendent  did  not  grant  them  permission, 
and  hence  the  constable  in  charge  asked  them  to  leave  the  island.  65 
About  five  months  after  the  previous  incident,  three  merchant  ships  arrived  at 
the  island  in  transit  from  Dubai  to  Iran.  They  asked  for  permissioii  to  land  their 
goods  on  the  island,  but  the  constable  in  charge  asked  them  to  wait  until  he  had 
telegrammed  the  Ras  al-Khaimah  Police  Headquarters,  which  refused  to  grant  them 
this  permission  and  gave  them  one  hour  to  leave  the  harbour.  66 
The  sovereignty  of  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  was  not  only  practised  oti  and 
applied  to  foreigners  but  also  in  relation  to  citizens'  exits  I-or  Greater  Tunb;  the 
representative  of  the  ruler  wrote  on  12  January  1971; 
From  Yousil'  Mohamed  Ali  to  Shaikh  Sa(lar  bin  Mohamed  Al- 
Qasimi,  the  ruler  of'  Ras  al-Khannah,  I  wish  to  inflorm  You  that  the 
Said  Ismail  Kharnis,  from  the  citizens  ol'Tunb  island  wishes  to  seek- 
07 
permission  to  transfer  to  Ajman  Imiratc 
. 
"' 
-  Ibid.  Doc.  No.  16,1'.  96. 
65  See  Telegrams  File  of  Greater  Tunh  Police  Station  at  Ras  al-Khaimah  Police  Headquarters, 
Telegram  date  9/5/1971. 
66 
-  Ibid.  Telegrain  date  18/10/197  1. 
(17 
-  Our  translation,  the  original  text  is  written  ill  the  Arabic  langpla""C-  See  I'Clegranis  File  of  (  11  Calcr 
Tunb  Police  Station  at  Ras  al-Khainiall  Police  I  Icadquarters,  Tcle,,  rarn (late  1  2/l/I  97  1. r8 
8.4.7.  Stopping  any  acts  of  aforeign  country  over  the  islands 
200 
The  government  of  Ras  at-Khaimah  exercised  its  sovereignty  over  Greater  Tunb 
island  by  different  means.  It  prevented  any  state  or  individual  from  undertaking  any 
activity  on  the  island  without  its  permission.  Even  if  a  permission  was  granted  to  any 
individual  or  government,  it  was  never  unconditional.  Rather  was  it  limited  and 
restricted  to  whatever  the  job  was  and  this,  in  any  case,  meant  no  intertercrice  with 
the  sovereignty  of  the  Ras  al-Khaimah  government. 
The  ruler  of  Sharjah  (he  was  also  in  charge  of  Ras  al-Khaimah)  allowed  the 
British  government  to  build  a  lighthouse  to  guide  ships  and  boats  when  coming  to 
Greater  Tunb.  Guarantees  were  made  by  the  British  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf, 
Sir  Percy  Cox,  to  ensure  that  there  was  no  interference  in  the  island's  sovereignty 
and  he  was  able  to  assure  the  Sharjah  ruler  that  the  ultimate  authority  rested  witli  the 
ruler. 
69 
On  16  October  1887,  the  ruler  of  Sharjah  felt  under  threat  from  the  Persiaii 
government,  because  he  feared  that  Iran  intended  to  invade  GreaterTunb  island  after 
the  occupation  of  Sirri  island.  The  ruler  sought  protection  from  the  British 
government  in  India,  requesting  British  help  in  preventing  fraii  from  invading  'I'Unb, 
69 
and  securing  its  withdrawal  from  Sirri  island  . 
In  April  1904,  the  ruler  of  Sharjah  condemned  the  lowering  oftlic  Qawas,  11, 
from  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb  and  the  raising  oftlic  Iranian  flag  in  its  place.  I  le 
asked  the  British  government  to  take  the  necessary  Illeasures  according  to  tile  treaty 
70 
of  1892 
. 
See  Telegrams  from  Political  Resident  to  Shaikh  of'  Slim-  I  jah,  28  Sclitcniber  N  12  ill,  d  22  octo 
1912  ill  IMBG,  Vol.  5,1903-1924,11.599-600. 
69 
_  See  IM13G,  Vol.  7,1920-1930,11.333. 
70 
-  Ibid.  P.  334. Chapter  8  207 
In  1949,  Iranians  tried  again  to  ruii  up  their  flag  over  the  island  of  the  Lesser 
Turib,  but  this  time  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  reacted  very  quickly.  Ile 
immediately  sent  his  people  to  pull  down  the  Iranian  flag  and  informed  the  British 
Resident  of  what  had  happened 
.71 
This  action  was  taken  to  uphold  the  sovereignty 
of  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah. 
8.4.8.  Signing  of  contracts  granting  concessions  over  the  islands 
and  their  territorial  waters 
Another  evidence  of  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah's  ownership  of  the  two 
islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb  was  her  exercise  of  sovereignty  by  signirig 
contracts  with  foreign  companies  for  the  right  to  search  for  minerals  on  the  islands. 
On  6  February  1952,  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  signed  a  contract  with  Golderi 
Valley  and  Co.  This  contract  allowed  the  company  to  extract  and  export  red-oxide 
from  the  Tunb  islands  for  21  years  from  the  date  of  signing  the  contract  . 
72  1,11C 
contract  was  sanctioned  and  legalised  by  the  British  Political  Residem  iii  Sharjah  on 
73  1  February  1952 
. 
The  same  company  had  been  granted  permission  by  the  ruler  of' 
Sharjah  to  invest  in  extracting  and  exporting  the  red  oxide  From  Abu  Musa  island. 
Fhe  exercise  of  sovereignty  of  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khairnah  over  the 
Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb  islands  did  not  stop  at  the  extraction  and  exportation  of'rcd 
oxide,  but  was  expanded  to  include  new  contracts  Ior  the  exploration  I'or  od  m  the 
islands  and  its  territorial  waters. 
"-  Ibid.  Vol.  15,1950-195  1,  P.  60  1. 
See  the  text  of  the  ag  72 
_  reement  in  Vinson  &  Elkins,  op.  cit  ,  (loc.  no.  17,  P.  97.  Also  M.  A[- 
Mahmoud,  The  Merits  of  Iran's  Claim  to  the  Islands  ofAbu  Mjjsj  it,,  (]  IjilplIblishc(l  -1,11csij, 
(1983),  11.193. 
71 
_  A.  M.  Al-Sawaidi,  al-.  hmv,  al-Arubiah  (11-Thaluth  ham  al-Nuiit 
Arabiah  al-A4ashrwuh  (The  Arabic  islands  between  the  Iranian  claims  aild  (lie  legal  Arabic 
rights),  (1984),  P-44. Chapter  8  208 
In  1935  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Company,  through  its  Abadan  branch  in  South 
Iran,  wished  to  search  for  oil  in  Ras  al-Khaimah  according  to  the  Exploration 
Agreement  of  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Company  Limited  with  the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al- 
Khaimah.  The  island  of  Greater  Tunb  was  not  mentioned  in  the  survey.  This  resulted 
in  the  rulers  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  sending  a  letter  to  the  company  manager  oil  28 
October  1935.  They  drew  his  attention  to  the  island  and  asked  whether  he  wanted  to 
search  in  it.  74  On  2  November  Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Salem,  the  ruler  of  Ras  al- 
Khaimah,  repeated  his  note  concerning  the  island  in  a  letter  he  sent  to  Mr. 
Elkington,  General  Manager  of  Exploration  Company  Limited.  He  said: 
I  now  wish  to  address  you  in  connection  with  our  island  'Tunb' 
and  would  like  to  know  if  the  company  wishes  to  have  it  surveyed,  as 
75  it  is  not  free  of  oil,  red  clay  and  other  mineral  S. 
Since  the  Abadan  branch  was  not  aware  to  whom  the  island  belonged,  Mr.  Elkington 
sent  a  letter  on  13  November  to  the  head-quarters  in  London.  He  inquired  whether 
the  island  was  included  in  the  territory  of  Ras  al-Khaimah: 
We  are  not  aware  of  what  rights,  if  any,  the  Shaikh  has  over 
'Tunb'  Island,  and  have  asked  the  Political  Resident  to  advise  LIS  Oil 
this  point.  We  have  also  requested  Mr.  Williamson  to  point  out  to  the 
70  Shaikh  that  our  option  covers  all  his  territor,  es. 
In  the  same  subject  Mr.  Elkington  sent  a  copy  of  this  letter  to  the  Political  lZesl(lent 
in  the  Gulf  at  Bushire.  77  On  16  Novcniber  19-)  1111  35  the  Political  Resident  in  the  GLilfat 
Bushire  wrote  to  the  General  Manager,  the  Anglo-h-aniaii  Oil  Company  1.1  1 
Abadan  answering  his  question  saying: 
"-  BP  Archive,  71727  Trucial  Coast,  Ras  al-Kliaimali  26/4/1935-22/2/1936.  Also  scc  Appendix  A, 
Doc.  6,  P.  269. 
71 
_  Ibid.  Also  see  Appendix  A,  Doc.  7,  P.  27  1. 
76 
_  Ibid.  Also  see  Appendix  A,  Doc.  9,  P.  274. 
77 
-  Ibid.  Also  see  Appendix  A,  Doc.  8,11.273. Chapter  8  209 
Tanb  is  definitely  within  the  territories  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  and 
therefore  falls  within  the  company's  option,  vide  the  Shaikh's  letter 
dated  29  Rabi  11  13354,  to  the  D'Arcy  Exploration  Company.  'g 
On  the  basis  of'  the  Political  Resident's  letter,  Mr.  Elkington  sent  a  letter  on  2 
December  1935  to  Shaikh  Sultan  bin  Salem,  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah, 
confirming  that  the  island  of  Tunb  was  included  in  the  territories  of  Ras  al-Khaimah 
and  that  they  would  be  searching  it  if  necessary: 
Further  to  our  letter  No.  72-1-117  dated  the  13th  November,  we 
have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  as  regards  your  Island  of  'Tunb', 
we  should  expect  to  prospect  there  if  it  was  deemed  necessary,  as 
being  in  your  territory  it  is  covered  by  the  terms  of  our  option.  79 
On  3  March  1964,  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  Shaikh  Saqar  bin  Mohamed  Al- 
Qasimi,  concluded  a  contract  for  the  oil  exploration  with  two  American  companies: 
the  Union  Oil  Exploration  and  Production  Company  and  the  Southern  Natural  Gas 
Company.  80  This  agreement  specifically  included  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Turib 
islands  within  the  concession  area.  81  The  contract  was  also  legalised  by  the  British 
government,  according  to  a  political  agreement  on  5  March  1964  between  the  Britisli 
government  and  the  two  American  Companies.  82 
8.4.9.  Administration  ofjustice  in  the  island 
Before  establishing  the  police  station  in  the  island  of  Greater  Turib,  tile 
representative  of  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khainiah  on  the  island  enforced  rules  to  keep 
law  and  order.  After  the  establishment  of'  the  police  station,  it  was  the  police's 
78 
-  Ibid.  Also  see  Appendix  A,  Doc.  10,  P.  275. 
79 
-  Ibid.  Also  see  Appendix  A,  Doc.  11,  P.  276. 
8() 
-See  the  text  of  the  agreement  in  Vinson  &  Elkins,  op.  cit.,  Doc.  No.  23,  P.  108. 
"-  Ibid. 
82 
-  See  the  text  of  the  political  agreement  in  M.  A.  Shoukri,  Msulul  al-duzur  fi  al-Khliij  al-,;  Irahi  viv 
al-Qanun  al-Dawli  (The  case  of  the  islands  in  Arabian  Gulf  and  International  Lawy  (  1972), 
P.  97.  Also  T.  M.  Abed,  cil-Ihieled  al-Askan  /i 
. 
111-7111-  41)i  Musa,  'Punb  al-Kubra,  I/- 
Sughra  (Iranian  military  occupation  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunl)  an(]  Lesser  Tunh  islands), 
(  1983),  P.  102. 210 
authority  to  arrest  outlaws,  interrogate  them  and  ask  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaii-nah  t'or 
a  decision  on  their  punishment.  For  example,  on  Sunday  30  August  1970,  the 
Greater  Tunb  police  arrested  a  rnan  called  Abbas  Musam,  a  citizen  ofthe  island,  lie 
had  been  found  drunk  and  in  a  quarrel  with  other  residents.  83  11  e  was  punished  with 
a  jail  sentence  according  to  the  order  of  the  Ras  al-Khaimah  Police  and  Security 
84  Headquarters;  he  was  released  on  II  September  1970 
. 
On  the  same  day  of  his  release,  Abbas  Musam  reported  that  his  house  had  been 
burgled.  The  Greater  Tunb  police  convicted  Said  All  Khamis  and  Khalil  E.  braheern 
of  this  crime.  85  They  confessed,  were  charged  and  found  guilty.  The  charge  was 
determined  by  the  Police  Headquarters  in  Ras  al-Khaimah.  86 
At  11:  30  a.  m.  on  30  December  1970,  Greater  Tunb  police  reported  that 
Mohamed  Ali  Mohamed  from  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb  had  shot  his  wit'e 
accidentally  when  he  was  cleaning  his  PiStol.  87  Ills  wll'e  had  been  shot  through  in 
eye  and  the  bullet  had  exited  behind  her  ear.  Turib  police  investigated  and  kept  the 
man  and  his  weapon  in  custody.  88  The  woman  was  taken  to  the  emergency  services 
and,  since  there  was  no  treatment  for  such  cases  on  the  island,  she  was  transferred  to 
Ras  al-Khaimah  to  be  treated.  89  The  results  of  all  investigations  showed  that  it  was 
an  accident  and  that  the  husband  had  not  intended  to  harin  his  wife.  FLA-d"ICI-11101-C, 
since  the  wife  and  her  family  dropped  the  charges,  the  man  wits  relcascd  on  2 
November  1971  by  the  Tunb  police. 
90 
Telegrams  File  of  Greater  Tunb  Police  Station  at  Ras  al-Khaimah  Police  I  leadquarters,  I  elcgian, 
date  3  1/8/1970- 
Ibid.  Telegram  date  11/9/1970. 
See  the  bulletin  which  was  SUbmitted  by  the  Said  Abbas  Musam,  dated  11/9/1970,  Ibid. 
96 
-  See  the  confession  of  defendants  to  thieving,  dated  11/9/1970,1  bid. 
87 
-  See  the  bulletin  dated  30/12/1970,  regarding  the  woman's  injuries,  Ibid. 
,8-  See  the  interrogation  and  the  invcstipation  ofMoIjajjcd  I  All  Mohamed  on  3012/1970,  Ibid, 
89 
-  See  the  telegram  regarding  the  treatment  ofthc  woman  on  30/  12/1970,  Ibid. 
90 
-  See  the  telegram  which  states  the  release  ofthe  liti.  sband  on  2/1/197  1.  Ibid. - 
2-1-1- 
Other  evidence  to  show  that  security,  law  and  order  rested  with  the  governor  of 
Ras  al-Khaimah  is  that  in  Greater  Tunb,  at  7:  30  a.  m.  on  5  July  1971,  Greater  Tunb 
police  station  reported  to  Ras  al-Khaimah  Police  Headquarters  that  a  man  called 
Ahmed  Mohamed  Mahmud,  a  resident  of  the  island,  was  in  breach  of  the  peace  and 
had  conspired  against  the  representative  of  the  governor  and  the  police  forces.  91  On 
the  same  day,  the  Police  Headquarters  in  Ras  al-Khaimah  sent  a  telegram  to  Greater 
Tunb  police  station  to  arrest  the  man  and  this  order  was  signed  by  Shaikh  Saqar  bin 
Mohamed  Al-Qasimi,  the  governor  of  Ras  al-Khaimah.  The  order  asked  Greater 
Tunb  police  to  bring  the  said  man  to  Ras  al-Khaimah  as  soon  as  possible  in  order  to 
sign  the  order  of  his  punishment  and  enforce  law  and  order.  92 
This  discussion  of  the  exercise  of  different  forms  of'  sovereignty  by  the 
government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  two  islands  of  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb 
shows  that  the  exercise  of  sovereignty  by  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  over 
the  island  of  Lesser  Tunb  was  very  limited.  This,  however,  does  not  reduce  the 
sovereignty  rights  of  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  this  island.  First,  the 
island  is  not  inhabited.  The  requirements  of  international  law  are  very  limited  11or  the 
practising  of  sovereignty  over  remote  or  uninhabited  territories.  Secondly,  the  island 
of  Lesser  Tunb  is  related  to  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb.  Both  islands  should  be 
considered  together  as  a  group.  Sovereignty  does  not  have  to  be  manifest  on  every 
point  of  territory.  Related  islands  lorm  a  special  case,  in  which  the  practising  ol 
sovereignty  over  one  island  in  a  group  of  islands  extends  to  the  other  islands  M  the 
same  group.  93  This  is  what  Judge  Iluber  stated  in  the  case  ofthe  Islantl  of  Paltnas: 
See  the  Memorandum,  which  was  sent  to  Greater  Tunh  Police  regardino  Ahmed  Mohamed 
Mahrnud  on  5/7/197  1,  Ibid. 
92 
_  See  the  order  and  the  warrant  to  arrest  Ahmed  Mohamed  Mahnnid  on  5/7//197  1,  Ibid. 
93 
-  See  D.  W.  Bowett,  The  Legal  Regime  (?  f  Ishinds  in  h7tej-jjjjj(),  7(j1  1979),  11.45- Chapter  8  212 
As  regards  to  groups  of  islands,  it  is  possible  that  a  group  may 
under  certain  circumstances  be  regarded  as  in  law  a  unit,  and  that  the 
fate  of  the  principal  part  may  involve  the  rest.  Here,  however,  we 
must  distinguish  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  act  of  first  taking 
possession,  which  can  hardly  extend  to  every  portion  of  territory, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  display  of  sovereignty  as  a  continuous  and 
prolonged  manifestation  which  must  make  itself  felt  through  the 
whole  territory.  94 
Therefore,  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  had  practised  different  forms  of 
sovereignty  over  the  two  islands,  as  a  unit,  in  a  continuous  and  peaceful  fashion  until 
the  day  of  the  Iranian  occupation. 
After  displaying  the  different  forms  of  exercising  sovereignty  by  the 
governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  three  islands,  the  question  is, 
to  what  extent  was  the  allegiance,  acceptance  and  cooperation  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  islands  with  the  two  governments  in  the  administration  of  the  islands  actual  and 
peaceful? 
8.5.  Allegiance  of  the  inhabilants'of  the  islands  to  the  Sharjah 
and  Ras  al-Khaimah  governments 
Among  evidence  of  the  sovereignty  of  a  state  over  the  territory  is  the  extent  of'  the 
feeling  of  allegiance  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants,  their  compliance  with  the  rules, 
and  their  cooperation  with  the  government.  In  the  case  of  the  three  islands,  we  stated 
in  the  definition  of  the  dispute  between  Iran  and  the  UAFI,  that  the  Inhabitants  of'  tile 
islands  of  Abu  Musa  and  Greater  Tunb  arc  a  braiich  oftlic  Arab  tribes  which  hiliabit 
the  two  Emirates  ot'Shaijah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah,  such  as  the  tribes  ol'Sudan,  I  lurez 
95 
and  Tarnim.  '  These  tribes  are  allies  with  the  tri*bc  of  Qawaslin,  they  accept  its  I-Ljlc 
and  they  feel  they  belong  to  it.  11'  the  original  tribes  accept  the  rule  of'  the  Qawasim 
9"-  RIAA,  Vol.  11,  P.  845. 
See  Chapter  3,  P.  34,36. Chapter  8 
and  consider  themselves  their  allies,  then  the  branches  of  these  tribes  follow  the 
original  tribes  in  accepting  and  allying  themselves  with  the  Qawasim. 
Another  point  is  that  by  the  time  of  the  establishment  of  the  passport  system  for 
travelling  in  the  two  Emirates  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
islands  of  Abu  Musa  and  Greater  Tunb-as  mentioned  earl  ler-registered  their  names 
at  the  department  of  passports  as  citizens  of  these  Emirates  and  also  applied  to 
acquire  passports  when  they  needed  these  to  travel  abroad.  96  This  is  a  demonstration 
of  their  feeling  of  allegiance  to  the  two  Emirates,  otherwise  they  would  have  gone  to 
the  Iranian  government  to  apply  for  passports. 
We  also  notice  the  insistence  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  islands,  Abu  Musa 
and  Greater  Tunb,  to  belong  to  the  Qawasim  before  as  well  as  after  the  Iranian 
occupation  of  the  islands,  as  the  Honourable  Lt.  Col.  H.  V.  Biscoe,  Political  Resident 
in  the  Gulf  mentioned  in  his  report  on  6  January  1931  to  the  Foreign  Secretary  of  the 
British  Government  of  India.  The  way  in  which  the  ruler  of'  Ras  al-Khaimah  was 
convinced  to  lease  the  Tunb  island  to  the  Iranian  government  at  that  time  is  also 
important:  if  the  ruler  agreed  to  the  lease,  then  "that  the  inhabitants  of  the  island 
would  remain  subjects  of  the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  and  that  no  kind  of  pressure 
would  be  brought  on  them  to  become  Persian  subjects".  97 
Even  after  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  islands,  the  inhabitants  insistcd  ot-i 
allegiance  to  Sharjah  as  they  have  lived  III  the  SOLIthern  part  ol'  the  island  of'  Abu 
Musa  until  the  present.  The  inhabitants  01'  tIIC  ISIMICI  Of  GI*CýItCl'  TLIIII)  refused  the 
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Iranian  offer  to  receive  Iranian  nationality  and  all  related  rights  if  they  stayed  on  the 
island.  They  insisted  on  refusing  the  offer  and  left  for  Ras  al-Khaimah.  98 
Another  aspect  of  the  feeling  of  allegiance  to  the  governments  of  Shar  ah  and 
Ras  al-Khaimah,  is  the  degree  and  extent  of  cooperation  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
islands  of  Abu  Musa  and  Greater  Tunb  with  the  ruler,  his  representative  or  the 
police.  For  example,  it  was  the  inhabitants  of  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  who  helped 
the  goverment  to  build  the  police  station  in  the  1950s.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was 
no  cooperation  with  the  Iranian  forces  on  the  day  of  occupation.  The  inhabitants  of 
Greater  Tunb  refused  to  cooperate  and  stay  under  Iranian  rule,  and  they  left  the 
island.  The  inhabitants  of  the  island  of  Abu  Musa  who  stayed  in  the  southern  part  of 
the  island,  according  to  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding,  stayed  in  isolation  from 
the  Iranian  forces  which  were  stationed  in  the  northern  part.  This  is  a  strong 
indication  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  islands  of  Abu  Musa  and  Greater  Tunb  refuse  to 
belong  to  Iran,  refuse  the  rule  of  the  Iranian  government,  and  insist  on  belonging  to 
the  Emirates  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  and  being  governed  by  their 
governments  as  the  owners  and  rulers  of'  tile  islands  until  the  present.  This  is 
supported  by  the  fact  that  some  Arab  and  non-Arab  countries  used  to,  and  still  do 
recognize  the  allegiance  of  the  inhabitants  of'  the  islands  to  the  governments  of' 
Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah. 
8.6.  The  third-parly  recognition  of  the  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah 
governments'  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands 
The  acceptance  and  recognition  by  other  statcs  that  tile  three  islands  are  owned  by 
the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khairnah  and  that  tile  Inhabitants  belong  to 
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those  two  Emirates  means  the  recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  these  two 
governments  over  the  three  islands.  As  explained  earlier  in  the  definition  of  the 
dispute  over  the  islands,  since  the  arrival  of  the  British  in  the  Gulf  region  and  the 
imposition  of  their  control  on  the  area,  they  recognized  that  the  ownership  of  the 
three  islands,  Abu  Musa,  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunb,  belong  to  the  tribe  of  the 
Qawasim  who  used  to,  and  still  do,  govem  the  two  Emirates  of'Sharjah  and  Ras  al- 
Khaimah.  There  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  Iran  had  sovereignty  over  these  islands 
before  the  British  presence.  99  British  recognition  the  ownership  of  Qawasim  of  the 
three  islands  was  continuous  until  it  left  the  region  in  197  1. 
Arab  and  non-Arab  countries  recognized  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  island  of 
Greater  Tunb  belonged  to  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khairnah,  before  and  after  the 
Iranian  occupation  of  the  island  on  30  November  197  1.  Kuwait  and  the  Kingdom  of' 
Saudi  Arabia,  for  example,  permitted  entry  for  the  purpose  of  visiting  to  Moharned 
Ali  Mohamed,  who  was  born  in  Tunb  island  and  carried  passport  No.  131897  issued 
in  Ras  al-Khaimah  on  14  July  1965.100  This  indicates  the  formal  recognition  by  tile 
two  countries  that  the  passport-ho  I  der's  was  a  national  ofthe  government  of'Ras  al- 
Khaimah. 
Another  example,  from  a  non-Arab  Lountry,  iS  tile  ISSLIC  Of'tWO  visiting  visas  by 
the  government  of  India  in  1967,  the  first  was  to  Mohamed  Malirnoud,  born  onTunt) 
island  and  carrying  passport  No.  B4792  issued  In  Ras  al-Khannah  on  22  February 
1967,1  01  and  the  other  visa  was  issued  to  Mohamed  All,  born  on  Tunb  island  and 
carrying  passport  No.  B4794  issued  in  Ras  al  102  -Khaimah  22  February  1967.  Se 
9,  See  Chapter  3,  P.  63. 
See  Appendix  A,  Doc.  13,11.279. 
See  Appendix  A,  Doc.  14,  P.  28  1. 
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two  men,  because  of  the  nature  of  their  work  as  sailors,  had  travelled  to  India  every 
year  using  the  same  passports  issued  from  Ras  a]-Khaimah  since  the  date  of  the  first 
visa  issued  to  them  until  1972.  This  implies  the  formal  recognition  of  the  Indian 
government  that  the  above-mentioned  men  born  in  Greater  Tunb  were  rational  of' 
Ras  al-Khaimah,  before  and  after  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  island. 
The  recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al- 
Khaimah  over  the  three  islands  and  the  consequent  nationality  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  islands  was  not  limited  to  some  Arab  and  non-Arab  countries,  but  also  extended 
to  include  the  Iranian  government  itself  on  many  occasions.  This  was  expressed 
either  by  the  acquiescence  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras 
al-Khaimah  or  by  the  acceptance  that  the  inhabitants  were  nationals  of  the  two 
governments. 
8.7.  Iran  acquiesces  and  recognizes  the  sovereignty  of  Sharjah  and 
Ras  al-Khaimah  governments  over  the  three  islands 
As  argued  earlier,  acquiescence  is  when  a  state  takes  a  negative  stand  In  the  Cace  of' 
the  violation  of  its  rights  from  another  state.  This  is  implied  in  the  silence  and  the 
lack  of  protest  in  a  case  which  should  initiate  a  reaction  to  express  the  protest  of  a 
state  towards  the  actions  of  another  state.  Otherwise,  silence  and  lack  of  protests 
indicate  acceptance  and  acquiescence  ofthe  actions  ofthe  ()tile,.  State.  103 
In  the  case  of  the  three  islands,  AbLi  Musa  and  the  Greater  and  LesserTunbs,  we 
can  see  from  the  history  of  the  dispute  and  the  lorms  of  exercising  sovereignty  by 
the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khainiali  over  these  islands,  that  the  Iranian 
government,  or  bodies  representing  the  Iranian  governi-nent,  kept  silent  in  niany 
cases  towards  the  actions  of  the  two  governments  regarding  the  islands.  Moreover, 
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in  some  cases  the  Iranian  government  entered  into  negotiations  to  rent  the  island  01' 
Greater  Tunb  from  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  which  indicates  its 
acceptance  and  recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and 
Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  three  islands. 
8.7.1.  The  acceptance  of  the  Iranian  government  to  leasing  of  the  island 
of  Greater  Tunb 
We  noted  in  the  historic  background  of  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands  that  in 
1930  negotiations  took  place  between  Sir  Robert  Clive,  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Tehran  and  Teymourtache,  the  Iranian  Minister  of  Court  at  the  time,  on  how  to  solve 
the  dispute  over  the  islands.  The  Iranian  Minister  of  Court  suggested  to  the  British 
Ambassador,  amongst  the  solutions  that  the  Iranian  government  would  be  willing  to 
accept,  was  the  leasing  of  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb  from  the  ruler  of  Ras  al- 
Khaimah.  He  also  said  that  the  Iranian  side  was  ready  to  pay  the  lease  as  long  as  it 
was  a  long-term  one.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  put  forward 
conditions  which  were  not  accepted  by  the  Iranian  government  and  the  contract  was 
not  signed.  104  These  negotiations  to  lease  Greater  Tunb  indicates  the  recognition  of 
the  Iranian  government  of  the  ownership  and  sovereignty  of  the  island  of  Greater 
Tunb  by  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah.  Otherwise,  the  Iranian  Minister  of' 
Court  would  not  have  suggested  to  the  BrItIsh  Ambassador  in  Teliran  a  lease  ol'the 
island. 
8.7.2.  The  recognilion  of'lhe  Iranian  governmeni  that  lhe  inhabilants  ofthc 
island  of  Abu  Musa  were  nationals  ofthe  government  of'Shaý,  iah 
We  have  mentioned  that  Assad  Afudel  Abdullah  Lised  to  travel  I'm  business  to 
Bandar  Abbas  and  Shiraz  frequently  From  August  1967  to  September  197  1.  Dun  ng 
2  17 
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that  time  he  was  never  refusal  entry  into  Iran  even  although  he  travelled  oil  a 
passport  issued  from  the  government  of  Sharjah,  nor  was  there  any  objectioii  based 
on  the  fact  that  he  was  born  on  the  island  of  Abu  Musa.  105  The  same  goes  for  Salem 
Obaid  Salem  who  was  born  in  Abu  Musa  island  and  carried  passport  No.  14519 
issued  by  the  government  of  Sharjah  on  6  August  1971.  lie  travelled  to  Iran  on  25 
August  1971  with  no  objection  on  the  part  of  the  Iranian  authorities.  106 
Moreover,  the  Iranian  authorities  formally  recognized  that  the  inhabitants  of  the 
island  of  Abu  Musa  were  nationals  of  a  foreign  state  and  not  Iran.  The  proof  ofth's 
is  that  the  Iranian  government  registers  all  electronic  equipment  carried  by  a 
foreigner  on  his  passport.  This  system  is  applied  in  Iran  to  all  foreigners.  The  idea  is 
that  whoever  enters  Iran  with  any  electronic  equipment  must  leave  Iran  with  the 
equipment  and  the  record  will  be  checked  on  the  passport.  Nevertheless,  Iranian 
citizens  are  treated  differently,  and  are  required  to  pay  Customs  and  FAcise  duty 
upon  entry.  Thereupon,  on  25  August  1971,  Salem  Obaid  Salem  travelled  to  Iran, 
carrying  a  transistor  radio  in  his  luggage.  When  he  reached  Bandar  Abbas,  the 
Customs  and  Excise  in  Bandar  Abbas  recorded  the  radio  specifications  and 
estimated  its  value  in  his  passport.  On  8  September  1971,  when  he  decided  to  leave 
Iran  through  Kanarek  (a  seaport  near  Blujestan),  they  recorded  in  his  passport  that  lie 
had  left  with  the  radio  that  had  been  recorded  on  his  entry.  107 
This  formal  action  indicates  the  recognition  that  the  inhabitants  ol'thc  island  of 
Abu  Musa  were  nationals  of  Shagah  and  not  the  Iranian  government. 
"" 
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8.7.3.  The  recognition  by  Iranianformal  bodies  that  the  three  islands 
are  not  under  Iranian  sovereignty 
The  fact  that  the  Iranian  authorities  did  not  assert  their  sovereignty  over  the  three 
islands  is  evidence  of  their  recognition  and  acquiescence  that  these  islands  are  under 
the  sovereignty  of  another  state.  For  example,  on  19  September  1954,  the  islands  in 
the  Gulf  under  Iranian  sovereignty  were  defined  so  that  oil  could  be  searched  for  in 
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them  by  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Company  and  they  could  be  named  in  Schedule  I  of 
the  agreement  between  Iran,  the  Iranian  National  Oil  Company  and  the  Consortium 
members.  A  letter  from  the  Anglo-Iraman  Oil  Company  Ltd.  to  the  Ministry  of 
Finance  stated: 
In  view  of  the  expressed  desire  of  the  Government  of  Iran  to 
improve,  as  far  as  possible,  the  economic  status  of  the  islands  in  the 
Persian  Gulf  under  Iranian  sovereignty,  and  named  in  Schedule  I  of 
the  Agreement  between  Iran,  NIOC  and  the  Consortium  members,  the 
Consortium  members  undertake  to 
(a)  Either  commence  exploration  work  for  oil  or  gas  on  at  least 
one  island  in  each  of  the  three  groups  designated  below  within 
seven  years  of  the  Effective  Date,  or  exclude  and  release  from  the 
Area  of  the  Agreement  any  such  group  of  islands  in  which 
exploration  work  has  not  so  commenced. 
(b)  Either  discover  oil  or gas  on  at  least  one  island  iii  each  of'such 
groups  within  fifteen  years  of  the  Fffective  Date,  or  exclude  and 
release  from  the  Area  of  the  Agreement  any  such  group  in  which 
oil  or  gas  has  not  been  so  discovered. 
(c)  Either  produce  on  each  of  such  islands  oil  or  gas  for  shipment 
therefrom  by  the  end  of  the  twenty-third  year  from  the  Effective 
Date,  or  exclude  from  the  Area  of  any  continuation  of  the 
Agreement  under  Section  B  of  Article  49  any  Such  island  1rom 
which  oil  or gas  has  not  been  so  produced. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  letter  the  groups  of'  islands  referred  to  above 
shall  consist  of 
Group  I-  Q1shm,  flengain  and  I  lorniLiz 
Group  2-  Hindurabi,  Qais  and  Shu  Aib 
Group  ')  -  Kharg  and  KhargLi 
and  each  group  shall  include  the  area  lying  within  a  line  three  miles 
offshore  from  the  lowest  tide  line  ofeach  of'such  islands  in  that  group. 
The  obligations  undertaken  by  this  letter  shall  be  pertbrined 
through  the  Exploration  and  Producing  Company  and  shall  be  sLib_jcct 
to  the  provisions  ofthe  Agreement  as  ifthis  letter  were  itsell'a  part  of' 
the  Agreement. 220 
This  letter  shall  be  deemed  to  be  dated  as  of  the  Effective  Date  of' 
the  Agreement.  '  08 
It  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  letter  did  not  mention  the  three  disputed  islands.  Anglo- 
Iranian  Oil  Company  had  been  granted  permission  to  search  by  the  government  of 
Ras  al-Khaimah  in  1935,  and  had  then  asked  to  whom  the  island  of  Tunb  belonged. 
Iran  did  not  draw  attention  to  the  absence  of  the  three  islands  from  the  definition,  as 
had  the  ruler  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  in  1935.  They  kept  silent  over  the  matter,  and  three 
Iranian  official  departments  ratified  it;  these  were  the  Iranian  Embassy  in  London, 
the  Iranian  Consulate  in  New  York,  and  the  Iranian  Consulate  in  Lahay.  109 
This  indicates  that  official  Iranian  bodies  recognized  that  the  three  islands  were 
not  under  Iranian  sovereignty.  Otherwise,  they  would  have  asked  to  add  these 
islands  to  one  of  the  groups  of  islands  under  the  Iranian  sovereignty,  even  if  in  a 
later  letter. 
8.8.  Conclusion 
I  conclude  from  the  above  that  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah 
practised  different  forms  of  sovereignty,  such  as  administrative  and  legal,  over  the 
three  islands  of'  Abu  Musa  and  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Tunbs  until  the  date  of'  the 
Iranian  occupation  of  the  islands  on  30  November  1971.  This  was  done  elTectively 
and  in  a  continuous  and  peaceful  Eashion,  in  proportion  to  the  circumstances  ofthe 
islands  in  terms  of  area  and  size  of  population.  Moreover,  the  inhabitants  of'  the 
islands  had  the  feeling  of  belonging,  and  accepted  the  rule  of'  the  gowniments  of 
Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  which  Icd  to  thcir  cilective  cooperation  in  the 
administration  of  the  islands. 
""-  BP  Archive,  1091333  Iranian  Oil  Participants'  A-reements  19-24  September  1954. 
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I  also  conclude  that  some  Arab  and  non-Arab  countries  recognized  the 
sovereignty  of  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khairnah  over  the  three 
islands,  and  the  allegiance  of  the  inhabitants  to  the  two  governments.  Even  Iran 
accepted  and  recognized  formally,  in  many  instances,  this  sovereignty  and  the 
allegiance  of  the  inhabitants. 
Following  the  discussion  of  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands  in  the  previous 
chapter,  the  question  should  be  answered:  How  should  the  dispute  between  Iran  and 
the  UAE  be  solved? 222 
CHAPTER  NINE 
Possible  Means  of  the  UAE  to  Achieve  Pacific  Settlement 
of  the  Dispute 
9.1.  Introduction 
Since  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  three  islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  'rUnb  and 
Lesser  Tunb,  the  governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  have  been  trying  to 
find  a  peaceful  settlement  for  this  dispute  with  Iran,  according  to  Article  33  (1)  of' 
the  UN  Charter.  This  sets  out  the  means  which  should  be  l'ollowed  to  reach  a  pacific 
settlement: 
The  parties  to  any  dispute,  the  continuance  of  which  is  likely  to 
endanger  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security,  shall, 
first  of  all  seek  a  solution  by  negotiation,  inquiry,  mediation, 
conciliation,  arbitration,  judicial  settlement,  resort  to  regional 
agencies  or  arrangements,  or  other  peaceful  means  of  their  own 
choice. 
Initially  this  was  done  by  contacting  Arab  countries  to  present  the  dispute  to  the 
Security  Council  in  order  to  find  a  settlement  of'  the  dispute  without  my  violence. 
Since  the  admission  of  Sharjah  to  the  UAE  on  2  December  1971  and  the  admissio", 
of  Ras  al-Khaimah  on  10  February  1972,  the  UAE  has  endeavoured  by  diplomatic 
and  political  means'  to  find  a  settlement  for  the  dispute,  since  it  represents  the  two 
goverturients  in  front  of  the  international  community. 
1-  According  to  sorne  authors,  the  pacific  settlement  ot'disputes  is  divided  into  diplomatic,  legal  and 
political  means.  Diplomatic  means  include  negotiations,  good  oil-ices,  mediation,  inquiry  and 
conciliation;  legal  means  include  international  arbitration  or  tile  courlý  whereas  political  nicans 
include  international  and  regional  organisations.  See  A.  S.  Abu  Hail"  al-()(momi  al-Oatvli  al-"Iam 
(Public  International  Law),  (  1995),  11.727.  Also  M.  A.  Shokri,  Msa/t  al-Juzur  li  al-Khalcei  al-llrahi 
iva  al-Oamm  al-Dawli  (The  Case  of  the  Islands  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  and  International  Law), 
(1972),  P.  224.  Also  F.  A.  Talia,  al-Qanwn  wa  Mnazaint  al-Hadzid  (I  nternational  Law  and 
Boundary  Disputes),  (1982),  P.  147.  Also  M.  Al-Mjjljob,  (1q)(11101111  tj1-j)zjjj,  ji  (Public 
international  Law),  (1994),  P.  425. Chapter  9  223 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  highlight  the  attempts  made  by  the  UAL  to  settle 
the  dispute  peacefully  with  Iran,  and  the  peaceful  methods  which  the  UAF1  call  adopt 
to  regain  possession  of  the  three  islands.  I  will  first  explain  the  UAE  efforts  to 
present  the  dispute  to  the  Security  Council  for  a  settlement.  Then  I  will  discuss  the 
Abu  Dhabi  negotiations  in  1992  between  the  parties,  and  the  use  of  the  good  offices 
of  the  State  of  Qatar  for  dispute  settlement.  Finally,  I  will  present  my  opinion  oil 
how  to  reach  a  peaceful  settlement  to  this  dispute. 
9.2.  The  UAEpresenting  the  dispute  to  the  Security  Councilfor 
a  settlement 
The  Security  Council  plays  a  great  role  in  the  settlement  of  disputes,  which  first  has 
the  right  to  invite  the  disputing  parties  to  settle  their  dispute  by  peaceful  means.  21t- 
the  disputing  parties  fail  to  settle  their  dispute  by  peaceful  means,  it  is  then 
obligatory  that  they  present  the  dispute  to  the  Security  Counci  1.3  It  is  permissible, 
however,  for  the  disputing  parties  to  present  their  dispute  to  the  Security  Council 
directly,  without  referring  firstly  to  peaceful  means.  In  this  case,  the  Security 
Council  would  issue  its  proposals  for  the  peaceful  settlement  ofthe  di  Sputc  .4 
These 
proposals  are  not  obligatory  and  it  is  up  to  the  disputing  parties  to  adopt  these 
5  proposals  or  refer  to  other  peaceful  rneans  as  long  as  they  do  not  adopt  me,  ir  asL  es 
which  would  either  keep  the  dispute  going  or  allow  the  to  situation. 
On  3  November  1971,  the  day  of  the  occupation  ofthe  two  islands  of'  Greater 
Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  by  Iranian  forces,  the  government  of'  Ras  al-Khailliali  sent  a 
message  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  UN  arid  another  to  the  Security  COLIFIC11 
-  Article  33)  (2)  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN. 
3  Ibid.  Article  37  (1). 
Ibid.  Article  3  8. 
Ibid.  Article  48-49. - 
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requesting  their  intervention  to  end  the  Iranian  occupation  by  the  Iranian  withdrawal 
from  the  two  islands  and  sought  their  help  In  settling  the  dispute  peacefully.  '  The 
government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah  did  not  find  any  positive  reactiori  frorn  either,  which 
7  made  it  have  recourse  to  Arab  countries  and  urge  them  to  raise  the  issue  at  the  [JN 
. 
After  the  request  of  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khaimah,  an  urgent  complaint 
was  presented  to  the  Security  Council  on  30  December  1971  by  Iraq,  Algeria,  Libya 
and  Southern  Yemen.  They  asked  for  an  emergency  meeting  of  the  Security  Council. 
Accordingly,  on  9  December  1971  the  Security  Council  held  a  meeting  especially  to 
discuss  the  case  and  find  a  peaceful  settlement  for  the  dispute'after  inviting  the  four 
Arab  countries  who  had  presented  the  request  plus  Kuwait,  UAE  and  Iran  to  Join  in 
discussing  the  case  of  the  occupying  of  islands'without  giving  any  of  them  the  right 
to  vote.  8 
After  a  discussion  of  a  few  hours  without  coming  to  a  solution,  the  Somali 
representative,  who  at  the  time  was  a  non-permanent  member  of  the  Council, 
proposed  ending  the  meeting  and  postponing  the  discussion  to  a  future  meeting,  to 
be  arranged  later,  in  order  to  give  a  chance  for  diplomatic  efforts  to  look  l'or  a 
settlement.  9  Accordingly,  the  case  was  postponed  and  has  not  bccII  discussed  by  tile 
Security  Council  since  then. 
it  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  Security  Couricil  issued  document  No. 
S/1996/603  on  26  August  1996  which  sought  to  reduce  the  CoLuicil's  agenda  by 
removing  disputes  which  had  beeii  pending  before  it  I'or  thaii  five  years.  Among 
these  problems  was  the  case  of'  the  Iranian  occupatiori  of'  the  three  islands  of  Abu 
6 
,  See  these  letters  in  Vinson  &  Elkins:  AUonwys  at  lAw,  Repml  on  the  linh  Islan&,  SulmniHed  to 
Ras  al-Khaimah  Government,  Houston-l'exas,  (1980y  I'Doc.  No.  303. 
7 
Ibid.  P.  Doc.  No.  302  ý  305. 
See  SCOR,  26  Year  1610  le  Meeting:  9  December  1971,113-4. 
Ibid.  P.  24. - 
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Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb.  The  permanent  representative  of  the  UAF,  to 
the  UN  objected  to  their  being  dropped  and  sent  a  message  to  this  effect  to  the 
chairman  of'  the  Council.  He  emphasised  the  necessity  of'  keeping  the  case  of'  the 
Iranian  occupation  for  the  three  islands  on  the  agenda  until  the  Iranian  government 
ended  her  illegal  occupation  of  the  three  islands  and  the  UAE  governments  regained 
their  actual  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands.  The  Security  Council,  in  response  to 
this  request,  refrained  from  cancelling  the  case  of  the  occupation  of  the  three  Islands 
from  its  agenda  until  Iran  ended  her  occupation  of  the  islands.  () 
The  dispute  over  the  three  islands  has  continued  without  any  developments 
since  1971.  No  diplomatic  contact  was  made  to  search  for  a  peaceful  settlement  until 
the  Islamic  revolution  in  Iran  in  1979.  Mr.  Rashed  Abdullah,  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  for  the  UAE,  sent  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  UN  declaring  his 
country's  wish  to  settle  the  dispute  with  the  new  government  of  Iran  by  d1plomat1c 
means.  ''  The  Iranian  government  did  not  respond  to  this  invitation.  The  situation 
remained  without  any  development  despite  the  efforts  of  some  Arab  countries  who 
suggested  mediating  in  the  dispute,  but  all  initiatives  were  refused  by  the  Iranian 
government.  The  Iranian  refusal  remained  until  1992,  when  the  Iranian  navy 
prevented  some  of  the  inhabitants  of  Abu  Musa  and  those  who  worked  oii  the  islarid 
from  entering  it.  This  behaviour  initiated  a  reaction  froin  the  government  ol'  UAF, 
since  it  contradicted  the  Memorandum  ot'Understanding  which  Iran  had  signed  with 
the  government  of  Shar*  12  jah.  The  government  of  the  UAl'  recluestcd  the  Iran' 
government  to  enter  Into  negotiations  between  the  two  countries. 
-See  Appendix  A,  Doc.  18,11.294. 
-  Al-Khaleci,  21  August  1980. 
12 
_  See  Chapter  3,  P.  6  1. 226 
9.3.  Abu  Dhabi  negotiations  in  1992  between  the  VAE  and  Iran 
Negotiation  is  the  exchange  of  opinions  between  two  disputing  states  with  the  ann 
of  reaching  a  solution  of  the  active  dispute  between  them.  13  Negotiations  are  carried 
out  by  direct  communications,  which  are  done  by  presidents  of  states  and  ministers 
of  foreign  affairs  or  their  representatives.  This  is  usually  done  in  an  international 
conference  which  is  held  with  the  aim  of  finding  a  settlement  for  a  specilic 
international  dispute.  The  advantage  of  this  means  is  that  it  happens  with  much 
freedom  for  all  parties,  allowing  the  parties  to  continue  or  postpone  the  negotiations 
for  good  reasons.  14 
Following  the  request  of  the  government  of  UAE,  on  26  September  1992  the 
Iranian  government  sent  to  Abu  Dhabi,  the  capital  of  the  UAF,  a  high-level 
delegation  chaired  by  Mustafa  Haeri,  the  head  of  the  Department  of  the  Gulf  in  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  advisor  of  the  Iranian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  on  the  affairs  of  the  Gulf.  The  ann  of  the  delegatim  was  to  negotiate  on  the 
dispute  of  Abu  Musa  which  had  led  to  the  disturbance  in  relations  and  the 
prevention  of  inhabitants  and  workers  entering  the  island. 
Negotiations  began  on  the  second  day  after  the  arrival  oftlic  Iranian  delegation 
in  Abu  Dhabi.  The  UAE  side  was  chaired  by  Ambassador  Sait'Saed,  the  director  of' 
the  Department  of  the  Gulf  Cooperative  Council  at  the  Ministry  ofForeigii  AlTairs 
in  the  UAE.  Ambassador  Saed  presented  an  agenda  I*Or  the  negotiations  concerning 
the  three  islands.  15  The  head  of  the  Iranian  delegation  rcJcctcd  the  ageiida  pi-esciited 
by  the  UAE  with  the 
-justification 
that  they  had  come  to  the  I  JAF.  to  (11SCLISS  111C 
problern  of  Abu  Musa  and  the  events  which  had  Icd  to  preventing  peopic  ciaci-mg 
13 
-  See  M.  N.  Shaw,  International  Law,  (1991),  1'.  633.  Also  Abu  I  lail' 
'  op.  cit.,  11.728. 
14 
_  J.  G.  Merrills,  It7ternational  DisInite  &Itlement,  (1993),  P.  8.  Also  Al-Mjthob,  op.  cit.,  11.425. 
'5 
-  See  Chapter  1,  P.  61-2. Chanter  9 
the  island.  They  had  not  been  given  permission  to  discuss  other  matters.  Also,  the 
Iranian  government  would  not  accept  any  discussion  about  the  islands  of  Greater 
Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  because  it  was  not  permitted  for  anyone  to  discuss  the 
sovereignty  of  any  of  the  Iranian  lands.  '  6 
In  response  to  the  reaction  of  the  Iranian  delegation,  the  UAE  delegation 
insisted  on  following  the  agenda  by  discussing  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands,  and 
not  Abu  Musa  on  its  own.  The  Iranian  delegation  refused  to  proceed  and  returned  to 
Iran.  This  led  to  the  failure  of  negotiations  between  the  two  parties  after  only  one 
day.  The  UAE  blamed  the  Iranian  side  for  the  failure  of  the  negotiations  by  its 
refusal  to  discuss  the  three  islands.  In  the  meantime,  the  Iranian  Embassy  in  Abu 
Dhabi  stated  on  30  September  1992  that  the  negotiations  had  failed  because  ol'  the 
UAE  which  had  put  forward  for  discussion  irrelevant  matters  that  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  dispute  over  the  island  of  Abu  Musa.  The  Iranian  government  was  still 
ready  to  continue  negotiations  over  Abu  Musa.  17 
After  the  failure  of  these  negotiations,  the  dispute  over  the  threc  islands 
continued  without  any  communication  aiming  at  a  peaceful  settlement,  until  the 
initiative  was  taken  by  the  state  of  Qatar  in  its  good  oft-ices  to  bring  the  two 
disputing  states  to  the  negotiation  table  on  18  November  1995. 
9.4.  Good  offices  of  the  State  of  Qatarfor  dispule  settlement 
When  negotiations  between  two  disputing  states  do  not  lead  to  a  settlement,  then  the 
intervention  of  another  state,  a  regional  or  an  international  organisation,  or  even  a 
16 
-41-luihad,  29  September  1992. 
-  See  the  Iranian  Embassy  letter  on  the  Special  File  ot''I'liree  Islands  Case,  Abu  Musa,  Grcatcr  I  unh 
and  Lesser  Tunb,  Vol.  2,  Department  of'  Information,  International  and  Arab  Research  Ccntrc,  Al- 
Ittihad  Institute  for  Publisher  and  Journalism,  (1992),  11.268. 
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figure  of  great  standing  may  be  needed  and  may  be  able  to  bring  the  two  partics  back 
to  the  negotiating  table. 
A  state,  a  regional  or  an  international  organisation,  or  a  figure  ot'great  standing 
may  offer  good  offices  to  find  a  way  to  convince  the  disputing  parties  to  carry  out 
direct  negotiation,  or  try  to  convince  them  to  reach  a  pacific  settlement.  '  8  The  aun 
of  the  good  offices  is  limited  to  bringing  together  the  two  parties  to  the  negotiating 
table,  without  playing  any  role  in  the  actual  negotiation  or  the  eventual  settlement  of 
the  dispute.  19  An  example  of  good  offices  was  the  role  played  by  the  American 
President  in  1906  in  concluding  the  Russian-Japanese  War,  and  also  the  role  played 
by  the  United  States  to  settle  the  dispute  between  Indonesia  and  Holland  in  1947, 
aiming  to  put  an  end  to  the  conflict  between  the  two  parties.  20 
In  an  initiative  to  end  the  tension  in  the  Gulf  region  and  to  maintain 
international  peace  and  security,  the  state  of  Qatar  began  good  off-ices  clTorts  to  try 
to  bring  the  two  disputing  parties  to  the  negotiating  table.  As  inentioried  earlier, 
Qatar  succeeded  convincing  the  Iranian  government  and  the  government  of  UAF  to 
resume  negotiations.  21  This  was  in  Doha,  the  capital  of'  Qatar;  a  delegation  ol 
experts  from  both  sides  arrived  in  Doha  on  18  November  1995.  At  the  beginning  of' 
the  first  session,  the  delegation  of  UAE  suggested  arranging  an  agenda  according  to 
the  invitation  which  had  been  sent  to  them  by  the  Qatar  Minister  of'Forcigii  AtTairs. 
He  stated  that  such  an  agenda's  aim  would  liavc  the  aiin  of'  scttlIng  the  disputc 
between  them.  Accordingly,  the  delegation  olJJAE  rcqLICStCd  tIMt  the  1geII&I  SIIOLII(l 
include  the  t'ollowing: 
Shaw,  op.  cit.,  P.  6334.  Also  R.  M,  Wallace,  InIcrmitional  Lmv,  (1992),  P.  267.  Also  A.  A.  All',  id- 
Pvagi,  -.  Iial-Qtit7oitnal-Duývlial-Atili7  (Concise  Public  I  nternationa  I  Law),  (1989),  I).  47S. 
19 
-  Merrills,  op.  cit.,  P27.  Also  Abu  I  laif',  op.  cit.,  P.  729. 
20 
-  Al-M  Jthob,  op.  cit.,  P.  426. 
2'-  See  Chapter  3,  P-62- r9 
1.  Ending  the  military  occupation  of  the  islands  of  Greater  Turib  and  Lesser'Funb. 
2.  Abiding  by  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  which  was  signed  in  1971 
regarding  the  island  ofAbu  Musa  and  cancelling  any  measures  which  contradicted 
the  Memorandum. 
3.  Deciding  the  issue  of  sovereignty  over  Abu  Musa  island 
4.  Referring  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and 
Lesser  Tunb  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  if  negotiating  a  settlement  was  not 
possible  within  an  agreed  time  limit.  22 
The  Iranians  rejected  the  agenda  presented  by  the  UAE,  as  they  saw  the  meeting 
at  Doha  as  a  preparation  for  a  meeting  of  the  foreign  ministers  of  the  two  countries 
without  being  tied  to  any  agenda,  since  ministers  have  the  authority  to  discuss  any 
matter  they  wish.  23  After  four  days  of  negotiating,  each  country  insisted  on  its  stand, 
which  led  the  negotiations  to  a  dead  end.  Thus,  the  Doha  meeting  failed  and  the  two 
delegations  returned  to  their  countries  with  no  advance  in  the  direction  of  a  peacefUl 
settlement. 
After  the  failure  of  the  Doha  meeting,  which  was  the  result  ofthe  Failtire  ol'the 
negotiating  experts  to  reach  the  desired  airn  in  the  light  of'  the  good  ofliccs  of'  the 
state  of  Qatar,  the  UAE  declared  that  it  was  rencwing  its  invitation  to  Iran  to  reach  a 
peaceful  settlement  of  the  dispute,  and  that  this  may  Include  rcierral  to  the 
International  Court  of  Justice.  24  No  response  was  made  to  this  Invitatlon  on  the  part 
of  the  Iranian  government.  This  led  to  the  end  of'  all  diploniatic  communications 
between  the  two  sides  aimed  at  reaching  a  setticiliclit  Oil  tile  (11sputc  over  the  threc 
islands,  a  situation  which  still  continUeS  to  this  day. 
9 
22 
-  Al-litihad,  19  November  1995. 
23 
_  Ibid. 
24 
-  Al-Khaleýj,  22  November  1995. 230 
After  discussing  the  efforts  to  reach  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  dispute  over  the 
three  islands  between  UAE  and  Iran,  and  their  repeated  failure  because  of  the 
insistence  of  the  Iranian  side  not  to  discuss  the  dispute  over  the  islands  of  Greater 
Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb,  and  their  refusal  to  refer  the  case  to  arbitration  or  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  thus  the  question  remains:  how  can  a  peaceful 
settlement  of  the  dispute  be  reached? 
9.5.  Separate  opinion  of  view  on  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  over 
the  three  islands 
There  is  no  doubt,  after  discussing  the  different  acts  of  sovereignty  exercised  by  the 
governments  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  over  the  three  islands,  that  the 
ownership  of  the  islands  goes  to  the  present  UAE.  Iran  is  not  known  to  have 
exercised  any  sovereignty  over  the  islands.  It  is  therefore  uqjust  to  say  that  the  three 
islands  belong  to  Iran  or  that  the  UAE  should  give  up  her  claim  ol'the  islands,  unless 
it  were  to  be  proved  that  Iran  does  have  evidence  of  practising  sovereignty  over  the 
islands,  more  than  that  practised  by  the  UAE. 
The  three  islands,  therefore,  should  be  returned  to  the  UAF,  whose  they  were 
before  30  November  1971,  but  not  by  the  use  of  armed  force.  I  disagree  with  the  use 
of  force  to  returr,  the  islands,  no  matter  whether  this  were  to  be  carried  out  by  Arah 
forces  supporting  the  UAE  forces  or  by  allied  forces  wider  the  UnIbl-ClIa  ofthe  (IN. 
Any  such  solution  would  not  be  in  the  interest  of'  the  UAF,  since  tI11S  Would 
engender  hatred  and  bad  feeling  between  the  two  countries,  which  could  lead  the 
region  to  war. 
Having  ruled  out  the  use  of  forcc,  the  best  way  to  bring  back  the  islarids,  it 
appears,  is  by  peaceful  means.  Since  all  diplomatic  and  political  efforts  ot'sculement 
have  failed,  one  means  remains;  this  is,  a  legal  setticnient  cither  by  arbitration  or  the 9 
International  Court  of  Justice.  The  first  way  is  defined  by  International  Law 
Commission  as  "a  procedure  for  the  settlement  of  disputes  between  States  by  a 
binding  award  on  the  basis  of  law  and  as  a  result  of  an  undertaking  voluntarily 
,  25  accepted'  . 
International  arbitration  means  deciding  on  disputes  between  states 
according  to  the  rules  of  law  by  judges  chosen  by  the  disputing  states.  26 
Therefore,  the  disputing  parties  have  total  freedorn  to  choose  the  judges,  and 
define  their  number.  It  is  possible  for  the  tribunal  to  comprise  one  person  or  a 
number  of  persons.  It  is  also  left  to  the  disputing  parties  to  define  the  law  to  be 
applied  by  the  arbitration,  the  proceedings  and  the  duration  of  issuing  the 
arbitration. 
27 
Arbitration  is,  thus,  a  measure  which  is  taken  with  the  acceptance  and  the  free 
will  of  the  disputing  parties.  No  state  should  be  forced  into  accepting  arbitration. 
The  acceptance  to  refer  to  arbitration  may  be  given  before,  during  or  after  the 
dispute.  28 
The  acceptance  of  arbitration  should  be  prior  if'  a  state  is  signing  a  treaty  by 
which  it  accepts  reference  to  arbitration  any  dispute  which  may  arise,  or  a  particular 
kind  of  dispute.  For  example,  on  28  May  1902  Argentina  and  Chile  signed  a  treaty, 
according  to  which  they  agreed  to  refer  to  the  British  government  ally  diSpUte  WIIICII 
may  occur  between  them,  no  matter  what  its  nature.  21) 
The  later  agreement  occurs  when  an  agreement  is  inacle  bctwccii  two  states  to 
refer  an  active  dispute  between  them  to  arbitration.  For  ex,  1111ple,  tile  displitc 
25  YbILC,  Vol.  11,  (1953),  P.  202. 
26  See  Article  37  ofConvention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  ofinternational  Disputes  in  1907,  UKTS, 
No.  6,  (197  1),  Cnind.  4575. 
27 
_  M.  Whiteman,  Digest  (#'International  Law,  Vol.  12,  (1971),  1).  1047. 
28 
-  Taha,  op.  cit.,  P.  148.  Also  S.  M.  Bader  al-Din,  al-Ilikim  fi  AInazana  al-Hadud  td-l)waliah 
(Arbitration  in  International  Boundaries  Disputes),  (1991),  P.  203-4. 
29 
-  BFSP,  Vol.  95,  P.  764. 
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between  Britain  and  France  concerning  delimitation  borders  ofthe  continental  shelf 
between  the  two  countries  in  the  English  Channel  was  referred  to  arbitration 
according  to  a  mutual  agreement  on  10  May  1975,30  and  the  dispute  over  the 
delimitation  boundary  between  Sharjah  and  Dubai  was  referred  to  arbitration 
according  to  a  mutual  agreement  signed  on  30  November  1976  by  the  ruler  of 
Sharjah  and  the  ruler  of  Dubai.  31 
The  arbitral  decision  is  binding  on  all  parties  with  no  need  for  further 
acceptance  on  confirmation.  This  is  because  referring  to  arbitration  is  considered 
acceptance  of  the  means  and  an  obligation  to  abide  by  its  final  ruling.  32  ,  Yhe  ruling 
of  arbitration  is  considered  final  and  cannot  be  reviewed  by  any  other  body 
. 
33 
However,  it  is  acceptable  for  any  of  the  disputing  parties  to  review  the  ruling  if  after 
its  delivery  a  new  fact  is  discovered  which  could  have  influenced  the  arbitration  in  a 
decisive  manner  if  it  had  been  known  to  the  arbitral  tribunal.  It  is  also  possible  to 
object  if  the  arbitration  tribunal  exceeded  the  powers  and  limits  given  to  it  according 
to  the  agreement  to  refer  to  arbitration.  34 
Although  the  arbitral  decision  is  binding,  it  is  not  CXCCUtIVC,  in  the  sense  that  it 
should  not  be  imposed  by  the  use  of  force  against  the  will  ofthe  losing  party.  At  the 
end  of  the  day,  the  execution  of  the  ruling  of  arbitration  relies  on  the  honesty  of  the 
losing  party  and  its  good  intention.  35  It  is  a  common  practice  1*6r  different  states  to 
accept  and  execute  the  arbitral  decision  with  a  Jew  exceptions,  wilci-e  ()Ile  ()I*  the 
parties  refuses  to  abide  by  the  decision.  For  example,  the  USA  rejected  the  rLiling  ol 
'0  -  ILM,  Vol.  18,  (1979),  P.  397. 
-  ILR,  Vol.  91,  P.  550. 
32 
-  Article  38  of  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlcincilt  01'  Intcl"lational  Disputcs  in  1907,  UKTS, 
No.  6,  (1971),  Crnnd.  4575.  Also  see  Abu  Hail',  op.  cit.,  P.  746. 
33 
_  Ibid.  Aricle  8  1. 
34 
-Ibid. 
Article  833. 
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the  international  arbitration  on  its  dispute  with  Mexico  over  the  territory  of 
Chamizal  in  1911.36  However,  after  the  visit  of  the  American  President  to  Mexico 
in  1962  the  two  parties  expressed  their  desire  to  execute  the  ruling  of"  the  arbitration 
of  1911  in  the  light  of  the  contemporary  circumstances.  This  was  expressed  in  a 
treaty  signed  in  August  1962.37  Another  example  was  the  rejection  of  Argentina  of 
the  ruling  of  the  arbitration  concerning  the  dispute  over  Beagle  Channel  with  Chile 
38  in  January  1978 
. 
In  January  1979,  the  two  parties  accepted  the  mediation  of  Pope 
John  Paul  11  in  search  for  a  settlement  for  the  dispute.  39 
The  second  way  means  of  settling  a  dispute  between  two  states  or  more  by  the 
judgment  issued  from  a  permanent  forum  which  contains  independent  judges, 
chosen  earlier. 
40 
From  this  definition  the  difference  between  an  international  court  and 
international  arbitration  becomes  obvious.  The  existence  of  the  Court  is  prior  to  the 
dispute,  and  continues  after  its  settlement.  Arbitration  does  not  enjoy  this 
permanence,  as  it  is  usually  formed  after  the  start  of  a  dispute  and  is  dissolved  after 
the  settlement  of  the  dispute.  The  members  of  the  Court  are  not  elected  by  the 
disputing  parties,  as  is  the  case  for  the  arbitration.  "' 
The  first  appearance  ol'  international  court  was  in  1920,  when  the  Lcaguc  of' 
Nations  decided  to  found  the  Permanent  International  Court  01'.  ILIStICC,  WIIICII  played 
36 
_  RIAA,  Vol.  1  1,  P.  309. 
31 
-  AJIL,  Vol.  58,  (1964),  P.  336. 
ILN4,  Vol.  17,  (1978),  P.  738. 
19  -  11,  N4,  Vol.  18,  (1979),  13.1. 
40 
-  See  Article  2  of  the  Statute  oftlie  International  Court  of'Justicc. 
-  JI  Bricrly,  The  Law  (?  I'Nulions,  ed.  11.  Waldock,  (  1963),  P.  347.  Also  Mcrrills,  op.  cit.,  11.109-  10. 
Also  Taha,  op.  cit.,  1).  156.  Also  Shokri,  op.  cit.,  11.434.  To  mention,  there  is  an  exception  offlerniancill 
Court  of  Arbitration:  for  more  details  refer  to  1-1.  SclilocliaLiCl-,  Permanent  Court  ofArhitration,  FT11', 
Vol.  ],  (198  1  ),  P.  157. ---  -- 
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a  great  role  in  settling  disputes  between  states.  This  Court  continued  to  exist  until 
1945  when  the  International  Court  of  Justice  replaced  it,  and  still  exists  today.  42 
The  International  Court  decides  cases  which  are  presented  to  it  according  to  a 
agreement  between  the  disputed  parties  to  refer  their  dispute  to  the  Court. 
Agreements  are  the  basis  according  to  which  most  regional  disputes  over 
sovereignty  have  been  referred  to  the  Court,  such  as  the  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  case 
43  between  France  and  UK 
,  and  the  Continental  Shelf  case  between  Libya  and 
44 
Malta. 
The  decision  of  the  Court  is  binding  for  the  disputing  parties  and  for  the 
dispute,  45  and  is  considered  final  and  cannot  be  reviewed.  It  is,  however, 
permissible  to  review  it  if  a  critical  fact  which  was  not  known  by  the  Court  and  the 
46 
party  which  is  requesting  a  review  is  discovered 
. 
According  to  Article  94  (1)  of  the  United  Nations  Charter,  "Each  Member  of  the 
United  Nations  undertakes  to  comply  with  the  decision  of  the  International  Court  of' 
Justice  in  any  case  to  which  it  is  a  party".  The  Security  Council  has  the  power  to 
issue  recommendations  or  resolutions  to  implement  the  decision  ofthe  International 
Court.  Article  94  (2)  of  the  Charter  states  that: 
If  any  party  to  a  case  fiails  to  perform  the  obligations  incumbent 
upon  it  under  a  judgment  rendered  by  the  Court,  the  other  party  may 
have  recourse  to  the  Security  Council,  Which  may,  it'  it  dccins 
necessary,  make  recommendations  or  decide  upon  measures  to  be 
taken  to  give  effect  to  the  j  udgrncnt. 
Along  similar  lines  to  the  International  COUrt  of'  Justicc,  a  few  projccts  have  bccn 
initiated  for  courts  attached  to  regional  organi  I  such  as  the  Organisation  ol'tllc 
42 
_  See  Article  92  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN. 
"-  ICJ  Rep.,  (  1953),  13.47. 
44 
-  ICJ  Rep.,  (1985),  11.13. 
, 15 
-  Ibid.  Article  59. 
46 
-  Ibid.  Article  60-6  1. -- 
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Islamic  Conference  47  and  the  Arab  League,  48  which  alm  to  settle  disputes  between 
the  members  of  the  organisations.  They  do  not  differ  much  frorn  the  International 
Court  of  Justice.  They  have,  however,  not  yet  been  established. 
These  are  the  two  ways  which  would  lead  to  a  legally  binding  settlement. 
Neither  of  the  two  disputing  parties  would  be  able  to  object  to  any  settlement 
reached  since  both  would  have  accepted  this  means.  The  obstacle  is  the  Iranian 
refusal  to  agree  to  a  legal  settlement  of  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands-despite  the 
fact  that  earlier  international  disputes  involving  Iran  have  been  considered  by  the 
International  Court  of  Justice.  49  How,  then,  will  Iran  accept  a  legal  settlement  of  her 
dispute  with  the  UAE? 
In  my  opinion,  since  both  Iran  and  UAE  are  members  of  the  Organisation  of  the 
Islamic  Conference,  and  given  their  religious  ties  through  this  organisation  and  their 
geographic  proximity,  there  is  a  chance  that  the  organisation  could  play  a  role  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute  between  the  two  parties,  instead  of  the  UN 
. 
50  The  two 
parties  should,  therefore,  present  their  disputes  to  their  regional  organisations  before 
referring  to  the  UN  to  search  for  a  peaceful  settlement.  The  Security  Couricil 
On  the  Charter  of  the  Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference,  See  UNTS,  Vol.  914,11.111. 
On  the  Charter  of  the  Arab  League,  See  UNTS,  Vol.  70,11.248. 
49  See  e.,.,  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Co.  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952),  11.93.  US  Diplomatic  and  Consulal. 
Staff  in  Tehran  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (  1980),  P.  3 3. 
Furthermore,  in  1970  Iran  accepted  the  formation  ol'an  inquiry  committee  concerning  the  island  ol 
Bahrain.  This  committee  was  chaired  by  the  oeneral  director  ofthe  6eneva  office  ofthe  I  JN.  It  bepan 
the  inquiry  in  March  1970  and  presentcd  its  report  to  the  Security  Council  Oil  II  May  01'  111C  Same 
year,  with  the  Suggestion  of  the  independence  of  Baln-ain  and  the  refusal  of  tile  Iranian  i-equest  to 
annex  it  to  the  Iranian  lands.  The  Security  Council  aijCCCI  With  tile  SUg.  0CS1iOllS  01'  tIlC  C0111111iUCC, 
After  that  the  Shah  of  Iran  declared  his  acceptance  ofthe  Security  Council  resolution.  The  Iranian 
Parliament  then  confirmed  his  decision.  Since  then  Bahrain  has  been  an  indepcilderit  state.  ILM, 
Vol.  9,  (1970),  P.  787.  Also  see  H.  AI-Baharna,  The  Fact-Finding  Mission  01'  tile  United  Nations 
Secretary-General  and  the  Settlement  ol'the  Baliraiii-Iran  Dispute,  May  1970,1('I,  Q,  Vol.  22,  (197-3)), 
P.  54  1. 
50 
_  For  more  details  of  means  ofpacific  settlement  by  tile  Organisation  Ol'the  Islamic  ('0111el-clice  scc 
M.  Al-Raslildi,  Positive  Approach  to  the  Disputes  over  the  Three  Islands:  Abu  MOSa,  'I'Unb  A]-KUbra 
and  'Funb  Al-Sughra,  The  Journal  of'Shari'a  and  Law,  Novenibcr  1996,11.1. Chapter  9  236 
encourages  the  search  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  through  regional 
organisations.  Article  52  (3))  of  the  UN  Charter  states  that: 
The  Security  Council  shall  encourage  the  development  of  pacific 
settlement  of  local  disputes  through  such  regional  arrangements  or  by 
such  regional  agencies  either  on  the  initiative  of  the  states  concerned 
or  by  reference  from  the  Security  Council. 
Thus  the  role  of  regional  organisations  is  complementing  the  Security  Council  in 
keeping  international  peace  and  security  between  members.  It  is  natural,  therefore,  to 
be  interested  in  guaranteeing  the  regional  security  of  members,  and  the  observation 
of  sovereignty  between  member  states.  Otherwise  the  existence  of  regional 
organisations  would  be  meaningless. 
The  Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference  played  a  major  role  in  ending  the 
Iran-Iraq  war,  because  of  the  damage  this  war  had  caused  to  its  members,  especially 
to  the  Gulf  states.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
Islamic  countries  in  September  1980  formed  a  committee  of  good  offices  to  look  for 
a  peaceful  settlement.  The  committee  continued  its  efforts  during  the  war,  witli 
continual  communications  with  the  two  sides  until  it  was  possible  to  end  the  war  in 
51  1988 
. 
Concerning  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands,  the  Organisation  of  the  Islamic 
Conference  should  endeavour  to  reach  a  settlement  ofthe  diSPLItC  hetween  the  I  JAF, 
and  Iran  and  put  an  end  to  the  tensions  which  could  lead  to  a  war  between  the  two 
parties,  with  the  danger  of  its  expansion  to  the  other  states  of'  the  Gull'  which  could 
result  in  the  disintegration  ofthe  organisation.  11,  illy  opinion,  it  is  possible  tIILIS  I'M 
the  president  of  the  Organisation  to  put  diplOlnltIC  Pl-eSSLIrC  On  Ir,  111  to  ICCept  the 
51 
_  See  A.  Al-Ashal,  AsvvI  al-7)?  t1ji1ý1  11-1slutni  (11-Divali  (The  ()I-igil,  ()f  JSjkJjic  ()I-gjj,  iSk(iOjj), 
(1988),  P.  298-302.  Also  see  Musitat  ('I-Siusiah  (Encyclopedia  of  Political  Science),  Vol.  1, 
(  1994),  P.  115  8-9. 'hapler  9  23  7 
reference  of'  the  dispute  to  arbitration.  Article  2  (B-4)  of  the  constitution  of'  the 
Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference  provides  that,  "settlement  of  any  conflict 
that  may  arise  by  peaceful  i-neans  such  as  negotiation,  mediation,  reconciliation  or 
arbitration".  52  The  other  option  is  to  refer  the  dispute  to  the  International  Court  of 
Justice. 
Should  the  Iranian  government  not  respond  to  the  good  offices  of  the 
Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference,  the  only  remaining  avenue  will  be  to  refer 
the  dispute  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the  UN.  This  should  be  done  by  insisting  on 
its  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands,  and  by  requesting  a  legal  settlement  of  the 
dispute  until  the  Iranian  government  responds. 
9.6.  Conclusion 
We  conclude  from  the  above  that  the  UAE  will  not  be  able  to  get  back  the  three 
islands  except  by  a  legal  settlement  of  the  dispute.  This  can  be  achieved  by 
diplomatic  pressure  through  the  auspices  of  the  Organisation  of  the  Islamic 
Conference  or  the  General  Assembly  of  the  UN.  All  other  attempts  to  reach  a 
political  diplomatic  solution  have  failed  because  of  the  I-nian  refusal  to  discuss 
sovereignty  of  the  islands  of  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb.  Diplomatic  efforts  by 
the  UAE  had  been  made  by  going  to  the  Security  Council  of  the  UN,  then  by  direct 
negotiation  with  the  Iranian  government,  and  eventually  by  Sitting  I-Offlid  a  table  f'or 
free  negotiation  initiated  by  Qatar. 
52 
-  UNTS,  Vol.  914,  P.  III 238 
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Concludinq  Observations 
I  will  try  in  this  conclusion  to  highlight  the  main  points  discussed  in  the  present 
research  on  the  dispute  between  Iran  and  the  UAE  about  sovereignty  over  the  three 
islands  of  Abu  Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb.  I  will  also  highlight  the  results 
reached. 
I  started  with  the  emergence  of  the  UAE  and  the  circumstances  in  which 
territories  of  the  state  were  established,  since  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khaimah  are  part 
of  the  union  and  the  three  islands  follow  these  two  Emirates.  The  two  Emirates  were 
governed  by  the  tribe  of  Qawasim,  which  had  marine  and  land  power  and  with 
which  it  had  controlled  territories  in  the  Gulf  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  This  had  led  to  the  occurrence  of  repeated  battles  between  them  and  the 
British  armed  forces  in  their  attempts  to  control  the  Gulf,  which  gradually  weakened 
the  Qawasim.  This  eventually  forced  them  to  sign  treaties  with  the  British,  the  last 
being  in  1892.  This  treaty  gave  Britain  the  right  to  administer  the  foreign  allairs  of' 
the  two  Emirates  for  their  protection  from  any  external  attack  on  the  Qawasim  land 
but,  as  with  previous  treaties,  it  did  not  give  the  British  government  the  right  to  sell 
or  lease  territories  or  even  to  determine  borders. 
I  concluded  that  the  treaties  between  the  British  and  tile  rLilers  of'  tile  two 
Emirates  recognized,  formally,  the  political  identity  and  legal  statLIS  OI'thC  F'InlratCS. 
Since  the  treaties  were  signed  between  two  cOLIntrics  they  were  not  a  III-ItIsh  colony 
as  they  are  commonly  thOLIght  to  be.  Britain  did  not  satisFy  its  obligation  under  their 
treaties  to  protect  the  two  Fmirates.  This  led  to  their  loss  ofcontrol  over  some  ol'thc Chapter  10 
territories  which  belonged  to  them,  amongst  which  were  the  three  islands  of  Abu  Z:  ý 
Musa,  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb. 
Then  I  defined  the  three  islands  concerned  and  we  also  looked  at  the  historic 
background  of  the  dispute.  I  reached  the  conclusion  that  this  dispute  at  different 
times  as  a  result  of  the  Iranian  interest  in  the  mineral  wealth  in  the  land  and 
territorial  waters  of  the  islands.  These  interests  led  the  Iranian  government  to  occupy 
the  two  islands  of  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  by  the  use  of  force  against  tile 
government  of  Ras  al-Khalmah  on  30  November  1971,  and  to  the  dividing  of  the 
island  of  Abu  Musa  with  the  government  of  Sharjah  on  29  November  197  1. 
Then  I  discussed  the  modes  of  acquiring  territory  according  to  international  law, 
and  applied  the  findings  on  the  legal  validity  of  the  arguments  on  which  each  party 
builds  its  claim  for  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands.  I  established  that  Iran  cannot 
base  its  occupation  of  the  islands  of  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb  on  the 
assumption  that  they  are  a  terra  nullius  territory.  Events  prove  otherwise,  for  there 
were  inhabitants  on  the  island  of  Greater  Tunb  who  were  loyal  to  the  government  of 
Ras  al-Khaimah.  Also  the  government  of  Ras  al-Khainiah  had  practised  full 
sovereignty  over  the  two  islands  until  the  day  ofthe  Iranian  occupation. 
The  Iranian  government  may  not  base  Its  claim  on  tile  passing  of'  time  as  ýl 
historic  right  after  a  period  of  her  occupation  of  the  islands.  This  is  because  an 
essential  condition  of  acquiring  sovereignty  over  a  territory,  by  acquisitive 
prescription,  is  that  the  acquisition  did  not  occur  by  the  use  of'  florce  in  the  first  place. 
It  is  established  that  occupying  the  island  by  the  Iranian  l'orces  was  nict  by  rcsistancc 
oil  the  part  ofthe  inhabitants,  which  led  to  the  death  ol'some  ofthem.  Morcovcr,  tile 
use  of  Iorce  to  occupy  the  two  islands  was  fiorbidden  according  to  the  Charter  ofthe 
239 
United  Nations  Article  2  (4).  Also  the  international  C0111111LInity  does  not  I-CCOgIIISC 240 
territorial  acquisition  which  is  the  result  of  the  use  of  force.  An  example  is  the 
refusal  of  recognition  on  the  part  of'  the  international  community  of  the  Iraqi 
occupation  of  Kuwait  in  August  1990. 
Concerning  the  island  of  Abu  Musa,  it  cannot  be  considered  that  Sharjah 
granted  the  island  to  Iran  according  to  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding.  For  it  is 
stated  in  the  introduction  to  the  Memorandum  that  each  of  the  parties  does  not 
recognise  the  sovereignty  of  the  other  over  the  island.  I  concluded  that  the 
Memorandum  was  a  temporary  settlement  for  the  problem  of  the  island  of  Abu 
Musa  until  a  permanent  one  was  found. 
I  then  established  that  Iran  cannot  base  her  occupation  of  the  islands  on  the 
concept  of  historic  right  because  documents  prove  otherwise.  Britain  had  recognised 
that,  from  the  beginning  of  her  presence  in  the  Gulf,  there  was  no  trace  of  any 
Iranian  practise  of  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands. 
I  concluded  that  it  is  the  UAE  which  can  base  its  sovereignty  over  the  three 
islands  on  the  concept  of  historic  rights,  since  these  islands  never  belonged  to 
anyone  save  the  Qawasim,  the  rulers  of  Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khairnah.  Their 
sovereignty  over  the  islands  is  founded  on  the  basis  of  immemorial  possession.  I 
suggested  that  the  UAE  should  base  her  claim  1`6r  sovereignty  on  the  extent  ol'  her 
actual  practises  of  sovereignty  over  the  islands  beflore  the  Iranian  OCCLIpatlOri,  I 
chapter  was  devoted  to  this  particular  point. 
Then  I  mentioned  the  cvidence  on  whicli  Iran  built  its  claiin  f'or  the  three 
islands.  There  are  three  principal  claims:  its  historical  right  of  owiicrsliip  to  the 
islands;  the  recognition  by  the  British  map  of'  1886  of'  Iranian  sovereignty  over  the 
islands;  and  the  strategic  importance  of  the  islands  Ior  Iran.  I  concluded  that  the 
Iranian  right  of  ownership  over  the  Islands  IS  110t  SLIpported  by  any  documents  or r  10 
other  evidence.  On  the  contrary,  British  documents  and  the  opinion  of  some  Iranian 
writers  confirm  that  the  Iranian  government  never  practiced  any  kind  of  sovereignty 
over  the  islands  in  any  materialistic  way.  Concerning  the  strategic  importance  of  the 
islands  for  Iran,  I  clarified  that  legal  experts  consider  this  a  political  and  not  a  legal 
argument.  I  proved  with  court  rulings  that  geographic  proximity  does  not  grant 
sovereignty  over  a  territory.  I  discussed  the  argument  built  on  the  British  map  of 
1886  in  a  separate  chapter. 
A  chapter  was  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  maps,  with  particular  emphasis  on 
the  map  of  1886  which  Iran  uses  in  her  claim  of  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands.  I 
discussed  different  kinds  of  maps,  their  legal  power  and  the  extent  of  acceptance  by 
courts  of  maps  as  evidence  for  sovereignty  over  a  territory.  I  concluded  that  both 
kinds  of  maps,  official  and  unofficial,  should  be  executed  with  a  degree  of  precision 
in  information  and  drawing  techniques,  and  that  a  official  map  is  more  decisive  than 
a  private  one,  especially  if  annexed  to  a  treaty  and  mentioned  as  an  inseparable  part 
of  the  treaty.  It  was  also  concluded  that  in  most  cases  of  territorial  disputes,  the  court 
looked  at  maps  with  a  degree  of  suspicion  and  reservation,  because  of'  lack  of' 
precision  in  drawing  and  the  great  number  of  mistakes  in  their  contents. 
I  concluded  that  the  map  of  1886,  on  which  Iran  builds  her  sovereignty  over  the 
three  islands,  is  not  a  official  inap  for  determining  borders.  Rather  it  was  a  inap  I'm 
the  purpose  of  navigation.  Moreover,  it  was  a  present  given  to  tile  Shall  of  Iran  in 
1888-i.  e.  it  was  from  a  third  state  not  related  to  the  region  at  the  time.  I  also  stated 
that  the  dates  of  drawing  the  map  were  betbre  the  signing  of'  the  treaty  of'  1892 
which  treaty  gave  Britain  the  right  to  manage  the  foreign  all'airs  of'Sharlah  mid  Ras 
at-Khainiah.  Britain  did  recognise,  on  different  occasions  and  c1carly,  the 
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the  map  had  been  drawn.  I  therefore  concluded  that  it  is  difficult  to  accept  the  map 
as  evidence  for  Iranian  sovereignty  over  the  three  islands. 
I  discussed  the  critical  date  in  the  dispute  over  the  three  islands  and  how  to 
define  it.  I  stated  that  the  critical  date  should  be  the  date  when  the  aspects  of  dispute 
were  crystallized.  When  correspondence  between  parties  stop,  negotiations  stop  and 
each  party  adopts  a  final  stand  in  the  case.  Accordingly,  any  act  to  improve  or 
support  the  legal  stand  of  the  parties  after  this  date  is  unacceptable  and  illegal. 
I  concluded  that  the  date  on  which  aspects  of  the  dispute  between  Iran  and  the 
UAE  were  crystallized  was  29  November  1971  for  the  island  of  Abu  Musa,  which 
was  the  date  when  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  was  accepted  by  the 
governments  of  Iran  and  Sharjah,  and  30  November  1971  for  the  islands  of  Greater 
Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb,  which  was  the  date  of  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  two 
islands.  Accordingly,  any  acts  or  activities  to  improve  and  support  the  legal  stand  of 
either  of  the  disputing  parties  after  these  dates  are  considered  void  and  without 
effect.  Sovereignty  acts  should  be  defined  according  to  the  legal  position  existing 
before  the  two  dates. 
I  said  at  the  end  of  discussing  this  dispute  that,  in  most  regional  disputcs,  the 
court  builds  its  ruling  on  the  acts  of  sovereignty  presented  by  the  disputing  parties.  I 
proved  that  different  forms  of  practising  sovereignty,  SLIch  as  administrative  and 
legal,  were  undertaken  by  the  governments  ot'Sharjah  and  Ras  al-Khairnah  over  the 
three  islands  until  the  date  of  the  Iranian  occupation  ofthe  islands.  This  had  not  becti 
proved  in  the  published  documents  and  evidence  which  I  collected  and  had  not  becri 
discussed  before  in  any  study  ofthis  dispute.  I  also  slied  light  on  the  recognition  ol 
the  allegiance  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  islands  to  Shar  jah  and  Ras  al-Khalmall  by 
Arab  and  non-Arab  states,  including  Iran. - 
Since  I  have  proved  that  the  three  islands  belong  to  the  UAE,  these  islands 
should  be  returned  to  the  UAE  as  was  the  situation  before  the  Iranian  occupation.  I 
therefore  end  this  research  by  putting  forward  a  vision  of  how  to  settle  the  dispute.  I 
stated  that  the  settlement  of  this  dispute  must  be  achieved  by  peaceful  means,  which 
were  mentioned  in  Article  333  (1)  of  the  United  Nations  Charter.  I  disagree  with  any 
kind  of  force  to  take  back  the  three  islands. 
Since  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the  three  islands,  the  UAE  has  tried  to  find  a 
settlement  for  the  dispute  by  peaceful  means.  It  first  went  to  the  Security  Council, 
then  tried  direct  negotiation.  It  then  accepted  the  good  offices  made  by  the  State  of 
Qatar.  However,  failure  was  always  the  result  because  of  Iran's  insistence  that  it 
would  not  discuss  the  occupation  of  the  islands  of  Greater  Tunb  and  Lesser  Tunb.  I 
therefore  suggest  the  remaining  avenue,  after  the  failure  of  attempts  to  reach  a 
diplomatic  or  political  settlement,  i.  e.  a  legal  settlement.  I  also  suggest  that  pressure 
should  be  exercised  by  the  Organisation  ofthe  Islamic  Conference  and  the  General 
Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  on  Iran  either  to  accept  arbitration  or  to  go  to  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  for  it  to  issue  a  ruling. 
I  would  like  to  advise  the  government  of  the  IJAE  to  continue  to  seek  a  pcaceftil 
legal  settlement  for  the  dispute  at  every  international  and  regional  event,  to  convince 
the  international  community  to  exercise  pressure  on  the  Iranian  government.  The 
UAE  should  also  collect  more  documents  and  evidences  to  prove  its  sovereignty 
over  the  three  islands,  especially  those  which  prove  the  practising  ol'  the 
governments  ofSharjah  and  Ras  al-Khalmah  ofachninistration  and  the  imposHig  of 
legislation  over  the  three  islands.  Those  should  include  documents  ISSLIed  bv  local 
governments  and  the  inhabitants  ofthe  two  Islands  ot'Abu  Musa  and  GJI-CýItCl-  'I'Llill), r  10 
so  that  they  can  be  presented  to  the  body  of  Arbitration  or  the  International  Court  ol' 
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Document  2-a 
Translation 
Date:  I/  I  1/  1975 
To  Whom  It  May  Concern 
The  Central  Department  of  Financial  Affairs  of  the  Government  of' 
Sharjah  certifies  that  Mahmud  Ebraheem  Al-Hamarnah  started  work 
in  the  Department  of  Education  at  the  Government  of  Sharjah,  as  a 
teacher  in  the  island  of  Abu  Musa,  starting  the  school  year  of'  1968 
until  1971. 
During  this  period  he  received  his  salaries  from  the  Government  of 
Sharjah. 
This  certificate  was  given  to  him  according  to  his  request. 
Khalid  Said  Al-Alarni 
Director  of  Central  Financial  Aftairs* 
*  Our  translation.  The  original  text  is  written  in  theArabic  languagc Appendix  A.  -  Documents  204 
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Abu  Muse  in  the  position  20  0  5V  30"  North  and 
55  0  3'  26"  East  was  removed  by  us  on  Pridvy, 
5th  Zul  Hijja  1383,  corresponding  to  April  17, 
1964.  This  for  the  information  of  the  public. 
(Signed)  Saqr  Bin  Sultan  Al  (,  aslml 
Ruler  of  Sharjah  &  Darpenden- 
ctes. 
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Translation 
In  12  Muharram  1300  H  24  November  1882 
To:  Mr.  Ross  the  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf  of  Persia 
Regards 
... 
Dating  in  November,  we  knew  from  Sharjah  that  an  act  of 
theft  occurred  on  the  island  of  Abu  Musa.  Boxes  which  were  in  the 
house  of  the  ruler  of  Sharjah  on  the  island  were  broken.  It  is  not 
known  what  was  stolen  from  the  house  exactly.  Three  foot  prints 
were  found,  they  are  preserved  until  the  specialist  (in  recognizing 
foot  prints)  arrives. 
The  ruler  of  Sharjah  sent,  immediately,  for  a  specialist,  who  was  sent 
over  from  Ras  al-Khaimah.  He  arrived  on  the  island  of  Abu  Musa 
accompanied  by  a  few  persons  to  examine  the  scene  of  the  theft  in 
the  house  of  the  Shaikh.  On  their  arrival  to  the  island  of'  Abu  Musa, 
the  specialist  who  was  called  Sultan,  realized  that  breaking  the  boxes 
was  done  under  the  impression  that  they  contained  cash,  but  wlicil 
the  thieves  did  not  find  cash,  they  stole  a  pistol  and  a  musical 
instrument  from  the  Shaikh's  house.  Ile,  then,  examined  the  toot 
prints,  from  which  he  recognized  that  one  person  was  froin  I  labashali 
and  two  others  were  free  individuals.  However  he  could  not 
recognize  the  particular  persons.  We  heard  that  the  foot  prints  were 
heading  to  the  sea,  and  that  they  left  the  island  after  theft. 
Whereas  on  this  shore,  they  suspect  that  the  ruler  of  linini  al- 
Qaiwain  is  behind  all  that,  since  he  claimed  that  he  would  attack  Abu 
Musa.  Until  now  it  is  not  known  if  it  was  him,  or  another  person.  Wc 
appointed  a  few  individuals  secretly,  to  investigate  this  matter.  But 
we  heard  that  on  that  particular  night,  the  ruler  of  (Jmni  al-Qaiwain 
did  not  sleep  all  night  ... 
This  is  a  fact.  We  have  told  the  Agcm  of 
Lingah  of  this  theft. 
Best  wishes 
Hap  Abu  al-Kasern 
Residency  Agents  in  Sharjah* 
*  Our  translation.  The  original  lexi  is  writlen  in 
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Document  6-a 
Lranslation  of  letter  dated  the  1st  ý, ý-nalban 
-!  --54 
Sultan  bin  -  aler  of  October  1935)  from  Shaikh  SI  Oallim, 
Ras  al  Khaimah,  to  E.  C.  H.  Ilkington  Lsquire,  General  kanager, 
The  rfArcy  fxpLoration  ComTany. 
After  Compliments. 
I  vish  to  invitc  your  attention  to  the  fLct 
tl--at  there  arrs  otl,,  icr  loirces  tith4in  oV  -,  osz.:  cs--ions,  which 
E,  -re  not  under  m  but  in  -.,  artnerzhip  vith  my 
cousin.  These  places  ý,,  &vc  some  minerais  and  v-ere  not 
ip.  spr=(--ted,  befor6  hý  the  geDlogistse  I  a]-so  V-ýallt  to 
invite  your  attei-ition  about  nW  1sland  lanb  anck  to  ask  !,  iieth(7- 
r 
yo'a  to  inz'ý  ect  LI-I  tv, 
ý 
Se  place-:  3.  i'et'Le  et  ME  Xý-nov% 
if  you  YErt  to  do  this  so  that  I  may  mke  other  arrange- 
me-nt.  s  as  I  have  clone  in  tlhtý  first  caoe.  am  Lsking  this 
Is  I  do  not  want  to  'Leave  these  places  without  any  v.  ork, 
as  the  inspc-ction  is  r(:  -stricted  to  the  place  which  Y..  as 
scen  by  the  fwologists. 
I  to  get  a  re;  ýIy  from  you. 
Usual  Ending. 
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Document  7-a 
TRANSLATION 
4th  Shalban  From,  Sultan  Bin  Salem  Daied.. 
........ 
To'-  Mr.  Elkington,  No 
...................  .  ........ 
03eneral  Manager, 
v-xploration  Co.,  Ltd. 
4P 
'Ile  are  in  receipt  of  your  letter  Yo.  274/ý'  of  22nd  October 
explaining  to  us  the  positi6n  which  is  satisfactory  rind  we  hope  for 
still  better  and  more  satisfactory  a  condition  in_the  future. 
have  sent  you  a  letter  through  F.  E.  the  Consul  and  trust  that 
be  has  been  good  enough  in  despatching  same  to  you.  Therein  I 
granted  your  request. 
I  now  wish  to  address  you  in  connection  with  our  island 
and  would  like  to  know  if  the  Com*,:  )any  wishes  to  have  it 
surveyed,  as  it  is  not  free  of  oil,  red  clay  and  other  minerals. 
also  wish  to  inform  you  that  there  are  other  places  within 
the  area  which  are  not  under  my  independant  control  but  my  cousin 
is  a  partner  thereto.  These  places  are  also  not  free  of  the  slid 
minerals  and  have  not  yet  been  surveyed. 
Does  the  Company  ".  'ish  to  have  them  surveyed  or  it  is  satisfied 
with  the  places  already  surveyed  by  its  Enpineers? 
if  you  have  any  idea  about'thib-question  we  should  then  deal 
with  "  separately,  as  we  do  not  want  to  leave  these  places  idle. 
Kindly  let  me  have  your  reply,  for  which  I  shall  be  much  obliged. 
272 
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Document  8 
13th  Nove-iber  1935. 
The  lion:  The  Political  'Zesident 
in  the  Peraian  -iulf, 
%,  ahire. 
31  r, 
',  Ve  have  the  honour  to  enclose  copies  of  the  following, 
correspondence:  - 
(1)  H.  E.  the  ý*haikh  of  Ras-al-Khaimah'  a  letter 
dated  4th  cýhaban  1354. 
(2)  Cur  reply  to  Fhp  above  dated  13th  November  1935. 
As  regards  the  letter  referred  to  by  the  r2ialkh  in  the 
second  paragraph  of  his  letter  as  having  been  sent  to  us  through 
you,  we  do  not  appear  to  have  received  this  letter  as  yet. 
As  regards  "T'unb"  island,  we  are  not  clear  as  to  the 
3haikh's  rights,  If  any,  over  this  island,  and  should  be  much 
obliged  for  your  information  o,.  -i  this  r)oInt. 
je  liave  the  honour  to  be, 
31  r, 
Your  obedient  serwmmtp, 
For  ýJGLG-I*,,  ýý[!  -I; 
l  OIL  MCIANY  LTD., 
O"Id  E  17.0.  Pkinilm. 
COPY  tO  'I-3-?!  -POlitiC,  3.1  ,  igent,  ",  111rein, 
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From  Abadan  GvViEltlkL  MANAGENENT  To  London 
Mail  Division  CONFIDENTIAL  (MISCELLANSOUFAemo.  No.  34575. 
subjed  TRUCIAL  COAST. 
RA,  S-  AL-  KHAIMAH. 
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Date  1  3th  Ilovernber  19,15. 
Rirther  to  our  Memo.  Ho.  34563  dated  6th  November  1935, 
we  enclose  copies  of  Shaikh  of  Ras-al-Khaimah's  letter  dated 
2nd  November  1935  and  our  reply  Viereto  dated  13th  November  1935. 
We  are  not  aware  of  what  rights,  if  any,  the  qhaikh 
has  over  "Tunb"  Island,  and  'Aave  asked  the  r1olitical  Resident 
to  advise  us  on  this  DOint.  We  have  also  renuested  Mr.  Willimsolý' 
to  point  out  to  the  Shaikh  that  our  option  covers  all  his 
territories. 
'90  have  been  informed  by  oir  Bahrein  Agent  that  the 
Shaikh  of  FAS-al-Khaimah  has  asked  if  oar  option  payment  can 
be  paid  to  him  In  two  yearly  instalments  in  advance,  i.  e. 
Rs-9000/-  now  and  Rs.  9000/-  on  lst  August  1936.  we  have 
requested  our  Bahrein  -, -ýgent  to  advise  the  shaikh  to  refer  the 
matter  to  us  direett  and  expect  to  hear  from  him  In  due  course. 
Me  feel,  however,  that  it  would  be  advisable  to  agree  to  the 
Shaikh's  request,  and  shail  be  glad  to  receive  your  pei-ission 
to  do  so. 
ärd.? 
En  cl  a. 2  75 
Document  10 
Confide  nti  al.  No.  677-6  of  19,35. 
l3ritiah  liesidemy  and  ý;  oasulate-ueneral, 
bUShire,  the  16th  -November  1935. 
Rae  al  Khaimah  Oil  Agreement. 
Dear  Sir, 
i  enclose  a  copy  of  a  letter  -No.  515/10/10, 
dated  the  31st  October  1935,  frcm  the 
-Political 
Agent, 
Bahrain,  together  with  the  original  tand  translation)  of 
the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al  Khaimah's  letter  referred  to. 
2.  With  regard  to  Colonel  Loch's  paragraph  4(a). 
It  is  not  quite  clear  what  territories  the  Shaikh  of  has  al 
Khaimah  states  that  he  holdn  in  partnership  with  hie  cousin, 
J.  e  the  Shaikh  of  Kalba,  presumably  iialba  itself.  As 
I  understand  it,  in  the  latter  territory  the  ComparW  do  not 
want  any  concession,  but  in  arW  case,  no  overtures  should 
be  made  to  the  Shaikh  of  Kalba,  either  direct  or  throbgh 
the  Shaikh  of  Ras  al  Khaimah,  andýno  geologiate  should  visit 
that  area,  without  reference  to  me. 
3.  With  regard  to  7,01onel.  Loch's  paragraph  4(b). 
Tianb  is  definitely  within  the  territories  of  Rae  al  Yhaimah, 
and  therefore  faUs  within  the  ComparVIs  option,  vide  the 
Shaikh's  letter  dated  29th  Rabi  11  1354,  to  the  D'Arcy  Ex- 
-ploration  ý;  ompany.  uolonel.  Loch  has  since  informed 
me  that  he  was  unable  to  clear  up  this  point  with  kiaji 
Williamaon  at  -fibu  Dhabi. 
I  am  sending  a  copy  of  this  letter  to  the 
Political  Agent,  bahrain. 
Yours  faithfully, 
%-1,11-  C- 
Li  eU  t-  Col  one  1, 
Political  Resident  in  the  Persian  Gulf Appendix  A.  -  Documents 
_276 
Document  11 
2nd  Decomberl  1935o 
ghaikh  ! 3ultan  ibn  Salim, 
Ruler  of  Ras-ai-Kbadmah- 
your  T-occe  Uency  , 
rarther  to  our  letter  No* 
72-H/7  dated  the  13th  Novemberp  we 
have  tbo  honour  to  inform  you  that  as 
rogards  yvur  Island  of  "Tunb",  we 
*wuld  expect  to  prospect  there  if  It 
was  domed  necessary,  as  being  in  your 
terriUry  It  is  covered  by  the  terms 
of  our  option* 
Asouring  you  of  our  higii 
esteemt 
Yours  faithfullyt 
For  WARCY  TEMLORATION  COMPANYILM, 
Sydý  F,  ly.  0.  Elkinlion- 
GENERAL  MANAGER. Appendix  A:  Documents  277 
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This  passport  contains  72  pages  LU-  vT  3-  AJI-I  Uh  J-. 
PASSP 
ISSued'at  Jrmd  ,  e'_A 
No.  of  Pas'spo  B  l8t7  I  AV 
Name  of  Bearer  0, 
Ac%Mpanied  b 
his  Ife 
PASSPORT  'U1  j  9'ý-  j 
RAS  AL  KHAIMAH 
and 
Dependencies 
To  all  whom  it  may 
concern  :- 
Lak  cr.  jo 
Greeting. 
Honourable  friends,  the 
Officials  of  the  Great  Powers,  'U"J' 
and  the  Representatives  of  c'l.  '  <11  'p.,  (UWI  4.41  jVj 
other  Kingdoms  abroad  are 
required  and  requestQ  to  'ýLL 
allow  the  bearer  to  pass  41,  :.  Jz  C-ý  freely  without  let  or  hind- 
rance  and  to  afford  him  every 
assistance  and  protection  of  .;  A.  LLI  ql  rL4  L  jsý' 
which  he  may  stand  in  need. 
Issued  by  order  of  the 
*' 
Ruler  of  Ras  al  Khaimah. 
Given  at 
4&1 
n 
the/_4-_ýY194Lr_  %rAoZý  11 
. 
AeOM 
ý, 
*Iz 
rI 
Ia  / 
U! 
% 
\￿. 
I! 
Profession  7: 
40A"A 
Place  and  date 
of  birth 
ro 
Domicile 
Height 
6-t. 
In  0  J-,,  1&31 
Colour  of  eyes 
ýi 
C.  Iourofhair  z"11 
Special  Peculiarities 
.  -J.  ýJk  Name  of  Wife  7ýý 
Place  and  date  of  birth  &\:  'y- 
Children  juj:  vl 
Place  and 
Name  dataofbirth 
'Moe 
Photog(fTh  of  Bearer. 
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valid 
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-All 
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only 
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Passport  expires 
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PASSPORT 
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To  all  whom  it  may 
-4116 
A  Cra  j5j 
concern  :  - 
Greeting. 
Honourable  friends,  the 
Officials  of  the  Great  Powers,  j 
and  the  Representatives  of  z'Lj  W  p.,  ruLi  J,.  Jl  JL'r.  ' 
other  Kingdoms  abroad,  are 
required  and  requested  to  jil-I  1ý6  ý.  LL.  ý_ý  ZA  ;' 
allow  the  bearer  to  pass  '.  "LJ 
freely  without  let  or  hind- 
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PASSPORT 
'AASALKHAIMAN 
and  Itsued.  t  ý4-  &,  ýft  J 
De  pe  n  dencie  S 
No.  of  ,  Passport  479  f  Ijýj  r; 
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concern: 
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I[---' 
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this  Passport  is 
valid 
Ail  Arab  Countl 
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14,  L021  Jaid  jil  aýll 
jl  ý.  41 
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V  is  as. 
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Visas. 
A  ING 
lb 
INN 
40 
Al  & 
Translation 
Notice 
The  bearer  of  this  passport  will  carry  a  Transistor  Radio  2  Wave  Lengths, 
Weighs  800  g,  costs  1000  Iranian  Riyals 
. 
Upon  check-in  or  out  he  should 
face  no  difficulties  and  must  not  be  interrogated. 
Superintendent  of  Custom  Hall  Bandar  Abbas  Customs  &  Excise 
Mr.  Abbas  Reysi 
25/8/71 
VIE*  Ir  Visas. 
w.  -  J1AA  YP  aft 
If  r.  &A 
1PILL! 
L& 
Pot, 
"bralow  Is 
w 
ý41 
ý; )  ivjov 
, 
91 
AM 
_; 
W 
Check-out 
The  bearer  of  this  passport  has  left  Kanarek  Port  to  Dubai 
DeputeSst2rintendent  Kanarek  Police 
i 
ser%eant  :  Iffat  Tub 
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311  Ih"A  200% 
'e, 
Hoot 
E  IIILIý'  OM  Smid  SL,  LoWnt  MI. 
it  FREMMCK  CLMMELL  Gý 
Of  the  CitY  Of  London.,  Notary 
-7-"u'olic,  duly  admitted  and  sworn, 
Pral0tising  in  the  said  City 
DO  UUM  CERTIpy.,  ýIMj=z  T 
That  the  letter  hereuntO  annexed  was  this  day  signed  in  nw 
of 
ra' 
f 
Pres  ce  for  and  on  behalf  or  LN-=-j]RUwj  OOIMPZr,  UNIM 
ael 
ýN  OIL 
tb 
ot 
f  Britaxmic  I,  louse,  Finsbury  Circus,  London,  g.  C.  2.  by  M:  R 
FRZM, 
-C, 
B,  E,,  LL.  D. 
p  Chairman  and  Directar  ar  the 
In  witness  vahereof  I  bave  haramto  set  zOr  hand  ixad'affimd 
Of  Office  in  the  Ci  Of  London  aforesaid  tbUjIrmtiath" 
September  One  thousand  niae  bundred  ar4  f.  iftoR,  Moe 
7  Y-ý 
q;  !  777 
ell' 
Jx 
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oloofts"Nobw  dw 
TO:  MINISTRY  OF  FiNANcz, 
ATTENTiox:  MINISTER  OF  FiNANcz 
f 
and 
NATxoxAL  litANLAN  Om  ComPANY. 
COY  tO:  IRAANSZ  AAAD6LIZ  EXPILORATIR  EN  PRODUCrIZ 
MA,  ATSCELAPPIJ 
(Iranian  Oil  Fxploration  and  Producing  Company) 
N.  V. 
F 
J%;.  ".  .-  ýV  ý  lalands 
in  view  of  the  expressed  desire  of  the  Government  of  Iran  to 
as  far  as  possible,  the  economic  status  of  the  islands  in  the 
Gulf 
-under  Iranian  Sovereignty,  and  named  in  Schedule  I 
of  the  Agreement  between  Iran,  NIOC  and  the  Consortium  members, 
the  Cotisorthm  members  undertake  to 
(a)  Either  commence  exploration  work  for  oil  or  gas  on  at  least 
one  Wand  in  each  of  the  three  groups  designated  below 
within  seven  years  of  the  Effective  Date,  or  exclude  and 
release  from  the  Area  of  the  Agreement  any  such  group  of 
islands  in  which  exploration  work  has  not  so  commenced. 
(b)  Either  discover  oil  or  gas  on  at  least  one  island  in  each  of 
such  groups_iýtbin  fifteen  years  of  the  Effective  Date,  or 
emdude  and  release  from  the  Area  of  the  Agreement  any 
such  group  in  which  oil  or  gas  has  not  been  so  discovered. 
(c)  Either  produce  on  each  of  such  islands  oil  or  gas  for  ship- 
memi  therefrom  by  the  end  of  the  twenty-third  year  from 
the  Effective  Date,  or  exclude  from  the  Area  of  any  con- 
tinuation.  of  the  Agreement  under  Section  B  of  Article  49 
any  such  Wand  from  which  oil  or  gas  has  not  been  so 
produced. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  letter  the  groups  of  islands  referred  to 
above  shall  consist  of 
Group  1--Qi3hm,  Hengam  and  Hormuz 
Group  2-FlindurabL  Qais  and  Shu  Aib 
Group  3  L.  -"rg  and  Khargu 
and  each  group  shall  include  t'  he,  area  lying,  within  a  line  three  miles 
offshore  frova  the  lowest  tide  line  of  each  of  such  islands  in  that 
group. 
T*he  obligations  undertaken  by  this  letter  shall  be  performed 
through  the  Exploration  and  Producing  Company  and  shall  be  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Agreement  as  if  this-  letter  were  itself  a  part 
of  the  Agreement. 
T*his  letter  shall  be  deemed  to  be  dated  as  of  the  Effective  Date 
of  the  AgreernenL 
Yours  faithfully, 
KV.  Qq  BATAAFSCHE  PETROLEUM  flýAATSCHAPPU 
CO. 
I/ 
'00ý 
; 
e-- 
Group  3-"Lrg  and  Khargu 
and  each  group  shall  include  the,  area  lying,  within  a  line  three  miles 
offshore  frova  the  lowest  tide  line  of  each  of  such  islands  in  that 
group. 
The  obligations  undertaken  by  this  letter  shall  be  performed 
through  the  Exploration  and  Producing  Company  and  shall  be  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Agreement  as  if  thi&  letter  were  itself  a  part 
of  the  Agreement. 
T*his  letter  shall  be  deemed  to  be  dated  as  of  the  Effective  Date 
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ýi-  V.  ':  I!  em  Thomas  KGLIrIP,  Njýary  at  The  I'legue,  hareby  caddy 
!ýi  above  ý.,  g,  atjres  are  tlýose  of 
J.  H.  LOUDON,  Manaaing  Director 
and 
L.  SCHEPERS,  Managing  Director 
of 
P,  ý  Ratiafsc:,  a  Petroleum  M3atsckappij,  a  Company  organized  zid 
t.  i:  ler  the  lans  of  The  Nether'a.,  -.  j;,  that  the  said  persons  have 
si,?  ied  tý,;;  dc:  j  -.  ic:,  t  in  rry  pr-ý;  ence  at  The  Hague  on  the  date  me.  i.  ioned 
!  -,,  ý;  ow  --id  6at  in  virtue  of  a.  tic!  i  10  of  tEat  C-impany's  Articles  of  AsIo 
ciation  ('Statuten-)  the  above  signdtures  are  binding  upon  the  said  Company 
.  ..........  .  The  Hague,  this  NINETFEEN...  I  day  of 
SEPTEMBER 
nineteen  hundred  and  fi:  ty-four. 
For  and  *n  behalf  of 
COMPAGNIE  FRANCAISE  DES  PETROLES 
joran  W,  Ilern  Thomas  KOLLFR,  Notary  at  The  Hjoue,  h,  ý,  reby  certify 
il---  per;  on  having  signed  for  and  on  behaff  of  Compagnie  Fran;  aise 
FtStrc!  cs  is 
..  --  4  R.  T.  do  MONTAIGU 
-.......  .... 
a!  v.  1  that  this  document  has  been  signed  by  the  said  -person  in  my  presenco 
at  7he  Hague  on  the  date  mentioned  below. 
The  Hague.  this  .....  -NINETEENTH 
day  of  -SEPTEMaE 
nineteen  hundred  and  fifty-four 
IRAANSE  AARDOLIE  EXPLORATIE  EN  PRODUCTIE  MAATSCHAPPU 
(Iranian  Oil  EAploration  and  Producing  Company)  N.  V. 
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't  Johan  Willem  Th  -)fr.  a  -,  K(11UL'-'!  Z,  N  i!  ary  at  TEe  H  jq-je.  cerlify'  P,  31  O-e 
above  s*gna'ures  are  thite  of  Mr.  C.  P.  C.  Wijc'.  (crhr'J  6;  sdc-.  n  .  -A 
Mr.  Ch,;  rmin  ?.  nd 
cf  -he  Baard  of  Directors  of  the  Irianse  AcrJol'e  Explorat:  e  en  Prcl-itun 
tltaa-schappij  (Iranian  Cil  Explcora',  io.,  and  Pioducing  Company)  ".  V..  a 
Company  organized  and  existing  under  lh-i  laws  of  The  NethrrIands  a-d 
that  the  said  persons  h3ve  signed  this  4ocurnent  in  my  presence  at  The  ;  m5ue 
on  the  date  mentioned  below.  I  further  certify  that  there  have  been  shown 
to  me  the  Minutes  of  the  General  Meeting  of  Shareholders  of  6e  said 
Company  hold  on  25th  August,  1954,  at  which  meeting  it  was  unanimouily 
resolved  that  an  agreement  or  agreements  as  referred  to  in  article  2. 
paragraph  I  of  the  Articles  of  Asso=iaticn  (-Statuten-)  of  'he  said  Comport-.  - 
be  signed  by  the  persons  entitled  to  rer-resent  the  Company,  tlý,  at  fý-t  s-344 
resolution  Is  valid  and  that  in  accorda  n,:  e  w7th  a.  -tir!,  a  0.  para-,  -,  -!  -n  4  of 
the  Conipaly's  Artic'es  of  Association  ths  ---i  I  M;  nui-,  ýs  have  b-?  -m  -;.;..;  eJ 
by  th-3  Chairman  of  the  meelir:  g  as  welf  as  F;  ali  ý.  e  rorr,  ýý  n!:  -,! 
both  t.  -.  e  s;  '.  jreha!  de.  -s,  the  latter  per7ons  only  having  2-J  in  Y  : r-v  n;  Ore 
ý,  -npar!  ance  of  -he  matter  dealt  with.  In  virtue  of  tý..  rp%ýIut:  ý  i  and  tJ 
a.  -cle  9  ot  the  Company's  A7i:  cle;  of  Association  the  above  siInal-ire; 
cra  Lnd;  ng  up-an  the  said  Company. 
The  Hague,  this  NINFT;:  rMTU  dav  of 
SEF.  TE'-' 
nineteen  hundred  and  fifty-four. 
Lahaye  Ie-  . 0,1  -  2-  /J1.. 
--- 
IC-e-r  191fA 
V4"  Pftt  I&  168slisation 
W 
Consul 
de  [1ran 
APA.  0 
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Document  17-d 
OF  MW  YORK,  STATE  of  L-9  I-  .  ýLITED  STATIS  OF  AIMCA 
20th  Mil  OF  SMEMBLI,  1954  TWO 
kj  v 
st  *0  16 
4"  qqlýj  r.  - 
44 
V  m 
.,  %i  ",,  -I-,  -ý  4  ."-  ar.  ý:, 
t'ý-v  TOM  Aiiý  OF 
12 
4", 
mw  '!  %  PORMA 
N 
tT,  t6F  NEW 
., 
1011E,  UIVITnx  STA  2,  ES  OF  mmum 
014  0.01PA!  n 
qjj,  at  taw 
14 
mm  iroat,  UNITE)  M21i  OF  AMMU  A 
OF 
STABDqD 
T4ý  y 
Chairman  of  the  Awi 
L seer-* 
JT  THE  CITY  Of  -NEW  YORK,  STATE  OF  FEW  YpRJK,  751TED  STATES  OF  AIMCA 
, 
ows  20th  DAY  OF  SE2'4 
-1-1-R, 
r  NY  A 
mom  Qf 
1.01, 
Qlr  ýw  NOV# 
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Document  17-e 
w  YORK) 
as 
Oft  Me  2OU  407  of  September,  aLvatow  bwmbvd  and  fifty-tour 
601INIIII  1111111  Pwm=3U  ý  006  Of  the  ivAlvidwda  named  Isalow,  to  use  known. 
Idwe  being  tr  90  006  *Ar  swam,  did  oseh  dope"  and  says  That  he  resid" 
Im  19141  A&"  i0t  fwU  after  his  namses  that  be  bo3As  the  office  bet  forth 
after  hills  In  The  earporation  likemaLve  sot  forth  after  his  now,  being 
00  4C  11111111  doperibed  IA  end  wbidb  esisomiad  the  &bay*  Jistrummants 
VIA  111011  111111111mill  '1111110  emal  of  maid  oup"  t1m;  that  the  weal  affixed  to  slaid 
III  flesh  SWVW&te  sn"Ll  that  it  was  m  affixed  b7  authority  or 
WdIIIII!  Ot  411110111  Board  Of  Diftotora  of  *&U  on  put  timim.  and  that  be  siv%ed  him 
slsý  Usy*U  bcr  Uke  amussrity  ur  wdqw. 
MURM  im  22= 
S.  A.  Swmnd  Perk  mouniý  12sairsom  af  the  Board  auly  Z31L  COMPAILON 
PLUIDWArof  Plow-Wlv&UL& 
jewlim  aLft  Bud  President  BOODC-TACUUM  OIL 
lAft  MAIA,  low  left  OOH?  AXr.  INGaP3BATIM 
DIIIIIIIIIIIIIII  502ý  2  I&A  ISM  street  (2kairmsim  of  the  Dealt  STAXWL  OIL  0,24PA)ff 
New  Tork  CLIWO  Im  lerk 
IL.  L  roll"  "  wasshisiogtom  stv"t  (3sairmn  ca  the  Board  ý;  UXCiý  L  OIL  COMPAh7 
sm  rrellmssim",  aillitsiln"  OF  CkLIFORIXA 
J.  as  L41111141ils  2ft?  River  Oaks  Ilvd.  Chairman  of  the  Board  TKI  TUA,  COW  A?  J 
mommitems,  Tax" 
1101A.  1  Prp  IC  NTITV  OF  MRW  VORI 
C-f-  f- 
N.  V.  Ok  ...  d  Wf- 
,,  -. 
35023 
14  ARCHIBAIM  R.  WATSON,  County  Clark  Rod  Clark  of  the  Supreme  Cotw%  New  York  County,  a  C-M 
of  Record  bkvbv  by  I!  w  a  mmL  DO  HEREBY  CRRTIFY  that 
- 
QZORGI  A.  SCHOLZID 
:0 
M  PAED 
--d.  ý  4e.,,  i  ý.  ý ioij  -- 
-a 
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Document  18 
UNITED 
NATIONS 
Security  Council 
Distr. 
GENERAL 
S/1996/693 
26  August  1996 
ENGLISH 
ORIGINAL:  ARABIC 
LETTER  DATED  26  AUGUST  1996  FROM  THE  PERMANENT  REPRESENTATIVE 
OF  THE  UNITED  ARAB  EMIRATES  TO  THE  UNITED  NATIONS  ADDRESSED 
TO  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
with  reference  to  document  S/1996/603,  concerning  the  simplification  of  the 
list  of  matters  of  which  the  Security  Council  is  seized  (rule  11  of  the 
provisional  rules  of  procedure  of  the  Security  Council),  and  on  instructions 
from  my  Government,  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  of  the  following: 
The  United  Arab  Emirates  objects  to  the  procedures  set  forth  in  document 
S/1996/603  for  the  removal  from  the  list  of  matters  of  which  the  Council  is 
seized  of  matters  that  have  not  been  considered  by  the  Council  and  to  the 
deletion  of  the  item  listed  in  the  annex  to  the  document  as  No.  16,  which  is 
entitled  "Letter  dated  3  December  1971  from  the  Permanent  Representatives  of 
Algeria,  Iraq,  the  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya  and  the  People's  Democratic  Republic 
of  Yemen  to  the  United  Nations  addressed  to  the  President  of  the  Security 
Council"  and  which  relates  to  the  question  of  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the 
Greater  Tunb,  the  Lesser  Tunb  and  Abu  Musa,  three  islands  belonging  to  the 
United  Arab  Emirates. 
Until  such  time  as  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  terminates  its  illegal 
occupation  of  the  Greater  Tunb,  the  Lesser  Tunb  and  Abu  Musa  and  the  United  Arab 
Emirates  regains  de  facto  control  of  the  three  islands,  my  Government  requests 
the  Security  Council  to  retain  in  the  list  of  matters  of  which  it  is  seized  the 
item  relating  to  the  question  of  the  islands  and  listed  as  No.  16  in  the  annex 
to  document  S/1996/603.  The  reasons  for  this  are  as  follows: 
(a)  The  continued  illegal  occupation  by  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  of 
the  Lesser  Tunb  and  the  Greater  Tunb  is  in  violation  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations  and  the  principles  of  international  law. 
(b)  The  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  has  not  ceased  to  violate  the  memorandum 
of  understanding  of  November  1971  through  the  measures  it  has  taken  and  is 
continuing  to  take  on  Abu  Musa  with  a  view  to  imposing  its  control  over  the 
island  and  forcibly  annexing  it  to  Iranian  sovereignty. 
(c)  My  Government  fears  that  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  would  exploit 
the  deletion  of  the  item  in  question  from  the  list  of  matters  of  which  the 
Council  is  seized  in  order  to  perpetuate  its  occupation  of  the  three  islands  and 
would  use  it  as  a  pretext  to  evade  the  application  of  the  principle  of  the 
inadmissibility  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  force. 
In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  my  Government  is  prompted  by  the  hope  that 
the  Security  Council  will  retain  the  item  relating  to  the  question  of  the  three 
islands  belonging  to  the  United  Arab  Emirates  in  the  list  of  matters  of  which  it 
is  seized.  Should  the  Council  decide  to  consider  the  retention  of  the  item  in 
the  list  of  matters  of  which  it  is  seized  or  its  deletion  therefrom  at  some  time 
in  the  future,  my  Government  requests  the  Council  to  inform  it  accordingly  and 
to  allow  it  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  relevant  discussion  in  the 
Council's  formal  meetings,  given  that  the  issue  of  the  three  islands  concerns 
the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  United  Arab  Emirates. 
My  Government  takes  this  opportunity  to  affirm  the  desire  of  the  United 
Arab  Emirates  for  security  and  stability  in  the  Axabian  Gulf  and  to  confirm  its 
commitment  to  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the 
principles  of  international  law. 
I  should  be  grateful  if  you  would  have  this  letter  circulated  as  a  document 
of  the  Security  Council. 
(Sicme  )  Mohammad  J.  SAMHAN 
Ambassador 
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